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If, therefore, we must ask after truth, then an
answer is demanded to the question: "Where do we
stand to-day?" We want to know what our position is.
We call for the goal which shall be set for man, both
in his history and for his history. We want the real
"truth". Well, truth thenJ
But in calling for real "truth" we must already
know what in fact is meant by truth. Or do we only
know by "feeling" and in a "general" sort of way?
Yet is not this vague "knowing" and this indifference
to the vagueness of it even more wretched than plain
ignorance of the nature of truth?!
Robert Grosseteste was certain as to where he stood with
respect to the question concerning truth. He begins his De
Veritate treatise with the words of John 14:6: " 'Ehgo sum via
Veritas et vitay. Hie ipsa Veritas dicit se esse veritatem.
The immediate purpose of this thesis is to examine Robert
Grosseteste*s understanding of the nature of truth. St. Augus¬
tine's and St. Anselm's doctrines of truth are also briefly
examined in view of their profound impact on GrossetesteTs
thought. However, it cannot be said that Grosseteste*s doctrine
of truth is nothing more than a simple restatement of these
%. Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," pp. 320-21
2Pe Ver.; BW 130.
conceptions of truth which most influenced him. In the third
chapter some attention will be given to certain other principal
factors which contributed to the shaping of Grosseteste*s
thought and method. His thought and endeavors have their own
unique character and the latter is in part determined by the
temperament and character of the man himself. However, it
should also be pointed out that Grosseteste*s thought and writ¬
ing, which manifest a wide range of interests and breadth of
scholarship, are marked by a spirit of humility which arises out
of his wonderment in the face of the ineffable supreme Truth and
the truth which the latter has created. We shall see that
Grosseteste even manifests a certain propensity in the direction
of a mystical silence. He is overwhelmed by the Truth in all
his grandeur and declares his own indigency in trying to speak
of this Truth. In his declaration of the ineffable character
of the Truth Grosseteste clearly echoes the sentiment of both
St. Augustine and St. Anselm.
There was a deliberate reason for stating above that the
immediate purpose in this thesis is to examine Grosseteste's
doctrine of truth. This study of Grosseteste's conception of
truth does not arise out of sheer historical curiosity concerning
certain mediaeval phenomena, viz, certain notions entertained by
certain mediaeval thinkers concerning the nature of truth. Al¬
though an attempt will be made to offer an exposition of Grosse*-
teste Ts and certain other doctrines of truth it should be pointed
out that this writer is interested in more than a sheer phenom-
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enological and analytical examination of these doctrines.
The purpose of this thesis extends beyond an attempt to ascer¬
tain the ways in which 'Veritas', 'verum'. and related words
are used by Grosseteste, St. Anselm, St. Augustine, and others.
This writer believes that we still have much to learn from the
conceptions of truth held by such as Robert Grosseteste and
St. Anselm.
The intention in the first chapter is in part to discuss
briefly particular problematical developments in certain modern
and more recent correspondence and coherence notions of truth.
It is believed that certain of these developments have arisen in
part because of forgotten or rejected emphases and motifs pre¬
sent in the mediaeval conceptions of truth to be considered.
For this reason it is also believed that we would do well to
recall and retrieve some of these emphases and motifs which were
key components of these mediaeval doctrines of truth. However,
as will become apparent, there are facets of the doctrines to
be discussed which are themselves problematical in character and
which must be brought into view. Some of these problematical
facets are also noted and discussed. Reasons for incorporating
a brief discussion of M. Heidegger's thought concerning truth
are brought together at the end of the first chapter.
A brief explanatory note is in order with respect to the use
of single and double quotation marks. Single quotation marks,
except in such cases as where we have a quotation within a
quotation, are generally used to indicate that the word or
expression itself is being discussed and considered. Single
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quotation marks are also used on occasion to indicate that
the sense or meaning of the words enclosed by the marks is
rather ambiguous and indeterminate. Single quotation marks
may indicate that the word or words involve a problematical
sense or reference. The manner in which single quotation
marks are being used in a given instance is usually indicated
by the context in which they appear. Double quotation marks
are used to indicate that the words enclosed constitute a
citation from an author or thinker discussed. Here and there
one will find single words and phrases enclosed in double
quotation marks. This is done for the purpose of showing that
the words and expressions so designated are not mine. In
certain instances where double quotation marks are used it may
also be that the enclosed word or words are themselves being
considered and discussed. Again, the context should help to
make this clear.
The chapters are divided in accordance with the context
and material being discussed. The amount of space and discussion
given to a specific topic or theme often indicates the signifi¬
cance of the material itself and its place within the whole of
the thesis. On the basis of the divisions found within a partic¬
ular chapter it is possible to make reference to a specific
section. Reference to specific sections are to be found espec¬
ially in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER I
THE LOCUS OF TRUTH AND RELATED PROBLEMS
Before proceeding to deal directly with Robert GrossetesteTs
understanding of the nature of truth we shall consider certain
related topics and questions involving a number of doctrines of
truth. In this first chapter we shall examine some of the
difficulties that have arisen in connexion with the use of the
words ftruthf and ^rue*. We shall also examine some of the
assumptions, criteria, definitions, and methods utilized in
different doctrines of truth. Reference will also be made to
certain problematical developments that have arisen during the
course of the history of these doctrines. Further explanation
and the rationale of this chapter will be given below. In the
second chapter we shall examine St. Augustine*s and St. Anselm's
doctrines of truth as background to Grosseteste's doctrine of
truth. In the third chapter Grossetesters doctrine of truth will
be discussed, especially as it is set forth in his De Veritate
treatise. In the fourth chapter we shall deal with Grosseteste's
doctrine of the knowledge of truth and examine cardinal facets
of his epistemology, methodology, and method. In the fifth
chapter we shall formulate a brief analysis and critique of
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notions discussed in the preceding chanters, Grosseteste's
notions in particular.
1. Preliminary considerations
(1.1) Explanation of procedure and subject matter in this chapter.
The plan in this chapter is not to present an historical
outline or sketch of doctrines of truth as they have been
developed and formulated in particular theological and philosoph¬
ical systems. We shall deal rather with eristemological, method¬
ological, and logical problems and questions that have arisen in
connexion with various doctrines of truth. In dealing with
these problems and questions we must, of course, take into con¬
sideration specific doctrines of truth and the systems of
thought in which they are situated. However, in this present
chapter we shall not be able, noy is it our intention, to explore
fully and in depth all of the doctrines of truth that will be
cited. We shall examine briefly some of the historical, psy¬
chological, and ontological factors that have played a determi¬
native role in the formulation of different conceptions of
'truth1. Gordon K. Kaufman speaks of the different formulations
of 'truth' and the problem which arises from this fact:
The very existence of diverse positions, each claiming to
portray Reality, is clear evidence that philosophies are
not derived simply from direct contemplation of the Real.
The eplstemological problem which this historical fact
raises is the question of the relation of 'Truth Itself
to the different formulations of 'truth' which arise in
the course of human history.1
3-G. D. Kaufman, Relativism. Knowledge, and Faith (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, I960), p. 27.
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We shall be especially interested in the divergent ways in
which the word 'truth' is understood and used. The manner in
which 'truth' is used and understood has far-reaching implica¬
tions for an entire system of thought. The usage and the range
of application of the words 'truth' and 'true' are also a clue
to the character of the system of thought in which they are used.
Oftentimes the words 'truth' and 'true', along with 'meaning',
'reason', 'logic', and a host of others, are used uncritically
and out of sheer force of habit. We shall attempt to delineate
some of the uncalled-for confusion and difficulty that emerges
when such words are employed as though they designated a priori
concepts with determinate changeless senses, or as names denoting
certain specific things that we could run up against. Adherents
of doctrines of logical grammar and rules-of-usage theories have
tended to treat words in this manner without due regard for
actual usage. L. Jonathan Cohen says: "The most obvious fault
in the doctrine of logical grammar is that it suggests the
conceptual study of meanings to be concerned with something that
is timeless and unchanging."■**
We shall consider the need to investigate extra-linguistic
factors in dealing with questions of language and logic. Heidegger
emphasizes the fact that talk about the 'true statement * immedi¬
ately calls forth an inquiry as to the nature and possibility
-*-L. J. Cohen, The Diversity of Meaninr (London: Methuen It
Co. Ltd., 1962), p. 81.
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of the 'true statement'. An effort shall also be made to make
inquiry into topics closely allied to that of 'truth', such as
the issues of certainty, verification and validation. The con¬
sequences that result from the different doctrines of truth,
especially in connection with the relation of thought and/or
language to that which is signified, must be discussed. We also
clan to cite significant mediaeval conceptions and formulations
of 'truth' in connexion with certain modern notions of 'truth'.
Heidegger's doctrine of truth will be discussed for reasons to
be given later in this chapter.
(1.2) Reasons for this preliminary inquiry and analysis
Our present intention is to set forth briefly some of the
major reasons for pursuing this preliminary inquiry and analysis.
In other words, some explanation is in order as to why we plan
to deal with the torics cited above before proceeding to the
mediaeval doctrines of truth cited. One may want to question
why these issues and problems are considered at the beginning
rather than at the end of the thesis. We probably should
reiterate that some critical evaluation and commentary will also
be offered at the end of the thesis.
(1.2.1) We engage at the outset in the analysis of 'truth'
and related terms in order to bring together some of the principal
senses signified by these words as used in particular doctrines
of truth. We shall not pursue a dogmatic and critical analysis
carried on in accordance with strict criteria for the purpose of
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passing judgement on all the different types of usage. We have
in mind a form of analysis similar to that suggested by J. 0.
Urmson:
Language has many tasks and many levels; we may or may not
be trying to describe the world, and when we do we may do
it in radically different ways not reducible to each other.
We must on each occasion find what language is being used
for without preconceived ideas, especially without the pre¬
conception that logically different types of statement will
be reducible to one another, and that one type is specially
proper or basic.1
The purpose of the brief linguistic analysis offered below is to
take note of the manifold and diverse ways in which a word like
•truth* is used and also to achieve a degree of critical aware¬
ness of some of the problems attending its usage. We do well to
have in mind certain significant distinctions and a degree of
clarification regarding the different uses of •truth1 and related
terms before examining Grosseteste's and other mediaeval doc¬
trines of truth. By dealing at the outset with some of the
problems that have attended the use of such terms as the
'transcendentales' we shall be able to approach the above medi¬
aeval doctrines with something of a critical framework in hand.
However, it should be pointed out that our primary purpose will
be to attempt to understand and set forth the above mediaeval
notions of truth and not to assess critically their validity.
Nevertheless, there will be some critical evaluation and some¬
thing of a critique.
^■J.O. Urmson, Philosophical Ana^sis (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1956), p. l£H!
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(1.2.2) We shall also take a look at some of the special
rroblems or difficulties that have fostered in large part certain
modern and recent coherence and correspondence theories of truth.
For example, the demand and quest for radical certainty and
certitude, coupled with varying degrees of doubt and scepticism,
have been determinative in Descartes' formulation of radical
coherence and indubitable truths. Heidegger, in discussing
Descartes' point of departure and access to res extensae con¬
stituting the world, says:
The only genuine access to them lies in knowing [Erkennen],
intellectio. in the sense of the kind of knowledge
[Erkenntnis] we get in mathematics and physics. Mathe¬
matical knowledge is regarded by Descartes as the one
manner of apprehending entities which can always give,
assurance that their Being had been securely grasped.
The dualism of mind and matter and doubt concerning the exis¬
tence of the eternal material world have also contributed to
the formulation of strict coherence. We shall also examine
H.H. Joachim's coherence theory as another response to some of
the above problems.
Another position that has been taken with respect to the
issues of truth and certainty is that of logical positivism and
the "Verification Principle." Regarding this Principle J. Wisdom
states:
The Verification Principle is the generalization of a very
large class of metaphysical theories, namely all naturalistic,
pM. Heidegger, Being- and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie & E.
Robinson (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1962), H. 95.
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empirical, positivistic theories. While its opposite,
which I venture to call the Idiosyncracy Platitude, is
the generalization of all common-sense, realist, tran¬
scendental theories.!
This "Verification Principle" allows for truth as correspondence
but such truth is restricted to empirically verifiable statements.
We shall examine L. Wittgenstein's theory of isomorphic picturing
and some of the problems that it entails. His theory of picturing
could be considered a theory of very strict correspondence. In
his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein of course speaks
out against this strict correspondence and his logical atomism
set forth in his Tractatus.
We shall make reference not only to specific radical
attempts to achieve certainty or known conformity and correspon¬
dence but also to the preoccupation with cognitive or logical
truth that has been especially prevalent in a number of modern
theories of truth. Erich Frank emphatically stresses the latter
point in what may be considered to be something of an over¬
statement :
47. Modern philosophers recognize only cognitive (or sub¬
jective) truth. In so doing they can hardly claim for
themselves the authority of Aristotle. He clearly dis¬
tinguishes cognitive and existential truth and restricts
logical truth to the sphere of the logos, . . .
!j. Wisdom, "Metaphysics and Verification," Philosophy and
Psycho-analysis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 19$3), p. 51-
^E. Frank, Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth
(London: Oxford University Press, 194$), P. 114, n. 47.
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By placing such great emphasis on cognitive and logical truth
there seems to be a greater tendency to make reality conform to
understanding and statement rather than making thought and
statement congruent with reality. Other acute problems have
arisen regarding the possibility, ground, and nature of cog¬
nitive or logical truth. It cannot be said, however, that the
tendency for thought, statements, and words to shape and
structure reality or being is strictly a modern tendency and
•phenomenon. As Heidegger states: "This secession of the
logos which started logos on its way to becoming a court of
justice over being occurred in Greek philosophy itself.
None the less, this development has in a sense reached its
peak where in the midst of radical doubt, especially doubt
regarding the external world or object, there has been a demand
for radical certainty or known conformity of statement with what
is the case. In this kind of situation the desire for cer¬
tainty may involve the abandonment of material truth and truth
as correspondence in favor of formal truth and truth as strict
coherence. These are the kinds of theories and problems that
will be briefly discussed in this chapter.
(1.2.3) It should be pointed out at this juncture that our
primary reason for discussing the above theories and related
problems or difficulties is to view them in relation to and in
Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics. trans.
R. Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1^59), p. 179.
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anticipation of the mediaeval doctrines of truth to be examined.
We do not intend to examine these modern theories and problems
simply for their own sake. One thesis that will be advanced is
that some of the modern theories and problems cited above have
their roots, in part at least, in particular facets of mediaeval
doctrine. We have in mind, for example, the intelligible-sensible
dichotomy as a kind of precursor of the modern mind-matter dualism,
and the corresponding aspects of mediaeval theories of perception
which seem to foreshadow modern theories of representative per¬
ception. We also T-lan to take note of the growing emphasis in
the mediaeval period on cognitive and logical truth. A related
thesis that will be advanced is that certain of the above modern
theories and problems have arisen in part because of the rejection,
neglect, or forgetting of significant emphases and beliefs which
were held by Grosseteste, St. Anselm, and St. Augustine among
others. We have in mind such doctrines and emphases as their
doctrines of faith, their doctrines of truth, particularly their
emphasis on truth as being, and their ecistemologioal realism.
With respect to St. Anselm's belief that the mind knows res
themselves J.V.L. Casserley says: "Anselm was in fact contra¬
dicting beforehand philosophical doctrines, not yet propounded
in his time, which we now know as the representative theory of
perception and the correspondence theory of truth.
•*•J.V.L. Casserley, The Christian in Philosorhy (London:
Faber & Faber Ltd., 1949), p. 62.
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In a somewhat similar view M. Polanyi states the following
concerning modern critical thought:
But its incandescence had fed on the combustion of the
Christian heritage in the oxygen of Greek rationalism, and
when this fuel was exhausted the critical framework itself
burnt away. Modern man is unprecedented; yet we must now
go back to St. Augustine to restore the balance of our
cognitive powers. In the fourth century A.D., St. Augustine
brought the history of Greek philosophy to a close by inau¬
gurating for the first time a post-critical philosophy. He
taught that all knowledge was a gift of grace, for which we
must strive under the guidance of antecedent belief; nisi
credideritis. non intelligitis. His doctrine ruled the
minds of Christian scholars for a thousand years. Then
faith declined and demonstrable knowledge gained superiority
over it.1
In the above mediaeval doctrines of truth factors like faith,
epistemological realism, and intelligibility constituted the
ground on the basis of which cognitive and logical truth were
considered to be possible and actually realized.
Part of the purpose, then, for engaging in these preliminary
considerations is to attempt to make somewhat explicit some of
the reasons for our examination of Grossetestefs doctrine of
truth and those doctrines from which he draws most heavily.
Our investigation of the latter is not a matter of sheer his¬
torical curiosity or interest. It is partly in view of certain
modern and recent theories and related difficulties that we wish
to recall notions and emphases which prevailed in earlier, less
critical, and more realist doctrines of truth, viz., the mediaeval
^M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 195$), p» 266.
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theories cited above. We propose that the recall and retrieval
of these doctrines and their underlying assumptions will help
us in our attempt to cope with some of the radical problems
and difficulties that will be discussed below. Part of the reason
for dealing with Heidegger's conception of truth is that he has
attempted to recall or retrieve certain primordial notions and
emphases in the understanding of truth.
(1.2.4) One other reason for pursuing these preliminary con¬
siderations is to expose some of the implicit and often hidden
assumptions which underlie certain modern doctrines of truth
and involve a rejection or an abandonment of beliefs underlying
mediaeval doctrines of truth. One of these modern beliefs or
assumptions is that we cannot, and therefore do not, know things
themselves but only data or signs representing things. Another
belief or assumption, that is often accepted uncritically, is
that we can and must prove that the extra-mental external world
exists. Regarding such a proof Heidegger states: "The 'scandal
of philosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but
that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again.
There are, of course, also assumptions and beliefs underlying the
mediaeval doctrines of truth. It is not a matter of no beliefs
or assumptions in one case versus beliefs and assumptions in the
other. What is essential is that beliefs be uncovered, examined,
and seen for what they are. Part of our purpose is also to show
^Heidegger, Being and Time. H. 205.
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that doctrines of truth involve or include a number of onto-
logical and logical beliefs and assumptions. In raising lin¬
guistic and logical questions one must of necessity also raise
ontological questions.
2. 'Truth': signification and usage
An analytical inquiry into the formally and materially
diverse usages of the words 'truth' and 'true' is certainly
required if we are to achieve any degree of critical acumen and
insight into the different theories of truth. At this point
linguistic analysis and phenomenology can offer valuable assis-
tence, although oftentimes such methods prove most inadequate
because of a failure to give full enough attention to the deno¬
tative, symbolic, and revelatory functions of language. Moreover,
as noted above, linguistic analysis may be no more then sheer
linguistic phenomenalism resulting from radical sceptical and
solicsistic attitudes. Analysis of linguistic data can then be
seen as an abandonment of truth claims. A similar observation
was made recently in an editorial essay on contemporary philosophy
with particular reference to language, analysis, and existentialism.
Thus, for both movements, a question such as 'What is truth?'
becomes impossible to answer. The logical positivist would
say that a particular statement of fact can be declared true
or false by empirical evidence; anything else is meaningless.
A language philosopher would content himself with analyzing
all the ways the word true can be used. The existentialist
would emphasize what is true for a person in a particular
situation.I
l"What (If Anything) to Expect from Today's Philosophers,"
Time. January 7, 1966, p. 25.
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Irrespective of the accuracy or currency of this evaluation,
it cannot be gainsaid that failure to rose questions regarding
the sense as well as the truth or falsity of the whole range of
propositions will produce an incomplete and one-sided analysis
and investigation of linguistic data. Linguistic analysis,
properly utilized, can be of considerable assistance as a method
or a tool whereby our usage of words can be clarified, pseudo-
problems, rooted in misunderstood words and grammar, eliminated,
and the logically diverse tasks of language delineated. It has
been suggested that something like a language of meaning or an
ideal or perfect language or symbolism ought to be developed
like that used in mathematics and symbolic logic. Such a view
fails to give due consideration to the diverse functions and
usages of language. Rules-of-use theory and canons of symbolism
have been proposed, the latter by such as C.K. Ogden and I.A.
Richards in The Meaning of Meaning. We note the attempt by
Russell to provide the mathematical skeleton of a perfect
language in Princiria Mathematics, and Wittgenstein's attempt to
define the isomorphic character of the logically perfect language
in the Tractatus. Urmson says: "The aim of analysis thus was to
make every statement an adequate picture of the reality it
referred to, and the perfect language was the tool which could
make the undertaking capable of complete realization."^- The type
^-Urrnson, op. cit.. p. 21
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of analysis, however, which is of present interest to us, is
neither the attempt to find the adequate picture nor reductive
analysis, whether new-level or same-level. The immediate aim
is to reflect on the different senses found in the use of the
words ♦truth* and *true*,
(2.1) Such words as *verum* and 'Veritas', ' a A n t <* '
and * « A i 9ns '. and others of like nature, for example, what
have been called the transcendental predicates, are problematical
and extraordinary words. The semasiologist will be hard put to
ascertain a determinate sense. If 'veritas' could be assumed to
have a generally accepted sense or could be used as a proper
name or common name, an argument could ensue as to the character
and nature of that named and designated. Like other such words,
'Veritas' has often been used in a most uncritical and indeter¬
minate manner on the assumption that it had a generally accepted
sense and signified something that one could easily run up
against. The usage of the word is in many cases rooted in
nothing other than sheer habit. A multitude of instances of
the uncritical employment of 'truth* could be easily assembled,
as Ogden and Richards have done with the word 'meaning'. Regarding
the usage of 'meaning' thejr say: "Some quotations, however, do
tell their own tale, but even where no actual absurdity tran¬
spires, the resort to such a term in serious argument, as though
it had some accepted use, or as though the author's use were at
15
once obvious, is a practice to be discredited."-*- So it has been
with the word 'truth* and many others such a 'beauty', 'goodness',
and 'being'. If such words could be assumed to possess unchanging
senses that could be perceived, such as universals or ideas
which would be directly accessible to the knower, then the diffi¬
culties would be considerably less. Or if it were believed that
the sense of words could be ascertained by way of simple and
infallible apprehension, as in the sensing of a sense datum,
then agreement and understanding could be reached. The infallible
apprehension of the sense of terms is affirmed by Aristotle in
his Metaphysics and De Interrretatione and in the arcrehensio
simrlex of later logic. It must not be forgotten, however, that
for Aristotle the 'concert' or affection of the soul took its
rise from knowledge of the primary substance. Whether 'universals'
or 'concepts' are thought to have inderendent. existence or exis¬
tence only in the members of a srecies, the difficulty in
determining their nature persists, assuming that they are.
J.L. Austin says in a discussion regarding a priori concepts:
But on the whole there is remarkably little to be said in
favour of 'universals', even as an admitted logical con¬
struction; the plain man did not use it until he acquired
the habit from philosophers, and the errors into which
that habit leads are very common and numerous. . . .
Or again, and this most concerns us, we think of the
'abstracted' universal as a solid piece of property of
ours, and inquire into its 'origin*.2
1C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning; (6th
ed.; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1944), pp.
160-161.
2j. L. Austin, Philosophical Pacers (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1961), p. 9.
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If ftruthf is taken to designate a concept, we then are
involved in the further difficulty of trying to determine the
nature of a concept. Regarding the 'concept1, C. I. Lewis
gives a number of different senses of the word, for example,
"The concept is a definitive structure of meanings, which is
what would verify completely the coincidence of two minds when
they understand each other by the use of language.'Truth'
is one of an extremely large category of words which do not
signify a definite structure of meanings. A cursory survey of
the usage of such words as 'truth' or 'true' should make it
apparent that the various uses extend even beyond the bounds of
likeness and analogy. The formal and material diversity of the
usage of the words 'truth' and 'true' does not permit facile
delimitation. Furthermore, we cannot deal solely with the words
themselves with the hopeful intention of discovering what is
the meaning of the word. A multitude of linguistic, semantic,
and even metaphysical problems have emerged on the basis of
ordinary usage when the same identical word, as used in different
situations by different users, is assumed to have always the
same sense. On the assumption that the word must function as a
name, specifying in each instance the same object, sense datum,
or substance, it has been concluded that there must be present
in every referent to which the word is applied that one identical
3-C. I. Lewis, "The Pure Concert," Contemrprarv Philosophic
Problems, ed. Y. H. Krikorian and A. Edel (New York: Macmillan
uo., 1V59), p. 141.
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object or 'universal'. Austin critiaes one of the arguments
that is used to make necessary the 'universal':
Clearly it depends on a suppressed premise which there is
no reason whatever to accent, namely, that words are
essentially 'proper names', unum nomen unum nominatum. But
why, if 'one identical' word is used, must there be 'one
identical' object present which it denotes? Why should
it not be the whole function of a word to denote many
things?!
However, if one and the same particular word is simply used to
denote many things it may be asked whether we have anything
more than a series of proper names denoting a series of things.
We still seem to have unum nomen unum nominatum although there
is this significant difference, that each time one and the same
word is used it is not taken to be one and the same name naming
'one identical' object. Austin, has, of course, stressed deno¬
tation and words as names, however, there are also words which
do not name and do not have referents but do have signification.
Moreover, one and the same word may in one instance or usage name
some referent and in another instance simply signify or symbolize
a sense, viz., other words.
It would be most misleading to suppose that in each particular
application of the same word or sign there must necessarily be
an overlap of meaning with every other usage, thereby ensuring
a modicum of univocity and a degree of analogy. If the sense or
meaning of such words as 'verum' or 'bonum' is to be ascertained,
it is necessary to consider each instance of usage. For instance,
^-J. L. Austin, or. cit., p. 7.
IS
for St. Thomas 'veruiri' is one of the 'transcendentales*. whereas
for those who hold the no-truth theory it is only a mark of
assertion. If ♦truth* were a concert in the sense that is
connoted a "definitive structure of meanings, ^ then it would be
possible in accordance with such a rule or guideline to complete
the blank spaces with the definitive structures, when the word
♦truth* or *true' appears in a particular context. But such does
not appear to be the case. We do well to take into consideration
what such as Wittgenstein, in The Blue and Brown Books and the
Philosophical Investigations, and the school of ordinary func¬
tional language analysis have to say, rartieularly with respect
to the question about the meaning of a 'general term' or a
♦concept'. The point to be made is that we should not be misled
into thinking that a certain word designates an a priori concept
which can be perceived, thereby making possible a general con¬
sensus concerning usage which rejects any other usage as cata-
chresis. Wittgenstein makes the point repeatedly that if one
would like to know the meaning of a word one must investigate the
specific instances of use of that word. In other words, the
boundary of the meaning of a word cannot be arbitrarily delinea¬
ted, but there must be an attempt to find out what the word does
in fact mean in usage. Wittgenstein says in The Blue Book;
If on the other hand you wish to give a definition of
wishing, i.e., to draw a share boundary, then you are free
to draw it as you like; and this boundary will never
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entirely coincide with the actual usage, as this usage has
no sharp boundary.1
For remember that in general we don't use language according
to strict rules-—it hasn't been taught us by means of strict
rules, either. We, in our discussions on the other hand,
constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding
according to exact rules.2
Or else we might, by the explanation of a word, mean the
explanation which, on being asked, we are ready to give.
That is, if we are ready to give any explanation; in most
cases we aren't, (any words in this sense then don't have
a strict meaning. But this is not a defect. To think it is
would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is
no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.3
Or, as Wittgenstein explains in the Philosophical Investigations:
63: For I can give the concept 'number' rigid limits in this
way, that is, use the word 'number' for a rigidly limited
concept, but I can also use it so that the extension of the
concept is not closed by a frontier. And this is how we do
use the word *game'.^
77. . .In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did
we learn the meaning of this word ("good" for instance)?
From what sort of examples? in what language-games? Then
it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a
family of meanings.5
79. . . And this can be expressed like this: I use the name
"N" without a fixed meaning. (But that detracts as little
from its usefulness, as it detracts from that of a table that
it stands.on four legs instead of three and so sometimes
wobbles. )ij
^L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 195#), p. 19.
2Ibid., p. 25. 3Ibid., p. 27
^■L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M.
Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), pp. 32-33e.
3Ibid., p. 36e. ^Ibid., p. 37e.
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Grammatical and lexical forms and structures themselves
have been the source of considerable difficulty and complication,
especially when they have been taken as certain indications of
sense and logical form. It then happens that grammatical simi¬
larity is taken to imply logical and even factual similarity.
For that reason, a word that is a general term or logical con¬
struction may be thought to function in much the same manner as
does a proper name. For this reason, in part, disputants con¬
cerning the nature of 'truth1, 'being', 'meaning', 'love',
'beauty', and so on, have often treated these words and others
like them as though they were proper names. This, of course,
does not preclude the possibility that they may be so used.
However, even with proper names one cannot simply trace the
boundary of what the name means. It may be possible, however,
to point out the referent. Wittgenstein stresses the deceptive
nature of what he calls 'surface grammar':
664. In the use of words one might distinguish 'surface
grammar' from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses
itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is
used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its
use- one might say- that can be taken in by the ear. —And
now compare the depth grammar, say of the word 'to mean',
with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect.
No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about.1
To use words, particularly words like 'truth', 'reality',
'being', and 'meaning', as though they had a generally under¬
stood and accepted use or even possessed a univocal sense, can
^bid., p. 163e.
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result in a failure to say anything, or to make any sense, in
which case the words are not working, or it can deceive the
users of language into thinking that all words generally function
in much the same manner. Consequently, such questions as 'How
is it used?', 'What does it say?', and 'What is the framework?',
must be asked concerning srecific uses of such a word as 'truth'
in order that a degree of clarification may be achieved. This
means that one must do much more than look at the word and
explore its etymological roots. The word 'truth' must be con¬
sidered in view of the particular linguistic and extra-lin¬
guistic context in which it is found, including the whole per¬
spective and its underlying beliefs. D.D. Williams, from the
viewpoint of a rerspectivist analysis, deals with the question
concerning the different senses in which 'truth' is used:
The thesis I suggest is: The meaning of the term 'truth'
in anv and all of its senses cannot be stated excert with
reference to the presuppositions of the rersrective in
which it. arrears.-I
(2.2) Having already cited certain formal problems per¬
taining to such a word as 'truth', including its problematical
character, problems involved in uncritical and habitual usage,
the problem of ambiguity and equivocation surrounding such words,
the need for contextual consideration, and deception of gram¬
matical similarity, it is necessary now to specify some dis¬
tinctions that are found in actual usage. Subsequent to this
^-D. D. Williams, "Truth in the Theological Perspective,"
The Journal of Relirion, XXVIII, No. 4 (October, 194&), 243.
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we are to consider certain of the presuppositions, consequenres,
and implications involved in a particular usage.
(2.2.1) In the first place, then, 'truth1 has often been
employed to refer to 'being' or what has been called 'substance',
either absolute or conditional. J.L. Austin, although he too
simply and quickly characterizes 'truth' as a logical construction,
does make particular helpful distinctions:
1. 'What is truth?' said jesting Pilate, and would not stay
for an answer. Pilate was in advance of his time. For
'truth' itself is an abstract noun, a camel, that is, of a
logical construction, which cannot get past the eye even
of a grammarian. We approach it cap and categories in hand:
we ask ourselves whether Truth is a substance (the Truth,
the Body of Knowledge), or a quality (something like the
colour red, inhering in truths), or a relation ('corres¬
pondence'). 2 But philosophers should take something more
nearly their own size to strain at. What needs discussing
rather is the use, or certain uses, of the word 'true'. In
vino, possibly, 'veritas'. but in a sober symposiam 'verum'.1
Austin, then, does touch upon the different ways in which 'truth'
has been applied, but he too readily dismisses 'truth' as a
logical construction thereby failing to take seriously just what
the specific uses of 'truth' entail. We consider 'truth' then
not in the first instance as a substantive derived from the
adjective 'true' as applied to statements, which is a generally
accepted usage, but as equivalent to 'being', 'the real', 'that
which is', irrespective of how the latter may be interpreted.
'Being', of course, has been understood in terms either of
'essence', 'existence', 'rrocess', 'encounter', or 'thought'.
■'•J. L. Austin, op. cit. . p. 85.
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Whatever the meaning of 'being* in any specific instance,
•truth* has been used almost interchangeably with 'being*.
'Truth' often carries with it the sense of the 'absolute' such
as we find in what is called 'objective idealism', where it is
used with reference to 'absolute knowledge', 'absolute mind',
or 'eternal ideas*. There is the attempt by Heidegger to
recover what he calls the primordial sense of 'truth', which is
a more literal rendering of T or /] q 9 c, l « '. viz., "revealedness
(Entborgenheit)/' "revelation (Entbergung)," and an "uncovering"
of "what-is." 'Truth' may be found to refer not only to 'being'
or 'the absolute' in any one of the number of senses in which
they have been used, but to "the very entity of any thing" or
"the incomplex truth" as set forth in the Summa Philosorhiae of
the pseudo-Grosseteste. The latter usage refers to the partic¬
ular 'being*. Augustine uses 'truth* in a similar fashion in
saying that "the truth is that which is" (Verum est id quod
est"). The question regarding 'being', however, must also be
raised with respect to the last two mentioned uses of 'truth*.
'Truth* appears to be used, therefore, both as an equivalent for
such words as 'being', 'the real*, 'the absolute*, 'the uncov¬
ering of what-is', and on the other hand, for such words as
'entity*, 'thing', 'state of affairs', 'such as is the case',
and the like. 'Falsehood' and 'errancy' must function according
to their positive counterpart. It should also be said at this
point that 'truth* and particularly 'true' are applied to what¬
ever happens to be congruous with and in a correct relation to
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the absolute referents cited above, or in some way shares or
rarticirates in the same.
(2.2.2) Another major kind or type of usage of the word
'truth' has been with reference to knowledge or thought. This
usage of the word 'truth' has its rlace in Greek philosophy, in
Plato, and to a greater extent in Aristotle. This usage also
prevailed especially in later mediaeval scholastic ism, and
starting with Descartes, modern philosophy has been almost pre¬
occupied with this usage, with significant exceptions however.
Here 'truth' is used with reference to a body of knowledge or
understanding, either by virtue of its relation to or position
over against the subject or object known, or as an expression
of seIf-awareness, or as an internal consistency of thought.
Here 'truth' is used to signify a body of knowledge or series
of true assertions. However, by reason of such usage itself,
which in fact is meant to stress the factor of relationship or
the relative nature of a body of knowledge, knowledge may
acquire the character of equality or near identity with the state
of affairs known. The consequences and implications ensuing
from this usage of 'truth' are very extensive. When 'truth' is
used in a cognitive sense there is a great number of material
distinctions within the formal categories of usage, viz., 'truth'
as 'being' or 'knowledge'. First, there is the question as to
the sense of 'truth' when the reference is to 'knowledge' in
general.
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Not only is there a wide range of anrliration of 'truth' as
'knowledge' in terms of subject and method, for example, theolog¬
ical 'truth', Physical 'truth', historical 'truth', mathematical
'truth', but in each case 'truth' is to be taken differently
because of different subject matter, structures, criteria and
methods whereby each kind of 'truth' is realized and validated.
'Truth', then, cannot be used in each instance in the same sense
because the subject, the criteria, and the ground of the possi¬
bility of 'truth' or 'knowledge' differ in each specific case.
To complicate matters still further, the sense of 'truth' can
change even as it is used within a particular discipline.
Whether it be philosophy, theology, history, physics, at one time
the sense of 'truth' may be that of a 'bod}/- of knowledge' as a
composite of true judgements or statements and on another occa¬
sion 'truth' may signify 'that which is' or the 'actual state of
affairs.' It is much like the problem that we confront with
the word 'fact'. 'Fact* in one context is understood as an
actual situation or occurrence and in another as *a truth', in
other words, a true statement, a factual statement.
In metaphysics, ethics, and theology, 'truth* may be used
with reference either to 'a body of truths', or 'an actual state
of affairs' or 'an ideal or future state of affairs', or with
reference to 'being', 'the real', a certain kind of 'existence'.
Within a given structure of thought, such as idealism and
existentialism, there can be shifts in meaning from one usage
to another which are not made explicit. This is not as likely
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to happen where there is a rigorous restriction placed upon the
usage of 'truth', for examrle, when 'true' is limited to certain
kinds of assertions or statements or when 'truth' is discussed
in some detail by such as B. Russell, M. Heidegger, and E. Erunner.
Considerable misunderstanding is created where 'truth' used for
'a body of knowledge or beliefs' is not clearly distinguished
from 'truth' used for an 'actual state of affairs' or 'the real'.
This introduces the whole problem of 'knowledge' and 'being' and
their interrelationships. First, however, some of the implica¬
tions and consequences relating to the usage of 'truth' as a
'bod}r of knowledge or thought' must be considered.
Just what is meant then when 'truth' is taken as 'a body of
knowledge', 'a collection of truths'? This immediately raises
the problem regarding how the one word 'truth' can be made to
apply to a vast sum of knowledge. Putting aside for the pre¬
sent an inquiry into the problem of the nature and validity of
knowledge, although fundamental to every aspect of the problem
that we are discussing, the usage of 'truth' as 'knowledge' in
its most general sense has to be investigated.
In this area of application, J.L. Austin mentioned three
possible senses: a substance, a quality or property, or a
relation such as correspondence. If we take 'knowledge' as a
sum or a whole, there is always the possibility of failure to
differentiate within the whole, and it is immediately apparent
that there is a wide diversity within 'truth* as the whole of
knowledge. Where 'truth' has been used as equivalent to
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'substancef, with 'substance* being the sum of knowledge, there
is apt to be inadequate recognition of the complex, extensional
or intensional, dialectical or paradoxical connections or rela¬
tionships both among the parts of the whole and between each
part and its extra-linguistic referent, where there is such.
Considering the scope of what is designated as 'truth' or 'know¬
ledge', from the tautology of formal and symbolic logic to a
medication about 'being' which itself could be called 'truth',
it is difficult to see what the sense of 'truth* is in such a
wide application, whether one thinks of such a 'substance' as
a single whole or as a collection of particulars. It is diffi¬
cult to see just what the referent is in such a usage because
the very problem that the philosopher faces is to relate the
parts which in the above usage are taken to constitute a sub¬
stance or a sum of particulars. Could it be that it is only
possible to speak of this or that 'true* statement. John Wisdom
says: "The philosopher's purpose is to gain a grasp of the
relations between different categories of being, between expres¬
sions used in different manners. . . . Philosophical progress
has two aspects, provocation and pacification."1 Assuming such
a substance or body of knowledge that could be referred to as
'the truth', it is questionable whether it would do more than
function as a lexical equivalent, another name for 'knowledge'.
■*-J. Wisdom, "Philosophical Perplexity," on. cit.. p. 42.
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If "truth* is taken to be a quality that can be attributed to,
or inhere in statements or judgements that then are considered
to be 'true', or as a logical construction that can be reduced
to an x number of statements- 'p is true", the meaning of "true"
must still be made clear in the particular instances. The
question could possibly be raised whether the word 'verum' is
even predicated analogically of all statements. One thing is
clear, viz., that we must examine instances of actual usage.
(2.2.3) In addition to this, the words "truth" and 'true'
are used within the contexts of varying theories of truth,
ranging from the so-called 'no-truth theory' to the 'coherence
notion of truth'. It is important, therefore, that the analyst
inquiring into the sense of 'truth' or 'true' realizes that one
cannot decree or judge usage on the basis of a priori rules,
and also, that differences of usage do not necessarily inrnly
opposing positions. However, it must also be emrhasized that
when semantical misunderstanding has been dissolved to the
greatest possible degree, fundamental disagreements do still
prevail by reason of different faiths, points of view, meta¬
physical assumptions, and diverse orientation to the reality
that is the object of knowledge. D.D. Williams touches upon
this matter in the article cited above, "Truth in the Theological
Perspective":
However, I have not argued this point In order to show that
semantics can solve the problem of truth. The perspectivist
view does not permit that conclusion. The fundamental
problem of the meaning of "truth" for different perspectives
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remains. What does emerge from this analysis is that our
theory of the relation between language and reality, and
our theory of how that relationship can be made adequate,
are functions of what we conceive the real to be.l
It cannot be denied that a great deal of difficulty and confusion
arises because of 'rules of usage' or 'theory of logical grammar'
presuppositions in which case an apparent factual disagreement
is actually little more than the putting forth of opposing
rules and verbal definitions. However, it can be said that a
difference in usage majr be indicative of underlying diversity.
In any event, it is necessary to appeal beyond linguistic and
grammatical form in order to ascertain the sense and to deter¬
mine to what extent linguistic diversity is indicative of
further difference. Even the linguistic rhenomenologist can
only pretend to restrict himself to linguistic data. Polanyi
says:
Correspondingly, disagreements on the nature of things can¬
not be expressed as disagreements about the existing use
of words. . . . These controversial questions can be
attended to only if we use language as it exists to, direct pur
ouF'seesAWoiiPV-iuf-'m'' pwS-*
cisely the total of linguistic rules which can be observed
by using a language without attending to the things
referred to. The purpose of the philosophical pretence of
being merely concerned with grammar is to contemplate and
analyse reality, while denying the act of doing so.2
By way of summary, it should be stated that the words
'truth' and 'true' are problematical. 'Truth', moreover, does
^•D. D. Williams, loc, cit.. p. 246.
2M. Polanyi, or. cit.. p. 114.
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not function as a name ostensively designating a 'universal'
that can be intuited, whereby argument over the meaning of
the word is a possibility. 'Truth' in fact has a wide range
of usage and application and the factors that are accountable
for this great diversity must be recognized and taken into
consideration. Some of these aspects have been cited, such
as the diverse applications of 'truth' to 'being', 'the real*,
'the absolute', 'knowledge' - both absolute and conditional,
'thought', and 'statement*. Within the sphere of usage of
'truth' as knowledge there are a great number of distinctions
to be made, and these depend on such factors as the subject
known, assumptions or beliefs regarding 'the real', and the
conception held concerning the relationship of the 'trixe'
statement or the 'truth' to the 'real* or the 'state of affairs'.
The latter introduces the crucial torlc of theories of 'truth'
or criteria which in fact enable us to grasp the sense of the
word 'truth' when it has been applied to an entity or statement
within a particular context. This is the subject to be dis¬
cussed in the next section where the aim is to consider what is
rresupposed and implied in saying 'This is the truth', or 'This
is true*, whether what is intended is being, a state of affairs,
knowledge, a statement, a quality, or a relation.
3. Theories and criteria of 'truth': imrlications and consequences
As has already been noted, there is a considerable diversity
of usage of the words 'truth' and 'true' which is grounded in
another diversity, viz., different metaphysical beliefs and
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eristemological or logical theories. There is usually a subtle
interaction, interdependence, and inter-reinforcement between
metaphysical or ontological doctrine, epistemological theory,
methodology, ethical doctrine, language with its syntax, logical
doctrine, psychological and existential factors. Certainly one
of the tasks of the analyst is to inspect, sort out, and scru¬
tinize critically the ways in which these several elements or
areas have interacted uron and interpenetrated one another.
This implies radical questioning and analysis both of each area
and the interrelationships. Classical and mediaeval philosophy
for the most part was indigent particularly in terms of employing
a critical and analytical method or procedure with respect to
its own doctrine, method, and language. In contrast to modern
empiricism and atomism, knowledge of the singular instance, the
accidental, the sensible, the contingent and mutable, was dis¬
paraged and quickly passed over in the movement from opinion to
knowledge. In this instance we see how on the basis of meta¬
physical and logical doctrine, epistemological method and the
nature of knowledge are determined. Although Plato in The Cratylus.
and Aristotle in the Categories and De Interpretations, attempt
an analysis of language, it is not critical enough to keep lan¬
guage and grammar from exercising a determinative and decisive
role in the development of the Platonic Ideas and Aristotle's
Categories and his logic in general. Moreover, the Platonic
ontology involves a theory of truth, as Heidegger has shown. In
Plato, 'Being' is the what-ness (Idea) of beings, and 'Truth' or
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'Being' as the non-concealment of the essence of beings, by-
reason of the visibleness of the Idea, subtly becomes 'truth' as
correctness of view, conformity with the Ideas.
(3.1) It suffices here to ^oint out that the development of
a particular theory of truth is seen to be dependent on a number
of ontological and epistemological doctrines interacting uron
one another. These, in turn, may have been formulated under the
impact of language and grammar which have assumed a normative
role, due in part to uncritical usage. In Plato, then, 'truth'
is closely allied with Being or the quidditas of beings, in
other words, the what-ness of the beings which participate in
their respective Ideas. The Being of beings therefore is visible
in the Idea which is viewed and this 'real' is truth. However,
there is a gradual shift in the sense of truth from the viewed
Idea to the viewing and its conformity to the viewed. It is in
the speaking of 'truth' in terms of conformity, correspondence,
and relationship that the question of criteria arises in virtue
of which truth claims are made. If 'truth' has reference to
'being' or the 'real' or the 'absolute', then one may be speak¬
ing of the criteria themselves insofar as 'truth', thus under¬
stood, functions as the measure or criteria of the conformed.
As soon as one speaks of 'truth' as the correctness or Tightness
of viewing, knowledge, and statement, then appeal is made in
behalf of the latter to criteria more primordial or transcendental.
When 'of X n 9cccy' is understood in its more literal and presocratic
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sense where it has such a very close affinity with such words
as 1<£vcri s \ 1 oh cr cor. T to b'v \ the emphasis falls not on under¬
standing or judgements as 'truth' but on 'beings' and 'being'
itself. For this reason, therefore, and in view of the belief
in the close proximity or even identity of 'being' and 'knowing',
'beings' and 'names', the ' \oy os ' and 'human speech', there
were not present the epistemological and logical difficulties
that arise later in theories of logical and cognitive truth.
As we shall see, in the traditional logical conception of 'truth'
as correspondence between proposition and the thing cr fact there
arises the problem of relating or joining statement or under¬
standing and the reality, plus explaining how it is that the
proposition or verbum corresponds with the res. This problem
becomes particularly acute in modern rationalism, scepticism,
empiricism, and atomism with the divorce of 'object' and 'thing',
sense data and physical object. The problem in the earlier
Greek doctrine of truth was that which resulted from a more or
less immediate and direct access to or viewing of the 'truth'
or 'being' or 'beings'. 'Truth' understood as ideality pre¬
pares the way for the absolutization of knowledge. Such a
development is furthered insofar as 'being' is understood as
'what-ness' or quidditas. 'Truth' as 'being' is then the ideal
or the intelligible. This development appears to culminate in
Hegel's absolute and unconditioned knowing.
The appropriate question to be asked at this point concerns
ontological, metaphysical, and religious beliefs, and these are
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determined by a number of contextual factors. When 9e.cc* 1
and Veritas * have by reason of usage a very close affinity or
even identity with 1 v o-c s 1. T ovcrco< f7"o oVf, and the like,
then the appropriate method is to seek to lay bare the sense of
the latter in both a negative and positive fashion. After a
certain amount of such clarification it becomes possible to talk
meaningfully about criteria, validation, verification, and
related logical problems. The latter come to the foreground in
discussing correspondence, coherence, pragmatist, and verifiea-
tionist or positivist theories of truth. The question of criteria
applies as well to ontic or objective truth which involves talk
about 'true' or 'false' sensible entities which are so by reason
of participation in the ideal world of the eternal forms. The
inquiry, however, takes on a different form when one considers
such as Heraclitus, Plato, Augustine, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and
their usage of the words 'truth' and 'true' with reference to
'being1, 'nature', 'existence', 'God*, 'absolute*. This sense
or reference would also aprly to Heidegger's understanding of
'truth' as "unconcealment." or "revealment."
(3.2) Those theories of truth that refer primarily or even
solely to the understanding and statements, such as certain
correspondence and coherence theories of truth, have been critical
of the usage of 'truth' discussed above. Aristotle in De Inter¬
pretations and the Metarhvsioa formulates a theory of truth in
which the locus of truth is primarily the thought or judgement
and its correspondence or conformity with reality. Aristotle
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does speak of 'true* perception or 'true' things but this a
secondary and extended usage. The impact of this theory of
truth is very marked in scholastic thought although there are
differing adaptations of it depending in part on the nature of
the synthesis or equilibrium achieved between the Augustinian
tradition and the Aristotelian corpus. Throughout mediaeval
thought we observe a gradual development in the understanding
of 'truth* in the direction of a correspondence theory of truth
partly by reason of the increasing impact of Aristotle's under¬
standing of truth upon the Augustinian tradition. Augustine's
understanding of 'truth' as ". • . verum mihi videtur esse id
quod est,"-'- which of course must be understood in an ontological
sense and not simply as factuality, and the understanding of
the truth as "adaequatio intellectus et rei" are two fundamental
formulations of truth which R. Grosseteste, pseudo-Grosseteste,
and St. Thomas among others, had to interpret and relate to each
other. Truth as "adequation of the understanding and the thing,"
a notion which could be said to be prefigured in Aristotle's cor¬
respondence theory of truth, especially emphasizes the factor of
relationship, viz., a certain conformity between understanding
and things. The important factor to note is that this adequation
theory of truth, which is of classical derivation and a corres¬
pondence type theory of truth, became predominant in mediaeval
1Solil. II.5.0; PL 32:009.
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thought and remained so in modern thought. This tended to force
out of the picture the application of 'truth' to 'being' or
'things that are'.
(3*2.1) We do well, therefore, to look briefly at Aristo¬
telian correspondence and 'representative' knowledge or thought
wherein 'concepts' or 'likenesses of things' are compounded or
divided in accordance with reality. The correspondence theory
of truth, in its manifold modes and types, has been accompanied
by a number of difficulties and complications which have become
particularly acute in the modern versions of the theory. These
problems did not achieve critical proportions in Aristotle and
mediaeval thought because of such factors as 'fides'. onto-
logical and episternological realism, conceptualism, intelli¬
gibility, and a less sophisticated view of correspondence. There
are other factors, as well, that made the correspondence theory
as formulated in Aristotle and in mediaeval thought possible and
workable. Classical and mediaeval doctrines of perception and
apprehension contained guarantees and safeguards that appeared
sufficient to ensure the truth < f understanding and judgement in
terms of correspondence. Thought or knowledge as representation,
however, contained the seeds of later radical problems in modern
correspondence theory. The problems that have accompanied
modern correspondence theory, in such forms as atomic picturing
and also less stringent correlation, have arisen partly because
of representative perception, 1:1 isomorphy, scepticism, and
the demand for certainty or known conformity of thought and
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and statement with reality. These elements were latent and
partly actualized already in ancient and mediaeval correspon¬
dence theory. These developments in modern correspondence
theory have contributed to the emrhasis on formal truth, phe¬
nomenalism, and the abandonment of truth claims except possibly
for empirical verification in terms of sense data.
In addition to the factors already mentioned, Aristotle's
representative theory of knowledge and correspondence theory did
not prove to be as problematic as modern formulations of the
theory because of his infallible apprehension of the meaning of
terms, a doctrine of knowledge in which the passive reason has
an immediate relation with its object by way of affections or
concepts of the soul which are "likenesses of things themselves,"
and the activity of what has been termed the "active reason"
which, among other things, acts on the passive reason impressing
upon it the forms of knowable objects. Then there is also the
"intuitive reason" whereby one can pass from particulars to the
universal. Heidegger in Sein und Ze.it cites Aristotle's expli¬
cation of T X oy ox r as f 8h 3? o v v '. or 1 °< rr o cj><x c ve. 9»»-\ This
understanding of 31 ay o 5 further indicates the noetic realism
that inheres in Aristotle's doctrine of knowledge whereby 'truth'
was possible. Heidegger, however, in a seminar of 1940 entitled
"Voin "Wesen und Eerriff der & yj er L S , Aristoteles Physik E I"
refers to the transformation of f 31 o y o s1 whereby the sense is
not 'to show forth that which is' but T Z a yos1 becomes a judgement
or expression which is in conformity with the judged. At this
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point already we note a move in the develo ment of correspon¬
dence theory where the emphasis moves from that about which
the judgement is made to the judgement itself and its relation
to reality. This understanding of the 'true' judgement or
understanding in terms of a 1 on o c cu (res1 between the judgement
and the judged further emphasizes the representative character
of knowledge. Concept and thought come to stand between the
cognitive subject, and the singular entity and even the genus.
When Veritas therefore arcears in the mediaeval context as
'adequatio intellectus et rei' it is clear that if'has
lost its etyraologitally more correct and literal sense as
"revealment" and its close affinity with 'being', whether it
is understood as v o-c 5 . 1 I <f e c* T , 1 ev &pye <■ or f ov r
When 'truth' therefore ceases to be so used and has reference
to the correspondence or adequation of the intellect or judge¬
ment with the thing known, a number of questions must be posed
pertaining to such cognitive or logical truth. The nature, the
possibility, the validity, the criteria, and the underlying
assumptions of the correspondence theory of truth have to be
examined.
(3.2.2) In the mediaeval period the correspondence theory
plays an important role in the formulation of theological and
philosophical doctrine. The use and application of the theory
varies and is restated in different ways depending on the way
in which the Augustinian theology or wisdom and the Aristotelian
theories are juxtaposed. Traditional Augustinians understood
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'truth* primarily in terms of 'being' or 'that which is'. They
also speak of the truth of created things which is made possible
by the rectitudo or adaequatio of the thing, whatever it may be,
with its c <?€<* in the supreme Truth or intellec-tus divinus.
Knowledge of such truth presupposes a knowledge of both the
object or thing and the understanding or idea of the thing in
the divine intellectus. This truth of things can be formulated
as the 'adaequatio rei creatae ad intellectum divinum*. In the
Augustinian tradition, then, the supreme Truth or divine under¬
standing is the ground and possibility of the truth of the thing
and understanding. For the present, however, in view of the
correspondence theory of truth, our interest is in the mediaeval
formulation 'veritas est adaeouatio rei et intellectus' as con¬
formity of the human understanding or judgement with the object.
This formulation of correspondence was widely held in mediaeval
thought although there were, as already noted, significant dif¬
ferences in emphasis in understanding truth, depending in part
on the major influences, e.g., Neo-clatonic or Aristotelian.
Therefore, on the one hand, major emphasis is placed on the
immutable rationes ("Speech of the Father," Grosseteste, De
Veritate) of things in the mind of God and the created things
which are true because of their likeness to the divine speaking
or understanding, and on the other hand, as in St. Thomas,
'truth* is primarily in the human intellectus and signifies the
adaequatio of the understanding and the thing. It will become
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apparent just how crucial is the interpretation given to the
formula - 'adaeauatio intellectus et rei1 and the character of
the conformity or congruence, as well as the nature of the
intellectus and the res.
(3.3) The adaequatio formula of truth, depending of course
on the manner in which it is understood and used, and the onto-
lopical and epistemological context in which it finds expression,
has at times been abandoned in favor of coherence theories of
truth. Given a strict interpretation, while at the same time
abstracted from its primitive setting, correspondence theory
can become highly problematical and an alternative theory has to
be propounded to achieve certitude. Correspondence theory then
gives way to coherence theory such as we find in modern rational¬
ism and idealism. Coherence theory has assumed a number of
different forms in different systems of thought. Descartes1
notion and use of coherence must certainly be distinguished from
that of Bradley and H.H. Joachim.
(3.3.1) The demand for certitude and validity has played a
most determinative role in the formation of theories of cogni¬
tive truth. The demand for certitude, which to a considerable
extent may be grounded in either anxiety or intellectual demand,
coupled with a placing of Veritas primarily in the intellectus
or rronuntiatum. places the task of establishing certainty or a
known conformity on the cognitive subject. Certain schools of
thought, such as logical positivism, have stressed exclusively
empirical verification based on sense data or Physical objects.
41
Moreover, problems pertaining to perception, logic, language,
and certitude have led to the abandonment of material truth in
favor of formal truth or linguistic analysis. In the mediaeval
context we note beliefs or doctrines indicative of the striving
for verification and certitude. The doctrines included such as
idealist assumptions involving knowledge of the quidditas of
things, the disparagement of the contingent and the sensible,
which spelled flux and uncertainty, in favor of the necessary,
the immutable and the immaterial, and the doctrines of fides and
authority. The attempt to achieve certitude included the appeal
to necessary 'truth' or arguments of a formal, analytic, deduc¬
tive character and a subjectivistic introspection of one's own
mind and consciousness. Augustine held that the mind could know
immutable and transcendent truth under the ideas of things and
by means of divine illumination while Aquinas believed that
things could be known and grasped through the intellectus turn¬
ing to abstracted forms. As with Aristotle, a great deal of
epistemologiral and metaphysical doctrine not only explained or
described but also established grounds for certitude or known
conformity between understanding and reality. Formal and intrin¬
sic coherence within conceptual structures and between judgements
was also thought to insure the conformity between the understand¬
ing and the thing, and this could be valid only if reality itself
were looked upon as a necessary and coherent ideality.
(3.3.2) Attempts to achieve certitude reached their culmina¬
tion in modern philosophy in figures like Descartes and Hegel.
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Surh a radical culmination in these two directions was inevit¬
able once many of the factors contributing to the certainty of
truth in mediaeval theology and philosophy were repudiated,
such as faith, revelation, illumination, authority, immutable
rationes. and tradition. For when 'truth' is placed in the
understanding or in the judgement, is conceived of in terms of
rational certitude, and is courled with a rejection of the
traditional grounds of certitude, the cognitive subject is
abandoned to itself and there emerges the rational autonomous
subject. Moreover, in modern thought beginning with Descartes
there is the employment of a critical method rooted in doubt
and scepticism, which was to have momentous consequences both
for philosophical method and theory. The onl3c recourse for
thinkers who doubted radically the existence of the res externa.
God, and the existent self, and who at the same time desired a
high degree of rational certainty, was to formulate coherence
theory of various types. Descartes sought a necessary or mathe¬
matical certainty with his intuited indubitable self-evident
'truths* and those deduced therefrom, but in the process 'truth'
was reduced to just such 'truths' and the external extended
world had to conform accordingly. This meant that 'truth' as
understanding, idea, or judgement, intended to be representative
of the world-to-be-known, became an intrinsically logically
coherent system of necessary truths. Demonstration follows from
the self-evident indubitable truths.
Heidegger states that this subjectivism and truth-as-certitude
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finds its culmination in Hegel. In Hegel truth as certitude is
granted absolute ontologieal status. Knower and known become
one in the absolute's self-awareness. The knowledge or judgement
of the finite knower is not the 'truth' primarily in terms of
correspondence to reality or because of its place in a logically
deductive system, but because of its ontological status as a
fragment of an ontological absolute whole which is the "Ideal
Truth." Here we see that truth-as-certitude is made absolute,
it is the 'real' or 'being'. Thus, for the Hegelian to say that
a particular judgement or understanding is 'true' does not
finally mean that it conforms to a known state of affairs or
that it logically coheres with other judgements, although such
may be presupposed and indicated, but that such a fragment of
understanding is a finite cart, of a whole, the absolute and ideal
experience. As the Hegelian H. H. Joachim asserts regarding
correspondence theory:
That notion, so far, as we have studied it at present,
appears to give us at best the mere externals of what con¬
stitutes truth. Correspondence, perhaps we may say, is a
symptom of truth. We do not yet know whether there may be
truth without correspondence; but at least there may be
correspondence without truth, or with truth so trifling
that serious falsehood is involved in it.^
Joachim says further of his coherence notion of truth:
In the above formulation I have endeavoured to express the
coherence-notion so as to emphasize the concreteness of the
coherence which is truth, as against the view which found
truth in formal consistency; and I have insisted upon the
^H.H. Joachim, The Nature of Truth (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1904 p. 17.
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conception of truth as a living and moving whole, as
against the Cartesian view of fixed truths on which the
structure of knowledge is built.I
In Joachim's idealist coherence 'truth' has reference to
"the Absolute,^ viz., the "Ideal Experience.* 'Truth' is
applicable to a 'true' judgement inasmuch as it is a fragmen¬
tary actuality of the "Whole." A judgement is not 'true' in its
primary sense because it represents a part of reality or has
achieved a certain conformity or congruit.y with the part, but
it is 'truth' as a part of reality, 'Truth' is not knowledge
or judgements that correspond with the object known for the
object has in fact become the subject. Absolute or unconditioned
knowledge, therefore, is not dependent on an object because such
knowledge is grounded in the absolute's self-awareness. As in
Descartes 'truth' is thought of in terms of certitude which is
grounded in the cognitive subject's awareness of its own know¬
ledge, so in Hegel 'truth' becomes absolute certitude which is
grounded in absolute self-awareness. Coherence in Hegelian
idealism is identified with the 'real' itself. Absolute certi¬
tude is found in the absolute's self-awareness which is realized
and expressed through finite understanding. Descartes achieved
certainty by his rogito ergo sum, the creature-consciousness
whereby he argued for the existence of God who served to help
establish our knowledge of the external world, the rationally
intuited indubitable truths, and the system of demonstrated truth
^Ibid., p. 77.
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deduced from these principles. Truth as certainty, however,
reaches its culmination in Hegel. For in Hegel certainty is
ultimate because the problem of relating to the object is
dissolved for absolute knowledge in its unconditioned self-
awareness.
(3.3.3) The purpose of this brief digression is to indicate
how the understanding of 'truth' and the grounds of 'truth' which
prevailed throughout mediaeval thought gave way in modern thought
to radical forms of coherence theory of truth. Rationalist and
idealist subjectivism can be considered partly as attempts to
compensate for the rejection and loss of mediaeval criteria and
safeguards of truth. As we have already observed, in the medi¬
aeval period 'truth' came more and more to have its locus in the
understanding. Certain grounds and criteria which rendered
'truth' possible kept the human 'ratio' and 'intellectus' from
playing a more absolute and determinative role than it did.
However, in mediaeval thought, even with authorit}', reve3ation,
faith, an intelligible creation, and exemrlarisrn, the rational
or cognitive subject tended to exercise a formative and normative
function in cognition partly because of the perennial problem
offered by the sensible-intelligible dichotomy and consequent
abstraction and introspection. As we have attempted to indicate,
this mediaeval legacy, which was bequeathed to modern thought,
was bound to have far-reaching repercussions, particularly when
the factors which before had helped to restrict the activity of
the intellect were largely ignored or rejected. This helps to
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explain in part the modern theories of coherence to which we
have alluded. What modern rationalism and idealism had accepted
from mediaeval thought, and developed to radical proportions,
was reintroduced into theological thought and resulted in ratio¬
nalist and idealist theology. Underlying these developments we
must recognize the coherence theory of truth as it came to be
formulated in such as Descartes and Hegel. Underneath this
coherence theory we must notice the very problematical certainty
which was to be resolved in the knowing subject, whether absolute
or conditional. Still more foundational or rudimentary is the
understanding of 'truth' which made the matter of certitude a
central issue.
Although Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason takes for
granted 'truth' as agreement of knowledge with its object, in
formulating his epistemological theory in terms of the rational
a priori categories, transcendental subject and the phenomenal-
noumenal dichotomy, it happens that 'truth' as 'agreement'
becomes 'truth' as a tyre of intrinsic coherence grounded in
the rational categories which serve as forms for the structuring
and interpreting of phenomena. Heidegger points out how the
mediaeval adaequatio would be interpreted by Kant:
Veritas as adaeouatio rei ad int.eliectur; does not imply the
later, transcendental conception of Kant- possible only on
the basis of man's subjectivity- that "objects conform to
(sich richten nach) our perception", but rather the Christian
theological belief that things are only what they are. if
they are, to the extent that the}', as created things (ens
creaturn) correspond to an idea preconceived in the intellectus
divinus, that is to say, in the mind of God, and thus conform
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to the idea (are right) and are in this sense "true".-*-
Kant, in placing 'truth' in the judgement and denying access
to any world except that which is structured by the knower's
reason, is obliged to formulate truth in terms of rational
coherence. Cassirer speaks of Kant's understanding of truth
as an escape from the impasse produced by the sceptical attitude
toward language and knowledge of the nature of things:
Against this self-dissolution of the spirit there is only
one remedy: to accept in all seriousness what Kant calls
his 'Coperican revolution'. Instead of measuring the
content, meaning, and truth of intellectual forms by some¬
thing extraneous which is supposed to be reproduced in them,
we must find in these forms themselves the measure and
criterion for their truth and intrinsic meaning . . . , The
question as to what reality is apart from these forms, and
what are its independent attributes, becomes irrelevant
here.2
(3.3.4) Coherence theories of truth, correspondence theories
of truth, and even pragmatist theories of truth, all teach in
varying degrees that judgements or knowledge are at least 'true'
in terms of a certain correspondence. However, the majority of
these theories do go much further to extended conceptions of
'truth'. For instance, in idealist coherence theory finite judge¬
ment and knowledge are more than 'truth' understood simply in
terms of correspondence inasmuch as they are granted an ontolog-
ical status as parts of a rational or intelligible whole. In
lM. Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," trans. R. F. C.
Hull and A. Crick, Existence and Beinc. introd. W. Brock (London:
Vision Press, 1949), p. 323.
^E. Cassirer, Lanp-uare and Myth, trans. S. K. Langer
(New York-London: Harper & Brothers, 1946), p. &.
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such a view, wherein truth as coherence is thought of in terms
of ideal or absolute understanding so that the severance between
knower and known is thought to be overcome through self-awareness,
there remains a number of unsolved problems pertaining to finite
knowledge and understanding. Although such a theory asserts of
a 'true* statement that it is only symptomatic of truth or only
involves some truth, there still is an indispensable minimal
place that must be given to the duality of knower and known and
a certain kind of correspondence or congruity between them, the
lack of which can be described as falsehood or error. It seems
reasonable to assert that every theory of truth must to some
degree allow for a conception of true judgement or statement in
terms of a more or less satisfactory relation with a particular
state of affairs, even though this may merely be a simple and
elementary part of a developed system. This has been acknow¬
ledged by such as Kant, William James, F. H. Bradley, and H. H.
Joachim. In each case there is presupposed a 'true* judgement
or statement which in some way corresponds to a state of affairs.
Radical divergence occurs when elementary judgements are utilized,
assimilated, and structured within different systems of thought.
However, even in the formulation of metaphysical, ethical, epis-
temological doctrine, these 'true' statements must remain 'true'
in this basic sense if an aggregate is to be kept from dissolv¬
ing into mere intrinsic and formal coherence. In modern idealist
coherence theory, the degree of 'truth* in a judgement increases
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as the judgement expands in meaning by being placed within a
system of judgements. Here it appears that the 1 truth1 of a
category of judgements is less its correlation with its subject
matter and more its being a part of the whole which is "Absolute
Truth,NS a self-fulfilling and self-sustaining unity. Apart from
the highly speculative character of the coherence notion of
truth developed under the impact of Hegel by such as Bradley and
Joachim, it is difficult to see what criteria can serve the
finite understanding as it seeks to approximate to the "Absolute
Truth" which struggles for self-fulfillment in finite under¬
standing. Without knowledge of the real nature of this "syste¬
matic whole," this unity, it is extremely difficult to see how
the finite knower can relate to the Ideal. Even if it is allowed
for the sake of argument that the metaphysical beliefs of this
coherence theory of truth are valid, there are required the
criteria and standards according to which coherence is judged.
The question that remains pertains to the nature of such
coherence and its basis, whether coherence is provided by the
knower himself on the basis of his self-consciousness or self-
awareness, or by a priori rational categories, or whether it is
provided by the content of knowledge itself and results without
deliberate effort. While idealist coherence theory has rejected
coherence as formal consistency, it has sought coherence in
"conceivability" and "intelligibility," As W.M. Urban says:
"Truth, then, in the last analysis, is immanent in discourse-
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the sum-total of intelligible discourse is the truth. Veritas
in dicto. non in re consistit."-*• And Joachim says: "Con-
ceivability is the essential nature of truth To 'conceive*
means for us to think out clearly and logically, to hold many
elements together in a connexion necessitated by their several
contents. And to be 'conceivable' means to be a 'significant
whole', or a whole possessed of meaning for thought."2 Although
such theories of truth demand more than mere logical or formal
consistency it is manifest that they do in fact rely greatly on
such consistency to help hold together the conceivable or intel¬
ligible whole. Although such theories of truth are certainly
grounded in more than intensionality, the latter is certainly
fundamental and determinative in their formulation.
Coherence can, however, be taken in another sense than
that found in idealist metaphysics. In this other sense it has
no intention of going beyond finite thought and understanding as
representational and relative. The duality of knower and known
is not something that renders questionable the possibility of
knowledge. Where coherence has been employed to overcome a
problematical severance between subject and object, and to attain
certainty by making finite knowledge a part of an absolute know¬
ledge, it has either had to fall back on formal consistency or
■^W. M. Urban, Language and Reality (London: G. Allen &
Urwin Ltd., 1939), p. 394.
%. H. Joachim, op. cit.. p. 66.
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the rational categories of the self-consciousness. However,
rational coherence and formal consistency are not in themselves
proof of validation of the truth, understood in terms of corre¬
spondence, of the system of thought or doctrine that is in
question. In other words, the formal consistency or systematic
coherence, mentioned above, can not of itself certify or vali¬
date a system of thought unless it is believed that reality
itself is of such a character, but then the method is no longer
demonstrative but simply indicative. M. Polanyi makes reference
to coherence as a "criterion of stability":
I conclude that what earlier philosophers have alluded to by
speaking of coherence as the criterion of truth is only a
criterion of stability. It may equally stabilize an erro¬
neous or a true view of the universe. The attribution of
truth to any particular stable alternative is a fiduciary
act which cannot be analysed in non-committal terms.1
(3.3.5) This leads us then to this other understanding of
'coherence*. 'Coherence1, although still indicative of stability
and a kind of interconnectedness, may be placed outside the
context of certification and validation. 'Coherence' can then
be taken to refer to a naturally developing pattern or structure
within a particular area of knowledge which bears an analogical
relationship to the known. 'Coherence' here is taken in no
strict and formal sense for its nature is determined by the sub¬
ject or object known. In such a view 'coherence' is not an
*M. Polanyi, op. cit.. p. 294.
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issue or a desideratum that has to be achieved. This is not to
presuppose that a particular type of Coherence1 will necessarily
have to appear if certainty and truth are to be achieved. The
evolving construct may be either paradoxical, dialogical, or
dialectical. Max Black has something similar to such coherence
in mind when he talks about "analogue models": "Analogue models
furnish plausible hypotheses, not proofs."-'- Black's "analogue
model" is a faithful-as-possible reproduction in some new medium
of the web of relationships in an original. However, he empha¬
sises that such models can not function as proofs or as isomor¬
phic pictures, however else they may function. It may be helpful
to formulate a certain kind of coherence as an hypothesis, but
a hypothetical coherence can hardly be assumed to be true or
certain on the basis of its coherence. If it does correspond to
the original, it will be on the basis of a relation to the web
of relationships in the original. Any coherence, therefore, that
may evolve -nd manifest itself within a given discipline will be
valid insofar as it is analogous to a real coherence in the sub¬
ject, whatever the nature of the coherence. Even where a certain
coherence or pattern does appear within a particular scope of
knowledge which is analogous to that in the original, one can
still speak of a type of correspondence between the original as
one coherent whole and the "analogue model" or pattern as another
coherent whole which is analogous to the original.
Models and Metaphors
53
We have discussed these different types of coherence theory
in order to show that much of modern coherence theory has been
formulated in part in response to critical problems concerning
validation and certainty. There are exceptions, of course, as
in the case of Black's models cited above. The mediaeval period
both increasingly prepared the way for the crisis regarding truth
and certainty in modern thought and at the same time postponed
its emergence by the presence of factors already mentioned. As
we shall have occasion to notice later, the utilization of formal
or rational coherence in the mediaeval understanding of truth
differs in certain significant aspects from nominally similar
coherence in modern thought, both with respect to presuppositions
and method.
(3.4) We have already alluded to the course that the corres¬
pondence theory of truth has taken in modern empiricism, logical
atomism and positivism. A number of elements have been respon¬
sible for the development of the correspondence theory that led
to phenomenalism. Some of the difficulty has arisen from the
attempt to present a too precise and sophisticated account of
the nature of the congruence or conformity between the statement
or judgement and the fact or state of affairs. Ledger Wood
speaks of the correspondence theory in terms of congruence:
Truth may be defined as the correspondence - or as I shall
prefer to designate it, the congruence - between the mean¬
ing of a proposition and a factual situation. Congruence,
the crucial conception in the definition, is an unique
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harmony or accord between meaning and fact which eludes
precise definition and description.1
Leibniz, Russell, and Wittgenstein, among others, have sought
to achieve just such a precise description, viz., in the 1:1
relation between the parts of two aggregates. On the one side
there were the logical, linguistic, or psychical elements or
particulars and on the other the sense objects or physical
particulars. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein asserts that in a
logical picture each element must serve as a representative or
name of an object. We are reminded here of Aristotle*s affec¬
tions of the soul or concepts which are joined or separated to
correspond with connexions in reality and also of the elements
of Leibniz's Monads. One of the problems in such theory was to
make explicit the nature of these elements or particulars so
that the theory could be made intelligible. How could these
atomic elements and particulars be identified and then on what
grounds and in what manner are they related; Other problems
have arisen where correspondence theory has been combined with
a theory of representative perception. Wood makes reference to
this problem.
The conventional criticism of the correspondence theory is
that if truth is a relation between ideas or sense-data as
immediately given and an extramental object, the correspon¬
dence could never be confirmed, since its confirmation would
■1-L. Wood, "Knowledge, Meaning and Truth," Contemporary
Philosophic Problems, ed. Y. H. Krikorian and A. Edel (New York:
Macmillan, 1959), p. 225.
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require the direct comparison of the idea with its object-
a comparison which is precluded by the inaccessibility of
the object to direct inspection.1
The failure to realize confirmation has been the inevitable out¬
come where a correspondence theory of truth has been accompanied
by a scepticism which doubts the existence of an extra-mental
world, other minds, and the existence or identity of the self.
It is not difficult to see how such problems have forced those
who have introduced them to retreat to formal logic and to dif¬
ferent types of phenomenalism. One can imagine similar problems
in St. Augustine*s and in St. Thomas* epistemology if there had
been absent the contact or connection between the intellect and
things via intelligibility, which compensated for their theories
which in turn foreshadowed in certain respects representative
perception. E. Gilson says: "In any event there could be no
intellection unless the sensible object known were endowed with
its own proper intelligibility."2
(3.4.1) Modern correspondence theory has found itself in
an extremely difficult position when holding to theories of repre¬
sentation in perception and cognition generally, while at the
same time not being able to posit an intelligible extra-mental
world. Mediaeval thought was able to overcome its problematic
of a mutable fleeting sensible world through appeal to the
1Ibid., p. 224.
2E. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, trans.
A. H. C. Downes (London: Sheed & Ward, 1936), p. 239.
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intelligible. The empiricist denies himself this appeal. Even
when the empiricist, as a kind of realist, believes that there
are particular minds in the midst of a real and extra-mental
external world, problems regarding the accessibility of this
world and the possibility of knowledge may prove insuperable.
The possibility of knowledge of things is considered questionable
on the basis of such doctrines as the dualism of sense-data and
physical objects or things and the dualism of ideas or thought
and a material world. Those holding such doctrines are forced
in the direction of the abandonment of truth claims. G.R.G. Mure
says of the empiricist:
But it gradually dawns on him that to talk about the appear¬
ance of a totally unknown reality is still question-begging,
and he is forced to retreat further and confess that the
sensuous imagery which arises in us (or, indeed, the speech
which we find ourselves uttering) is not the appearance of
any ulterior reality but just-appearance. He becomes a
fully fledged (or fully plucked) phenomenalist.1
In this connection A. C. Ewing says of the correspondence theory:
The theory must not be worded in such a way as to imply that
we are never aware of the real but only of our judgements
or propositions. If that were the case, we could never know
that they did correspond. You cannot tell by inspecting a
photograph whether it is a good likeness of a person you
have never seen.2
It can be said that the presupposition of a problematical
dualism determines to a considerable degree metaphysical or
^G. R. G. Mure, Retreat from Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958),
p. 166.
2A. C. Ewing, The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy (Lon¬
don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 55.
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epistemological views which are offered as solutions to assumed
problems. It is important to observe regarding the understand¬
ing of truth in the mediaeval period that certain prior meta¬
physical and epistemological beliefs prevented or precluded the
occurrence of problems that have been determinative in the
formulation of a considerable amount of theory in modern thought.
However, it must be said that those mediaeval doctrines that pre¬
cluded certain problems which have appeared in modern thought
were often themselves responses to other prior assumed diffi¬
culties. But it must be kept in mind that a considerable num¬
ber of mediaeval realist and idealist epistemological doctrines
were grounded not in a presupposed problem but in prior less
critical and more belief-ful conceptions regarding things, the
real, and their knowability. One such doctrine is that of the
adaeouatio between the understanding and the thing. These more
optimistic beliefs stand in contrast to the more pessimistic
and critical modern theories that question or reject the possi¬
bility of adaeauatio and other realist beliefs. Such modern
critical theories may generate special difficulties by having
presupposed, from the beginning, a highly questionable and
problematical relation of self over against the world and
extra-mental reality. St. Augustine's intelligible-sensible
dichotomy could be considered a harbinger of such dualisms as
mind-matter and psychical elements-sensible particulars. Further
difficulty arises where there is an attempt, as in Wittgenstein's
5S
logical atomism, to formulate or to understand correspondence
in terms of strict ismorphic picturing.
(3.4.2) L. Wittgenstein, in a radical and unrelenting
fashion, faces up to certain of the consequences of his picture
theory formulated in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein feels com¬
pelled to move beyond the solipsism of subjective idealism and
linguistic solipsism to the shrinkage of the self of solipsism
in an extensionless point and the 'absolutizing1 and 'objecti-
fication' of "my world.'1 He says:
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides
with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an
extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated
with it.l
There are adherents of correspondence theory who reject what they
consider to be a naive realism but who at the same time do not
follow through to the final consequences of their position.
Wittgenstein says further: "I am my world. (The microcosm.)"2
Then later he adds: "As in death, too, the world does not change,
but ceases."3 Wittgenstein would do away with the self of solip¬
sism and be left with the reality coordinated with it. This is
his "pure realism."" This "realism" however must be understood
in the context of the self of solipsism and its world. The
lL. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.64, ed.
C.K.O., introd. B. Russell (London: Routledge 4 Kegan Paul Ltd.,
1949), p. 153.
2Ibid. 5.63, p. 151.
3Ibid. 6.431, p. 1S5.
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mediaeval intelligible world was wholly different from this
world. David Favrholt, who in An Interpretation and Critique
of Wittgenstein's Tractatus presents Wittgenstein's logical
picture of a fact as a "thought" in contrast to Stenius' inter¬
pretation of the picture as a "propositiondiscusses Wittgen¬
stein's solipsism and speaks of two lines leading to his solip¬
sism:
The first one begins with the fact that only one language
can exist. This language is my language and it has limits.
Because it has limits, the logical space and consequently
the world have limits too. From this, however, it does not
follow, as Wittgenstein thought, that the world is my world.
This assertion is not well-founded unless we take the
second line leading to solipsism into consideration. This
line begins in a type of realism from which by means of
Berkeleyan arguments one is led to idealism and solipsism
which in this case is an epistemological solipsism as
Wittgenstein distinguished between the subject and the
world. Even the statement 'I am my world' does not wipe
out this distinction.1
In accordance with Wittgenstein's solipsism a question pertain¬
ing to 'the world in itself' is nonsensical because the expres¬
sion itself is nonsensical. Wittgenstein's problem in his
solipsism is grounded in a "gnoseological dualism/'1 which is
intrinsic to the picture theory, and what he calls "my world.^
Wittgenstein therefore faces what is called "the egocentric pre¬
dicament, ° from which one escapes only by way of a violation of
the professed solipsism. To give expression to his solipsism,
1D. Favrholdt. An Interpretation and Critique of Wittgen¬
stein's Tractatus (Copenhagen: Kunksgaard, 1964), pp. 161-162.
60
the solipsist must take up a perspective outside "his world"
and he thereby contradicts his own theory. A. Maslow, according
to Favrholdt, in A Study in Wittgenstein's Tractatus has brought
this fallacy to light. This means that thorough-going solipsism
may be believed but cannot be validated.
In order to keep his picture theory intact and remain con¬
sistent with his logical theory Wittgenstein posits his meta¬
physical subject-the philosophical self. The metaphysical sub¬
ject, which is other than the empirical ego, does not think or
speak but only "sees." For if the metaphysical subject could
put into words the relationship of the picture and the fact,
which relationship is determinative for the truth claim, we
would be involved in an infinite regress. Favrholdt says of
Wittgensteins "metaphysical subject":
Even if he had not introduced this concept in the Tracta¬
tus we would arrive at it as a consequence of the thesis
of extensionality and the picture theory. For if we pre¬
suppose that propositions are either true of f sic 1 false
and in addition to this deny the possibility of intensional
relations between propositions, we are compelled to accept
that the truth-value of a proposition can only be fixed by
a proposition and a fact. Hence there must be a kind of
knowledge which cannot be said or thought and therefore
cannot be related to the empirical ego.!
Our present concern, however, is not with the functioning of the
"metaphysical subject" as much as with the need for positing the
"metaphysical subject" and the implicit refutation of a consis¬
tent solipsism. Wittgensteinfs solipsism is ineffable and no
^Ibid.. pp. 165-166.
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sensible formulation of it can even be given because of his
theory of picturing and his theory of logic and meaning. We
direct our attention to Wittgenstein's picturing theory or
logical theory only to show that in order to make truth claims
possible it is necessary for him to posit the "metaphysical sub¬
ject," thereby rendering inconsistent his solipsism. The inevi¬
tability of some kind of solipsism seems to be determined already
in the early stages of the formulation of the picture theory.
It would seem that the attempt to formulate a 1:1 relationship
between a logical picture and a fact so restricts that which is
pictured that correspondence with certain facets of reality is
precluded. Favrholdt says: "Hence, Wittgenstein's picture theory
apparently rejects all talk of physical continuity, indivisi¬
bility, time and space." An atomistic view of the world com¬
plicates matters still further, and this, coupled with all the
difficulties involved in the attempt to structure the "world" in
terms of "logical space/ promotes scepticism and the abandon¬
ment of truth understood as correspondence.
(3.4.3) If a correspondence theory of truth is to keep from
developing into sheer phenomenalism and solipsism one must hold
certain beliefs regarding the possibility of ascertaining truth
and making truth claims. Beliefs that make truth claims prob¬
lematical must be examined. For instance, it must be pointed
out that consistent ontological and epistemological solipsism
llbid., p. 69.
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can hardly be formulated without serious inconsistency. It
would seem that solipsistic affirmations have to presuppose non-
solipsistic, even realist moments. To believe that the self is
acquainted only with its own ideas and sensations is a sure way
of undercutting the notion of cognitive or logical truth under¬
stood in terms of correspondence. Of course, to believe that
only the self exists precludes truth understood as correspondence.
However, as already intimated, if one is to demonstrate and to
know with certainty that the self only know/is its own ideas and
that only the self exists one must know more than his own thoughts
and sensations. This is impossible. On the other hand, a naive
type of realism assumes that the cognitive subject can know the
thing itself even though media may be involved. A 'realist'
epistemology which affirms that human knowledge, thought, and
experience deal directly with things to be known and experienced,
while at the same time teaching that such knowledge is not a
copy of the thing or a 1:1 correspondence with the state of
affairs, appears as an alternative to those theories of coher¬
ence and correspondence discussed above.
(3.4.4) In mediaeval realism, as we shall have ample oppor¬
tunity to note, a great deal of effort is spent in formulating
and describing the fundamental ontological context which makes
it possible for the intellect or understanding itself to enter
into a right relation with the being of things. Mediaeval epis¬
temology as a whole is considered by the modern critical analyt¬
ical mind to be naive and uncritical in believing that the
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intellect is present in the midst of an intelligible world, and
that the mind and things exist in a state of potential readiness
for one another. It must also be stressed that in mediaeval
thought the critique of knowledge, truth, and questions of
methodology were looked upon as very much reflexive and secon¬
dary, posterior to the act of knowing things which is primary
and the foundation of a critique. The possibility therefore of
the truth of a thought or proposition or judgement is something
that is believed and accepted on the basis of a real connexion
between the knowing subject and reality. It was believed and
taken for granted that there was a real adequation of the mind
and things themselves. There is not present here the urgent
need to introduce a Wittgensteinian "metaphysical subject" or
"philosophical selfg a Cartesian absolutely good Being who sub¬
stantiates our sensible experience, the angelic viewpoint, or an
absolute self-awareness, for it is believed that ontologically
prior to the comparing of a statement or proposition with an
actual state of affairs, and the recognition of its truth or
falsity, there is the existent and cognitive subject which is
open to and in touch with the intelligible order.
4. M. Heidegger's understanding of 'truth'
(4.1) Heidegger touches upon questions pertaining to 'truth'
and 'being' throughout his works. For our present purpose, how¬
ever, we refer primarily to Being; and Time and his essay "On the
Essence of Truth." We shall make allusions to other works as
discussed in W. J. Richardson's study of Heidegger. Reference
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is made at this juncture to Heidegger's understanding of truth
and related questions of being and logic not primarily for its
own sake, but as an aid in constructing a critical framework
which can serve as a context in which the really significant
problems can be brought into the open. It is also helpful to
see Heidegger's treatment of truth in comparison to those dis¬
cussed above, thereby noting the contrasts and also the points
of intersection. We hope to see why Heidegger does not seem
to be beset by all the noetic and logical difficulties dis¬
cussed above, afc least not to the same degree. It should become
evident that this is due in part to Heidegger's point of depar¬
ture and his critique of certain metaphysical assumptions that
have come to be accepted without question.
Heidegger is an ontologist who has utilized the methods
and materials of phenomenalism and existentialism. According
to Heidegger's own clarification of terms and definitions in
Being and Time, he is concerned with something beyond 'exis¬
tence' itself and therefore one cannot simply categorize him
with 'existentialists' in general. As he says:
The question of existence is one of Dasein's ontical 'affairs'.
This does not require that the ontological structure of
existence should be theoretically transparent. The question
about that structure aims at the analysis (Auseinanderlegung]
of what constitutes existence. The context (zusammenhangj
of such structures we call "existentialitv." Its analytic
has the character of an understanding which is not exis-
tentiell, but rather existential.^
Heidegger, Being and Time. H. 12.
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Heidegger therefore directs his attention to existence only to
go beyond it. Heidegger, under the impact of Husserl, employs
a 'phenomenological' method of investigation. This method is
based on an understanding of Phanomen as that which shows-itself-
in-itself. As Heidegger says: "Thus the term 'phenomenology'
expresses a maxim which can be formulated as 'To the things them¬
selves '."1 Heidegger says further: "Phenomenological truth (the
disclosedness of Being) is Veritas transcendentalis."2 In empha¬
sizing the basic theme of philosophy he says:
Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosoph¬
ical disciplines among others. These terms characterize
philosophy itself with regard to its object and its way of
treating that object.3
Heidegger's concern from the beginning is to seek to dis¬
cern the meaning of 'Being' and he proposes to do this by way of
a phenomenological analytic of Dasein. We cannot begin to deal
here the nature and validity of his method of phenomenological
analysis of Dasein as the via to fundamental ontology. Neither
is our present interest to investigate Heidegger's conclusions
regarding the Being of Dasein as Care rooted in temporality,
except insofar as it involves disclosedness and truth. Heidegger
makes explicit that his intention is to proceed phcnomenologically
by way of the Being of Dasein to fundamental ontology and beyond
that to the sense of Being itself. Heidegger's program is to be
distinguished from Kant's inasmuch as Kant was interested in the
1Ibid.. H. 2d. 2Ibid., H. 3d. 3Ibid.
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ontological structure of the reason in the form of the Critique
of Pure Reason, whereby cognition is rendered possible and
achieved. Heidegger begins, however, with an analysis and
investigation not of man's reason but of Dasein as Being-in-
the-world or man in his totality and this is the point of de¬
parture for a fundamental ontology and the exploration of Being.
As Richardson says:
For Kant, what are the conditions which render possible the
ontological synthesis (transcendence) of finite reason?
For Heidegger, what is the relation between the radical
finitude of man and the comprehension of Being as such?1
Heidegger, therefore, has in mind the question of Being through¬
out his ontological analysis of Dasein. which achieves "authentic
self-Being" and "Being-authentically-in-the-world" through "re¬
solve. ^ Heidegger's phenomenological study of Dasein. whose
essence lies in its existence, is therefore not undertaken for
its own sake but by reason of its existential priority and its
constitutive propensity for metaphysics. As Werner Brock says:
"But Dasein is envisaged in the light of 'Being' and not pri¬
marily as a theme and 'transcendental object' of human conscious¬
ness and 'subjectivity'."2 This is just what Heidegger affirms
at the close of Being and Time (2nd section):
Nevertheless, our way of exhibiting the constitution of
!w. J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to
Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 33.
o
W. Brock, "An Account of Being and Time," Existence and
Being bv Martin Heidegger (London: Vision Press, 1949), p. 33.
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Dasein's Being remains only one way which we may take. Our
aim is to work out the question of Being in general. The
thematic analytic of existence, however, first needs the
light of the idea of Being in general, which must be clari¬
fied beforehand.1
Although much influenced by Kant, Heidegger makes clear, in
speaking of Kant's failure with respect to the problematic of
Temporality, that he is to be set apart from Kant:
There were two things that stood in his way: in the first
place, he altogether neglected the problem of Being; and,
in connection with this, he failed to provide an ontology
with Dasein as its theme or (to put this in Kantian lan¬
guage) to give a preliminary ontological analytic of the
subjectivity of the subject.*
It is important to note at this point that having completed
the first two sections of Part One of Being and Time. Heidegger
did not complete the third which was to have been entitled "Time
and Being" and in which temporality or primordial time was to
have been investigated as a way to the meaning of Being. Here¬
after we have what is called the 'reversal' in Heidegger's
thought. After having analyzed Basein as a way to the sense or
meaning of Being in which the Being Dasein was seen as Being-in-
the-world, as Care grounded in Temporality, and Being-authenti-
cally-in-the-world in terms of Resoluteness, Heidegger against
this background focused on Being itself, in other words, a Being-
centered problematic for which preparation had been made in Sein
lalnd Zeit. Kant und das Problem der Metaphvsik. and Vom Wesen des
Grundes. In Was ist Metanhvsik? Heidegger systematically raises
■^Heidegger, Being and Time, H. 436. ^Ibid,, H. 24
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the question about "Das Nichts" and the ontological difference
between Non-being and beings. The question about Non-being, which
becomes manifest in and through anxiety, and the attempt to answer,
provides a strangeness of beings and is therefore the beginning
of a finite attempt to ponder Being in its truth.
Throughout the above mentioned works Being comes to be
thought of as Truth or as unveiledness of the Being of beings.
However, according to Richardson, in Being and Time. Kant and the
Problem of Metaphysics, and The Essence of Ground the focus of
attention is still upon Dasein. that transcendence which makes
possible access to Being. In What is Metaphysics? the question
of Non-being calls for the Being of beings. In Vom Wesen der
Wahrheit Heidegger makes more explicit that Being is to be thought
of in terms of truth as uncovering, of das Seiende. Heidegger
states in An Introduction to Metarlv .'ics: "In showing itself, the
unconcealed as such comes to stand. Truth as un-concealment is
not an appendage to being. Truth is inherent in the essence of
being."1
Heidegger proceeds then in the direction of what has been
called "foundational thought" or There-beingTs meditation on
Being as the process of truth. We shall inquire further into
the exposition of such thought in the essay "On the Essence of
Truth" to note how he proceeds to ground thought and logical
iHeidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 102.
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truth by exploring primordial truth. In giving our attention
to this process of thought we shall be availing ourselves of
a specific instance of the grounding of 'truth' which can serve
to recall and retrieve forgotten emphases in past doctrines of
truth and being. This discussion should also provide a prepar¬
atory framework which will facilitate the acquiring of an aware¬
ness of the subtle progression and movement in the understanding
of 'truth' as it is applied to being, to beings, to thought, and
to statements.
(4.2) In his essay "On the Essence of Truth" Heidegger goes
beyond the understanding of truth that we find in Being and
Time. In the latter Heidegger does set forth the derivative
character of truth understood in terms of adaeauatio and con-
venientia but he does not really go further than grounding it
primordially in Dasein. 'Truth' is defined as "uncoveredness,"
"Being-uncovering/' "disclosedness./" and such belongs to the
very constitution of Dasein. As Heidegger says:
Being-true as Being-uncovering*, is a way of Being for
Dasein. . . . But disclosedness is that basic character
of Dasein according to which it is its "there".1
Truth, understood in the most primordial sense, belongs to
the basic constitution of Dasein. The term signifies an
existentiale.2
In the essay on truth Heidegger, however, goes on to describe
the nature of truth as freedom, which is not a property that
man has, but instead, "freedom, or ex-sistent, revelatory Da-sein
^Heidegger, Being and Time. H. 220. H. 226
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possesses man and moreover in so original a manner that it
alone confers upon him that relationship with what-is-in-totality
which is the basis and distinctive characteristic of his history.
Freedom therefore is not "the random ability to do as we please"
or "licence." This ex-sistent freedom in turn springs from the
"original essence of truth, from the reign of mystery in error."2
Richardson gives the following resume':
The essence of truth as conformity lies in ek-sistent free¬
dom as the pre-predicative disclosure of the Open in which
judge and that-which-is-judged may meet. But ek-sistent
freedom, in turn, resides in the originating truth of this
Open itself which comports its own negativity (mystery,
errance).3
It is from such a position that Heidegger considers the so-
called conventional understanding of truth. He has in mind the
correspondence theory of truth which was formulated in the medi¬
aeval period as adaeauatio rei et intellectus. Heidegger makes
reference to its twofold signification, i.e., the correspon¬
dence of a thing with its idea and the correspondence of that
which is intended by the statement with the thing itself. Un¬
truth then is a failure to agree in either case. It can be
said at this point that Heidegger*s critique regarding the "tra¬
ditional conception of truth" is more applicable to this con¬
ception of truth in certain of its formulations and contexts
than in others.
■'■Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," p. 336.
^Ibid.. p. 347. ^Richardson, on. cit.. p. 254.
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While Heidegger does allow for the application of 'truth*
and 'falseness* to the statement or proposition, he neither
believes that the proposition is the sole or even the essential
or original place of 'truth' nor does he accept the traditional
conception of truth without providing his own qualifications.
"Thus the traditional practice of attributing truth exclusively
to the statement as its sole and essential place of origin, falls
to the ground. Truth does not possess its original seat in the
proposition."! In the chapter on untruth and error he says:
"What we ordinarily understand by 'wrong' and moreover, accord¬
ing to the teachings of philosophy-namely the wrongness (Unrich-
tigheit) of a judgement and the falseness of a perception, is
only one, and that the most superficial, way of erring."2
Heidegger really chooses the traditional conception of truth,
as set forth in the mediaeval adaequatio. as a point of depar¬
ture from which he proceeds to his formulation of truth as
Being- the negatived das Qffene. Heidegger speaks of the old
traditional conception of propositional truth "according to
which truth is the likeness or agreement (Uebereinstimmung:
r / . « / .
ouoccuprcs ) of a statement ( ) to or with a given
thing ( n-pvy lka. ). "3 Heidegger doesn't give much attention to
the ontological ground of the mediaeval understanding of truth
although he does make reference to "objective truth!' "Admittedly
■^■Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," p. 329.
2Ibid.. pp. 345-346. 3Ibid., p. 326.
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the above definition is usually employed only in the formula:
Veritas est adaeouatio intellectus ad rem. Yet truth so under¬
stood, i.e. propositional truth, is only possible on the basis
of objective truth, the adaeouatio rei ad intellectum.
Heidegger is eager to move on to propositional truth and its
"agreement" and "likeness" which he will analyze and critically
evaluate in anticipation of his own formulation of truth.
Heidegger does make reference, as manifest in the quotation
above, to Objective' 'truth1, i.e., the "approximation" of the
thing to its idea in the divine intellectus and the approxi¬
mation of thought to thing. This he speaks of as a "sich
richten nach" of the statement with the thing and of the thing
with its idea. Heidegger says of the approximation of thought
to thing and the thing to its idea in the divine understanding:
"Both conceptions of the nature of Veritas always imply 'putting
oneself right by' (sich richten nach) something and thus con¬
ceive truth as rightness (Hichtigkeit)."2 In connection with
Richtigkeit Heidegger doesn't name St. Anselm.
Although Heidegger does therefore make limited reference
to the ground or possibility of the cognitive and logical truth
stipulated in the mediaeval formula, he is particularly interested
in the logical elements of propositional Richtigkeit or Ueberein-
stimmung and seeks to show what they can not mean and what they
can mean. Because of a great number of foundational and trans-
J-Ibid.. p. 322-323. 2Ibid., p. 323.
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cendental factors, propositional or logical truth does not
reach the problematical dimensions in the thought of St. Augus¬
tine, St. Anselm, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Heidegger, that it
has in much of modern correspondence theory. This formal like¬
ness must not be taken to minimize the considerable material
difference between the following juxtaposed terms as used by
Heidegger and the mediaevals respectively.1 substantia1 and 'Dasein'.
'
cx X 77 9 e c tx 1 and 'veritas'. fex-sistere' and Tesse'. ' <£> v <r i s ' and
'natural 'das Seiende im Ganzen'and "res'or'ens'. Heidegger's r3einr
and the fDeus' of mediaeval thought. Mediaeval theologians
found such terms as 'adaequatio'. ''conveniens', and 'rectitudo1 work¬
able and suitable for the explanation of both objective, cog¬
nitive, and logical truth because of res intelligibiles. both
transcendent and immanent, and because of the fact that "veritas
est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis.Mediaeval episte-
mology did not have to cope with all the problematics that
Heidegger cites for propositional truth simply because propo¬
sitional truth was grounded in adaeouatio. conformitas. or
similitudo between mens or intellectus and res, which was possible
on the basis of species intelligibilis.2 E. Gilson gives a
brief statement of this facet of Thomist epistemology:
In short, the adequation between thing and intellect set
up by the judgement, always presupposes a prior adequation
between concept and thing, and this, in its turn, is based
•*-St. Anselm, De Veritate 11; AO(Schmitt) 1:191.
^Cf. St. Thomas, De Veritate 1.1,2.
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upon a real adequation of the intellect and the object
informing it.l
Gilson speaks further regarding the grounding of logical truth
or of the judgement: "And that is why, being founded on a real
relation, it has no need to ask how it shall rejoin reality."
Heidegger makes reference to some of the more obvious dis¬
similarities between a statement and a thing, namely, material,
structural, formal, and the functional unlikenesses like that
between a coin and the statement "this coin is round." This is
helpful as a via neeativa. Heidegger raises the following
questions in charting a positive course.
What else is tacitly posited in this relational totality of
the adaequatio intellectus et rei? And what ontological
character does that which is thus posited have itself?.*
Heidegger rightfully asserts that as long as this Relationship*
is left indeterminate it is difficult to discuss and assess it
further. It appears that the use of such words as 'agreement',
'likeness*, and 'approximation' for the relation between state¬
ment and thing may further complicate the problem and mislead.
Heidegger makes manifest his clear preference for other words
such as 'Richtigkeit'. '. rschlossenheit'. Entdeckung'. 'Sehen-
lassen'. 'Vorstellung'. and later 'Preiheit' and 'das Qffene*.
Already in the "Introduction" of Being and Time Heidegger made
clear his notion of what the primary sense of 'truth* is not:
«——■ ■ i ■ n urn—■iin i ————— ■ i —— mi i ii ■ ai m hi w——
■4s. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 237.
2Ibid., p. 238. -^Heidegger, Being and Time. H. 215.
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Furthermore, because the 2 oV os is a letting-something-
be seen, it can therefore be true or false. But here every¬
thing depends on our steering clear of any conception of
truth which is construed in the sense of Agreement'. This
idea is by no means the primary one in the concept of
C* 2 cx
Heidegger makes amply clear the course that he intends to pur¬
sue. He intends to expose the ontologically derivative charac¬
ter of the traditional conception of truth by exploring the pri¬
mordial phenomenon of truth. The derivative character of logical
truth is not always clearly recognized and propositional truth
becomes, therefore, more and more determinative. This is the
development that Heidegger would reverse in the direction of
being.
Heidegger sees the "traditional conception of truth" as a
derivation from interpretation and its structure, which is depen¬
dent upon understanding, and this in turn is dependent upon Da-
seinTs disclosedness. "Thus the roots of the truth of assertion
reach back to the disclosedness of the understanding."2 To Da-
sein's disclosedness discourse is essential and Dasein as a Being-
towards entities expresses itself in assertions about beings that
have been uncovered. The uncoveredness of the entity is there¬
fore preserved and is something that is zuhanden. Thereafter
one can appropriate the uncoveredness without onefs own uncovering.
Both assertion and the entities uncovered then are ready-at-
hand or present-at-hand. The relation between assertion and
J-Ibid.. H. 33. 2Ibid.. H. 223.
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entity is itself present-at-hand. The relation comes forward
because there is in the assertion the preserved uncoveredness
and the entity uncovered. But the uncoveredness itself becomes
the present-at-hand conformity of assertion to entity.^ Uncov¬
eredness (Bntdecktheit) of the entity becomes, therefore, a
relationship present-at-hand between intellectus and res or
assertion and the entity.
Truth as disclosedness and as a Being-towards uncovered
entities—a Being which itself uncovers — has become truth
as agreement between things which are present-at-hand within-
the-world. And thus we have pointed out the ontologically
derivative character of the traditional conception of truth.2
Heidegger accounts for the predominance of the "traditional con¬
ception of truth" by reason of the fact that Dasein naturally
tends to understand itself in terms of that which is ontically
proximate and so encountered within-the-world while that which
is ontologically prior remains hidden. Uncoveredness is encoun¬
tered in the first instance in the expression or assertion as
that which is present-at-hand, just as our understanding of Being
is that of presence-at-hand, so the question whether this kind
of Being of truth is a primordial one cannot even arise.
The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by
DaseinTs very understanding of Being — that understanding
which is proximallv the one that prevails, and which even
today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle.
Truth, then, is encountered in the first instance in that which
is actually nearest us and when considered ontologically in the
1Ibid., H. 224. 2Ibid.. H. 225. 3Ibid.
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manner closest to us it comes to be thought of as an assertion
about something or an uncoveredness of something. Heidegger
affirms that the primordial understanding of truth was present
among the Greeks, including Aristotle, even though they devel¬
oped a branch of knowledge in which Being came to be understood
in the way closest to us, viz., as Vorhandenheit. presence-at-
hand. Thus it became extremely difficult to uncover or recover
the primordial understanding of truth.
How does Heidegger propose to get back to the primordial
phenomenon of truth? In accordance with his phenomenological
method pursued in Being; and Time. Heidegger starts with that
which is present-at-hand. In this case there is need for a
clarification of the kind of being which belongs to knowledge
itself. In such an analysis the phenomenon of truth must be
considered as a characteristic of knowledge. Heidegger believes
that truth will be made phenomenally explicit in the demonstra¬
tion of knowledge as truth. In order, however, for the question
regarding truth to be asked some understanding is presupposed.
Heidegger notes this at the beginning of his essay on the es¬
sence of truth: "But in calling for real 'truth* we must al¬
ready know what in fact is meant by truth. Or do we only know
by 'feeling' and in a 'general' sort of way?"l
Heidegger makes reference to the problematic of the subject-
Object relation, the ideal content-Real thing, and the ideal
"'"Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," pp. 320-321.
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content-Real act of judgement relations, and questions the
validity of even posing such ontologically unclarified sepa¬
rations. Heidegger, by way of finite transcendence which is
for him the basic state of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, seeks
in an ontological fashion to reach a pre-subject-object com¬
portment. "Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-
the-world. Thus Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be
Interpreted beforehand."I This helps to explain Heidegger's
critique of the above dichotomies in seeking to clarify the
kind of being that belongs to knowledge and the relationship
of agreement between assertion and entity. Heidegger says
regarding a true assertion that it refers to the Thing itself
and not a psychological "representation (Vorstellung)." In
the essay on the essence of truth Heidegger states that "the
representative statement has its say about the thing repre¬
sented, stating it to be such as it is. This 'such-as' (so-
wie) applies to the representation and what it represents."2
In Being and Time it is put thus: "Asserting is a way of Being
towards the Thing itself that is."3 It is most evident there¬
fore that the statement or assertion represents or presents
(Vorstellen) the object itself so that as an object it assumes
a position over against us. What then can the demonstration of
^Heidegger, Being and Time, H. 62.
^Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth." p. 327.
^Heidegger, Being and Time, H. 218.
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the true assertion teach us about the relationship of "agree¬
ment?"
Nothing else than that this Thing is. the very entity which
one has in mind in one's assertion .... What gets demon¬
strated is the Being-uncovering of the assertion ....
The entity itself which one has in mind shows itself .lust as
it is in itself; that is to say, it shows that it, in its
selfsameness, is just as it; gets pointed out in the assertion
as being—just as it gets uncovered as being.1
Heidegger states:
The Being-true(truth)of the assertion must be understood as
Being-uncovering.* Thus truth has by no means the structure
of an agreementbetween knowing and the object in the sense
of a likening of one entity (the subject) to another (the
Object).2
The true assertion therefore is one that uncovers, presents, or
represents the entity, and what is demonstrated is the Entdeckt-
sein of the entity itself as pointed out in the assertion. The
"Being-uncovering" in turn is grounded ontologically in Dasein
in its basic state of "Being-in-the-world." We have traced the
transition from the conception of truth as "agreement" to truth
as "Being-uncovered," "Being-uncovering" and the Entborgenheit
and Entbergung of what-is. Let us observe how Heidegger probes
deeper into the "existential-ontological foundations of uncover¬
ing."
(4.3) The understanding of truth as "revealment" and "non-
concealment" marks Heidegger's whole discussion of truth, from
the truth of the assertion to the "Being-uncovering" of Dasein
1Ibid. 2Ibid.. H. 216-219.
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and further to Sein. "Truth is the manifestness of the essent."l
"Truth as un-concealment is not an appendage to being. Truth is
inherent in the essence of being,Heidegger, however, becomes
more and more preoccupied with Being itself in terms of the
question as to 'truth1, but there are intermediate steps to be
considered which are already set forth in the analytic of Dasein.
Without dealing with all the particulars of the analysis we
shall try to sketch the progression of thought from propositional
truth to truth as ontological ground itself. We have already
seen that Heidegger stresses the ontologically derivative char¬
acter of the present-at-hand conformity between the present-at-
hand assertion and the present-at-hand entity. Ontologically
prior is Being-uncovering which is a way of Being for Dasein and
this is the uncovering of entities. Heidegger says of the un¬
covered entities:
They are 'true' in a second sense. What is primarily 'true'
— that is, uncovering—is Dasein. "Truth" in the second
sense does not mean Being- uncovering* (uncovering), but
Being-uncovered (uncoveredness).3
From predicative truth we bring our attention to the un¬
covered entities themselves which are what in fact are presented
and manifested in the predication made. However, what is pri¬
marily 'true* is Dasein in its mode of Being-uncovering. One
must be careful to note shifts in sense in Heidegger's rather
unconventional and somewhat strange word usage as he seeks to
^Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics. p. 21.
^Ibid.. p. 102. ^Heidegger, Bein/r and Time. H. 220.
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lay bare ontological foundations. When 'true' is applied to
Dasein, therefore, 'true' denotes certain ways in which Dasein
comports itself with respect to entities and objects, whereby
the thing itself becomes manifest and assertion or representa¬
tion is made possible. One must keep in mind that for Heidegger
'truth' is used primarily with the sense of "revealment/'
which is of the essence of Being or Being itself. Heidegger's
thought is misinterpreted if one continues to consider the
primary sense of 'truth' to be that of agreement or conformity,
whether between thought and object, statement and entity, or
entity and its intelligible idea. Neither does 'truth' refer
to beings as beings, mere state of affairs or things that are
present-at-hand (Vorhandenes). If 'truth' is applied to enti¬
ties within-the-world, it has reference to such beings in their
"uncoveredness." 'Truth' therefore is said to be used in a
more primordial sense when applied to Dasein as Being-uncovering
which is a way of Eeing for Dasein. But one has still to go
further, as Heidegger says: "The most primordial phenomenon of
truth is first shown by the existential-ontolopical foundations
of uncovering."1
This most primordial phenomenon is disclosedness (Ersch-
lossenheit)." which belongs to Dasein essentially and not by
reason of Dasein's choice or discretion. Heidegger states: "But
disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to
llbid.
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which it is, its 'there'. Disclosedness is constituted by
state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse, and pertains
equiprimordially to the world, to Being-in, and to the Self."1
He develops this further by saying: "In so far as Dasein is
its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as
something disclosed to this extent it is essentially 'true'.
Basein is 'in the truthThis very disclosedness of Dasein
lies hidden in the structure of care. What is being affirmed
here is that uncoveredness of entities within the world is
certainly more primordial than the truth of assertion or state¬
ment, but the uncoveredness itself is grounded in the disclosed¬
ness of the World which is the Da or Dasein. i.e., of the very
constitution of Dasein. "This identity of the disclosedness of
the World and the There (luminosity) of There-being is precisely
what constitutes There-being's in-being in the world."3 We can¬
not here explore all that is involved in such disclosedness or
In-Sein. but this is what enables Heidegger to talk about Dasein
being essentially and equiprimordially in the truth and in un¬
truth, the latter due to the falling which belongs as well to
Dasein's state of Being. This means then that both uncovering
and covering belong essentially to Dasein in its disclosedness.
On the basis of such an understanding Heidegger can say that
" There is' truth only in so far as Dasein i s and so long as
Dasein i s. vl+
-*-Ibid. ^Ibid. t h. 221. ^Richardson, on. cit.. p. 59.
^Heidegger, Being and Time. H. 226.
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Therefore, according to Heidegger, it can be said that
before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, which is
not to say that before him there were no such entities as un¬
covered and pointed out by those laws. Entities uncovered
show themselves precisely as entities which beforehand already
were. "Such uncovering is the kind of Being which belongs to
•truth'."x This enables Heidegger to say that truth is rela¬
tive to Dasein's Being, without at the same time saying that
truth is at the mercy or at the discretion of the human subject.
Heidegger clearly states his intention:
For uncovering, in the sense which is most its own, takes
asserting out of the province of Subjective' discretion,
and brings the uncovering Dasein face to face with the
entities themselves.*
Although there is no Being-uncovering apart from Dasein. it is
the very interpretation of truth as uncovering which functions
as a polemic against a subjectivist theory of truth wherein the
locus of truth is the judgment or the thought of a "worldless
subject." The all important factor is that truth as uncovering
is relative to Dasein. whose transcendence precedes ontologieally
any encounter with beings such as we have in cognition. Sub¬
jectivism in which the cognitive subject dominates the object
is rejected here even though truth is said to be relative to
Dasein. It is Dasein and its disclosedness which is prior and
makes possible the subject-object relation.
XIbid.. H. 227. %bid.
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As Richardson states:
There-being is not a subject in relation to an object but
it is this relation itself, sc. that which is 'between'
subject and object. This 'between' is not derived from,
and therefore subsequent to, the juxtaposition of subject
and object, but is prior to the emergence of this relation,
rendering it possible.I
Therefore, only on the basis of Basein can there be a subject
and object juxtaposed. We shall investigate in subsequent
chapters the ontological ground or framework in mediaeval con¬
texts within which and on the basis of which the subject-object
relation has its existence.
(4.4) It is in the essay "On the Essence of Truth" that
Heidegger firmly and explicitly grounds the inner possibility
of truth or Tightness in freedom as the essence of truth or
possibility of truth. The reference to truth as Richtigkeit
is reminiscent of St. Anselm's rectitudo. but they are situ¬
ated in different contexts. Furthermore, the ground for
Tightness is different in each case, for Anselm such Tightness
is founded in God and for Heidegger it is grounded in freedom
and das Offene. There is a difference between the development
of the existential-ontologiral ground of truth in Being and Time
and that in the essay on truth. In Being and Time truth as un¬
covering was situated in Dasein's disclosedness which involved
being in truth and untruth equiprimordially. In the essay on
truth Heidegger begins with the truth of the representative
statement both as Uebereinstiramung and Richtigkeit. with the
Richardson, op. cit.. p. 101.
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latter of the two terms leading to the inner possibility of
Tightness and its basis in freedom. In the essay Heidegger
follows through in the grounding of truth as Tightness or agree¬
ment beyond Dasein and its disclosedness to ex-sistent revela¬
tory Dasein which in turn is situated in the negatived Open it¬
self or Being. As in Being and Time, so in the essay on the
essence of truth there is a going beyond the truth of judgement
to a pre-predicative truth. However, in his earlier treatment
of truth Heidegger saw truth grounded in Dasein's disclosedness
which belonged essentially to Dasein. Truth in its most pri¬
mordial sense was placed in this disclosedness. In Vom Wesen
der Wahrheit Heidegger is preoccupied with the possibility and
basis of truth in its essence and truth for its own sake as
Being. One respect in which this is seen is that we have talk
here of authentic untruth in terms of "mystery^" which is onto-
logically prior to "revealment" itself and therefore prior to
Dasein's being in truth and untruth. Whereas in Being and Time
the inquiry as to 'truth' and 'untruth' was bound to the analytic
°? Dasein. in the essay 'truth' is closely bound to das Seiende
im Ganzen and to the sense of Sein itself. In the essay we have
a further polemic ungainst that subjectivism which arises from
errance as forgetfulness of authentic untruth or mystery which
is the Un-wesen of truth. This forgetfulness of mystery is er¬
rance which is das wesentlicht Gegenwesen of the original essence
of truth. Of the man who forgets he says: "He is the more mis¬
taken the more exclusively he takes himself as the measure of all
$6
things."^- The dominating sense of 'truth' throughout the essay-
continues to be that of "non-concealment" or "revealment" but
more with a view to Being than to beings uncovered. Heidegger
raises the "still unmastered question" regarding das Sein des
Seinden and leaves it open. With respect to Sein. hearing (Horen)
is considered the appropriate response.
We cannot here deal with the manifold issues and problems
found in the essay which would take us too far in many directions.
Our present purpose is served if we consider the basic method
and movement of the thought itself. We have already noted that
Heidegger begins with the question as to the nature, the possi¬
bility, and the basis of the possibility of the truth of state¬
ment as "agreement" or "rightness." The statement is thought of
as a "representation" of the thing itself. To reiterate a ref¬
erence cited earlier: "The representative statement has its say
about the thing represented, stating it to be such as it is.
This 'such-as' (so-wie) applies to the representation and what
it represents.This is also formally analogous to what St.
Anselm says in his treatise on truth concerning the true state¬
ment : "Vere et recta et vera est, cum significat esse quod est."3
In either case the true statement presents or represents the
object. Heidegger speaks of the representation as "letting some-
"h-Ieidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," pp. 343-344.
^Ibid., p. 327. ^St. Anselm, De Veritate 2; AO 1:17$.
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thing take up a position opposite to us, as an ob.lect.
Anselm's ground for the possibility of the right or true state¬
ment shall be seen to be situated in the "Supreme Truth" and
created res, which make possible what for Heidegger is "attune-
ment" (Gestimmtheit). For Heidegger the possibility of such
rightness is rooted in what he calls the "Open" or "Overt" (das
Offene) wherein freedom is operative and Gestimmtheit is achieved.
The connection between Dasein's Erschlossenheit and the Open is
not made decisively explicit. The character of the "Open" is
however described as that area or sphere through which the
thing opposite us carries itself across to us and manifests it¬
self to us as a constant. The "open-ness" of the "Open" is not
created by the representative statement but such a statement
serves to implement a prior comportment realizable because of
the "Open." Dasein as Being-discovering and das Seiende that is
manifest are found in the "Open." It is in the "Open^" that
sphere or matrix of potential relationships, that "something-
that-is-open" can appear as the object of knowledge. It is im¬
portant to note how Heidegger sets his method over against Kant's
transcendental method and conceptual categories. Das Offene is
a positive way of rejecting certain preconceptions regarding con¬
sciousness and knowledge. Heidegger disregards those theories
of consciousness, perception, and reality that would make any
such traversing across such an "Open" highly problematical and
^Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," p. 328.
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questionable. Heidegger's method involves neither a critical
questioning as to the possibility of truth nor an attempt to
prove such a possibility. He proceeds by way of clarification
and analysis on the basis of a number of assumptions. Heidegger
posits that "overt behavior" whereby the being that is manifest
to There-being can become a criterion for the "representative
statement." The true judgement is to be placed in this con¬
text. "The statement derives its Tightness from the overtness
of behavior, for it is only through this that anything manifest
can become the criterion for the approximation implicit in the
representative statement."^ Heidegger's formulation makes it
or
certain that the truthATightness of the statement can be ascer¬
tained, for the judgement itself is dependent on the open-ness
of the Open across which das Seiende comes to us. Heidegger
does not find it necessary in such a context to wrestle with
problems of logical form and the exact character of correspon¬
dence because of his understanding of truth which underlies the
whole discussion, and his founding of the representative state¬
ment and its Tightness in the comportment of Dasein to "(ein
Offenbares als ein solches)."2
The further question has to do with the basis on which such
a comportment with a being that is manifest is founded. For
such a comportment is necessary if there is to be a criterion or
measure according to which judgements can be checked in order to
J-Ibid.. p. 329. 2Ibid.. p. 323
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determine their truth or Tightness. Heidegger is interested in
inquiring deeper into that which makes possible the uncovering
and unveiling of what-is. It is clear that he is directing his
thought to truth as the revealment of beings- in- their- totality
and the Being of beings. However, there are stages on the way.
The basis of this inner possibility of Tightness is "freedom."
"The essence of truth is freedom. "3- This "freedom" does not
abandon truth to the caprice of man for it is not the random
ability to do as we please nor is it licence. Heidegger makes
explicit just what this freedom is:
Freedom was initially defined as freedom for the revelation
of something already overt. . . . The freedom to reveal
something overt lets whatever "is" at the moment be what it
is. Freedom reveals itself as the "letting-be" of what-is.2
This Seinlassen is not disregard or indifference but it is to be
able to be open or overt, to accept a being as it is even as it
is unveiled and open. This freedom then is far from the freedom
to shape and to plan and to do with beings as one pleases. To
be free is to be placed in the midst of the opened, tcx. cx'X &€o> .
the Unconcealed. Such freedom, then, is to be seen as originat¬
ing from -h -h 0the revealedness and revelation of what-
is.
The nature of freedom, seen from the point of view of the
nature of truth, now shows itself as an "exposition" into
the revealed nature of what-is.3
Just as freedom, being the essence of truth, is the ground
for being in the truth, so too untruth must derive in the first
^bid.. p. 330. 2Ibid.. p. 333. 3Ibid., p. 334
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place from the essence of truth and not simply from the finitude
of man. Note here the change in emphasis from the Da to Sein
in Dasein. Heidegger states:
On the contrary, untruth must derive from the essence of
truth. Only because truth and untruth are not in essence
indifferent to one another, can a true proposition contrast
so sharply with its correspondingly untrue proposition.1
The essence of truth being freedom which means participation in
the revealment of what-is-in-totality, the dis-essence or non-
essence of truth is the concealment of what-is-in-totality. It
is in the particular "letting-be" or comportment itself that
das Seiende im Ganzen is concealed. "In the ex-sistent freedom
of Da-sein there is accomplished a dissimulation of what-is in
totality and therein lies the concealment (Verborgenheit)."2
The very exposition into uncovering or emergence into no.n-con-
cealment of beings-as-such-in-the-whole entails concealment
both of beings-in-the-totality and Being, and forgetfulness of
mystery, which is the primary mode of human erring. Just as
truth in its most primordial sense is not a particular comport¬
ment wherein there may be manifest the quiddity of the singular,
so the wrongness of a judgement is the most superficial way of
erring. What then is this mystery or authentic untruth that
pervades the whole of man's Da-sein? First, it is a concealment
which is anterior to all revelation of this or that actuality
and anterior to the Seinlassen which establishes the dissimulation
or concealment. This is the concealment or hidden-ness of the
1Ibid.. pp. 337-33S. 2Ibid.. p. 340
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mystery or the concealed. This is authentic untruth, viz.,
that not even the concealed (Verborgen) is recognized but is con¬
cealed. This is ontologically prior to Dasein*s letting-be.
Dasein. by ex-sisting, reaffirms the most extreme non-revelation
of all, authentic untruth, dis-essence or non-essence of truth,
the mystery. Therefore in letting things be in totality the
concealment itself appears as the initial thing concealed. The
mystery, the authentic non-essence of truth, points into or
denotes the yet unexplored region of the truth of Being(Sein)
as well as the truth of das Seiende. Dasein in letting-things-
be soon forgets the mystery and Dasein consequently ceases
letting-be and dominates beings while at the same time being
dominated by the forgotten mystery which has slipped back into
concealment. This oblivion of the mystery, the failure to
attend to the Being of beings-in-their-totality is human errance
of the first order. The other types of error that consequently
follow are confinement to immediate actualities, the covering
of things as man makes himself the measure, and the wrongness
(Unrichtigheit) of judgment which is a most supe, ficial way of
erring. Dasein therefore is in-sistent as well as ex-sistent.
"In-sisting, man is turned to the most readily accessible part
of what-is."l Dasein. however, can experience its errance and
the forgotten-ness of the mystery and therefore recollect the
mystery. The freedom which is the basis of propositional right-
1Ibid.. p. 344.
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ness arises from the original essence of truth, from the reign
of mystery in error. To recognize errance, thereby becoming
oren to the mystery, is really to begin to inquire as to the
essential nature of truth.
Gazing out of error into the mystery is a questioning in
the sense of the only question that exists: What is that
which is as such in totality? This question meditates the
essentially confusing and, because of its multifarious
aspects, still unmastered question regarding the Being of
what-is (das Sein des Seienden).1
In the concluding section of the essay Heidegger states
explicitly the project for thought which he has had in mind
from the beginning, even when dealing with the understanding of
truth as conformity of statement to thing. In the essay
Heidegger has stressed the non-essence (Unwesen) of truth com¬
posed of mystery, authentic untruth, and errance as forgotten-
ness of the same. This was the concealment of beings-in-their-
totality or concealment of the truth of das Sein des Seienden.
Philosophy as the quest for the complete essence of truth,
which includes also its non-essence, has a two-fold nature:
Its meditations have the calm dignity of gentleness, not
denying the dissimulation of what-is in totality. At the
same time they have the "open resolve" of hardness, which,
while not shattering the dissimulation, forces its essence
whole and intact into the open, into our understanding,
and so to reveal its own truth.*
Recollection of the forgotten mystery therefore is the beginning
of the quest for the manifest character or sense of the Being
of what-is. The constantly recurring dominating theme throughout
1Ibid.. p. 347. 2Ibid.. p. 343.
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the essay, from statement to Eeing, is truth whose essence is
nonconcealment or revelation and whose non-essence is conceal¬
ment. Truth is, moreover, held in close proximity to Being.
As Werner Brock says:
The essay is kept in the utmost possible "nearness to Being".
It is moving in the direction towards it as its goal, as the
end of the Sections 7 and & show as clearly as does the con¬
cluding note. But no premature statement is made about the
truth of Being.
It appears that as we go from Dasein to Sein we also move from
the former's Being-uncovering to its role of attending and being
open to the mystery, which is to pose the Being-question itself.
As Heidegger himself asserts:
The present essay leads the question concerning the nature
of truth beyond the accustomed confines of our fundamental
ideas and helps us to consider whether this question of the
essence of truth is not at the same time necessarily the
question of the truth of essence. Philosophy, however, con¬
ceives "essence" as Being.*
All that has gone before must be considered in this light.
(4.5) It is necessary at this point to draw certain impli¬
cations and inferences from the foregoing which will assist us
in our further investigation. Our present concern is not to
attempt to outline Heidegger's conclusions nor to attempt to
evaluate his methodology and basic formulations, but to make
those observations whereby we shall be better able to know just
what factors are most crucial in a theory of truth.
•%. Brock, "An Account of 'The Four Essays'," Existence and
Being by Martin Heidegger (London: Vision Press, 1949), p. 182.
^Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," p. 350.
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(4.5.1) Throughout his discussion of truth Heidegger makes
it abundantly clear that in order to deal adequately with a
particular theory of truth one must explore the entire philosoph¬
ical or theological system in which the theory is situated and
examine the underlying beliefs and assumptions which are founda¬
tional and rudimentary. As Heidegger says in Being and Time
where he briefly discusses the traditional conception of truth
in reference to its primordial basis: "Here it is not our aim to
provide a history of the concept of truth, which could be pre¬
sented only on the basis of a history of ontology."-'- In the
first section of the essay on truth Heidegger does trace the
accepted formula for the conventional concept of truth back to
its "immediate (i.e. mediaeval) origins." The conventional con¬
cept is here understood as the approximation or agreement of
statement or perception with the object and the correspondence
of the thing or object with its exemplary idea. Although
Heidegger's treatment of the formula- 'veritas est adaeauatio
rei et intellectus' is quite cursory, he does provide some of the
framework and structure in which the mediaeval formula is to be
studied. He indicates aspects of the substratum on which the
adaeauatio formula was grounded and made to rest. Hereby our
attention is directed to the very necessary procedure of taking
what is most apparent and proximate, for example, a particular
statement or a common usage, and then clarifying it by tracing
-'-Heidegger, Being and Time. H. 214.
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it back to its more primordial existential and ontological
ground. By such a method it may be possible not only to un¬
cover what is consciously and deliberately presupposed, but
also to formulate a critique in which implicit and even acknowl¬
edged assumptions are brought to light. Heidegger pursues this
method with respect to truth as propositional Tightness by tak¬
ing note of its derivative character and its realization on the
basis of the "overt character of behavior," which is grounded
in ex-sistent freedom and in the essence of Being. W. Brock
speaks of Heidegger's tracing back of the traditional formula
cited above:
The reason for this reference to the more comprehensive sett¬
ing of the problem of truth would appear to be that Heidegger
is convinced that the conception of truth is always essen¬
tially related to the interpretation of the nature of all
that exists, attempted in any age or in any greater historic
era. ... In other words, the reference to the historic
setting is the first, if implicit, refutation of the theory
that the seat of truth is in the proposition and its agree¬
ment with a fact or a thing. -—The reference shows, too,
that Heidegger's apparently purely systematic expositions
are accompanied by an acute historical consciousness; in
this case it is also to prepare for the greater historic
perspective which is to open up later in the essay.I
It is not possible to deal successfully with problems per¬
taining to 'truth', logic, and the meaning of language without
delving into ontological, extra-linguistic, and extra-logical
factors constituting the basis and context for the former. As
Samuel Thompson says:
Every truth claim has logical supposition, that is, it refers
^W. Brock, "An Account of 'The Four Essays'," pp. 151-152.
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to being in some of its modes. We can examine a truth
claim only if we know what order of being it refers to,
and this involves us in ontology.-*•
Much of the difficulty that has arisen in connexion with the
formulation of theories of truth and the evaluation of the same,
and in the determination of the nature of truth claims and the
possibility of verification, can be attributed to such factors
as unclarified and uncritically accepted assumptions, and a
neglect or disregard of the complex, variegated, and determina¬
tive environmental 'whole' or 'world1 in which the existing
cognitive subject is situated. The 'whole* is., and the exist¬
ing subject is situated therein, irrespective of the response
to and the interpretation of the 'whole*.
(4.5.2) Heidegger also prompts a more open and positive
treatment of the question of 'truth' by means of a number of
steps that he has followed. Firstly. Heidegger does not wish
to restrict the understanding of 'truth* to Uebereinstimmung or
adaequatio. He introduces more primordial conceptions of truth
while at the same time rejecting the judgement as the primary
locus of truth. His view of the statement as a "re-presentation
(vor-stellen)" of the thing immediately directs us beyond the
statement to res and Dasein. Logical and linguistic analysis
consequently demand an examination of the ontological and exis¬
tential setting or context in which logical truth is situated.
-*-S. Thompson, "Philosophy and Theology; a Reply to Professor
W. F. Zuurdeeg," The Journal of Religion. XL, No. 1 (January,
I960), p. 16.
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Secondly, by seeking to retrieve the understanding of Tot^ TjQeLO^
as "revealment" or act of revealing he makes it possible to avoid
some of the problems present in correspondence theory where the
predominant notion is "agreement" or "likeness" or "approxima¬
tion." Heidegger, therefore, focuses our attention upon Casein,
the object, ex-sistence, i.e., those elements which provide the
basis or context in which the true statement can come to be and
reveal or conceal. Thirdly, by using such words as 'truth*,
'freedom', 'essence', and numerous others in unexpected and
extraordinary ways, Heidegger is able to question generally
accepted usage which in itself often gives rise to unnecessary
and false problems. He stresses greater flexibility in usage
thereby avoiding problems that are to a large degree founded in
customary usage. Fourthly, by discussing truth in terms of
ontology and by speaking of the truth cf Being or Essence he
raises the question regarding the primordial ground of every
kind of truth.
(4.5.3) Heidegger, then, in a number of ways assists us in
our attempt to relate logical truth or truth as representative
statement to a number of factors that are ontologically prior
and which must be interpreted and understood if logical truth
is to be adequately grounded. It is also important to note
that what is first encountered and nearest us may in fact be
ontologically last in order, and that which is first known and
experienced may become an insurmountable barrier to the unveil¬
ing of that which is foundational for all experience and cognition.
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This is what Heidegger has in mind with "errance (Irre)/'
the Oegenwesen of the original essence of truth, which is a
forgetfulness of the mystery, the concealment of the concealed,
authentic untruth. Failure to bear in mind that what is imme¬
diate and nearest us, whether it happens to be a statement,
sensation, or consciousness, is not necessarily prior in being
has resulted in false questions and problems, such as have pre¬
vailed in theories of representative perception, and in addi¬
tion has caused or permitted that which is to be measured to
dominate the measure and to function as criteria themselves.
This development reaches its radical and fully realized propor¬
tions particularly when statements and ideas, having achieved
the status of copies or pictures of reality, are absolutized
insofar as their mode of being is not clarified. They then are
no longer measured by their referents because they have been
identified with them and become criteria themselves. Heidegger
has pointed out how a transition in the understanding of both
1
c< A 7) 0ec <x rand ' A o y oS' has fostered this.
(4.5.4) In introducing some of the different senses that
have been attributed to *truth* and analyzing the notion of
correspondence Heidegger points up the need for more careful
definition. Although an interpretation or conception of ftruth'
may initially be formulated consciously, deliberately, and even
critically, through subsequent usage such a conception or formu¬
lation is taken up as something present-at-hand or ready-to-
hand and is no longer considered in relation to its source and
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the context in which it was formulated. This involves us in
an uncritical and naive usage of a term in that its sense is
assumed to be absolutely fixed and the term itself becomes
determinative and normative. Such can also be the case with
the conception of ♦truth1 that Heidegger seeks to recover from
its hiddenness, if truth as "revealment" is allowed to become
a fixed and wholly determinate concept which is then used
strictly in accordance with the rules of a logical grammar.
What is most dangerous is the employment of 'truth* without
any really clear or explicit sense so that 'truth' merely prompts
a vague feeling. Heidegger poses the question concerning 'truth*:
If, therefore, we must ask after truth, then an answer is
demanded to the question: "Where do we stand to-day?" We
want to know what our position is. We call for the goal
which shall be set for man, both in his history and for his
history. We want the real "truthT Well, truth then! . . .
But in calling for real "truth" we must already know what
in fact is meant by truth. Or do we only know by "feeling"
and in a "general" sort of way? Yet is not this vague
"knowing" and this indifference to the vagueness of it even
more wretched than plain ignorance of the nature of truth?1
Part of our purpose in the following pages is to ascertain and
to set forth the different senses that 'truth' and 'true* have
in the thought of Robert Grosseteste, and in the thought of St.
Augustine and St. Anselm as background to Grosseteste. It will
become apparent that all three use these words with more than a
single sense or meaning. For example, although St. Anselm defines
♦truth' as 'rectitudo*, the latter does not have the exact same
Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," pp. 320-321.
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sense in each instance of use. Moreover, in one specific usage
more than one sense may be included and intended.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND TO GROSSETESTE*S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH IN ST.
AUGUSTINE»S AND ST. ANSELM'S DOCTRINES OF TRUTH
It would be both presumptuous and unrealistic to suppose
that one could in a single chapter treat fully and adequately
St. Augustinefs and St. Anselm's notions of truth, especially
when one considers that whole works have been devoted to these
subjects.^" In addition to these, a number of general works
and articles on their thought could be cited in which their
doctrines of truth are discussed. It should also be noted
that in dealing with their doctrines of truth one is also deal¬
ing with certain of their other doctrines including ontological
and epistemological notions. As Rudolf Schneider states:
"Ebenso ist bei Augustin eine Trennung von Theologie and Onto-
logie unm#glich. Die Seinsbegriffe durchziehen seine gesamte
Theologie." In view of these observations it is mandatory that
"^C. Boyer, LTidee de verite dans la rhilosorhie de s. Augus-
tin; G.S. Heyer Jr.", "Rectitudo in the Theology of St. Anselm"
(thesis); R. Pouchet, La rectitudo chez saint Anselme.
^R. Schneider, Seele and Sein (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1957),
p. 27.
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our present inquiry be selective, concise, and confined to
key themes directly bound up with their doctrines of truth.
In spite of the difficulty of dealing with such major topics
within a relatively brief space it is essential that these pri¬
mary sources of Grosseteste's doctrine of truth be examined.
In the third and fourth chapters we shall see that there
are a number of significant sources from which Grosseteste
draws, although in the formulation of his doctrine of truth
he is primarily indebted to St. Anselm and St. Augustine.
It is in the area of cognitive and propositional truth that
Grosseteste also makes use of another tradition which is ex¬
pressed in the phrase 'adaeauatio rei et intellectus1. In
his De Veritate treatise Grosseteste refers to all of the above
notions of truth. However, as we shall observe, even though
Grosseteste does draw from the above sources in constructing
his doctrine of truth the latter is no mere synthesis of the
former. GrossetesteTs doctrine has its own distinctive and
unique character and is no mere eclectic system.
This inquiry into Augustine's and Anselm's doctrine of
truth should also make apparent some cf the development that
occurs within the Augustinian tradition. Both Anselm and
Grosseteste show a greater interest in the truth of created res
lying outside the rational soul than does Augustine. Augustine
103
was particularly preoccupied with the itinerary of the soul
seeking God. In conjunction with this Augustine focused a
great deal of attention upon truth as it resides in the mind.
This preoccupation is due in part to a negative attitude to
the sensible corporeal world which attitude is not present to
the same degree in Anselm and Grosseteste. Augustine's exposure
to Manichaeism, Scepticism, Neoplatonism, and the crises of his
age contributed greatly to this negative attitude. Anselm's
and Grosseteste's personal histories are markedly different from
that of Augustine. For example, Augustine's agonizing struggle
for certainty is not shared by Anselm or Grosseteste. R. W.
Southern goes so far as to say that "Anselm followed Augustine
in his conception of the relations between Faith and Reason, but
so far as he allows us to see he had never known doubt.One
may want to question the categorical nature of this judgement
but it certainly is true that Anselm displays a confidence and
deliberate procedure not found in Augustine. At the same time
one must remember Anselm'c and Groooctcote's avowod indebtedness
to Augustine and Anselm's claim to be consistent with his doc¬
trine.2 Both the differences and the fundamental areas of con¬
sensus must be kept in view.
"*"R. W. Southern, Saint Anselm and His Biographer (Cambridge:
University Press, 1963), p. 32.
^Monologion. Prologus; AO I:S.
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PART A. ST. AUGUSTINE'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH
One of the difficulties that one faces in the study of a
particular facet of Augustine's doctrine is that his thought on
a specific subject is often dispersed throughout a number of
his works. There are of course many works such as De Trinitate.
De Mendacio. De Libero Arbitrio. and De Quantitate Animae which
deal with specified subjects, but even in such works a consider¬
able number of subjects are discussed. For example, in his De
Trinitate there is also teaching on the soul, faith, knowledge,
and truth; and in De Libero Arbitrio we find a demonstration of
the existence of God as well as teaching on truth and episte-
mological doctrine. In the Soliloquia there is theological
doctrine and an argument for the immortality of the soul pre¬
sented in connection with the major theme dealing with the soul's
quest for the truth and God. It is in the Confessiones that we
find significant teaching on time, creation, the nature and
presence of God. One reason for the absence of a deliberate
order and system in the writing of Augustine is that his literary
production arose out of and corresponds to his own intellectual
and spiritual pilgrimage. The course of his writing reflects his
own personal history and life's experiences rather than a syste¬
matic prearranged plan. The recurrence of such subjects as God,
grace, truth, soul, faith, wisdom,and understanding reflects
Augustine's unceasing interest in the same. Augustine's coherent
and integrated view of the Creator and creation also helps to
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account for the convergence of a number of different topics
within a single work. For Augustine God is the point of con¬
vergence and the subject in which all the other subjects finally
cohere. All created entities are related and cohere ultimately
in God, the summa Veritas.1 The continuity and coherence of
Augustine's thought is due in large part to the following desire:
p"Deum et animam scire cupio." This desire must be kept in mind
if one is to understand Augustine's mind and philosophy. G.
Nygren rightly says that "Augustine's theology constitutes an
articulated whole with a definitely determined ideational struc¬
ture, which does not allow an element to be considered apart
from its relationship with the others."3 If this is clearly
understood one is less apt to be misled by the diffuse and
fragmentary form of much of Augustine's writing. Only in under¬
standing Augustine's doctrine of truth and its central position
can one begin to appreciate the coherent structure and inter¬
related facets of his thought.
1. Introduction to St. Augustine's doctrine of truth
(1.1) The development of Augustine's doctrine of truth and its
central place in his thought
1De Lib. Arb. II. 13. 36-37; 15.39; De Util. Cred. 15.33;
Conf. I. 5.6: SoTil. I. 1. 3; De Trin VIII. 2.3; De Civ. Dei
XI.IS.
2Solil. 1.2.7; PL 32: #72.
^G. Nygren, "The Augustinian Conception of Grace," Studia
Patristica, ed. K. Aland and F. L. Cross (Berlin: Akademie-
Verlag., 1957), II, p. 259.
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An important question concerning Augustine's doctrine in
general, and his doctrine of truth in particular, is whether
there were any major changes in his thought in the period after
3 $6, that is, during the period after his conversion. There
have been opposing views as to whether there were any radical
alterations in the basic doctrine of Augustine with the likes
of Gilson taking the negative side and Rottmanner the affirma¬
tive.! Although one can readily assert that there is develop¬
ment in Augustine's thought after his conversion to Christianity
in 3&6, a number of basic beliefs were firmly fixed at the be¬
ginning, some already at Cassicia.cum and some even prior to this
period. In support of the continuity of such beliefs one notes
in his review of the Soliloquia in the Retract^ones (1.4) no
major corrections except where he repudiates the reference to
reminiscence and puts divine illumination in its place. He
states that he had already argued against reminiscence in De
Trinitate (XII). Although the majority of Augustine's worlsmade
their appearance after he became priest at Hippo, even before
his conversion he had developed notions concerning being, truth,
wisdom, and the like which were normative throughout his life.
These notions certainly underwent modification under the impact
of his Christian experience, but the same notions continued to
lA.D.R. Polman, The Word of God According to St. Augustine
(Grand Rapidsj Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1961), p. 9, nn. 1,2: E. Gilson,
Introduction a 1' etude de Saint Augustin (Paris: 1949); Rott¬
manner, Geistesfrtichte aus der Klosterzelle (Munchen: 190$).
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be determinative and part of the very fabric of his thought.
A number of these notions were derived from and inspired
by Neoplatonism. Neoplatonism provided the setting within which
Augustine encountered and interpreted the Christian Faith. It
is an oversimplification to say that Augustine utilized the
Neoplatonic doctrine that was consistent with his faith and re¬
vised what was contrary to his faith.* My reason for saying
this is that Augustine utilized Neoplatonic concepts and cate¬
gories in the very formulation of his theological doctrine and
to a great extent understood his faith in terms of Neoplatonic
doctrine. The above oversimplification tends to give the im¬
pression that Augustine approached Neoplatonism as a critical
detached inquirer whereas he in fact approached the Christian
Faith and the Scriptures from within the Neoplatonic tradition.
This sheds some light on the much disputed question as to
whether Augustine was really a Christian or a Neoplatonist at
Cassiciacum. Portalie' argues that Augustine was indeed a Chris¬
tian at Cassiciacum and says of this period: "There are not two
truths for Augustine; there is only the one which he has found
in the Gospel. He is now seeking reasons for it in philosophy."2
Portalie's remarks seem to suggest that Augustine first held the
truth "found in the Gospel" and then carefully and deliberately
selected philosophical notions in support of this truth. While
^•Cf. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I. $4. 5.
p /
*E. Portalie, A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine
(London: Burns & Oates, 196b), pp. 16-17.
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keeping in mind the profound differences which exist between
the doctrine of Augustine and Neoplatonism,1 it must be said
that Augustine's theology and understanding and formulation of
the Christian Faith were affected and influenced considerably
by Neoplatonic tenets.
This can be illustrated, in particular, in the case of
Augustine's understanding of the nature of truth and its central
importance. When Augustine comes to that point where fee be¬
lieves that 'truth' must be applied above all to the God of
Scripture he comes to understand the nature of God in large
part in terms of the previously established sense of the word
'truth'. Emile Cailliet states: "The ultimate confusion is
found at the point where Augustine, having found the true God
of Scripture, still strives to explain him and relate himself to
him in terms of an ontology of Platonic inspiration."2 One of
the consequences of understanding and conceiving of the nature
of God in terms of these doctrines of truth and being is that
some of the Biblical content and meaning is liable to be blocked
out and kept from coming into view.
However, when Augustine began to use 'truth' of the God of
Scripture^ the term acquired a new significance. This did not
*E.g. Doctrines of God, Trinity, Creation, Sin, Grace, and
History.
^E. Cailliet, The Christian Approach to Culture (Nashville:
Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1953), pp. 143-144.
3cf. p. 105, n. 1.
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come about so much through a repudiation of the prior sense of
the term as by reason of the new referent and what this meant to
Augustine. Nothing in the Plotinian hierarchy, including the
One, could compare with the triune God whom Augustine encounters.
This is borne out by Augustine's own words-1- even though he him¬
self professes to find in the Enneads the "idem omnino" that is
found in the prologue of John's Gospel. The surface similar¬
ities between certain doctrines of Plotinus and Augustine do not
cancel out the profound differences that exist. This is clearly
evident when one sets his doctrine of the Trinity over against
the Neoplatonic triad. It appears that Augustine himself did
not fully realize or appreciate the magnitude of the gulf or
chasm that stood between his Christian beliefs and Neoplatonism.
What is clear is that the meaning of the word 'truth1 could not
remain altogether unchanged once Augustine used it to signify
primarily the God of the Scriptures.
In connexion with the above it can also be said that truth
was a central concern for Augustine even before his conversion
in 336. Neoplatonism called man to contemplation of the truth,
the eternal and intelligible Ideas. Gilson says of the doctrine
of Plato and Plotinus: "When a man philosophizes and, discard¬
ing his body, focuses his mind upon intelligible truth, he simply
1Solil. 1.1,2,3,4; Conf. 1.4.4; VII.10.16; XIII.16.19;
De Trin. IV. 1.3; et passim.
2Conf. VII.9.13.
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behaves like a god who remembers to be a god."l Augustine long
believed that man's calling was to seek truth and wisdom and
the contemplation of the same. This belief was deepened and
reinforced when Augustine embraced the Christian faith.
Truth also occupies a strategic position in the thought of
Augustine by reason of the fact that one can only achieve beati-
tudo through knowledge and love of the Truth which is God.
"Nemo enim beatus est, nisi summo bono, quod in ea veritate,
quam sapientiam vocamus, cernitur et tenetur."^ Augustine states
that the Truth is "non solum bonum, sed etiam summum bonum, et
beatificum esse concedo."^ The mind "beatus ergo erit, si nulla
interpellante molestia de ipsa, per quam uera sunt omnia, sola
ueritate gaudebit."^ Truth is central both as a prerequisite
to beatitudo and as the foundation of all true things. Inas¬
much as the vision of the Veritas and heatitudo is not a necessary
concomitant of human existence it is the object of a serious
and diligent quest. It is divine grace which enables man to
attain knowledge of the truth and subsequent beatitudo. "Sed
quoniam non sicut homo sponte cecidit, ita etiam sponte surgere
■^E. Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1959), p. 56.
^De Lib. Arb. II. 9. 26; PL 32: 1254; cf. also De Lib. Arb.
II. 13.35; 15.39; 19-52; De Beata Vita 2.14; 4.34,35; De Mor.
Eccl. 1.6.10; I.11.IS; De Quant. Animae 33. 76.
3pe Lib. Arb. II. 15. 39; PL 32: 1262.
^Conf. X. 23.34; Pibliotheaue Augustinienne. Oeuvres De y
Saint Augustin (Paris: Desclee, De Brouwer et Cie, 1962) Deuxieme
Serie. v. 14, p. 204 (^hereafter abbrev. BAj .
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potest, porrectam nobis desuper dexteram Dei, id est Dominum
nostrum Jesum Christum. . . Augustine repeatedly emphasizes,
particularly in his later works, man's need of sanctifying
grace whereby he becomes an adopted son of God. The creation
of man is itself grounded in divine grace.^ This stands in
marked contrast to the Platonic and Neoplatonic man who has
access to truth by reason of his own divinity. As Gilson states:
"A god may eventually forget himself but he cannot possibly
stand in need of being saved."3 Augustine held that man was in
dire need of that salvation which could only be achieved through
knowledge of the Truth made possible through grace. Such know¬
ledge, of course, is considerably more than sheer intellectual
apprehension.^- We may have occasion later to look at the reli¬
gious and moral character of this human knowledge and wisdom.
Augustine says: "Hominis autem sapientia pietas est. . . . Sed
nihil est commodius illo nomine, quo evidenter Dei cultus ex-
pressus est, cum quid esset homini sapientia diceretur."^
1De Lib. Arb. 11.20. 54; PL 32:1270.
^Serm. 26.3.9; 26.6.7; De Gen, ad Litt. VI.25.36; De
Civitate Dei XIII.20.
3e. Gilson, God and Philosophy, p. 57.
^De Vera Relip. 5.3; De Util. Cred. 17.35; 12.27; DeMor.
Eccl. 1.25.47; Gilson notes that John 17.3 and Matt. 22.37 "are
deliberately set side by side by Augustine himself," De Piv.
Ouaest. 33,35.2: cf. his The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augus¬
tine , trans. L.E.M. Lynch (New York: ftandom House, I960), p. 251,
n. 28.
^Enchir. 1.2; BA, Ire Serie, 9:102.
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The nature and centrality of this Truth is what governs
Augustinefs conception of philosophy.
(1.2) Truth and philosophy
Augustine speaks of the nature of philosophy in making
reference to the impact that Cicero's Hortensius once had upon
him: "apud te est enim sapientia. amor autern sapientiae nomen
graecum habet philosophiam, quo me accendebant illae litterae."1
Insofar as God is himself wisdom,^ as is his Son,3 it follows
that philosophy is the love of God and the philosopher is there¬
fore truly the lover of God.^" Philosophy is therefore even more
than a way of life, it is the way of salvation. This is what
makes the quest for truth and wisdom so urgent. "Quando quidem
nulla est homini causa philosophandi, nisi ut beatus sit; quod
autem beatum facit, ipse est finis boni; nulla est igitur
causa philosophandi, nisi finis boni . • . I do not be¬
lieve that Grabowski puts it strongly enough where he states
that for Augustine "wisdom or philosophy practically means a
conduct of life which is in harmony with Christian ideals:
1Conf. 111.4.3; BA 13:374.
2pe Civ. Dei VIII.1; De Trinitate XIV.1.1.
^De Lib. Arb. 11.15.39; De Vera Relig. 55.110; In Joan.
Evang. 38.11.
4Pe Civ. Dei VIII.1.
5pe Civ. Dei XVIIII.l; CSEL 40,2:366.
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philosophy is Christian living."-*- For Augustine, philosophy is
a religious way as well as a moral way. "Deus ergo ipse summa
saoientia, cultus autem Dei sapientia est hominis, de qua nunc
loquimur."2 Philosophy and religion must not be divorced:
"Sic enim creditur et docetur, quod est humanae salutis caput,
non aliam esse philosophiam, id est sarientiae studium, et
aliam religionem, cum hi, quorum doctrinam non approbamus, nec
sacramenta nobiscum communicant."3 In accordance with his con¬
ception of philosophy Augustine says that the Christian man,
although ignorant of the philosophers, is to be preferred be¬
cause he knows God. The philosophers expend themselves in
seeking to know God who is the "causa constitutae uniuersitatis
et lux percipiendae ueritatis et fons bibendae felicitatis. "*♦■
'Philosophers1 who hold these beliefs are in agreement with
Christians.
It is not surprising therefore that Augustine prefers the
Socratic philosophy to that of the physicists. "Socrates ergo
primus uniuersam philosophiam ad corrigendos componendosque
mores flexisse memoratur. . . . ,T ^ He speaks of Plato's synthesis
■*-S.J. Grabowski, The All-Present God (St. Louis: B. Herder
Book Co., 1954), p. 274.
2Pe Trin. XIV.1.1; PL 42:1037.
3Pe Vera Relie. 5.2; CCSL 32:193.
4Pe Civ. Dei VIII.2; CSEL 40,1:371.
3Ibid. VIII.3: CSEL 40.1.356.
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of Pythagoras* interest in contemplation with Socrates' ethi¬
cal and practical concern, and Plato's subsequent division of
philosophy into moral, natural, and rational philosophy. As
the basis of all three one is to seek the "unum uerum optimum
Deum, sine quo nulla natura subsistit, nulla doctrina instruit,
nullus usus expedit: ipse quaeratur, ubi nobis seria sunt omnia;
ipse cernatur, ubi nobis certa sunt omnia; ipse diligatur, ubi
nobis recta sunt omnia.Here again Augustine's theocentric
perspective is most apparent. Although he recognizes this three¬
fold division he does not devote himself to any one area for its
own sake. For example, although he considers logic to be a pre¬
requisite to both moral and natural philosophy2 and states that
he knows more about dialectics than any other part of philosophy,3
dialectics is to be used simply as a means in seeking a vision
of the Truth. Dialectic is used in the Soliloquia in an attempt
to prove the immortality of the soul and in the treatise De
Libero Arbitrio to prove the existence of God. He speaks of the
"ratio disputandi" as that discipline whereby the other disci¬
plines are true.^ Nevertheless, Augustine is not primarily inter¬
ested in grammar, rhetoric, logic, or any other specific disci¬
pline. He regrets that time when he was too much interested in
1Ibid. VIII.4; CSEL 40,1:360. 2Ibid. VIII.4.
3
Contra Acad. III.13.29.
4Soliloauia 11.11.21; PL 32:395.
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grammar and rhetoric rather than in the commandments of God.-*-
He refers to those lovely things which once kept him from God
who is Beauty itself.2 According to Augustine philosophy is
the way one takes in seeking God who is the summa Veritas.
His understanding of philosophy is truly determined by his doc¬
trine of truth. Portalie says: "Clearly, then, there is a
philosophy of St. Augustine, but so intimately is it linked with
his theology that the two cannot be separated."His starting-
point was not the philosophical calm of contemplation, as with
the Neoplatonist, but the Christian's desire to reach his
maker."*•• Augustine describes his course as follows: "Hac Dei
gratia, qua in nos ostendit magnam misericordiam suam, et in
hac uita per fidem regimur, et post hanc uitam per ipsarn speciem
incommutabilis ueritatis ad perfectionem plenissimam perducemur.
The true philosopher strives after this immutable Truth
(1.3) Factors determinative of Augustine's notion of truth
(1.3.1) It is outside the range of our immediate interest
to explore fully Augustine's teaching concerning doubt and cer¬
tainty as related to faith, knowledge, reason, and authority.
Our present intention is simply to note that there is an immedi-
1Con£. I.Id.28. 2Conf, X.27.38.
^E. Portalie', op. cit... p. 90.
^"G. Leff, Mediaeval Thought (Harmondsworth: Penquin Books
Ltd, 1962), p. 36.
^De Civ. Dei X.22; CSEL 40,1:483,484.
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ate and mutually determinative relationship between Augustine's
notion of truth and his conception of and concern for certainty.
This is not to say that either conception, in and by itself,
wholly determines the other. It is only proposed that his doc¬
trine of truth and his quest for certainty affect and tend to
reinforce each other.
Although Augustine only embraced the Scepticism of the
Academics for a short time prior to his conversion, he continued
after 3&6 to struggle with doubt and to strive after certitude.
This struggle had a pronounced impact on his thought. In the
De Vera Religions Augustine utilizes the fact of doubt itself as
evidence.-^ He argues that if one doubts he is certain of one
truth at least, viz., that he doubts: "Omnis ergo, qui utrum sit
ueritas dubitat, in se ipso habet uerum, unde non dubitet, nec
ilium uerum nisi ueritate uerum est."2 In a single stroke Augus¬
tine sought both to refute that scepticism which blocked the
path to knowledge of the truth and to find reasons for that
which he believed. Even after he saw that faith was essential
he continued to seek that certainty which could not be founded
on authority or sense perception.-*
Augustine's anxiety over certainty was much more than an
intellectual problem. "To find a positive basis for knowledge
1De Vera Relig. 39.73; CCSL 32:234. 2Ibid.; CCSL 32:235.
^De Lib. Arb. 11.2.5,6; 11.15.39; Enchir.1.4.5: De Vera
Relic1. 8.14: Contra Acad. III.20.43; De Trin. VII.6.12; XV. 1.1;
De Civ. Dei XVII.17; In Joan Evang. XXIX.6.
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was for the young Augustine a task not of playful dialectics
but of anxious moral concern.In his desire for certitude
Augustine was drawn to Manichaeism for no other reason "nisi
quod se dicebant terribili auctoritate separata mera et simplici
ratione eos, qui se audire vellent, introducturos ad deum et
errore omni liberaturos."2 He discovered no ground for certi-
dude in Manichaean materialism and its appeal to the sensible.
Truth is distant from the minds of those vain men "qui nimis
in haec corporalia progress! atque lapsi nihil aliud putant esse
quam quod istis quinque notissimis nuntiis corporis sentiunt. . ..
That which is mutable and corporeal can hardly serve as a basis
for knowledge and certitude.^" Even corporeal figures only imi¬
tate the truth, viz., geometrical figures.5 If certainty is to
be attained one must appeal to the realm of the intelligible
where the immutable is to be found.
Augustine sought more than mere proof or evidence. He de¬
sired a necessary and self-evident certainty. He refers to his
stay in Milan prior to his conversion at which time he was
struggling to believe. He writes: "uolebam enim eorum quae non
^•M.H. Carre'. Realists and Nominalists (Oxford: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1946), p. 9.
2Pe Util. Cred. 1.2; CSEL 25.7. 3Ibid. 1.1; CSEL 25:7.
^•Pe Div. Quaest. S3,9; cf. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy
of Saint Augustine, p. 254, n. 24.
5Solil. II.IS.32.
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uiderem ita me certum fieri, ut certus essem, quod septem et
tria decern sint. . . .Although he came to recognize the
utility of faith in a number of areas, the necessary statement
or truth continued to serve as the sign and model of true cer¬
tainty. In seeking to refute the scepticism of the Academi¬
cians he utilizes self-evident, disjunctive propositions.* He
also uses necessary truths in his argument for the existence
3
of Truth, viz., God. In the second book of his Soliloquia
Augustine argues for the immortality of the soul on the basis
of the immortal and immutable truths of dialectic and geometry.^-
In such necessary truths Augustine discovers the greatest pos¬
sible certainty or certitude. It is clear that truth as cor¬
respondence and certainty as known corresnondence are not pri¬
mary here. If there is correspondence it is that which lies
between these necessary truths and the eternal rationes which
the former reflect.
These necessary truths do not have to be verified through
an appeal to authority, sense experience, or the mutable human
mind. The mind comes to know these truths through divine illum¬
ination. 5 These immutable truths are not perceived by the senses
1Conf. VI.4.6; BA 13:523. 2Contra Acad. III.10.23.
3Pe Lib. Arb. II.8.20-12.33.
^Solil. 11.11.19-21; 11.19.33-20.35.
3Pe Vera Relig. 55.113; Retract. 1.4.4; Solil. 1.1.3; 1.6.12;
I.8.15TConf . 1.26.37: Pe Trin. XII. 15.24.25 : XIV.15.21; XV.27.50.
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and are not situated in the sensible world. He says: "Unum
vero quisquis verissime cogitat, profeeto invenit corporis
sensibus non posse sentiri."3- Geometrical figures or truths
are not known through the senses2 and are not to be found in
corporeal objects.-* These immutable truths and figures are
situated in the mind, therefore "per hoc in nostro animo etiam
Veritas esse cogitur."^ The source of these truths is in the
Truth itself. Augustine states that such truths as 'equals
must be compared with equals' and 'the uncorrupted thing is
better than the corrupted thing' are contemplated by those
"qui haec valent sua quisque ratione ac mente conspicere. . . ."5
Augustine points out that these truths understood by the mind
are not taught by some teacher outside us. It is the interior
truth and teacher which must be listened to and consulted.^1
To achieve certainty one must turn from the mutable and sensi¬
ble world. He describes certain knowledge as follows: "Quid
enim appetit curiositas nisi cognitionem, quae certa esse non
potest nisi rerum aeternum et eodem modo se semper habentium??
1De Lib. Arb. U.S.22; PL 32:1252.
2Solil. 1.4.9,10; 11.20.35. 3Solil. II.lG.32; 11.19.33.
4Solil. 11.19.33; PL 32:901.
5Pe Lib. Arb. 11.10.29; PL 32:1256.
^Pe Magistro 11.3$- 12.40.
7Pe Vera Relig. 52.101; CCSL 32:252.
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Truth is not subject to the limitations and variations of space
and time for "omnibus proxima est, omnibus sempiterna; nullo
loco est, nusquam deest. . . . "^
Augustine also sought certainty by doing away with such inter¬
mediaries as authority, the spoken and written word, the senses,
and even the reasoning process. He desired direct and immediate
intuition of immutable Truth. As he states: "Religet ergo nos
religio uni omnipotenti deo, quia inter mentem nostram, qua ilium
intellegimus, patrem et ueritatem, id est lucem interiorem, per
quam ilium intellegimus, nulla interposita creatura est."2 We
note here that the Truth is referred to as the "interior light."
The mind has immediate contact with this light. Reference has
already been made to that certainty which is grounded in a re¬
flexive act of the mind. This is the first of the certitudes
even though it pertains to a mutable thinking, doubting, or
erring subject.-^ The mind knows itself directly without having
to appeal to some intermediary. "Sed cum dicitur menti, Cog¬
nosce te ipsam, eo ictu quo intelligit quod dictum est, Te ipsarn,
cognoscit se ipsam; nec ob aliud, quam eo quod sibi praesens
est."4 Every mind is conscious of its own understanding, doubt-
5
ing, being, and life. The existence of the knowing and thinking
^De Lib. Arb. 11.14.33; PL 32:1262. cf. De Doctrina Chris¬
tiana 11.38.56-39.56.
2Pe Vera Relig. 55.113; CCSL 32:259-260.
-^Enchir. 7.20; De Lib. Arb. II.3.7; Solil. II.1.1; De Civ.
Dei XlTSFI
4Pe Trin. X.9.12; PL 42:930. 5Pe Trin. X.10.13,14; XV.12.21.
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self is demonstrated on the basis of the mind's direct con¬
sciousness of its own activity. One is to look for truth and
certainty within one's own mind. Ratio therefore says:
"Avertere ab umbra tua, revertere in te . . . One can
readily see why Augustine placed such a high value on that
intelligible and immutable truth which man can discover within
his own mind.
(1.3.2) Augustine's doctrine of truth was also shaped and
influenced by a number of other very significant factors. The
Platonic and Neoplatonic legacy, with its notion of what con¬
stitutes reality, was a cardinal determinant in the formation
of Augustine's doctrine. In his refutation of scepticism Augus¬
tine made considerable use of this ontology, especially the
sensible-intelligible dichotomy. In answering the Academicians
p
Augustine appealed to Plato's intelligible world.
(1.3.3) Augustine's understanding of truth was also deter¬
mined by his notion of perfection. According to Augustine
supreme perfection must include ontological and moral immuta¬
bility. The mutable entity is not supremely perfect since it
may lose some of its being, goodness, and truth. Consequently,
only immutable truth and being can be called supremely perfect
and serve as the basis for certain knowledge. Change and even
the possibility of change belong to lesser or subordinate goods.
1Solil. 11.19.33; PL 32:901.
2Contra Acad. III.11.26; III.17.37.
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The supreme Good is the eternal and immutable Good. Concerning
mutable goods Augustine has this to say:
Thus it conies to pass that neither are the good things
striven for by sinners in any way bad, nor is free will
itself, which we are told should be counted as holding a
middle place among good things; but that evil is the turn¬
ing away of the will from the immutable good, and the
turning towards mutable goods.
One reason why Augustine will not permit the introduction of any
mutability or change into supreme perfection or being is that he
has a restricted notion of mutability and change. Augustine
believes that mutability can only signify and must always entail
the possibility of the loss of being or absence of being.
Where there is mutability there must also be possible a loss of
being. He does not allow for a mutability or process of change
which is at the same time exempt from the possibility of loss
of being and truth, in other words, a possible or actual change
without the possibility of evil.
(1.3.4) Augustine's doctrine of truth is also shaped by
the Scriptures. However, it is not so much the sense of 'Veri¬
tas ' and 'verus' that is derived from and fixed by the Scrip¬
tures as it is the manner and range of the usage and application
of these terms. At the same time it should be noted that the
sense of these terms is affected and modified through the usage
dictated by the Scriptures. Nevertheless, significant elements
•*"De Lib. Arb. 11.19.53; trans. E. Przvwara, An Augustine
Synthesis (New York: Harper &, Row, 195$), p. 124 (hereafter abbrev.
PA): cf. also Enchir. 3.9,10,11; De Natura fioni 2;3;10;12.
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of the Platonic or Neoplatonic meaning are retained. This may-
help to explain how Augustine is able to find certain basic af¬
finities between Biblical or Christian teaching and Neoplatonic
tenets. As noted above, Augustine finds such an affinity be¬
tween the prologue to John's Gospel and the teaching of the
Enneads. It could be argued that he simply misread the Enneads
However, this could be only a partial explanation. Could it not
also be argued that Augustine had introduced Neoplatonic content
and doctrine into the prologue to the Gospel? However, upon
examination of Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity2 and his
commentary on the prologue to John's Gospel'^ it becomes evident
that the declared affinity is basically superficial, and in this
instance results in large part from a misreading of the Neopla¬
tonic sources. That such is the case is indicated in the com¬
mentary on the prologue where Augustine states that the philos¬
ophers also teach "that by the Word of God all things were
made . . . .and that God has an only-begotten Son, by whom are
all things."^ Notwithstanding, Augustine's use of Neoplatonic
~*~Conf. VII.9.13; cf. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of
Saint Augustine. p. 34$, n. 2.
2Pe Trinitate IV;V;VI;VII;VIII.
3In Joan Evang. I ;IIj-covering John 1.1-14.
^•In Joan. Evang. II.4; trans. Rev. J. Gibb and Rev. J.
Innes ,"~Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. ed. P. Schaff (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans £ub. Co., 1956), VII, p. 15.
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concepts and motifs-^- accounts in part for the positing of these
congruities.
The impact of extrabiblical doctrines, such as the Platonic
inspired ontology and exemplarism, is manifest in Augustine*s
exegesis of Scripture. These doctrines not only affected his
interpretation of Scripture, they could also cause unnecessary
difficulty in the exposition of a particular text. One such
text is John S:26: "I have much to say about you and much to
judge; but he who sent me is true d. A rj On s verax^J , and
I declare to the world what I have heard from him."^ In his
exposition of this text^ Augustine finds the expression "he who
sent me is true" to be problematical. According to the theory
of exemplarism and the doctrine of universals it would appear
that God the Father is subordinate to the Son who is the Truth.
Augustine declares that piety is greater than he who is pious
by virtue of participation in piety, and goodness is greater than
the soul that is good through participation in goodness. So it
is with that which is true in relation to the Truth. God the
Father, however, is not subordinate to God the Son. Augustine
seeks to resolve the difficulty by saying:
But the true Father is true of Himself, for he begat the
Truth. It is one thing to say, That man is true, for he
has taken in the truth: it is another, God is true, for
1 2
In Joan. Evang. 1.16. Revised Standard Version.
^In Joan Evanp. XXXIX.7»&; trans. Gibb and Innes, op. cit..
p. 224.
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He begat the Truth. See then how God is true, -— not
by participating in, but by generating the Truth.1
The consequences are at least twofold: presupposed notions already
cited have led Augustine to this forced interpretation of 'veraxT.
(1.4) Truth as a determinative factor
Just as Augustine's conception of truth was determined and
dictated in large measure by the factors cited above so did his
conception of truth affect his epistemological beliefs and rein¬
force his view of certainty. In other words, on the basis of
his conception of the nature of truth he had to have an episte-
mology and the kind of certainty that would be commensurate with
his notion of truth. If truth is incorporeal, intelligible, and
immutable, then it can only be perceived by the mind and its
character as truth must be self-evident to the mind. In the
demonstration of such truth appeal must be made to mental facts
and experience. Such a demonstration is not achieved through
empirical verification and the bodily senses. One must flee
from the corporeal and mutable world and seek within the mind
and especially above the mind the immutable and eternal Truth.
2. The nature of truth and the true according to St. Augustine
In examining Augustine's doctrine of truth one is also en¬
gaged in a consideration of Augustine's doctrine of God, his doc¬
trine of being, and other closely related doctrines. This is to
•*-In Joan Evang. XXXIX. trans. Gibb and Innes,
p. 224.
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be expected in view of the usage of 'Veritas' adopted by Augus¬
tine. The situation would be quite different if Augustine had
confined the application of 'veritas' and 'verus' simply to the
proposition or to thought. However, his usage of these words
is more extensive than that. We do well, therefore, to con¬
sider first of all the meaning and usage of 'veritas'. 'verus'.
and related terms.
(2.1) The signification of 'veritas'. 'verus'. and related signs
(2.1.1) To know what Augustine intends when using 'veritas'
one must be familiar with his notion of 'ipsum esse'. ^ 'Ipsum
esse' is truly reserved for God alone who is "incommutabilis
2
substantia vel essentia. ..." 'Ipsum esse' is used to desig¬
nate and to set apart the supreme esse of God. 'Veritas' sig¬
nifies 'ipsum esse' but its sense is not strictly coterminous
with that of 'ipsum esse' or the expression that God "vere
summeque est."3
(2.1.2) 'Veritas' also signifies 'relations' both within
the being of God and between the eternal Word or Wisdom and the
creation. 'Veritas' signifies 'similitude' understood both as
a 'relation' and 'the thing that is similar'. The eternal Word
of God is the perfect similltudo: "Haec autem ipsa eius simili-
tudo et ideo ueritas. /^reference is to Word itself^J Ut enim
^•Ce Trin. V.2.3. ^Ibid.
3Pe Lib. Arb. 11.15.39; PL 32:1262.
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ueritate sunt uera quae uera sunt, ita similitudine similia
sunt quaecumque similia."^ Such a Word "summa similitudo prin-
cipii et ueritas est, quia sine ulla dissimilitudine est."^
♦Veritas' here signifies a perfect similitude and also being.
The eternal Son as the perfect and express Image of the Father
is Truth.3
(2.1.3) 'Veritas' also refers to the divine esse and eternal
Word as ground and norm of all mutable and created truth. Augus¬
tine speaks of the sole Truth according to which all things are
true.^ God is the "fontem ueritatis . . . ."3 Augustine states:
"Nam omne uerum ab illo est, qui ait: Ego sum ueritas."^
Augustine is certain that it is according to the Truth itself
ry
that the discirlinae are true.' He prays: "Te invoco, Deus
Veritas, in quo et a quo et per quem vera sunt, quae vera sunt
omnia.'Veritas' signifies the supreme measure which measures
all other entities and serves as the norm to which entities must
conform in order to be and tc be true.
But truth, in order that it may be, comes into being through
1De Vera Relie. 36.66; CCSL 32:231.
^Ibid. : also De Vera Relip-. 55.113; De Trin. VI.10.11;
VII.1.1;3.4.
3Pe Trin. VII.6.12. 4Conf. X.23.34.
5Conf. XII.30.41; BA 14:418.
^De Doc. Chr. Prooemium 8; CCSu 32:5.
?Solil. 11.11.21. &Solil. 1.1.3; PL 32:870
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some supreme measure, whence it proceeds and whither it
returns when perfected. But on this supreme measure no
other measure is imposed, for if the supreme measure is
the measure according to the supreme measure, it is the
measure according to itself. Moreover the supreme measure
must necessarily also be the true measure, so true measure
is recognized by truth.1
(2.1.4) Augustine speaks of God in whom we find the first
life, essence, and wisdom: "Nam haec est ilia incommutabilis
ueritas, quae lex omnium artium recte dicitur et ars omnipoten-
p
tis artificis." In connection with this usage 'Veritas' re¬
fers also to the eternal immutable rationes or regulae situated
in the divine Being or eternal Word. "Sunt namque ideae prin-
cipales formae quaedam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque in-
commutabiles quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae
ac semper eodem mcdo se habentes, quae in divina intelligentia
continentur.Augustine says: "In Thy presence do stand the
causes of all things that are unstable and even of all things
that are changeable — the unchangeable roots remain with Thee,
and the eternal reasons of things which are temporal and irra¬
tional do live."^ In discussing the creation of the world Augus¬
tine touches upon his exemplarism: "Neque enim multae, sed una
sapientia est, in qua sunt infiniti quidem eique finiti thensauri
J-De Beata Vita 4.33,34; PA 35.
2Pe Vera Relig. 31.57; CCSL 32:224.
^De Div. Quaest. $3, 46.1-2; PL 40:29-30; cited by Gilson,
The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, p. 291> n. 52.
4Conf. 1.6.9; PA p. 123; cf. also Gonf. X.12.19.
129
rerum intellegibilium, in quibus sunt omnes inuisibiles adque
incommutabiles rationes rerum etiam uisibilium et mutabilium,
quae per ipsair factae sunt."3 Augustine states that we do not
learn the nature of the human mind through generalization or
induction "sed intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte,
quantum possumus, definiamus, non qualis sit uniuscujusque
hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat."^
The archetypes of necessary truth and of the many created species
are called truth both because of their immutable being and their
determinative and regulatory function in relation to created
being. Augustine makes an appeal to such truth in his attempt
to demonstrate the existence of God: "Quapropter nullo modo
negaveris esse incommutabilem veritatem, haec omnia quae incom-
mutabiliter vera sunt continentem. . . . "3 Augustine speaks of
the Son as the perfect Word of the Father and the "ars quaedam
omnipotentis atque sapientis Dei, plena omnium rationum viven-
tium incommutabilium.. . . All true judgments and statements
regarding created truth are made in the light of these rationes.
(2.1.5) TVeritas' and 'verus' in particular are also used
of entities within the created order as seen in relation to the
supreme Truth. The adjective 'verus' is more readily and freely
1De Civ. Dei. XI.10; CSEL 40:523; cf. also XI.29-
2Pe Trin, IX.6.9.; PL 42:966.
3Pe Lib. Arb. 11.12.33; PL 32:1259.
4Pe Trin. VI.10.11; PL 42:931.
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applied to created entities than it is to God. We noted earlier^
that Augustine had difficulty in interpreting John 3:26 where it
is said that God is verax. This difficulty arose largely be¬
cause of Augustine's exemplarism and the notion that to be true
is to be subordinate to the truth. God, however, is subordinate
to no thing. Created beings are subordinate to the eternal
rationes to which they correspond. By virtue of such correspon¬
dence created things are said to be true.
(2.1.6) 'Veritas' may signify all that exists or simply a
particular truth such as a true statement. The word 'verum' is
used as a general or generic term where Augustine says that
O
"verum mihi videtur esse id quod est." This appears to be the
broadest possible application of 'verum'. The totality of esse
is signified without a distinct reference to any particular
facet or constituent of id quod est. Augustine furthermore
states that "omnia uera sunt, in quantum sunt. . .."3 He is as¬
serting that all things are true or conform to the truth, by
which they are measured, insofar as they are. However, the ex¬
tent to which a thing conforms to the supreme measure determines
its degree of being. This notion is expressed more explicitly
in the following: "Cetera illius unius similia dici possunt, in
quantum sunt, in tantum enim et uera sunt . . . .Quapropter
1Cf. (1.3) p. 124, nn. 2,3; p. 125, n. 1.
2Solil. 11.5.3; PL 32:339. 3Conf. VII.15.21; BA 13.624.
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quoniam uera in tantum uera sunt, in quantum sunt, in tantum
autem sunt, in quantum principalis unius similia sunt . . . .
The word 'verus' signifies similitudo while at the same time
signifying esse. Augustine asserts that the esse and nonesse
of creatures depend on likeness and unlikeness to God.2
(2.1.7) In his Soliloquia Augustine offers a definition of
'verurn' based on the appearance of a thing in relation to what
it is in fact. "Verum est quod ista £sic J se habet ut cognitori
videtur, si velit pcssitque cognoscere."3 This leads to the
problematical conclusion that "in veri similitudine habitare
falsitatem.Ratio then asks: ". . . nonne similitudinem
veritatis matrem, et dissimilitudinem falsitatis esse fatendum
est?"5 The man in a dream is said to be false because of the
dissimilarity to a true man. It is evident in this instance
that the criterion of judgement is dictated by the appearance
of an entity rather than its nature. Elsewhere, as intimated
above,^ judgement concerning the similitude or truth of an en¬
tity is based upon the eternal ratio of the thing and not its
appearance. This is more in accord with Augustine's exemplarism.
In agreement with this exemplarism, only a man can be a 'true1
man or a 'false' man.
(2.1.3) Augustine uses 'Veritas' and 'verum' not only to
1De Vera Relig. 36.66; CCSL 32:231. 2Conf. VII.11.17.
3Solil. 11.5.3; PL 32:333. 4Solil. II.6.12; PL 32:390.
5Ibid. II.7.13; PL 32:391. 6Cf. pp. 130-131, nn. 3, 1, 2.
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indicate esse and similitudo but also that which reveals or dis¬
closes that which is. "Sed cui saltern illud manifestum est
falsitatem esse, qua id putatur esse, quod non est, intellegit
earn esse "Ueritatem, quae ostendit id quod est."^ The referent
intended by "quae ostendit" is what has to be ascertained. From
the context it would seem that the referent is nothing less than
the supreme Truth or eternal Word which shows forth perfectly
the being of God as well as the truth or being of creatures.
In commenting upon the above statement of Augustine Grosseteste
offers this interpretation: "Quod autem lux summae veritatis
et non aliud ostendit mentis oculo id quod est, videtur ex auc-
toritatibus Augustini diligenter inspectis."2 Grosseteste then
quotes a number of texts in support of his position.-^ The doc¬
trine of divine illumination itself is sufficient grounds for
holding such a view. Augustine speaks of the mind which per¬
ceives many immutable true things and then "dirigit se in ipsam
veritatem, qua cuncta monstrantur. . . .It is "God, the
intelligible Light, in whom and by whom and through whom those
things intelligibly shine which anywhere intelligibly shine.
"Nempe ergo multa vera vidisti, eaque discrevisti ab ilia luce
1De Vera Relig. 36.66; CCSL 32:230. 2Pe Ver.: BW 133.
^Retract. 1.4.4; De Lib. Arb. 11.13.36; Conf. XII.25.35;
De Trin. XII. 14.23; Tract, in Joh.. ,XIV.&.
^Pe Lib. Arb. 11.13.36; PL 32:1260.
5Solil. 1.1.3; PA 131.
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qua tibi lucente vidisti: attolle oculos in ipsam lucem, et eos
in earn fige, si potes.''^ On the basis of these and other texts
it is clear that the divine Truth or Light shows forth id quod
est. However, it could also be said that *Veritas' signifies
thoughts or statements which show forth id ouod est. He says
elsewhere that propositions can be considered as truth in their
own genus of things.2 In the statement under consideration3 fal-
sitas is placed in the realm of thought or affirmation. If the
second part of the statement, which describes truth, is coordi¬
nate with the first part on falsehood, it could be argued that
'Veritas* in this instance specifies thought which manifests id
quod est. The divine Word as the perfect likeness of God shows
forth the being of God. In his Confessiones Augustine describes
the ecstatic vision in which one moves from changeable objects
to id quod est.^-
(2.1.9) Within the created world or order, 'veritas' sig¬
nifies above all what is to be found in the rational soul of
man as well as the rational soul itself. The mens, which is
the superior part of the rational soul,^ is "constituta tamen
inter incommutabilem supra se ueritatem et mutabilia infra se
1De Trin. XV.27.50; PL 42:1097.
2Pe Mendacio 20.41; CSEL 41:461-462.
3Pe Vera Relig. 36.66. ^Conf. VII.17.23.
5Pe Trin. IX.2.2; XII; XIV.16.22; XV.7.11; cf. Gilson, The
Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine. p. 269, n. 1; p. 354,
n. 10. " *
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1 2
cetera. . . ." Although the mind is mutable, in its noblest
part, the intellectus or intelligentia.3 we find that simili-
tudo or imago of God in which man was created. Augustine finds
a number of resemblances or analogies to the Trinity throughout
the created order, however, only in the human mens do we find the
imago Dei. He says that in the upper reason, which contem¬
plates the eternal realities, we have "non solum trinitas, sed
etiam imago Dei. . . . "4 This imago is most truly and fully pre¬
sent in the following manner: "Trinitas in mente eo est imago
Dei, qua meminit, intelligit et diligit Deum, quod est sapien-
tia."5 This similitude does not denote equality with the triune
God as the Son, the express image of the Father, is equal to the
Father. This imago Dei in man "non aequatur parilitate, sed
quadam similitudine accedit."^ "For not in the body but in the
mind was man made in the image of God. In his own similitude
7
let us seek God: in his own image recognize the Creator."
1De Doc. Chr. II.3S.57; CCSL 32:72..
2Conf. X.25.36; VII.17.23; De Doc.Chr. II.3S.57; be Men-
dacio VII. 10; XVIII.2, PA 40; De Vera Relie. 39.72.
■^Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine,
p. 269♦ n. 1 c.
4Pe Trin. XII.4.4; PL 42:1000.
5pe Trin. XIV.12.15; PL 42:104#.
6Pe Trin. VII.6.12; PL 42:946; De Vera Relig. 43.Si;
44.#2.
7In Joan Evang. XXIII.10; PA IS.
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(2.1.10) 'Veritas' also signifies the interior light and
those regulae. leges. or rationes which are present in the human
mind. These are not acquired through sense perception,"*" but are
bestowed upon the mind by the Truth which is above the mind.
We understand "de universis" not by listening to external speech
2
"sed intus ipsi menti praesidentem consulimus veritatem. ..."
"Ille autem qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine ha-
bitare dictus est Christus (Ephes. Ill 16,17), id est incom-
mutabilis Dei Virtus atque sempiterna Sapientia. • • .Within
the created order the mind is the foremost locus of truth.
"Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi. In interiore homine habitat
Veritas.In his Soliloquia Augustine attempts to demonstrate
the immortality of the soul by declaring that truth, such as
the rules of dialectic and geometrical figures, is eternal and
abides in the mind or soul.5 "Sive enlm figurae geometricae in
veritate, sive in eis Veritas sit, anima nostra, id est intelli-
gentia nostra, contineri nemo ambigit.. . .'t(D This immutable truth
in the mind is not established through correspondence with con¬
tingent corporeal reality but is the reflection of the transcen-
1Conf. X.12.19. 2Pe Maaistro 11.33; PL 32:1216.
-^De Magistro 11.36; PL 32:1216.
4Pe Vera Relic. 39.72; CCSL 32:234.
5Solil. 11.11-13; 15; 11.19.33.
6Solil. II.19.33i PL 32:901.
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dent eternal rationes.-*- Augustine teaches that through divine
initiative, divine illumination in particular, the human mind
had contact with the immutable truth or rationes through which
true judgements can be made concerning contingent corporeal
entities. "Et judicamus haec^corporeal entities^ secundum
illas interiores regulas veritatis, quas communiter cernimus:
de ipsis vero nullo modo quis judicat." These interior rules
constitute the truth whereby created things may be judged to be
true or false. These intelligible and "numerorum dimensionumque
rationes et leges innumerabiles,"3 although not derived through
abstraction or generalization,4 are somewhat similar to what
could be called concepts, or better, intelligible images or mental
percepts. Augustine uses the word 'notitia':
In ilia igitur aeterna veritate, ex qua temporalia facta
sunt omnia, formam secundum quam sumus, et secundum quam
vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione ali-
quid operamur, visu mentis aspicimus: atque inde conceptam
rerum veracem notitiam, tanquam verbum apud nos habemus, et
dicendo intus gignimus; nec a nobis nascendo discedit.5
In the light of the eternal formae true notitiae of created en¬
tities can be realized. The notitia in the human mind has a two¬
fold reference or correspondence. It must rightly correspond to
1De Trin. ¥1.10.11; VIII.9.13; IX.6.9,11; IX.7.12; XII.14.
23; XIV.15.21; De Vera Relig. 24.25; 30.56; 31.57; De Lib. Arb.
11.12.34; 11.16.42-44; Conf. VII.17.23; X.12.19; XI.5.7; XI.8.10*
2Pe Lib. Arb. 11.12.34; PL 32:1259.
3Conf. X.12.19; BA 14:174. 4Pe Trin. IX.6.9.
5Pe Trin. IX.7.12; PL 42:9671 IX.6.9.
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the eternal forma as well as to the degree of truth present in
the thing. Augustine concludes that he could make correct judge¬
ments because he had discovered "inconmutabilem et ueram uerit-
atis aeternitatem supra mentem meam conmutabilem.
(2.2) The nature of truth as being
As indicated above, to consider Augustine's doctrine of truth
is to consider his doctrine of being. It was noted earlier that
the word 'veritas' is used to refer to 'insum esse' and 'id quod
est'. It should be pointed out at the outset that although
Augustine was not interested in the question of being qua being
and did not seek to answer the question in the form of a general
systematic ontology, he did hold some rather definite notions con¬
cerning being. However, throughout all his intellectual activity,
God, the soul, and its salvation are his major preoccupations.^
It is in the course of this activity that his views regarding
being come to light. One finds these notions woven into the very
fabric of his thought and they are part and parcel of his philos¬
ophy or theology.^ A brief examination of his ontological beliefs
is therefore warranted.
(2.2.1) Augustine: 'essentialist' or 'existentialist'?
Augustine has been called both an 'existentialist' and an
1Conf. VII.17.23; BA 13:623. 2Cf. sections (1.1), (1.2).
o
Of. p. 101, n. 2; R. Schneider, Seele and Sein.
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'essentialistf. Joseph Mihalich states: "In its broader aspects,
the evolution of existentialism involves such figures as the 17th
century semi-mystic Pascal and the 'first existentialist' — St.
Augustine.Grabowski asserts: "The ontology of St. Augustine
is not 'existential' —it does not reach to the very act of
existence (the esse) —but is 'essential'— it encompasses the
2 o
essence, the ens". E. Gilson would agree with the latter view.-5
Any attempt to pigeonhole Augustine's notions concerning being
is beset by a number of difficulties. In the first place one
faces the task of trying to ascertain the senses of the labels
themselves. This in itself is no simple undertaking. Moreover,
even after 'essentialist' and 'existentialist' have been defined,
it is still doubtful whether they can be applied to specific doc¬
trines of being without further qualification. Another diffi¬
culty that arises with respect to Augustine's ontological beliefs
is that he does not offer us a clear and worked out ontology.
We shall avoid labeling his thought in this area and simply seek
to examine his formulations concerning 'esse', 'esse ipsum'.
'substantia'. and 'essentia'.
(2.2.2) 'Essentia' and 'esse'
Augustine speaks of being both in terms of 'essentia' and
^J.C. Mihalich, Existentialism and Thomism (New York: Phil¬
osophical Library, I960), p. 2.
2S. J. Grabcwski, The All-Present God (St. Louis, Missouri:
B. Herder Book Co., 1954), p. 170.
^E. Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1959), p. 61.
139
'esse'. Although Augustine uses both of these words he does not
appear to make a clear and explicit demarcation between the
essence and the existence of particular entities. Augustine man¬
ifests a degree of awareness of such a distinction but he makes
no precise delineation. "Essentia' and 'esse' are not used to
make distinct and definite ontological distinctions. In Augus¬
tine's thought these ontological categories or notions appear to
merge or at least flow over into each other. He does not follow
through with any kind of precise elaboration or development of
either category.
'Essentia' is very closely related to 'esse'. Augustine
states that "ita ab eo quod est esse dicta est essentia. . . et
ideo sola est incommutabilis substantia vel essentia, qui Deus
est, cui profecto ipsum esse, unde essentia nominata est, maxime
ac verissime competit.'Essentia' in this instance signifies
more than the nature, form, or essence of an existing subject.
'Essentia' designates the whole particular being. In the above
quotation 'essentia' is used of God himself as esse ipsum. Elsewhere
Augustine states that the "summa essentia esse facit omne quod
p
est, unde et essentia dicitur." Again essentia is closely bound
up with esse. This does not mean that 'essentia' is to be regard¬
ed simply as a nominal form of 'esse'. 'Essentia' connotes more
than sheer esse, it includes the whole being, both nature and
existence, of that entity so designated.
^De Trin. V.2.3; PL 42:912; cf. also De Civitate Dei XII.2.
2Pe Vera Relit?. 11.22; CCSL 32:201.
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One reason why Augustine was able to speak both of an
immutable essentia and mutable substantiae or essentiae is that
he did not think of essentia simply and strictly as a fixed nature
or essence to be expressed in the form of a concept. Augustine
uses 'natura'. fsubstantia *, and 'essentia' as equivalent terms.
Augustine argues that "intellegitur nullam naturam uel, si melius
ita dicitur, nullam substantiam siue essentiam malum esse."^" In
this statement and its context Augustine makes no attempt to dis¬
tinguish between the essence and existence of beings. It is
evident that Augustine has particular beings in mind, the rational
soul or substance in particular in relation to sin and evil. As
intimated above, it is in speaking of the eternal rationes and
formae situated in the divine mind that Augustine has in mind
what could possibly be termed the immutable natures and essences
of created beings or essentiae. Because 'essentia' and 'natura'
are used to signify a particular being in its entirety, Augustine
is able to speak of mutable natures and essences. He speaks of
that word generated within us "quod verbum amore concipitur,
sive creaturae, sive Creatoris, id est, aut naturae mutabilis,
aut incommutabilis veritatis."2 That Augustine's natura entails
the whole being of a particular entity is indicated by the follow¬
ing statement: "Sola ergo bona alicubi esse possunt, sola mala
nusquam; quoniam naturae etiam illae, quae ex malae uoluntatis
1De Vera Relig. 23.44; CCSL 32:215.
2Pe Trin. IX.7.13; PL 42:967; De Civ. Dei VIII.6.
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initio uitatae sunt, in quantum uitiosae sunt, raalae sunt, in
quantum autem naturae sunt, bonae sunt.""*" Such a natura is
clearly not the immutable essence of a particular species or
entity. The immutable essence as such is the eternal forma or
ratio of created essentiae or naturae. It goes without saying
that an essentia or natura exists and conforms to some degree
to its eternal forma. The application of 'essentia1 to partic¬
ular beings is also manifest in the following statement: "Et
propterea Deo, id est summae essentiae et auctori omnium quali-
umcumque essentiarum, essentia nulla contraria est." It must
also be kept in mind, however, that for Augustine evil is a
privation of being.
(2.2.3) The order of beings and modes of being
The order of being or truth extends all the way from the
summa essentia down to formless matter. The ordering of beings
is determined by such factors as immutability and mutability,
necessity and contingency. Furthermore, the ranking of created
entities depends both on the order of the rationes in the Word
of God as well as the manner in which particular beings exist.
(2.2.3.1) The summa essentia
God is the summa essentia. Augustine states: "Cum enirn Deus
1De Civ. Dei XII.3; CSEL 40:570; also De Civ. Dei XII.2;
XVIIII.13.
2Pe Civ. Dei XII.2; CSEL 40:569.
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summa essentia sit, hoc est sumrae sit, et ideo inmutabilis sit:
rebus, quas ex nihilo creauit, esse dedit, sed non sumrne esse,
si cut est ipse. . . ."^ The supreme Being, God, exists in the
highest degree. Supreme esse is immutable esse. Augustine
states that the mutable thing "non esse posse nisi ab illo, qui
p
uere est, quia incommutabiliter est." In speaking of creatures
which have both esse and nonesse Augustine states that "id enim
uere est, quod inconmutabiliter manet."^ He asserts that "ideo
sola est incommutabilis substantia vel essentia, qui Deus est,
cui profecto ipsum esse, unde essentia nominata est, maxime ac
verissime competit."4 The summa essentia is immutable in every
respect. "Nam sicut omnino tu es, tu scis solus, qui es incon¬
mutabiliter et scis inconmutabiliter et uis inconmutabiliter. .
. ."5 "God always is, nor has He been and is not, nor is but
has not been, but as He never will not be; so He never was not."^1
7
God is immutable both respect to space and time. The immutability
$
of God is bound up with his eternity. "Quomodo ergo obtinebimus
nec ipsa relativa esse accidentia, qucniam nihil accidit Deo tem-
ooraliter, quia non est mutabilis, sicut in exordio hujus dis-
iDe Civ. Dei XII.2; CSSL 40,1:563-569.
2Pe Civ. Dei VIII.6; CSEL 40,1:364.
3Conf. VII.11.17; BA 13:6lB. 4Pe Trin. V.2.3; PL 42:912.
5Conf. XIII.16.19; BA 14=45B. fcDe Trin. XIV.15.21; PA 97.
7E£. XVIII.2; PA 40. ^Conf. XII.15.lB; De Trin. XV.5.7.
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putationis tractavimus."^ There are no accidents in God who is
above time. Augustine believes that these are the notions con¬
cerning the divine esse which are intended in Exodus 3•14• "What
does 'I AM WHO AM* (Exod. iii,14) mean but 'I am Eternal?1 What
o
does 'I AM WHO AM1 mean but 'I cannot be changed?'" Concerning
the 'I AM WHO AM' of Exodus 3=14 Augustine further states: "Cum
enim esse aliquo modo dicatur et corpus et animus, nisi proprio
3
quodam modo vellet intelligi, non id utique diceret."
Augustine would not have 'esse irsum' mean or imply that the
summa essentia is in any way the sum of all being. Augustine
makes it abundantly clear that no created being is in any way a
constituent part of the divine Being. "For all substance that
is not a created thing is God, and all that is not created is
God."^4" 'Esse ipsum' signifies the transcendent character of the
divine esse as described above. God is esse ipsum for "vere
5
summeque est."
Augustine also asserts that God is. goodness, greatness,
eternity, and being, and not simply that he is good, great,
eternal, and has being. Augustine makes this point in order to
indicate that these predications concerning God are grounded on
his own being and not in a participation in some other being or
ft
nature. Such participation would be impossible simply because
1De Trin. V.16.17; PL 42:922. 2Serm. vii.7; PA 95-
3Pe Trin. 1.1.2; PL 42:821; Conf. XII.11.11.
^•De Trin. 1.6.9; PA97: De Civ. Pei XII.2; Conf. X.25*36;
XII. 2873^7
5Pe Lib. Arb. 11.15.29; PL 32:1262. 6Pe Trin. V.10.11.
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the summa essentia transcends all other entities. Furthermore,
the utter simplicity of the divine Being precludes such partici¬
pation and demands that God ijs what he is said to have.-*-
Augustine also holds and seeks to demonstrate that God is
p
a necessary essentia. By reason of his utter simplicity* and
immutability God is a necessary essentia. That God is a necessary
being is a corollary of Augustine's argument for the existence
of immutable Truth on the basis of immutable truths perceived by
the mind. In his De Libero Arbitrio Augustine seeks to demon¬
strate the necessary esse of God through an appeal to such immut¬
able truth as the truth of number.^ "Quapropter nullo modo nega-
veris esse incommutabilem veritatem, haec omnia quae incommut-
abiliter vera sunt continentem. . . In the Soliloquia it is
also argued that truth is necessary: "R. Videturne tibi verum
aliquid esse posse, ut Veritas non sit? A.nullo modo. R. Erit
igitur Veritas, etiamsi mundus interest."^ It is also argued that
the existence of Truth is established by the very negation of it.
Although this is not the place to set forth a full critique
of Augustine's arguments, the following observations may be in
order. There appears to be some confusion between the categories
-*-De Trin. VI.6.£; VI.7.£; PA 97-9£; In Joan Evang. XCIX,4;
PA p. 99; De Civ. Dei XI.10.1,3; PA 100; VIII.6.
2Pe Trin. VI.4.6; PA 100. 3Qx> cit. II.£,21; 11.10.23,29.
^De Lib. Arb. 11.12.33; PL 32:1259.
5Solil. II.2.2; PL 32:££6. 6Solil. II.2.2; II.15.2£.
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of factual necessity and logical necessity in which the former
is deduced from the latter. It is assumed that the existence
of necessary logical truths demonstrates that there is a neces¬
sary being. It is also assumed that there is someone who asserts
these necessary truths or who denies that there is any truth.^
Furthermore, if there is no truth whatsoever, it follows that no
O
true statement is even possible. However, it should be pointed
out that Augustine did not of course view necessary truths as
analytic statements. Necessary logical truths were such by
virtue of their relation to or participation in the eternal and
immutable Truth in which are situated the immutable regulae and
rationes. These truths exist independently of the human minds
which discover them. Augustine's arguments rest on his exem-
plarism and doctrine of rationes or formae.
It could rightly be said that Augustine's understanding of
the nature of God was determined in large part by his notion of
what constitutes supreme esse. This latter notion was in turn
determined very much by his idea of perfection, his anxious quest
for certainty in a mutable world, and the necessary premises of
his argument for the eternal existence of truth. Since God is
the supreme Being and the highest essentia it necessarily follows
■htf. and M. Kneale. The Development of Logic (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1962), p. 174-
^C. K. McKeon, A Study of the Surnrna Phllosonhiae of the
Pseudo-Grosseteste (New York: Columbia University Press, 194$)>
pp. 25,26, n. 12.
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that he exists truly and supremely, in other words, in the
manner prescribed above and which befits such a Being.
In the above argument that is set forth in De Libero
Arbitrio the following premise is taken for granted: "Hunc
plane fatebor Deum, quo nihil superius esse constiterit."^ At
the outset Augustine proceeds on the assumption that that which
is eternal and immutable is higher than the human ratio and all
other mutable entities. In attempting to demonstrate the exis¬
tence of God Augustine assumes that it is the eternal and immut¬
able Truth that is supreme and whose existence must be demon¬
strated. Although Augustine does not believe that there is any¬
thing more excellent than the immutable and eternal Truth he
does state the following near the close of the argument: "Si
enim aliquid est excellentius, ille potius Deus est: si autem
non est, jam ipsa Veritas Deus est."^
(2.2.3.2) The order of created beings
The order of created entities and goods is, of course, fixed
before creation by the hierarchy of formae and rationes in the
3
supreme Truth. Gilson speaks of this order as follows:
The sum-total of all the eternal essences and of the tem¬
poral things participating in these essences forms a
1De Lib. Arb. II.6.14; PL 32:1243; cf. also Conf. ¥11.4.6.
2Pe Lib. Arb. 11.15.39; PL 32:1262.
^Cf. (2.1); De Div. Quaest. 33.46.1-2; De Civ. Dei XI.10;
XI.29; De Trin. IX.6.9.
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hierarchy of higher and lower realities, and the relation¬
ships born of this hierarchy constitute what is called
order.1
Both the classes or species of created essentiae and their atten¬
dant modes of existence are predetermined by the eternal Verbum.
Augustine says that when created beings in general are compared
with God "nec pulchra sunt nec bona sunt nec sunt."^ Augustine
3
states that the "mutabilis mundus constat et non constat. . . . "
Such radical statements are intended to show forth the vastly
inferior character of created being in comparison with the divine
Being. All of created being differs radically from the supreme
essentia in several respects. "Causa itaque rerum, quae facit
nec fit, Deus est; aliae uero causae et fiunt, sicut sunt omnes
creati spiritus, maxime rationales."4 Furthermore, the created
5
order has been brought into being ex nihilo. All created essen-
z 7
tiae. including the mind of man, are mutable, whereas the
summa essentia is immutable and eternal.** Created essentiae are
also radically contingent upon the supreme Being. Augustine
•*•£. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine
(London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1961), p. 132.
2Conf. XI.4.6; BA 14:230. 3Conf. XII.3.3; BA 14:356.
4Pe Civ. Dei V.9; CSEL 40,1:227.
5Conf. XII.7.7; XII.23.3B; De Vera Relig. 13.36; De Civ.
Dei XII.1.
4Pe Doc. Chr. II.3B.57; De Vera Relig. 39.72; De Mendacio
VII.10.
7Enchir. 3.23; Conf. XII.3.3;IV.12.13' De Trin. IX.7.13;
De Lib. Arb. II.16.44. De Civ, Dei VIII.6.
^Cf. supra. (2.2.3.1)
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poses the rhetorical question: "non ergo essem, deus raeus, non
omnino essem, nisi esses in me. an potius non essem, nisi
essem in te, ex quo omnia, per quern omnia, in quo omnia?n^" He
speaks of the dependence of the creation on the Creator: "Ille
enim fecit, haec facta sunt, adque ut sint et bene se habeant,
2
eius indigent, a quo facta sunt." He says that "nisi faciente
illo non tale uel tale esset, sed prorsus esse non posset."3
There are also diverse modes of esse within the created
order itself.^" The modes of being correspond with the order of
the rationes discussed above. Position in the scale of esse is
determined in large measure by the degree of mutability and the
degree of involvement in the corporeal world. The less mutable
something is the more firmly it is fixed in esse. To be immut¬
able is to be necessary and eternal. "Norn enim proprie vocatur
aeternum, quod aliqua ex parte mutatur. In quantum igitur mut-
5
abiles sumus, in tantum ab aeternitate distamus." Augustine
has this to say concerning truth and eternity: "Veritas quippe
immortalis, incorrupta, incommutabilis permanet. Vera autem
immortalitas, vera incorruptibilitas, vera incommutabilitas,
ipsa est aeternitas.It would be wrong to conclude on this
basis that the immutable leges or regulae found in the mind of
1Conf. 1.2.2; BA 13:276. 2Pe Civ. Dei X.15; CSBL 40,1:472.
3Pe Civ. Dei XII.26; CSBL 40, 1:611. ^De Civ. Dei XII.2.
5De Trin. IV.lS.24; PL 42:904. 6Ibid.: PL 42:905.
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man rank highest in the order of created essentiae.-*- As indi¬
cated above, these leges or regulae are not really created
essentiae at all, but rather the result of illumination from the
2
divine light which transcends the mind. Every created entity
is a mutable good. Augustine explains why this is so: "Dici-
mus itaque incommutabile bonum non esse nisi unum uerum beatum
Deum; e& uero, quae fecit, bona quidem esse, quod ab illo,
3
uerum tamen mutabilia, quod non de illo, sed nihilo facta sunt."
In the order of created being the rational soul of man is
superior to all other earthly beings. It is in the human mens
that the image of God is situated.^" The human mind is fixed
between the eternal reasons of things and the corporeal things
which it judges: "Sed sublimioris rationis est judicare de is-
tis corporalibus secundum rationes incorporales et sempiter-
5
nas.. . Whereas the body is mutable both with respect to
time and space the soul is mutable only in terms of time, not
6 7
space. God rules the soul but the soul rules the body.' Augus¬
tine states that as the mind is to be preferred to the body, so
3-Cf. supra.
2Solil. I.3.15; Conf. X.26.37; De Trin. XII.15.24; XV.27.50.
3Pe Civ. Dei XII.1; CSEL 40,1:567; also Gonf. XII.7.7.
^"Note discussion above on image of God in man,
5Pe Trin. XII.2.2; PL 42:999; De Doc Chr. 11.33.57.
6Ejd. XVIII.2; PA 40. 7Pe Civ. Dei XVIIII.27.
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truth must be preferred to the mind itself. The rational soul
is also superior to other earthly beings by virtue of its immor¬
tality.2
Augustine speaks of the heaven of heavens, the donus3 of
God, which differs from God in essence and is not eternal but
where there is no change or variation even though there is the
possibility of change.^- In this heaven of heavens mutable
spiritual beings attain a state of changelessness. In this
heaven knowledge without change is realized, "ubi est intellec-
tus nosse simul, non ex parte, non in aenigmate, non per specu¬
lum, sed ex toto, in manifestione, facie ad faciem. . . .
This heaven of heavens is not coeternal with God but neither is
6
it situated in time or days wherein there is mutation. Before
the creation of this heaven of heavens and all other creatures
God created that wisdom which is the "mens rationalis et intel-
lectualis castae ciuitatis tuae, matris nostrae.. . .
Formless or unformed matter is most remote from God in the
order of esse. This matter was made out of nothing and "dei
g
beneficio formabile est." Although this unformed matter is not
^De Mendacio 7.10.
2Solil. II; II.1.1.; 11.19.33; De Immor. Animae.
3Conf. XII.11.11. 4Conf. XII.15.21.
5Conf. XII.13.16; BA 14:366. 6Conf. XII.12.15; XII.13.16.
7
Conf. XII.15.20; BA 14:372.
^De Vera Relig. 13.36; CCSL 32:209.
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absolutely nothing, it is close to nonesseRegarding this
formless abyss "non sunt utique dies nec uicissitudo spatiorum
p
temporalium." This matter was not made within the intervals of
o
time and could not change from one form to another.^ Augustine
points out that formless matter is by nature prior to formed
matter "sine ulla temporis interpositione" between them.^
In addition to the different levels or modes of being which
belong to the various created species, there are differences,
with respect to being, amongst the members of a particular species.
The position or rank of an entity within its species is determined
by the manner in which it exists. This manner or mode of being
is equivalent to the extent to which an entity conforms to its
ideal ratio. With respect to man it is his will, or better, the
character of his willing which is determinative. Created enti¬
ties are not created immutably, equally, supremely good "sed
tamen bona etiam singula; simul vero universa valde (Gen. I, 31);
quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulchri-
tudo."5
As part of the good creation the human free will is also
good.^ It is the manner in which the will is used which deter¬
mines whether a man is a good or true man or an evil or false man.
1Conf. XII.3.3; XII.6.6. 2Conf. XII.9.9; BA 14:356.
3Conf. XII.12.15. 4Conf. XIII.33.4S; BA 14:516.
^Bnchir. 3.10; BA 9:11$; 4.12; Be Vera Relig. 23.44; De Civ.
Dei XI.9; XI.24.
6Pe Lib. Arb. II.1.3; II.2.4; 11.19.50-53; III.1.1.
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It is a question of willing rightly or wrongly. Augustine speaks
of right wills: "Rectae autem sunt voluntates et omnes sibimet
religatae, si bona est ilia quo cunctae referuntur: si autem pra-
va est, pravae sunt omnes."1 That will wills wrongly which sub¬
stitutes mutable and lesser goods for the unchangeable supreme
good. Creatures as such are not evil but are corrupted by the
evil will: ". . . quoniam naturae etiam illae, quae ex malae
uoluntatis initio uitatae sunt, in quantum uitiosae sunt, malae
sunt, in quantum autem naturae sunt, bonae sunt."-* The misery
of the wicked angels must also be attributed to their own evil
willing.4
To the extent that a man wills rightly he is and is true or
conforms to his eternal ratio. In other words, one is and is
true to this ratio insofar as he exists or wills as he ought to
exist or will. As noted above, Augustine states that "uera in
tantum uera sunt, in quantum sunt, in tantum autem sunt, in
quantum principalis unius similia sunt. . . .To say that one
member of a species is more than another is to say that it con¬
forms to a greater degree to its ideal ratio and that it exists
accordingly. Furthermore, as one wills rightly and is conformed
1De Trin. XI.6.10; PL 42:922.
2Pe Lib. Arb. 11.19.52,53; II.16.43; III.1.1; Enchir. 3.23.
3Pe Civ. Dei XII.3: CSEL 40.1:570. 4Pe Civ. Dei XII.6.
^De Vera Relig. 36.66; CCSL 32:231.
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more and more to the eternal form or exemplar one advances to
higher levels of being and finally arrives at that highest level
of unchanging perfect being."'" The soul is, to the degree that it
has advanced in its ascent to God. Although every rational soul,
by virtue of its immortality, has its existence assured, it does
not achieve its highest degree of being until it attains the
beautific contemplation of the supreme Truth.2 This is the high¬
est mode of being that the human soul can enjoy. Augustine speaks
as follows of the renewal of the image of God in man: "In agni-
tione Dei, justitiaque et sanctitate veritatis, qui de die in
diem proficiendo renovatur, transfert amorem a temporalibus ad
aeterna, a visibilibus ad intelligibilia, a carnalibus ad spirit-
ualia. . . . "3
This moral and ontological ascent of the soul can also be
described epistemologically in terms of opinion, faith, know¬
ledge, and wisdom.^ "Hoc est nimirum quod requiris, quid pri-
mum, quid ultimum teneatur: inchoari fidei, perfici specie."3
With respect to the mind's vision of the truth Augustine states
that "ita quippe erit integior et castior, cum eius [truthJ pot-
-*-Conf. XII. 13.16; De Civ. Dei X.22; De Quant. Animae 33.70-
76; PA 24-26; De Magistro XI.36. "
2Pe Util. Cred. 11.25; Retract. 1.14.2; De Trin. XV.25.45.
3Pe Trin. XIV.17.23; PL 42:1054.
^"De Util. Cred. 11.25; De Quant. Animae 33.70-76; Conf. XIII.
16.23; Pe Trin. XII.1.1;2.2;3.3; XII.1.2.3; 19.24; Solil. 1.6.12,13.
5Enchir. 1.5; BA 9:106.
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ius iomutabilitate quam sua mutabilitate perfruetur. As the
soul advances to higher levels of being it becomes more holy and
complete. Truth, being, and holiness are inseparably bound up
together and must be considered accordingly. Insofar as a soul
is true, it is and is holy. In Augustine's doctrine, the onto-
logical, epistemological, and moral categories or dimensions of
human life are interdependent and interrelated.
3. Consequential dichotomies in St. Augustine's doctrine of truth
(3.1) Certain major dichotomies
(3.1.1) The whole of Augustine's thought is permeated by a
number of dichotomies of considerably consequence. These include
the intelligible-sensible, immutable-mutable, eternity-time, and
necessary-contingent bifurcations. Although Augustine himself
had to contend with certain problematical consequences resulting
from these dichotomies, those who inherited his doctrine came to
reap the full harvest. The shock wave arising from by these
divisions spans both mediaeval and modern thought. One must bear
in mind, however, that these dichotomies undergo alteration and
revision in the periods cited.
(3.1.2) We have already drawn attention to some of the
factors which played a decisive role in the formation of Augus¬
tine's doctrine of truth,^ a number of which helped to foster
these dichotomies. It can rightly be said that there is a sense
1De Mendacio 7.10; CSEL 41:429. 2Cf. (1.3)
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in which Augustine uses 'truth* so as to include both sides of
the above divisions. Such may be the case when 'veritas' is
used in a generic and broad sense to signify id quod est."*" Used
in this sense 'Veritas' includes both mutable and sensible en¬
tities since these also have being. As indicated above, every
created thing, including the mutable and the corporeal, is to
the degree that it is true, and is true insofar as it is.2 All
3
true things are true in and through God, the Truth. Augustine
distinguishes between that which is true and truth:" . . . ita
credo aliud esse veritatem, et aliud quod verum dicitur."^ In
connection with this, Ratio states that "ergo cum interit ali-
quid quod verum est, non interit Veritas."'5 The example given
is that of the true tree which perishes while truth remains.
Truth is not subject to such a vicissitude. With respect to the
corporeal, Ratio asks: "Quare jam allud ultimum videamus, utrum
corpus non sit vere verum, id est non in eo sit Veritas, sed
quasi quaedam imago veritatis." With reference to geometrical
figures Augustine asks who would be so blind as not to see "istas
quae in geometrica docentur, habitare in ipsa veritate, aut in
his etiam veritatem; illas vero corporis figuras, siquidem quasi
ad istas tendere videntur, habere nescio quam imitationem veri¬
tatis, et ideo falsas esse?"^ In other words, the question is
1Solil. 11.5.8. 2Conf. VII.15.21; De Vera Relie. 36.66.
3Solil. 1.1.3. ^Solil. 1.15.27; PL 32:883; also 11.15.29.
SSolil. 1.15.28; PL 32:884. 6Solil. II.18.32; PL 32:901.
7Solil. 11.18.32; PL 32: 901.
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whether bodies or corporeal figures can even be said to be true.
However, corporeal entities do have being and therefore deserve
to be termed true to the extent that they exist.
(3.1.3) It would be correct to say, however, that Augustine
consistently uses 'Veritas' to signify that which is incorporeal,
intelligible, immutable, and eternal. 'Veritas' signifies that
which vere est. Truth is incorporeal and consequently it cannot
be perceived by the senses. Truth is less like things we touch,
taste, and smell and more like things we hear and see, although
it also differs very much from the latter inasmuch as truth does
2
not vary according to either time or place. "At ilia veritatis
et sapientiae pulchritudo. . . nec sensibus corporis subjacet."^
Augustine says that the truth is distant from the minds of those
vain men "Qui nimis in haec corporalia progressi atque lapsi
nihil aliud putant esse quam quod istis quinque notissimis nun-
tiis corporis sentiunt . . ..Augustine teaches that truth
transcends both the body and the mind: "... ut autem animus
corpori, ita Veritas etiam ipsi animo praeponenda est, ut earn
non solum magis quam corpus, sed etiam magis quam se ipsum ad-
petat animus."''
(3.1.4) Not only is truth incorporeal, it is also immut¬
able. It transcends both time and space. With respect to the
1Solil. II.17.31. 2Pe Lib. Arb. II.14.36.
3Pe Lib. Arb. 11.14.36; PL 32:1262; Solil. 1.3.6.
4Pe Util. Cred. 1.1; CSEL 25:7. ^Pe Kendacio 7.10; CSfcL 41:429.
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immutability and eternity of truth a number cf texts have al¬
ready been cited.^ In these instances 'Veritas' signifies that
which truly is rather than simply correspondence or coherence.
We noted above that that which is immutable and eternal truly
is. God as the immutable Truth is "sine indigentia creatorem,
sine situ praesidentem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco
ubique totum, sine tempore sempiterum, sine ulla sui mutatione
mutabilia facientem, nihilque patientem.
(3.1.5) It is clearly evident that the corporeal entity,
although a created good, occupies a very low position in the
order of being. The realm of the sensible is certainly not the
primary or most proper locus of truth. In order to achieve wis¬
dom the following is prescribed: "R. Penitus esse ista sensibilia
fugienda. . . . "4 In his Retracf'lones Augustine offers a clari¬
fication concerning the above statement: ". . . .Non autem dixi
ego, Omnia sensibilia; sed, ista. hoc est, corruptibilia . .
. ."5 He goes on to say that corruptible sensible things will
not exist in the new heaven and the new earth. The corporeal
entity is not inherently evil^ but rather an inferior mutable
1Conf. VII.17.23; le Vera Relig. 31.57; 55.113; De Lib. Arb.
11.12.33; II.14.3d; De Doc. Chr. II.3d.56-39.55; De Civ. Dei
X.22; XI.10; De Trin. IV.18.24. '
2Cf. (2.1); (2.2.3.1). 3Pe Trin. V.1.2: PL 42:912.
4Solil. 1.14.24; PL 32:dd2. ^Retract. 1.4.3; PL 32:5#9.
6Pe Civ. Dei XI.9: XI.23; XII.3; XIIII.2.
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good. Augustine states that "cum caro sit ipsa substantia, pro-
fecto aliquod bonum cui accident ista mala, id est privationes
ejus boni quod dicitur sanitas.. . .Nevertheless, because of
his conception of immutable truth and being Augustine tends to
disparage the material world. In addition to the statements
cited above this is manifest where it is said that philosophy
"vere docet nihil omnino colendum esse totumque contemni opor-
tere, quidquid mortalibus oculis cernitur, quidquid ullus sen-
2
sus attingit." That man is renewed in the knowledge of God,
in the righteousness and sanctity of truth, who transfers his
love from temporal things to eternal things, from the visible
to the intelligible, and from the carnal to the spiritual.-*
Augustine states that one must even reject the incorporeal like¬
nesses of corporeal things in seeking an understanding of the
truth.^ Correct doctrine elevates the people of God from the
temporal to the eternal and from the visible to the invisible^
Augustine states:
. . . ecce vide, si potes: Deus Veritas est (Sap. IX, 15)
Hoc enim scriptum est, Quoniam Deus lux est (I Joan. 1,6):
non quomodo isti oculi vident, sed quomodo videt cor, cum
audis, Veritas est. Noli quaerere quid sit Veritas; statim
enim se opponent caligines imaginum corporalium et nubila
phantasmatum, et perturbabunt serenitatem, quae primo ictu
diluxit tibi, cum dicerem, Veritas.
1Enchir. 3.11; BA 9:120. 2Contra Acad. 1.1.3; CSEL 63:5.
7
Trin. XIV.17.23. S)e Trin. XV.27.50.
5Pe Civ. Dei X.14. 6Pe Trin. VIII.2.3; PL 42:949.
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(3.2) Specific consequences resulting from these dichotomies
(3.2.1) The above dichotomy, which involves a negative
attitude towards the realm of corporeal being, affected greatly
Augustine's doctrine of knowledge, his notions concerning written
and spoken statements, and consequently his view of the Scrip¬
tures. The corporeal or sensible world, whether sensible word,
a body, or an historical event, is at best the visible form of
invisible and immutable Truth. True or correct statements con¬
stitute part of this visible form. Augustine concludes that he
was able to make correct judgments concerning mutable entities
because of the eternal and immutable Truth.1 Augustine dis¬
tinguishes between the statement that involves a per se connex-
2
ion and that which involves an accidental connexion. However,
both types of statement are sensible signs of incorporeal thoughts
or words situated within the mind.3 This is what the heart or
mind is said to see.4 In thinking the truth the mind must be
free of everything that is corporeal.
The words or statements that primarily interest Augustine
are those which direct the mind to the eternal immutable Truth.
Such are the words of the Scriptures, the words of the Gospel.
They are the visible form of the eternal Truth. The Gospel that
1Conf. VII.17.23. 2Solil. 11.12.22; De Doc. Chr. 11.35.53.




is spoken through the flesh sounds in the outward ears "ut
crederetur et intus quaereretur et inueniretur in aeterna ueri-
tate. . . ." The words of the sacred text serve as a sign which
prompts the mind to behold the Truth which lies above the text
2
and the mind. Augustine believes that one must interpret the
text in an allegorical fashion if one is to acquire knowledge of
this Truth.3 He says, for example, that there are many truths
4
to be discovered in the words of Moses in Genesis 1:1 and 1:6.
He says that if he does not ascertain altogether what Moses had
in mind in the text "id tamen dicam, quod mihi per eius uerba
5
tua ueritas dicere uoluerit, quae illi quoque dixit quod uoluit."
The sensible-intelligible dichotomy is apparent in Augustinefs
allegorical interpretation of Scripture. He states in another
place: "Ergo ipsis carnalibus formis, quibus detinemur, niten-
dum est ad eas cognoscendas, quas caro non nuntiat."^ From the
perception of the corporeal object one must advance to "sapien-
tiam ubi contemplatio est aeternorum."7
(3.2.2) Augustine's understanding of truth as intelligible
and eternal also affected considerably his understanding of
historical events. The historical event, by reason of its temporal
1Conf. XI.S.10; BA 14:233. 2Conf. XIII.24.37.
3Conf. XII.13.27; XII.27.37; De Util. Cred. 3.5.
4Conf. XII.25.35. 5Conf. XII.32.43; BA 14:422.
6Pe Vera Relic. 24-45; CCSL 32:215.
7
De Trin. XV.3.5; PL 42:1061.
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and corporeal character, is very subordinate to that Truth
which is eternal and intelligible. Two such events are the
Incarnation and Resurrection. Although such events are not
readily integrated into his system of truth, Augustine neverthe¬
less clearly affirms both the Incarnation and the corporeal
Resurrection of Christ."*" Augustine argues that the mediator
between God and men must be a blessed mortal since God is
p
blessed and immortal and man is a miserable mortal. In speak¬
ing of the spiritual body Augustine says that it is subservient
3
to the spirit but that it is not spiritualized. The spiritual
body has the power of eating and drinking but not the need.
Augustine makes reference to I John 3:2 and states that our
image, which will be like that of the Son of God, will include
5
the body since Jesus has assumed a body. The flesh itself is
not evil even though sin is caused by the flesh. The corrup¬
tible body is the punishment and burden resulting from sin.^
Those of the earthly city live after the flesh and those of the
heavenly city live according to the spirit.7 Augustine does not
wish to repudiate the body as such. He emphasizes that the
spiritual body of Christ must be kept intact and not reduced to
spirit.
1De_Ciy^Jei XIIII.14; Villi.15; XIII.20-23; XVII.16-19;
Contra Acad. III.19.42; De Doc. Chr. 1.12.13; De Trin. XIII.14.
18; XIII.19.24; XIV.18.24.
2Pe Civ. Dei Villi.14,15. 3Ibid. XIII.19,20.
4Ibid. XIII.22,23. 5Pe Trin. XIV.18.24.
6Pe Civ. Dei XIIII.1-5. 7Ibid.
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The major difficulty arises from the union of the eternal
Word, the immutable and eternal Truth, with the mutable corporeal
human nature, and the question as to how they are united and
interrelated. The difficulty is manifest in the following state¬
ment: "In rebus enim per tempus ortis, ilia summa gratia est,
quod homo in unitate personae conjunctus est Deo: in rebus vero
aeternis summa Veritas recte tribuitur Dei Verbo."3- While grace
is situated within the temporal order, truth exists in the realm
of the eternal. The personal union of God and man is the supreme
grace in the order of time but is excluded from that order in
which the eternal Word is the supreme Truth.
(3.2.3) This bifurcation has an epistemological parallel.
The Word made flesh belongs to the sphere of knowledge while
the Word coeternal with the Father belongs to the sphere of
wisdom.Knowledge is of that which is situated in time while
wisdom has to do with eternal immutable Truth. Inasmuch as man
is called to seek wisdom he must advance beyond the Word in the
flesh to the eternal Word apart from the flesh. It is said of
Christ: "Ipse nobis fidem de rebus temporalibus inserit, ipse
de sempiternis exhibet veritatem. Per ipsum (Christ/ pergimus
ad ipsum ^Christ// , tendimus per scientiam ad sapientiam. ..."
It appears as though the human nature assumed by the Word
•^De Trin. XIII. 19.24; PL 42:1033. 2Ibid.
3Ibid: PL 42:1034.
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functions much like the sensible words which direct the mind to
the incorporeal Truth. There are, however, some significant
differences. For example, according to Augustine the eternal
Word retains a human body in the form of a spiritual body. It
must also be said that the human nature was not assumed in
order to serve simply as a sign.-*- At the same time it can be
said that for Augustine the immediate purpose of the Incarna¬
tion is largely didactic, significative, and revelatory. In
speaking of the intelligible world Augustine says:
. . . cui £"intelligible world J animas multiformibus erroris
tenebris caecatus et altissimis a corpore sordibus oblitas
numquam ista ratio subtilissima revocaret, nisi summus deus
populari quadam dementia divini intellectus auctoritatem
usque ad ipsum corpus humanum declinaret atque summitteret,
cuius non solum praeceptis sed etiam factis excitatae animae
redire in semet ipsas et resipiscere patriam etiam sine dis-
putationum concertatione potuissent.^
It is true that this statement is taken from one of Augus¬
tine's early treatises, those written at Cassiciacum; however,
the same notion recurs in later major treatises. The sensible-
intelligible and mutable-immutable themes are very much in
evidence throughout his De Trinitate. In his De Doctrina Chris¬
tiana Augustine speaks of the Word becoming flesh so that thought
3
may be communicated by means of sensible sound or speech. In
his he Civitate Dei Augustine cites the need for faith for the
1De Trin. XIII.14.18; XIII.15.19; XIII.17.22; De Civ. Dei
Villi.14,15.
2Contra Acad. III.19.42; CSEL 63:79.
^De Doc. Chr. 1.12.13.
164
renewal and purification of the mind so that the mind may come
to know the Truth. The Son of God establishes this faith in
the Incarnation which is revelation: "In qua ut fidentius am-
bularet ad ueritatem, ipsa Veritas, deus dei filius, homine ad-
sumto, non Deo consumto, eandem constituit et fundauit fidem,
ut ad hominis Deum iter esset hcmini per hominem Deum."^
(3.2.4) Augustine believes that the ceremony, the mandates
of the Law, and the history given in the Old Testament, when
taken literally, constitute a veil covering the mysteries and
secret truths.2 When understood figuratively or allegorically
they help to convey the mysteries. With the coming of Christ
the veil is taken away but not the truths or mysteries. "Non
igitur per domini gratiam, tamquam inutilia ibi tegerentur,
ablata sunt, sed tegmen optium, quo utilia tegebantur."3 Through
Christ the Old Testament figures can be understood. Augustine
does not really view the historical events reported in the Old
Testament as events which are intrinsically redemptive and signi¬
ficant in terms of their historical character and as historical
events. They are taken more as sensible symbols of intelligible
truth and mysteries or as types of New Testament antitypes.^4"
Augustine does say that the Old Testament record of history is
-4)6 Civ. Dei XI.2; CSEL 40,1:513.
2Pe Util.Cred. 3.S; 3.9; 6.13.
3Pe Util. Cred. 3.9; CSEL 25:13.
^E.g. De Civ. Dei XVI: XVII.
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not to be treated as a mere factual record nor must the whole
sense or content be thought to lie in the allegorical significa¬
tion.^ However, in the final analysis it must be said that
Augustine does not fully realize or appreciate the place and
significance of historical events as such. It appears that
this is to a considerable extent due to his notions concern¬
ing truth and being.
(3.3) Later developments fostered in part by these dichotomies
(3.3.1) In concluding this brief treatment of Augustine's
doctrine of truth I would simply cite some later developments
which were foreshadowed by and which were in certain respects
already incipient in Augustine's doctrine of truth and its in¬
herent dichotomies. In teaching that truth is to be sought with-
p
in one's own mind and the inner man Augustine paves the way for
that modern subjective idealism which holds that the mind can
know only its own content or ideas and consequently can only
turn in upon itself. It should be pointed out, however, that
Augustine believed that through divine illumination the mind had
access to the eternal transcendent Truth. He also held that the
mind could know the being and truth of created entities. Never¬
theless, Augustine helped to prepare the way for subjective ideal¬
ism. He did so by teaching that the mind has not that direct and
immediate contact with created entities such as it has with the
•be Civ. Dei XVII.3. 2Pe Vera Relie. 39.72; 39.73.
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truth within and above itself. In knowing the truth which re¬
sides within itself the mind can achieve utmost certainty since
it does not have to contend with the senses and the mutable
world. Augustine teaches that the mind perceives directly the
truth within itself.
(3.3.2) Although Augustine could be termed a type of epis-
temological realist insofar as he holds that there are entities
independent of the mind whose truth the mind can know, largely
because of his intelligible-sensible dichotomy and doctrine of
the soul in relation to the body, he introduces a type of repre¬
sentative perception and representative realism into his epis-
temology.-*- In the first place, the body and the corporeal senses
p
are inferior to the soul and therefore cannot act upon the soul.
Furthermore, only the senses of the body are in direct contact
with corporeal objects. However, sensation is a function of the
soul alone: "Ergo concludimus non sentire posse nisi animam."^
Although the soul engages in sensation it has no immediate con¬
tact with the corporeal object but only with an image of the
object.^" The question is, how can complete scepticism regarding
knowledge of corporeal objects be avoided? Augustine holds that
it is the human will which unites the corporeal object with the
1De Musica VI; De Trin. XI;XII.
2Pe Civ. Dei XVIIII.27. 3Solil. 11.4.6: PL 32:883.
^J. A. Mourant, Introduction to the Philosophy of Saint
Augustine (University Park, Penn.: Penn. State University Press,
1964), p. 16.
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image impressed upon the bodily sense."'" The will also unites
the image of the corporeal object situated in the memory and
the impression formed when the mind is turned to it. As one
advances toward intellectus he moves even farther away from the
corporeal object. Concerning the isolation of the mind from its
objects Carre7 says: "This separation foreshadows the representa¬
tive or indirect theory of perception, which in a scientific
setting formed the basis of theories of knowledge in the seven-
2
teenth and eighteenth centuries." Augustine's problem, however,
pertained more to the connexion of the soul and the spiritual
image, formed in sensation, with the physical image and object,
than the connexion of sense data with physical entities. The
latter connexion proved to be a major problem especially in
theories of representative perception.
(3.3.3) Finally, I should like to mention that although
Augustine placed considerable emphasis on ontological truth or
truth as being, he helped to prepare the way for doctrines of
truth which emphasized primarily intellectual or logical truth.
This development was fostered in part by Augustine's scepticism
concerning knowledge of the sensible world, his preoccupation
with the truth which resides within the soul, and his emphasis
on necessary truth. Augustine's quest for self-evident necessary
truths follows both from his desire for certainty and his under-
J-De Trin. XI. 2.3.
%. H. Carre7, Realists and Nominalists (Oxford: Oxford Uni¬
versity Press, 1946), p. 12.
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standing of being as being immutable and intelligible. The con¬
sequence is that truth tends to be divorced from the world of
mutable beings, the spatial temporal order. It is not surpris¬
ing therefore that Augustine urges us to seek that truth which
is within the self, the inner man,l and particularly above the
mind. It should also be pointed out, however, that Augustine's
adherence to faith, authority, divine illumination, and exem-
plarism made it possible for him to hold that truths in the
mind originate from without the mind. It is when Augustine's
doctrines of faith, divine illumination, and the like are aban¬
doned that the dichotomies already discussed become especially
problematical and critical. When the mind's contents and ideas
are wholly abstracted from res without the mind it may be that
'truth' finally signifies no more than strict coherence, viz.,
immutable and necessary truths held in the mind.
J-De Vera Relig. 39.72; 49.94; De Lib. Arb. 11.10.26,29;
Solil. 11.19.33: De Maeistro 11.38; 12.39; 13.41; 14.46.
PART B. ST. ANSELM'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH
We have already indicated some of the reasons why Anselm's
doctrine of truth should be examined. Although we cannot give
full consideration to the manifold facets of his doctrine of
truth we do hope to consider some of the chief features of this
doctrine, especially those which reappear in Grosseteste's doc¬
trine. While keeping in mind Anselm's avowed fidelity to Augus¬
tine^ we must take note of his unique contribution to the under¬
standing of truth within the Augustinian tradition. We are
especially interested in those factors which constitute this
uniqueness.
1. Cardinal facets of St. Anselm's doctrine of truth
Without attempting to cover the whole range of Anselm's
thought it is possible to achieve a fairly satisfactory insight
into his doctrine through a careful inspection of some of his
dominant motifs. This can be achieved in part because of Anselm's
deliberate and careful choice of terms and concepts and his con¬
sistent usage of the same. D. P. Henry amply substantiates this
2
in his thorough study of Anselm's logic. Furthermore, Anselm's
method, the structure of individual treatises, and the thematic
ordering of his works emerge out of a consistent and coherent
focusing of his mind upon a divinely instituted order and the
^Monologion. Prologos; AO I: $.
^D. P. Henry, The Logic of Saint Anselm (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1967J.
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"veritatis ratio.One must be cognizant of this fact if he
hopes to achieve some understanding of the particular formula¬
tions, analyses, arguments, and motifs in which this unified
vision of Anselm finds expression. One possible way of acquiring
a degree of insight into Anselm's doctrine is to direct one's
attention to certain cardinal notions that recur again and again
and serve to integrate his thought. Included are such notions
as rectitudo. iustitia. ratio. bonum, fides, intellectus. liber-
tas, necessitas(praecedens et seauens). possibilitas. gratia.
debitum. essentia, and the like. In examining Anselm's doctrine
of rectitudo one finds ofteself also engaged in the examination
of a number of the above related notions.
(1.1) Truth as a central and integrative factor
Anselm's doctrine of truth has a central and key place in
his thought for some of the same reasons cited in connexion with
Augustine. God is the summa Veritas^ and rectitudo.3 This be¬
lief is at the very center of Anselm's doctrine. 'Truth' also
signifies being although Anselm does not state this as explicitly
as does Augustine.^ That 'truth' signifies being is most evident
^Cur Deus Homo. Commendatio Qperis ad Urbanum Papam II; AO
11:40 [AO designates S. Anselmi Opera Omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt
(Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 194©); followed by
volume and page number.7J
2Pe Ver. 1,7,10,13; Pros. 14; Mon. 16,IS,22,31,47; Cur
Deus Homo 11.17.
3Pe Ver. 10,13. 4Cf. Part A, (2.1).
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when one considers Anselm's whole doctrine of truth and being.
In speaking of the truth of things Anselm states: "M. Est igitur
Veritas in omnium quae sunt essentia, quia hoc sunt quod in
summa veritate sunt."-*- Truth also has such an important place
in AnselmTs thought because of his conception of truth as "rec-
p
titudo mente sola perceptibilis." Everything that is has a
certain rectitudo. which means that every single thing is part
of an integrated complex of relationships. This is the basis
for the vision of which G. S. Heyer speaks: "One indeed dis¬
cerns amid the diverse works of the saint a consistent core, a
pivot on which his thought steadily turns. We may call it a
special vision of 'right order' or rectitudo.
The coherence of Anselm*s doctrine is a corollary of that
rectus ordo1* grounded in the supreme Truth and expressed in the
created order. In speaking of God's response to human perver¬
sity Anselm states: "Quas si divina sapientia, ubi perversitas
rectum ordinem perturbare nititur, non adderet, fieret in ipsa
cieu S
universitate quairiAdebet ordinare, quaedam ex violata ordinis
pulchritudine deformitas, et deus in sua dispositione videretur
5
deficere." Truth is this right or true order which man disturbs
1De_Ver. 7; AO I:l&5; cf. also De Ver. 13; De Casu Diaboli 19.
2Pe Ver. 11; AO 1:191.
^G. S. Heyer, Jr., "Rectitudo in the Theology of St. Anselm"
(unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School, Yale University,
1963), p. 5.
^Mon. 7; Cur Deus Homo I. 1,12,13 and especially 1.15.
5Cur Deus Homo 1.15; AO 11:73.
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and which God restores. Anselm seeks to order his thought in
accordance with this truth and right order. In discussing
Anselm's method, R. W. Southern states: "The inquiry was scarcely
distinguishable from the prayer, since the aim of both was to
shake off the torpor of the mind and see things as they are in
their essential being.The component parts of Anselm's teach¬
ing are interrelated and cohere by virtue of their relationship
2
to that ratio veritatis which is also the ratio fidei. If one
is not clearly aware of this ratio such expressions as "sola
ratione"^ and "rationibus necessariis"^ will be misinterpreted.5
Karl Barth says that in Anselm's doctrine there are the ratio
of the supreme Nature, the ontic ratio. and the ratio which is
a human faculty.^1 These three rati ones parallel the supreme
rectitude. the rectitudo of things, and the rectit-udo of thought
as set forth in Anselm's doctrine of truth.7 At the end of his
treatise on truth Anselm concludes that "una igitur est in illis
%. W. Southern, Saint Anselm and his Biorrarher (Cambridge:
University Press, 19o3), pp. 53-54.
o
Proslofion. Prooemium: Cur Deus Home. Commendatio, I.1;
11.15.
3Mon. 1; AO 1:13; Cur Deus Homo 11.22; AO 11:133.
^Cur Deus Homo. Praefatio: AO 11:42.
5E .g. J. Pieper, Scholasticism (London: Faber and Faber,
I960), pp. 55ff.
^K. Barth, Anselm: Fides Wuaerens Intellectum (London:
SCM Press Ltd., I960), pp. 45ff.
7Pe Ver. 3,7,10.
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omnibus Veritas.Grosseteste wrestles with this statement
and its implications, both at the beginning and end of his
treatise on truth. The meaning of Anselm's statement should
become apparent as we proceed.
(1.2) The multiple signification of 'rectitudo1
The multiple uses of 'rectitudo1 have already been suggested
in the discussion above. The pivotal term 'rectitudo' signifies
that which is, right or true relations, and a debitum^ which is
fulfilled. Anselm, however, states very emphatically that the
supreme rectitudo is radically different from any creaturely
rectitudo. With respect to the supreme Truth he asks: fTM. Vides
etiam quomodo ista rectitudo causa sit omnium aliarum veritatum
et rectitudinum, et nihil sit causa illius?"1 The aseitas of
God is a key facet of Anselm's doctrine of God. Because of
this aseitas alone no term can be predicated univoc.ally of God
and created entities. God exists a se. Anselm cites the
difficulty that man faces in trying to speak of God:
Sed ad illuA quid respcnderi poterit, quod iam supra in
hac ipsa disputatione constitit: quia sic est summa essen¬
tia supra et extra omnem aliam naturarc, ut si quando de
ilia dicitur aliquid verbis, quae communis sunt aliis
naturis, sensus nullatenus sit communis?^
1De Ver. 13; AO 1:199.
2
The verb 'debere' is used repeatedly by Anselm, especially
in his discussion of truth. He also speaks of the various ways,
proper and improper, in which the verb is used; cf. De Ver. B;
Cur Deus Homo II.1$.
3Pe Ver. 10; AO 1:190. 4Mon. 65; AO 1:76.
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Nevertheless, Anselm does predicate 'rectitudo' of Creator and
creature, but not without ample qualification.
It is evident that Anselm is saying a number of things
about every creaturely entity or act that is termed right or
true. For example, to assert that an enuntiatio has both the
first and second truth of signification"*" is to indicate its
ontological status. At the same time one declares its relation
to a given state of affairs. Such a proposition is also said
o
to have a natural truth and a truth that is not intrinsic to
it.3 Furthermore, the proposition is said to be fulfilling its
debitum or doing what it ought to do. It both signifies, and
signifies what is the case. Although not every entity possesses
this degree of rectitudo it can rightly be said that every exis¬
tent has a certain rectitudo. Because of his belief that evil
is nihil, non-aliauid. or absentia boniA Anselm is able to
assert that "omne quod est, recte est."^ The 'nihil* just cited
is to be distinguished from the 'nihil' discussed by Anselm in
connection with the creation from nothing.^ I do not wish to
n
oversimplify Anselm's conception of evil.
iDe Ver. 2,5,13. 2Pe Ver. 5.
3^It should be noted that some propositions necessarily have
both; cf. Pe Ver. 2.
4Pe Casu Piaboli 11. 5Pe Ver. 7: AO I:ld5. 6Mon. 7,8,9.
7Cf. Pe Casu Piaboli 1,9,10,26; in chapter 26 the evil that
is something and the evil that is nothing are distinguished.
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A striking feature of Anselmfs notion of rectitudo as ful¬
filled debitum is that every creaturely thing, even though it
has no will, appears to be under a divine imperative. Every
thing stands under a demand or obligation which is finally noth¬
ing less than the divine locutio rerum.1 "Ilia autem rerum
forma, quae in eius ratione res creandas praecedebat: quid aliud
p
est quam rerum quaedam in ipsa ratione locutio, . ..." In
speaking of the divine Word Anselm states: "Satis itaque manifes-
turn est in verbo, per quod facta sunt omnia, non esse ipsorum
similitudinem, sed veram simplicemque essentiam; ... . . In
the eternal Word are the models or archetypes which continually
impose a debitum upon created entities. This must be kept in
mind if one is to understand Anselm's De Verltate treatise,
chapter thirteen in particular. In this treatise he repeatedly
says that whenever a certain thing does what it ought [debere] to
do, then it is right or true. This holds for propositions,
thoughts, wills, natural actions, the senses, signs, and beings
in general.^ Although Anselm is well aware of characteristics
that are peculiar to a particular category of entities,-' he wishes
to emphasize that each thing stands under its respective debitum.
Man, for instance, is obliged to will rightly, to think rightly,
to speak rightly, and to act rightly in all that he does. To do
Vion. 10. 2Mon. 10; AO 1:24. 3Mon. 31; AO 1:50.
4Pe Ver. 2-7,9. 3Pe Ver. 5,6.
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the right is to do the truth. "Unde sequitur quia rectitudinem
facere est facere veritatem.
That not all rectitudines have the exact same character is
apparent in Anselm's discussion of the truth of natural and non-
natui'al actions. "Ex necessitate namquc ignis facit rectitudinem
et veritatem, cum calefacit; et non ex necessitate facit homo
p
rectitudinem et veritatem, cum bene facit.The one rectitudo
results from a certain physical necessity and the other from the
free will. The language that Anselm uses in describing the rec¬
titudo of the will, both of men and angels, also shows that this
particular rectitudo has its own unique character. Like every
other thing the will is to be termed right or true when it does
what it ought to do, however, the will that wills rightly is
most appropriately described as being just. In his closely
reasoned explication of iustitia Anselm states that "ergo non
est ista iustitia rectitudo scientiae aut rectitudo actionis,
sed rectitudo voluntatis,"J and furthermore, that this "iustitia
igitur est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata."^" I have
cited Anselm's conception of justice primarily to illustrate
how one particular Tightness may differ from others. Neverthe¬
less, every creaturely thing is termed 'right1 or 'true' because
1£e_Ver. 5; AO I:ldl. 2Pe Ver. 5; AO I:lS2.
^De Ver. 12; AO 1:193; of. also De Libertate Arbitrii 3;
Pe Casu Piaboli 4,9,16.
4Pe Ver. 12; AO 1:194.
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it is to some degree rightly related to the divine locutio.
and because it is doing what it is supposed to do, in one
respect at least.
In connection with the above, one or two further observa¬
tions may be in order. In a particular instance of truth
there may be a number of Tightnesses present, for example, when
a man asserts what is actually the case. The proposition ex¬
pressed has the two Tightnesses that a proposition ought to
have. At the same time there must be some degree of Tightness
of the will because of the very act of willing. "Unde sequitur
nullam voluntatem esse malum sed esse bonum inquantum est, quia
p
opus dei est; nec nisi inquantum est iniusta malam esse."
Furthermore, it is possible that he who signifies what is indeed
3
the case wills justly and wills Tightness for its own sake.
He can then be said to have the Tightness of the will which is
justice. In addition, there is here also that Tightness which
is present when man does what he was created to do, which in
this instance is the act of signifying and signifying correctly.
Because of this plurality of possible Tightnesses,^ or at least
two possible Tightnesses, Anselm can say of a particular entity
-*-Df. De Ver. 2,8; De Casu Diaboli 19,20; Cur Deus Homo II.18.
^De Casu Diaboli 19; AO 1:264; also 28.
^De Ver. 12; De Concordia 1.6.
40ne must, however, keep in mind the sense in which Anselm
wishes to speak of a single Tightness in all things; cf. De Ver.13.
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or act that it both ought to be and ought not to be. "Multis
enim raodis eadem res suscipit diversis considerationibus con-
traria."! Because the same thing can be right or true in one
respect, and be wrong or false in another respect, Anselm finds
it necessary to specify just what is intended when speaking of
the Tightness or propriety of a particular thing. Anselm does
just this when med £ tating upon the suffering and death of
2
Christ. He cites in what sense he ought to have suffered death
and in what sense he,ought hot to have suffered death.3
At the beginning of this section^ I intimated that 'recti-
tudo' has a very special and unique sense when it is used to
signify the Creator, the supreme Truth. At this juncture I would
like to add a few comments to what was said above. "Et quidem
5
credimus te esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit."
This cardinal belief, which in the Proslogion serves as a founda¬
tion stone of Anselm's argument for the existence of God, is
reason enough to believe that God is a rectitudo that is pro¬
foundly different from every creaturely rectitudo. On the basis
of the above belief and definition it certainly follows that God
is not measured by nor dependent upon anything else. Only if
there were a being still greater than God, which is an impossibility,
-J-De Ver. 8; AO I:l$7. ^De Ver. $; Cur Deus Homo 11.1$.
3Ibid. 4Cf. (1.2)
^Pros. 2; AO 1:101. cf. Augustine's De Lib. Arb. II.6 where
we find a certain foreshadowing of this belief.
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could God be measured and dependent on another being for his
existence.
That the supreme Rightness differs radically from every
created rightness is most apparent from Anselm's beliefs con¬
cerning God. He says of the supreme Nature that "est per seipsam,
alia vero per aliud: ita omnia quae sunt sint ex eadem summa
natura, et idcirco sit ilia ex seipsa, alia autem ex alio."l He
states in another place that "ita summa Veritas per se subsis-
tens nullius rei est; sed cum aliquid secundum illam est, tunc
eius dicitur Veritas vel rectitudo."2 God not only exists in
and through himself, he also is whatever he is solely in and
through himself: "Sed certe quidquid es, non per aliud es quam
per teipsum. Tu es igitur ipsa vita qua vivis, et sapientia
qua sapis, et bonitas ipsa qua bonis et malis bonus es; et ita
de similibus." The supreme Truth has no beginning or end.^ He
5
is immutable. The supreme Nature is also perfect simplicity.
When Anselm speaks of the supreme Truth or Rightness he
also has in mind a relationship that involves a perfect simili¬
tude. Following Augustine, Anselm says that "utique verbum quo
se dicit summa sapientia, convenientissime dici potest verbum
eius secundum superiorem rationem, quia eius perfectam tenet
1Mfin. 5; AO 1:18. 2Pe Ver. 13; AO 1:199.
^Pros. 12; AO 1:110; Mon. 16. Hlon. 18; De Ver. 10.
^Mon. 16, 21,24,25,31; Cur Deus Homo 11.16,17.
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Similitudinem.Anselm states in the Proslogion:
Etenim non potest aliud quam quod es, aut aliquid maius vel
minus te esse in verbo quo te ipsum dicis; quoniam verbum
tuum sic est verum quomodo tu verax, et idcirco est ipsa
Veritas sicut tu, non alia quam tu; et sic es tu?simplex,
ut de te non possit nasci aliud quam quod tu es.
The eternal Son is the Truth of Truth.3 Anselm wishes to make
it clear that the eternal Word, which expresses perfectly the
supreme Nature, must not be considered to be truth in the sense
that it corresponds rightly with the created world.^ The supreme
Truth "nullum augmentum vel detrimentum sentiet secundum hoc quod
magis vel minus creaturis sit simile; sed potius necesse erit
omne quod creatum est tanto magis esse et tanto esse praestantius,
quanto similius est illi quod summe est et summe magnum est."^
We noted above that the eternal Word is the true and simple essence
of created things rather than their similitude.^
When Anselm speaks of God as the supreme Truth he obviously
does not intend to signify that God has fulfilled a certain
debitum that has been imposed upon him. A cardinal aspect of
Anselmfs doctrine of God is that God is free from any external
compulsion, restraint, necessity or impossibility, or debitum.7
^Mon. 33; AO 1:52; this theme is explored at length through¬
out Mon. 29-4o.
2Pros. 23; AO 1:117. 3Mon. 47. Hlon. 31,33.
%on. 31; AO 1:49. 6Ibid.
7Cf. De Concordia 1.2,3; Pros. 7; Cur Deus Homo I.10;
11.5.10.16.17.18: PeTer. 10.
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Anselm states that "deus nullius legi subiacet"3" and that "Deus
quoque dicitur omnibus debere praeesse, non quia ille in hoc
aliquo modo sit debitor, sed quoniarn omnia debent illi subesse;
2
et debere facere quod vult, quoniam quod vult debet esse."
"Nam id solum iustum est quod vis, et non iustum quod non vis."3
Anselm stressed elsewhere that the "summa Veritas non ideo est
rectitudo quia debet aliquid. Omnia enim illi debet, ipsa vero
nulli quicquam debet; nec ulla ratione est quod est, nisi quia
est."4 The same can hardly be said of created Tightnesses, in¬
cluding the wills of men and of angels. On the basis of the
above observations it should be obvious that 'rectitudo' is not
and can not be applied to Creator and creature in a univocal
fashion.
(1.3) The incomprehensibility and ineffability of the supreme
Truth
(1.3.1) In discussing Anselm's doctrine of truth we would
do well to consider briefly his belief in the incomprehensible
and ineffable character of the supreme Truth. One must be aware
of this belief if Anselm's method and necessariae rationes or
rational necessity are to be interpreted correctly. The necessary
reasons, which also serve as the premises and grounds of demon¬
s-Cur Deus Homo I. 12; AO 11:69.
2Cur Deus Homo 11.18; AO 11:129.
3Pros. 11; AO 1:109. 4Pe Ver. 10; AO 1:190.
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strated beliefs, signify facets of the exalted Truth and
Mystery which remain beyond the grasp of the human intellect.
Because of the sublime nature of the Truth and the inadequacy
and perversity of the human reason, Anselm believed that he
could at best do no more than direct us to the Truth and intimate
something of its own interior ratio. He certainly did not ex¬
pect or attempt to unravel the mysteries inherent in the Truth.
"Won tento, domine, penetrare altitudinem tuam, quia nullatenus
comparo illi intellectum meum; sed desidero aliquatenus intelli-
gere veritatem tuam, quam credit et amat cor meum."^ Having
meditated on the mystery of the Trinity Anselm makes a state¬
ment that both points up the incomprehensibility of his subject
and suggests his general method:
Videtur mihi huius tarn sublimis rei secretum transcendere
omnem intellectus aciem humani, et idcirco conatum expli-
candi qualiter hoc sit continendum puto. Sufficere narnque
debere existimo rem incomprehensibilem indaganti, si ad hoc
ratiocinando pervenerit ut earn certissime esse cognoscat,
etiamsi penetrare nequeat intellectu quomodo ita sit;.. . .
Even E. Gilson, who portrays Anselm very much as a Christian
Nationalist', states that "however strongly he might trust the
power of reason, Saint Anselm never imagined that it would
succeed in understanding mystery. ... To understand a mystery
would be much more than to understand its necessity.The above
1Pros. 1; AO 1:100. 2Mon. 64; AO 1:74-75.
■^E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle
Ages (New York: Ptandom House, 1955), p. 130.
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statements taken from the Monologion. as well as Gilson's
comments, clearly indicate that to demonstrate that a certain
truth exists is not yet to comprehend it. "Denique ad te vi-
dendum factus sum, et nondum feci propter quod factus sum.
Throughout his writing Anselm constantly refers to his inability
to understand or grasp the truth. Such truth includes created
entities as well:
Cum ergo et hoc constet, quia omnis creata substantia tanto
verius est in verbo, id est in intelligentia creatoris, quam
in seipsa, quanto verius existit creatris quam creata essen¬
tia; quomodo comprehendat humana mens cuiusmodi sit illud
dicere, et ilia scientia, quae sic longe superior et verior
est creatis substantiis, si nostra scientia tam longe supera-
tur ab illis, quantum earum similitudo distat ab earum
©ssentia?2
Anselm's ordo essendi and ordo veritatis are also apparent in this
citation from the Monologion. The position of human knowledge
is rather clearly indicated.
(1.3.2) The ineffability of the Truth is rooted in its in¬
comprehensible character. Anselm confesses repeatedly that he
cannot adequately express the supreme Nature. Regarding the
supreme Word Anselm states that "licet de re tam singulariter
eminenti proprie aliquid satis convenienter dici non possit, non
tamen inconvenienter sicut similitudo ita et imago et figura et
caracter eius dici potest."3 In setting forth the nature of
justice Anselm asks the question: "M. Videtur tibi quod ista
definitio possit aptari summae iustitiae, secundum quod de re
Ipros. 1; AO 1:98. ^Mon. 36; AO 1:55.
3Mon. 33; AO 1:53.
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loqui possumus de qua nihil aut vix aliquid proprie potest dici?""''
Anselm believes that the terms 'sapientia' and 'essentia1 do not
adequately express or disclose him who is so far above all things.
This does not mean that everything expressed concerning God must
be false: "Sic igitur ilia natura et ineffabilis est, quia per
verba sicuti est nullatenus valet intimari; et falsum non est,
si quid de ilia ratione docente per aliud velut in aenigmate
2
potest aestimari." Man must speak of God per aliud. as in a
riddle or enigma. Anselm is aware of the difficulties involved
in taking words from everyday common usage and then applying
them to God. It is only after making clear how the supreme Being
differs from all other substances that Anselm asserts that "pro-
3
fecto si quid digne dici potest, non prohibetur dici substantia."
Or as he states earlier: "Unde si quando illi est cum aliis no-
minis alicuius communio, valde procul dubio intelligenda est
diversa significatio."4
(1.3.3) Anselm does not speak of created truth as being in-
5
effable, even though, as noted above, it too surpasses human
knowledge. He points out that our knowledge is but a likeness
of created substances: "Nam nulli dubium creatas substantias
multo aliter esse in seipsis quam in nostra scientia. In seip-
sis namque sunt per ipsam suam essentiam; in nostra vero scientia
1De_Ver. 12; A0: 195. 2Mon. 65; AO 1:77.
Iftion. 27; AO 1:45; cf. also Mon. 79.
4Mon. 26; AO 1:44. 5Cf. p. 183, n. 2.
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non sunt earum essentiae, sed earum similitudiness. "■*■ One can
reasily see how far the divine locutio transcends "omnia huius-
raodi verba quibus res quaslibet inente dicimus, id est cogitamus:,
. . ."2 Every work spoken in the human mind is more or less
true, depending on the extent to which it approximates the thing
to which it refers. In view of Anselm's repeated declaration of
the incomprehensible and ineffable character of truth I find the
following judgement of J. Pieper most unacceptable: "In the ab¬
stract he could recognize reason1s necessary inadequacy to cope
with mystery; he acknowledged that inadequacy rationally. But
he was unable to grasp it in any real sense, that is existen-
tially.
2. Critical survey of major motifs in St. Anselm's doctrine
of truth
Our present purpose is to examine rather critically certain
key factors found in Anselm's understanding of truth. We are
especially interested in the manner in which certain major themes
in his doctrine of truth are interrelated. Some of these motifs
have a direct bearing on Anselm's arguments for the existence of
a supreme Nature.
(2.1) Correspondence, coherence, participation, and their role
in Anselm's arguments for the existence and eternity of Truth
In examining Augustine's doctrine of truth we observed that
1Mon. 36; AO 1:54-55. 2Mon. 31} AO 1:46.
^Scholasticism. p. 64.
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correspondence, understood usually as similitudo. was an impor¬
tant component of his doctrine. It was evident, however, that
in the quest for certitude coherence was a key factor.1 Augus¬
tine's doctrine of truth was seen to include also an exemplarism
and a theory of participation. Although these themes are to be
found in the teaching of Anselm and Grosseteste, there are some
significant differences that should become apparent as we proceed.
(2.1.1) As already intimated, the whole of Anselm's con¬
ception of truth is permeated by the theme of right relations and
right order. He not only took over Augustine's notion of simili¬
tudo . but in utilizing the notion of rectitudo he goes further
than Augustine in emphasizing truth as right relation or corres¬
pondence. Only if the dominant motif of right relations is con¬
stantly kept in mind will coherence and participation in Anselm's
doctrine of truth be interpreted correctly. Such notions as
participation and coherence must be considered in the light and
context of rectitudo. For example, every instance of coherence
within the created order is a complex of intrinsic right rela¬
tions which has arisen out of a series of extrinsic right rela¬
tions. There are of course different types of coherence within
the created order, all of which differ radically from the supreme
Truth. The character of a particular coherent pattern or com¬
plex will be largely determined by the nature of the constituent
"^f. Part A. (1.3)
1S7
factors involved and the manner in which they are interrelated.
For example, one set of propositions may be simply a complemen¬
tary series; another, a series of true statements which together
serve as the premises of a demonstration; and another, a set in
which each statement follows necessarily from the statement pre¬
ceding it. When Anselm engages in the demonstration of a partic¬
ular belief he is interested in a coherence involving a necessary
connexion between premises and the conclusion. This does not
mean that in every demonstration the conclusion follows necessar¬
ily from each premise taken individually, but that the belief
to be demonstrated follows from the premises taken together.
This type of coherence is exsmplified in Anseln^s Cur Deus Homo.
Although the content and character of the premises and the order
of the demonstrations differ,1 a similar coherence is evident
in the arguments for the existence of God which are set forth
in the Monologion. In each case, however, the statements cohere
as they do because of their rectitudo or correspondence to factors
that cohere in re. Coherence in Anselm's thought and arguments
is much more than sheer logical consistency. Coherence arises
out of Anselm's method, in which he seeks to search out or trace
out the actual connexions found in reality itself. The connexions
may involve antecedent necessity, as in the case of an effect and
its cause. This does not mean that all the circumstances or
3-Cf. J. Mclntyre. St. Anselm and his Critics (Edinburgh:
Oliver and Boyd, 1954), Chapter One, especially pp. 34-51.
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entities, represented by the statements or reasons making up the
coherent demonstration, are subject to some antecedent necessity
and therefore compelled to be. In fact, the logical order of the
argument itself, in which the premises are seen to effect the con¬
clusion, does not always truly indicate the actual order of the
things represented. This is the case, for example, in the Mono-
logion, where Anselm seeks to demonstrate the existence of a
supreme Nature on the basis of created effects. We shall note
later on that Anselm was very much aware that linguistic and
logical form may at times mislead us if we fail to penetrate
beneath the form itself. None the less, Anselm believed that a
doctrine or belief could be shown and seen to be true by showing
that it follows from and coheres with other truths. Logical co¬
herence is considered to be indicative of right relations between
statements and res.
(2.1.2) I wish to compare briefly coherence in Augustinefs
doctrine with that of Anselm. In his anxious quest for certitude,
Augustine appeals again and again to self-evident immutable
truths^- as proof of the existence of the eternal and supreme
Truth. For the sake of comparison I wish to speak, as in the
first chapter, of such truths as instances of strict or narrow
coherence. Augustine, of course, did not consider these immut¬
able truths to be simply cases of formal or logical coherence.
He clearly did not view these truths as analytic statements or
^■Cf. Part A; (1.3), (2.1), (2.2.3.1)
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tautologies. These immutable truths in the mutable mind were
assumed to be reflections of extra-mental immutable being.^
The mutable mind could hardly be their source or referent.
Furthermore, and this is the point that really interests us
presently, their immutable truth does not have to be demon¬
strated but is immediately self-evident. Without any investi¬
gation or rational argument one is able to see that they are
necessarily true and signify what has to be the case. Moreover,
on the basis of his doctrine of formae and his theory of partic¬
ipation Augustine argued that there must be an immutable Truth
which contains these immutable truths.2 On the basis of his
assumptions Augustine held that the presence of these immutable
regulae is clear proof that the eternal immutable Truth neces¬
sarily exists.
Concerning the matter of coherence Anselm is certainly no
simple Augustinus minor. While keeping in mind such as Anselm's
arguments for the eternity of truth as well as his ontological
argument,3 it can be said that Anselm is generally more interested
in a 'broad* coherence rather than the narrow coherence of Augus¬
tine's immutable truths. The coherence qualified as being
'broad' is that which marks a series of interrelated truths mak¬
ing up a consistent whole. Anselm, unlike Augustine, did not
lcf. Part A; (1.3), (2.1). 2Pe Lib. Arb. II. 12.33
ESS* De Ver. 1,10; Pros. 2.
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feel the same compelling need to utilize strict or narrow co¬
herence. Augustine's anxious quest for certitude partly
accounts for this difference. Differences in historical milieu,
personal temperaments, and personal histories should also be
mentioned. Above all, mention should also be made of Anselm's
notion of rectitudo. Although frectitude* signifies what may
be termed right relations ad intra, for example, the relations
subsisting among the various components of a cogent argument1
or the elements of a body of doctrine, 'rectitudo1 signifies,
above all, right relations ad extra. I use the latter expression
to indicate those various Tightnesses which Anselm describes in
his De Veritate treatise. In speaking of the Tightness of a
proposition Anselm has in mind the proposition's right relations
ad extra, to its cause and ground. Creatures only exist by
virtue of their right relations ad extra. God, however, exists
a se and not by virtue of a right relation ad extra.^ In re¬
flecting on those perfect relations within the Trinity-^ Anselm
is obviously interested in relations ad intra. However, within
the created order all coherent wholes, with their right relations
ad intra, are contingent on and grounded in right relations
ad extra.
(2.I.3) lb is also essential that Anselm's exemplarism or
^•Cf. D. P. Henry, on cit.. pp. 1&, 240; De Grammatico 3,4.
2Pe Ver. 10. ^Mon. 29-63.
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doctrine of formae and theory of participation be considered
in conjunction with his understanding of truth or rectitudo.
There are passages in the treatises of Anselm under considera¬
tion which would almost seem to suggest a type of monism plus an
analogy of inequality or generic predication.1 However, in view
of Anselm^s repeated declaration of the radical ontological dis¬
continuity between Creator and creature, it is clearly apparent
2
that he does not teach either of the above, nor could he.
Although in his Monologion Anselm clearly utilizes a doc¬
trine akin to that of the Platonic Ideas, he does not apply the
doctrine strictly nor does the doctrine constitute the whole of
the arguments set forth. That such a doctrine cannot be used in
a strict fashion is evident at the outset, where Anselm attempts
to demonstrate the existence of the supreme Good on the basis
of many good things. After presenting most of the argument, he
states: "Illud igitur est bonum per seipsum, quoniam omne bonum
est per ipsum. Ergo consequitur, ut omnia alia bona sint per
aliud quam quod ipsa sunt, et ipsum solum per seipsum.Because
of this professed radical discontinuity between that which is to
be demonstrated and the many good things, an argument that re¬
quires strict participation is inappropriate and inapplicable.
The latter argument would only be applicable where the particulars
Tl.g. Mon. 1-7, 16; De Ver. 1,2,7,13. 2Cf. above (1,2)
%xon. 1; AO 1:1$; cf. also Mon. 7,27; Pros. 24.
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share in the essence of the universal form to be demonstrated.
Although Anselm does teach an exemplarism, his exemplarism
allows for the radical discontinuity cited above. The exemplars
of created entities are divine since they are the divine locutio.
The creatures which are patterned after them are not divine. It
is clear that the relation between a creaturely being and its
divine exemplar is quite different from that relation which
exists between a particular and its universal form or essence.
Assuming that Anselm has the latter relation in mind in the above
argument based on good things, the argument would at the very
most only demonstrate that there is a universal essence or form,
viz., goodness, in which good things participate. This is to
assume of cnarse that the argument itself and the theories on
which it rests are valid. Anselmfs intention, however, is to
demonstrate the existence of the supreme and absolute Good,
viz., God. This is what is intended even though the word 1Deus1
is not used in the above argument. The radical ontological dis¬
continuity between creaturely good things and God makes the
argument based on the participation of particulars in a universal
form inapplicable and inconclusive.
Near the end of the above argument Anselm simply argues that
because there are these many contingent goods there must be an
absolute good which is the basis and ground of their existence.
The argument at this point does not seem to rest on the notion
of strict participation on or an exemplarism. Contingent entities
are good per aliud. in other words, they are good because of their
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relations to that which is good per seipsum. The relations them¬
selves are not clearly spelled out, however, A difficulty lingers
because of Anselm's earlier insistence that the good in different
-S
good things ih one and the same.
The issue is somewhat clearer in chapters three and four of
the Monologion where Anselm seeks to demonstrate the existence
of a supreme Being on the basis of contingent beings and degrees
of perfection amongst beings. These arguments seem to anticipate
St. Thomas' Quinque Viae, the third and fourth ways in particular.
The type of relationship assumed in the argument in chapter three
of the Monologion is that which prevails between contingent beings
and an absolute or necessary being. Here a radical ontological
gap is clearly evident. The type of relationship basic to the
argument grounded on degrees of perfection is not that of partic¬
ulars participating in varying degrees in one and the same entity
or quality, but simply that which prevails between a lesser or
inferior entity and a greater or superior entity. A man has a
nature that is superior to that of a horse, as a horse has a
nature that is superior to wood."*" Anselm argues that beings are
finite in number. He realizes that the argument would be invalid
if this were not the case. In the argument based on contingent
beings a finite number of beings is also assumed.
In concluding our brief discussion of these arguments we
should note two other specific instances where Anselm clearly
■^•Pros. 4.
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utilizes a theory of strict participation in a universal form.
In both of the arguments he employs such a theory in order to
refute the contention of the opponent who would maintain that
there can be a number of beings existing per se, or a number of
beings superior to all other things but equal among themselves.
Anselm argues that if there were a plurality of these beings, then
there would still be a single entity or nature superior to them.
Anselm bases his argument on the theory of particulars participat¬
ing in the same nature of universal form. However, even if one
were to concede that the argument and the theory on which it is
based are valid, the argument itself does not really demonstrate
what Anselm is seeking to demonstrate. For the argument to be
valid Anselm must grant that there is a plurality of beings who
share in the same nature, but Anselm's intention is to demonstrate
a unique supreme Being whose nature cannot be shared or distributed.
It appears that Anselm has utilized rather uncritically a doctrine
of universal forms and strict participation. It would be wrong to
say, however, that the above arguments rest in their entirety on
this doctrine.
(2.1.4) In the De Veritate treatise the disciple speaks of
the true thing participating in the truth: "D. Quia nihil est
verum nisi participando veritatem; et ideo veri Veritas in ipso
vero est, res enuntiata non est in enuntiatione vera. Unde non
eius Veritas, sed causa veritatis eius dicenda est."^ This is
the only point in the treatise where participation is cited
1De_Ver. 2; AO 1:177.
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explicitly and even here it is carefully circumscribed. Here
Anselm makes a key distinction between a thing's own truth,
which is founded on a right relation with another entity or fact,
and that which is the cause of its truth. Just as the cause of
a true proposition is not in the true proposition itself, so too
a true proposition does not participate in its cause. This must
be kept in mind if one is to interpret correctly chapter thir¬
teen of De Veritate where Anselm inquires "an sit una sola Veri¬
tas in omnibus illis in quibus veritatem dicimus esse, an ita
sint veritates plures, sicut plura sunt in quibus constat esse
veritatem.
In concluding that there is finally only one truth in all
those things declared to be right or true Anselm does not wish
to suggest that the host of created particulars all share in a
single supreme Nature. If Anselm were to teach that creatures
share in the supreme Nature he would wholly contradict his doc-
trine of God and his belief in a contingent created order.
Moreover, at the very end of the treatise on truth Anselm states:
"ita summa Veritas per se subsistens nullius rei est; sed cum
aliquid secundum illam est, tunc eius dicitur Veritas vel recti-
3
tudo." The supreme Truth is not predicated of any created entity,
but whenever some thing is rightly related to the supreme Truth,
1De Ver. 13; AO 1:197. 2Cf. fen. 7-13.
3Pe Ver. 13; AO 1:199.
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then we speak of the truth of that thing. In chapter thirteen
of his De T eritate Anselm is especially interested in showing
how the sunma Veritas is the ultimate ground of all creaturely
truths. This Truth, subsisting in and through itself, remains
the immutable debitum even while creaturely beings fluctuate or
even cease to be. It is in this sense that the following has
to be understood: "D. Omnino video hac ipsa ratione probari,
quoquo modo ipsa sint, rectitudinem immutabilem permanere."1
It is sometimes difficult to ascertain just what Anselm has
in mind when speaks of the frectitudo' of a particular thing.
In general, when speaking of *the rightness or this or that
thing* Anselm seems to have in mind a particular quality of the
thing. It possesses this quality to the degree that it is rightly
related to a certain measure, standard, or state of affairs.
However, in chapter thirteen of De Veritate. where Anselm is pre¬
occupied with the supreme Measure or Rightness, he states that
it is improper to speak of 'the truth of this or that thing*.
He makes this point because he does not want anyone to think
that the supreme Truth is the truth of a particular thing. The
supreme Truth has its own independent and absolute existence and
is not situated in created things.
Anselm's doctrine of truth, his use of 'rectitudo', and his
talk of the true thing participating in the truth will be misin¬
terpreted if it is thought that 'rectitudo * functions much like
1JDe_Jer. 13; AO 1:198.
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a proper name naming one and the same thing in each instance of
use. When Anselm defines 'truth' as an intelligible rectitudo
the latter does not as such yet designate a particular entity,
quality, or set of circumstances. It is in instances of actual
usage that 'rectitudo' takes on a more precise signification.
For example, in some instances 'rectitudo' clearly signifies and
names the supreme Being as Cause of all other Tightnesses. In
such instances 'rectitudo' can hardly be said to designate a
universal essence or quality in which all entities participate.
As already indicated, 'rectitudo' in certain instances of use
seems to signify and name an eternal exemplar which serves as a
debitum to which creaturely entities ought to conform. This is
no doubt what is intended when Anselm speaks of that Tightness
or debitum which does not change or perish even though a proposi¬
tion does not signify as it ought. There are also places where
'rectitudo' simply signifies a quality, viz., 'being right' or
'having Tightness'. This does not mean that 'rectitudo' neces¬
sarily names a created universal quality that is shared by parti¬
culars. However, Anselm does use 'rectitudo' repeatedly to signi¬
fy and name a particular quality, viz., 'being right', belonging
to a particular entity. In this last mentioned usage there is
obviously also implied a state of affairs or set of circumstances
involving a right relation or a number of right relations. In
fact, it could be said that throughout the above usages 'rectitudo'
connotes right relations. When used of God 'rectitudo' signi¬
fies the absolute and supreme Cause and final Ground of all right
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or true relations. The above usages of 'rectitudo1 are mani¬
fest throughout Anselmfs De Veritate. They are more or less jux¬
taposed in chapter thirteen of the treatise.
Having examined the thesis of chapter thirteen of the De
Veritate, Hopkins and/or Richardson make the following conclusion,
which to me is incorrect in certain respects and certainly in
need of further qualification:
Anselm has attempted to give an argument for the Pla¬
tonic thesis that if truth is a universal, then it must exist
independently of the things it is in. He has done this by
combining the Platonic notion of participation with the Aris¬
totelian notion of correspondence. He wishes to affirm that
when a proposition has truth of reference (right correspon¬
dence), it participates in the Rightness of all things. When
a proposition has a truth of reference, it has a double par¬
ticipation in truth. This theory of double participation
is Anselmfs way of conflating two philosophical traditions.
His insistence that if there are truths there must be Truth
is reminiscent of Augustinefs argument in De Libero Arbitrio.1
Although the impact of the "Platonic notion of participation"
and the "Aristotelian notion of correspondence" is clearly evident
in Anselm^ treatise on truth, it can hardly be said that he
simply combines or fuses together these "two philosophical tradi¬
tions." Anselm's doctrine differs sharply from these notions at
several key points. Anselm's doctrines of God and creation, his
exemplarism, and his understanding of truth as rectitudo. neither
include nor do they leave room for any strict Platonic participa¬
tion or sheer Aristotelian correspondence. We have already noted
Anselm of Canterbury, Truth. Freedom, and Evil: Three Phi¬
losophical Dialogues, ed. and trans, by J. Hopkins & H. Richardson
(New York: Harper & Row Torchbooks, 19o7), pp. 25-26.
199
some significant points of departure between Anselm's doctrine
and parallel facets of Platonic doctrine. After a mere cursory-
examination of Anselm's conception of logical or propositional
truth, and its place within the whole construct of rectitudo and
right relations, it soon becomes apparent how his conception
differs from Aristotle's notion of logical truth. However, I
do not wish to deny that one may find formal similarities between
Aristotelian correspondence and Anselm's notion of logical truth,
particularly when the latter is abstracted from the rest of An¬
selm's doctrine.
I would not want to assert unqualifiedly that Anselm's
"insistence that if there are truths there must be Truth is rem¬
iniscent of Augustine's argument in De Libero Arbitrio." This
should not be asserted without taking note of significant differ¬
ences between Anselm's truths and Augustine's truths, and their
reasons for introducting them into the texts cited. In the first
place, Anselm's stated purpose in De Veritate is to inquire "quid
scilicet sit Veritas, et in quibus rebus soleat dici; et quid sit
iustitia"^ and to find out "per rerum diversitates in quibus ver-
o
itatera dicimus esse, quid sit Veritas." Moreover, it is not
really in his De Veritate but rather in his Monologion and Pros-
logion that we find Anselm's major arguments for the existence
of God, arguments that differ in important respects from Augustine's
argument in his De Libero Arbitrio. Some of these differences
•^De Ver.t Praefatio: AO 1:173. ^De Ver. 1; AO 1:177.
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should be apparent on the basis of our earlier discussion of
these arguments. In his De Veritate Anselm does not really seek
to demonstrate the sheer existence of God but rather, in chapters
one and ten, to demonstrate that the summa Veritas has no beginn¬
ing or end."'" These arguments are actually more reminiscent of
Augustinefs argument for the imperishability of the truth, which
is set forth in his Soliloquia.2 than the argument for the exis¬
tence of God, which is found in his De Libero Arbitrio.
However, even the last mentioned arguments differ in certain
respects. Anselm's argument is more elaborate than Augustine's.
One way in which this is so is that Anselm also uses such truths
as "futurum erat aliquid" and "praeteritum erit aliquid."^
Furthermore, and this is a more significant factor, in chapter
ten of his De Veritate Anselm traces out the actual connexion
between these truths just cited and that Truth which is their
supreme Cause. The statements are said to be true because they
refer to what indeed will be or what has been. Moreover, that
which will be, or has been, is in turn grounded in the supreme
Truth, which is in this way the first and supreme Cause of the
true statement. In the argument it is really assumed that even
though the immediate caused of the truth of the proposition is
1De Ver. 1,10. 2Solil. II.2.2; 11.15.27,28.
^De Ver. 1; AO 1:176; cf. also De Ver. 10 and Mon. 18.
4Cf. De Ver. 2.
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temporal and perishable, the supreme and more remote first Cause
is eternal and immutable. This seems to be the case where Anselm
states that "neque aliquid est futurum, si non est in summa ver-
itate", and "ideo est aliquid praeteritum, quia sic est in summa
veritate."^
The cogency and force of this argument of Anselm rests in
part on his identification of the proposition with the sentence.^
He therefore selects one sentence or proposition which would have
been true without beginning, and another which would always be
true after the fact. For Anselm, one and the same proposition
(sentence) may fluctuate in terms of its truth value. On one
occasion it may signify what is the case and on another occasion
it may lack this truth. Anselm introduces a conditional or hypo¬
thetical element into the above argument where he says "si oratio
ista esset" and "si [oratio]] facta fuerit."3 Anselm is right in
recognizing this fact even though his argument is weakened by the
recognition of this fact. Augustine does not make this admission
in his arguments for truth.
In arguing that truth has no beginning or end Anselm does
iPe Ver. 10; AO 1:190.
O
Such a confusion is also evident in passages dealing with
the two truths of the proposition; e.g. De Ver. 2, 13; here Anselm
states that a proposition (oratio. enuntiatio) may at one time
have accidental or extrinsic Tightness and may lack it at another
time. Of course, there are propositions which always have both
Tightnesses of signification.
3Pe Ver. 10; AO 1:190.
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at one point in particular follow Augustine quite closely.^ This
is where he argues that if truth had a beginning, or if it will
have an end, then even before truth existed it would be true that
there is no truth and after truth had come to an end it would be
true that truth doesn't exist. However, if there is something
true there must be truth. The criticism directed against Augus¬
tine^ argument of the same nature would also be applicable in
p
this instance. Before proceeding to another topic, I would
simply like to point out that neither in his De Veritate nor
elsewhere is Anselm especially interested in those immutable
truths with which Augustine is preoccupied in his attempt to
demonstrate the existence of God.^ As indicated above, Anselmfs
major concern in his De Veritate is to achieve an understanding
of the nature of truth. He seeks to achieve this understanding
by examining several categories of truths and by viewing them
in relation to the supreme Truth itself. The category of logi¬
cal truths is only one among several categories.
(2.2) 'Realism* and 'resf in Anselm's doctrine
It is not Anselm's position with respect to the question of
-*-Mon. IS; De Ver. 1; here Anselm presents an argument like
that found in Augustine's Solil. II.2.2; II.15.2S.
2Cf. Part A, (2.2.3.1) for critical assessment of Augustine's
arguments in Solil. II.2.2; II.15.2S; and in De Libero Arbitrio II.
3Cf. De Lib. Arb. II.3.7-15.39.
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universals that is of primary concern at this point. Oblique
reference has already been made to this question on which Henry
has presented some very helpful commentary."*" What is presently
intended in speaking of 'realism1 in Anselm's doctrine of truth
should become apparent as we proceed.
(2.2.1) Anselm manifests a steady preoccupation with res
and with actuality. As already noted above, Anselm's expressed
desire in his De Veritate is to examine the many res in which
truth is said to be in order that the nature of truth may be
known. He doesn't discuss truth in the abstract but in direct
connexion with different categories of things. Moreover, he is
constantly engaged in probing in and through effects to their
causes so that the effects may be more fully understood in terms
of their causes.** Therefore, although he begins with the truth
of signification "ut te a notioribus ad ignotiora perducerem,"^
he concludes his treatise on truth discussing the supreme Truth.
He also says in chapter nine: "Omnes enim de veritate significa¬
tions loquuntur; veritatem vero quae est in rerum essentia,
pauci considerant.Anselm holds that true thought and proposi¬
tions are the effects of other truth, viz., truth in the exis¬
tence of things and finally the supreme Truth. Proposition and
thought are not the causes of any other truth.*
■4). P. Henry, The Logic of Saint Anselm. pp. 9&-107.
2A method exemplified, for example, in the Cur Deus Homo,
the De Veritate. and the De Libertate Arbitrii.
3pe Ver. 9; AO I:ldg. ^Ibid. 5pe Ver. 10.
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Although Anselmfs intention is clear, it would seem that a
less restricted notion or use of cause would permit one to speak
of certain thought and propositions as causing in part other
true thoughts, statements, and true actions. However, such
causal thoughts and propositions would have to be distinguished
from such as the "res vero enuntiataj' ^ which Anselm considers
to be the cause of the truth of a proposition. Such causal
thoughts and propositions would belong in the same category of
causes along with those who think true thoughts and utter true
statements. Furthermore, the "res vero enuntiata" and the enun-
tians may on occasion be one and the same subject. This is
certainly the case when God, or someone else, expresses true
statements concerning himself. Anselm constantly strives to
lay bare the causes and rationes of things. Anselm is also
sensitive to the different ways in which things can be said to
be willed or caused.2
(2.2.2) Anselm's radical interest in sheer actuality is
also manifest in his notion of 'necessitas seauensf,^ This
necessity is a necessary concomitant of everything that has ex¬
isted, that presently exists, and that will exist. This notion
De Ver. 2; AO 1:177.
2Cf. De Concordia 111:11 pr~J or recensio: AO II:2&2 n; De
Casu Diaboli 1,12,20,23; Cur Deuft Homo I. 9.10: cf. D. P. Henry,
op. cit., pp. 117-133 (deals with text of Fin neuts unvollendetes




of consequent necessity is one that Grosseteste also adopt s.-*-
This necessity marks both that which has come to be through an
antecedent necessity as well as that which is under no compulsion
or constraint. Anselm states that this "necessitas nec cogit nec
prohibet aliquid esse aut non esse. . . .Non enim aliud signifi-
cat haec necessitas, nisi quia quod erit non poterit simul non
p
esse." Such a necessity also characterizes both divine and
human willing. Anselm introduces this type of necessity into
his discussion of Christ and his free choice or desire to suffer
and die. In this connexion there is a passage that should be
cited in its entirety:
Hac sequenti et nihil efficienti necessitate, quoniam vera
fuit fides vel prophetia de Christo, quia ex voluntate non
ex necessitate moriturus erat, necesse fuit ut sic esset.
Hac homo factus est; hac fecit et passus est quidquid fecit
et passus est; hac voluit quaecumque voluit. Ideo enim
necessitate fuerunt, quia futura erant; et futura erant,
quid fuerunt; et fuerunt, quia fuerunt. Et si vis omnium
quae fecit et quae passus est verum scire necessitatem, scito
omnia ex necessitate fuisse, quia ipse voluit. Voluntatem
vero eius nulla praecessit necessitas.3
In asserting that "fuerunt, quia fuerunt" Anselm clearly
indicates that he is content with the sheer actuality of Christ's
willing, and that he is much more interested in how Christ has
willed rather than how he might or might not have willed. Where
Anselm does entertain the question whether or not Christ could
-*-De Scientia Dei; De Libero Arbitrio, recensio, 3.
2Pe Concordia 1.2; AO 11:249.
-^Cur Deus nemo 11.17; AO 11:125.
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have willed or acted other than he has, Anselm again directs us
back to the actual willing and nature of Christ.^ When Boso
puts before Anselm the questions of infidels who ask why God has
redeemed man through such suffering and death, and whether he
could not have saved man through another way, Anselm brings him
up before God's actual willing: "A. Sufficere nobis debet ad
rationem voluntas dei cum aliquid facit, licet non videamus cur
velit. Voluntas narnque dei numquam est irrationabilis.The
will of God is rational in terms of its own coherence and radical
consistency with his immutable Nature, not because his will has
conformed with some external absolute rational principle. As
Anselm states elsewhere: "Omnia enim illi fsumma Veritas^ debent,
ipsa vero nulli quicquam debet; nec ulla ratione est quod est,
nisi quia est."3 Anselm again brings us up against the sheer
actuality of Godt. God's constantia^ and willing cannot be in¬
ferred from, nor determined by, any necessity or power antecedent
to himself, for God himself is the ultimate antecedent. The
application of consequent necessity to God points up the fact
that we must come to terms with the sheer actuality of God's
being and willing.
In his notion of consequent necessity Anselm appears to
have in mind things themselves in their actuality, whether any
•^Cur Beus Homo 11.10,16,17. 2Cur Deus Homo I.S; AO 11:59.
3Pe Ver. 10; AO 1:190.
^Cur Deus Homo 11.17; AO 11:124.
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coactio is present or not. Henry states that this consequent
necessity "is susceptible of being interpreted as the counterpart
of the moderns' 'logical' or 'analytic' necessity."^- Henry later
offers an interpretation of Anselm's consequent necessity in
support of this statement. However, as Henry himself indicates,
Anselm's consequent necessity and the modern logicians' 'analytic'
necessity are certainly not identical, even though the logical
form of the former has an affinity with the latter. In a some¬
what parallel case Kneale points out that A ristotle's Viecessary'
proposition must be differentiated from the modern logicians'
'analytic' statement.3 Aristotle's 'necessary' truths, as well
as the logical truths in which Anselm's consequent necessity
finds expression, were considered to refer to and to be bound
up with actual circumstances and particular states of affairs.
These truths differ from those modern 'analytic' truths which
have their foundation in logical or linguistic form and convention.^
(2.2.3) Anselm's strong interest in that which is the case
is also manifest in his interpretation of 'posse'. 'potestas'.
and 'libertas'. He does not conceive of possibility ('posse')
-*~The Logic of Saint Anselm. p. 173; cf. pp. 172-lSO where
both antecedent and consequent necessity are discussed.
2Ibid.. p. 179.
^W. & M. Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford: Univer¬
sity Pres3, 1962), II, p. 91 ff.
^"Ibid.
208
as sheer contingency. Although Anselrn clearly recognizes contin¬
gent or possible logical truths and the possible or contingent
facts that they presuppose,^- he thinks of possibility in terms
p
of actual capacities and the actual effects realized thereby.
Henry puts it well: "Now it is quite true, thanks to his equation
of possibility with power ( 5.4), that Anselm tends to treat
modal questions as part of the theory of physical dispositions
and capacities."3 Therefore, instead of saying that non-existent
X may or may not be, i.e., is possible, Anselm states that one
must speak of an actual or present capacity (potestas) which is
able to cause it to exist. In view of Anselm's interpretation
of 'possef as 'potestas'. it is clearly apparent why 'posse' can
only be rightly applied to that which already exists.
Anselm's conception of possibility is also manifest in his
De Libertate Arbitrii where the student refers to Anselm's defi¬
nition that "libertas arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem
voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem: . . . nJ* 'Libertas' is
clearly circumscribed by and defined in terms of a definite capa¬
city granted by God. "Est enim 'potestas' libertatis genus."5
^De Ver. 2,5,13.
2Cf. De Casu Diaboli 12; here 'posse 'is taken to refer to
an actual capacity rather than a simple possibility; cf. also
D.P. Henry, "Remarks on Saint Anselm's Treatment of Possibility,"
Spicilegium Eeccense, I (Paris: J. V>rin, 1959), pp. 19ff.
^Henry, The Logic of Saint Anselm. p. 173; also pp. 134-171
where we find an extended treatment of Anselm's modal logic.
4Pe Lib. Arb. 13; AO 1:225. 5Ibid.
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Anselro further states that "potestas ergo peccandi, quae addita
voluntati minuit eius libertatem et si dematur auget, nec liber-
tas est nec pars libertatis.Not only has Anselm interpreted
this freedom in terms of actual capacity or power, but he has
even fixed on a particular power in the exercise of which the
will is truly free. As he says: "M. Cernis itaque nihil liberius
recta voluntate, cui nulla vis aliena potest auferre suam rec-
titudinem."^ Although Anselmfs interpretation of 1posse' may
preclude an adequate treatment of simple possibility and con¬
tingency, his stress on actual capacities does steer us away
from vain speculation concerning sheer contingency or possibility.
Since 'posse1 is taken to signify a definite capability, it
must be used accordingly. Anselm emphasizes that one's mode of
expression, if it is to be logically precise and correct, must
reflect this sense of 'posse' and clearly indicate wherein lies
the capacity. One should not say that a given subject is able
to do this or that when an actual impotency on the part of the
subject is what should be expressed.-^ Dependihg of course on the
speaker, either a capacity or liability may be what is actually
intended. Neither is it correct to say that a given subject can¬
not accomplish this or that when a capacity in the same subject
1Ibid. 1; AO 1:209. 2Ibid. 9;.AO 1:221.
■^This subject is discussed by Anselm in the following places:
De Ver. 8; De Casu Diaboli 12; Pros. 7} Cur Deus Homo 11.17} cf.
Henry, op. cit.. pp. 158-161 where he cites portions from De
Potestate dealing with this same topic.
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is what really should be expressed, and the incapacity is really
situated elsewhere. This is a point that Anselm makes in connexion
with such statements as 'God is not able to lie', 'God cannot
make the true to be false', and 'God cannot make a past event
not to be a past event'.^ Anselm introduces these statements in
connexion with the following question: "Sed et omnipotens quomodo
es, si omnia non potes?" From what Anselm proceeds to say in
the same chapter of the Proslogion it is clear that he does not
consider divine omnipotence and power in abstraction from God's
actual nature and willing. Moreover, Anselm, both in this chapter
and in Cur Deus Homo (II. 10,16,17), examines more closely those
things which are said to lie beyond God's capability and he finds
that they are altogether at variance with God's nature and willing.
After considering the nature of God, what seemed prima facie to
be a divine incapacity is upon closer examination seen to be a
divine capacity. Furthermore, when the statement which seemed
to attribute an impotency to God is transposed into proper logi¬
cal form it becomes obvious that no impotency is predicated of
God. As Anselm states:
Quotiens namque dicitur deus non posse, nulla negatur in illo
potestas, sed insuperabilis significatur potentia et forti-
tudo. Non enim aliud intelligitur, nisi quia nulla res po¬
test efficere, ut ille agat quod negatur posse. . . .Nam cum
dicimus quia necesse est deum semper verum dicere, et necesse
est eum numquam mentiri, non dicitur aliud nisi quia tanta
est in illo constantia servandi veritatem, ut necesse sit ^
nullam rem facere posse, ut verum non dicat aut ut mentiatur.
"Pros. 7; Cur Deus Homo 11.17* ^Pros. 7; AO 1:10$.
3Cur Deus Homo 11.17; AO 11:123-24.
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The logical impropriety in saying fGod is able to lie' and
fGod is not able to lie1 is similar to the impropriety in saying
that "Hector potuit vinci ab Achille, et Achilles non potuit
vinci ab Hectore."^ However, there is a crucial difference.
With respect to the second pair of statements only the mode of
speaking has to be altered, and then it will be clear that the
ability truly belongs to Achilles and the inability to Hector.
However, with respect to the pair of statements concerning God,
once they are transposed into their proper logical form it will
be made clearer than ever that the first statement is indeed
false, and that the second is both true and properly expressed.
Genuine capacity is determined and measured by the nature of the
subject being considered. That God is omnipotent means that he
is able to maintain himself in his immutable truth, goodness,
and steadfast will, and that no power can prevent him from being
and doing the same. Anselm, in addressing God, says "ergo domine
deus, inde verius es omnipctens, quia nihil potes per impotentiam,
et nihil potest contra te."
In accordance with man^ nature and situation, Anselm attri¬
butes to him the ability to give himself freely and voluntarily
3
over to the servitude of sin. We noted earlier that this capac¬
ity is to be distinguished from that capacity to serve rectitudo
in the exercise of which is found true freedom. Clearly the
1De Ver. 8; AO 1:183. 2Pros. 7; AQ. 1:105-106.
^De Lib. Arb. 2,5-7,9.
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latter capacity ranks considerably higher than the former. For
in the utilization of this capacity to serve rectitudo. God's
intention for man, expressed eternally in his Word, is being
fulfilled.
Here we are again brought back to the determinative and
normative Word of God.^" Anselm is especially interested in the
actual eternal expression of God in his Word, what God has willed
and what God has accomplished. This is for Anselm the final
arbiter and ultimate court of appeal. Furthermore, Anselm con¬
siders God's willing and acting to be rooted in his own immutable
Nature. God is perfectly right with himself and acts in perfect
2
consistency with his own nature. There is no force or power
which can constrain God to act differently. He is omnipotent
and everything else is subject to him. In connexion with the
hypothetical statement that the divine compassion simply remits
the sinner's debt and punishment, Anselm says: "Verum huiusmodi
misericordia dei nimis est contraria iustitiae illius, quae non
nisi poenam permittit reddi propter peccatum. Quapropter que-
madmodum deum sibi esse contrarium, ita hoc modo ilium esse mis-
ericordem impossibile est."-* Near the end of his Cur Deus Homo
Anselm states that God was not in need of doing what he has done,
XCf. Mon. 9-14,31-37.
^Cur Deus Homo 1.10,12,24; 11.5,10,16,17; De Ver. $,10,13;
Mon. 29.30.32.33: Pros. 7,17,22,23.
-*Cur Deus Homo 1.24; AO 11:93.
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nor was he in need of descending from heaven in order to conquer
the devil and free mankind, but that "Veritas immutabilis exig-
ebat" and "ab homine deus exigebat ut diabolum vinceret, et qui
per peccatum deurn offenderat, per iustitiam satisfaceret.
God was not coerced to act as he has, either by the devil or by
any other alien power. Anselm has again brought us face to face
with the utter reality of the divine Nature, volitions, and
demands.
(2,2.4) Anselm's intense interest in res themselves is also
manifest in his use of such expressions as Tlocutio rerum* and
'cogitatio rerum'.2 In discussing the eternal speaking (locutio)
of things in the Word of God, Anselm states: "Mentis autem sive
rationis locutionem hie intelligo, non cum voces rerum signifi-
cativae cogitantur, sed cum res ipsae vel futurae vel iam exis-
3
tentes acie cogitationis in mente conspiciuntur." In speaking
of different kinds of words and expressions, and the manner in
which they are related to things, Anselm says that those words
"possunt etiam non absurde dici tanto veriora, quanto magis rebus
quarum sunt verba similia sunt et expressius signant."^" Further¬
more, apart from exceptions cited, "nullum aliud verbum sic vide-
tur rei simile cuius est verbum, aut sic earn exprimit, quomodo
ilia similitudo, quae in acie mentis rem ipsam cogitantis expri-
mitur."3 When the mind most truly views something it views its
1Ibid. 11.19; AO 11:131. 2Mon. 10,11,29,31,62; Pros. 4.
3Mon. 10; AO 1:24. %on. 10; AO 1:2$. 3Ibid.
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universalis essentia. This ties in with the notion that "veritas
est rectitudo mente sola perceptibilis.
In the Proslogion Anselm asks how it is possible for the
fool to conceive (cogitare) or to say (dicere) in his heart,
which are one and the same, that God does not exist, since God's
existence is such that he cannot be conceived not to exist.2 If
the nonexistence of God is unthinkable, since God exists so
truly, the question arises as to how or in what manner the fool
can conceive or think the unthinkable. Anselm's answer is that
there is more than one way in which a thing may be conceived:
"Aliter enim cogitatur res cum vox earn significans cogitatur,
aliter cum id ipsum quod res est intelligitur." In the first-
mentioned manner God can be conceived not to exist, whereas in
the latter instance God cannot be conceived not to exist. In
other words, the clear implication is that the fool lacks this
understanding ( 'bene intelligere' /*" and consequently has failed
to see that God cannot even be thought not to exist.
What is of particular interest at this point is Anselm's
distinction between thinking of the word or expression (vox)
which signifies a thing, and thinking of the very res itself.
Only in the latter instance can it be said that one truly under-
1De Ver. 11: AO 1:191
*Pros. 4: cf. Henry's The Logic of Saint Anselm where the
thesis presented in Pros. 3,4 is discussed in relation to the
thesis of Pros. 2.
3Pros. 4; AO 1:103. 4Ibid. ; AO 1:104.
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stands a thing. Anselm appears to give an example of such under¬
standing in the following: "Deus enim est id quo maius cogitari
non potest. Quod qui bene intelligit, utique intelligit id ipsum
sic esse, ut nec cogitatione queat non esse.""*" It is on the
basis of this kind of understanding that God cannot even be
thought not to exist. Concerning the expression Tbene intelli-
gere', Henry thinks "that there is ample material in De Gramma-
tico, as well as in the Responsio. to show that by 'understanding
well* Anselm wishes to indicate the full carrying through of
„2
linguistic and conceptual analysis, . .
(2.2.5) Anselm's analysis of language and beliefs includes
a number of significant distinctions which manifest an aware¬
ness of the different ways in which words may function, the
manner in which words are interrelated, and the fact that words
must be considered both in terms of their signification and the
3
things which they may name.
In seeking understanding Anselm stresses the need for an in
•^Ibid. ^Henry, op>. cit.. p. 149.
•^E.g., per se and per aliud signification, lie Gram. 12, 15,
17,1$; Henry (op cit. pp. 20-21) considers signifying proprie and
non proprie as "alternative expression" of per se/per aliud dis-
tinction; de voce/de re distinction; De Gram. 18t or secundum for-
mam/secundum rem. De Casu Diaboli 11; whole distinction between
misleading ordinary usage and the proper logical expression, e.g.
De Ver. $,13; Pros. 7; De Casu Diaboli 1,11,12; De Gram, passim;
cf. Henry's discussion of such distinctions - op. cit. : cf. also
Henry's The De Grammatico of St. Anselm (Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1964).
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depth analysis of ordinary language and usage. We have already
cited a number of texts of Anselm where he shows that the gramma¬
tical form and common expression are not logically correct, so
that analysis is required in order to determine the proper sense
and logical form. After a piece of such analysis Anselm's stu¬
dent remarks: "Quippe utile multum puto ad intelligendam veritatem
in multis occultam exercere mentem in huiusmodi considerationum
subtilitate.7^
Anselm remarks that 'nihil* and 'malum' are often used as
if they actually signified something: "Multa quoque alia simili¬
ter dicuntur aliquid secundum formam loquendi, quaa non sunt ali-
quid, quoniam sic loquimur de illis sicut de rebus existentibus."
In striving to speak secundum rem Anselm states that "nihil enim
non aliud significat quam non-aliquid, aut absentiam eorum quae
sunt aliquid." In discussing Anselm's position with respect
to signification per se in distinction from usus loouendi. Henry
says:
His position in relation to the discussions outlined involves
the recognition that the ordinary grammatical characteriza¬
tion of recurrent speech patterns (forma loouendi), even out¬
side the instances commonly recognized and described above,
can be positively misleading, and should not be taken as a
guide to the structure of things as they really are (secundum
rem): . . . .*
3-Pe Ver. 8, prior recensio; AG 1:1$$ n. ; cited by Henry,
op. cit.. p. 14; cf. also De ^asuTiaboli 1.
2Pe Casu Diaboli 11; AO 1:250-251. 3Ibid. : AO 1:251.
^"Henry, The Logic of Saint Anselm. p. 17.
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Anselm speaks of this "grammatical characterization" where he
defends logicians' efforts to speak of the signification of words:
M. Ita est. Hon enim movere nos debet quod dialectic!
aliter scribunt de vocibus secundum quod sunt significativae,
aliter eis utuntur loquendo secundum quod sunt appellativae,
si et grammatici aliud dicunt secundum formam vocum, aliud
secundum rerum naturam.-'-
Here Anselm refers not only to the difference between per se and
per aliud signification^ but also to the difference between
speaking de voce and speaking de re.
This de voce / de re distinction is also present in the
following statement made by Anselm in connexion with Aristotle's
principal intention in his Cateroriae: "Sed quoniam voces non
significant nisi res: dicendo quid sit quod voces significant,
necesse fuit dicere quid sint res."3 In discussing Anselm's
appeal to this de voce / de re differentiation Henry states that
"It is apparent that for him [Anselm], as also for Ontology, a
word like 'thing' is not univocal, but is to be correlated with
the sense of ens which happens to be in question."^ In his
translation of De Grammatico Henry translates 'res' as 'circum¬
stance' in view of "the modern tendency to attribute a univocal
sense to 'thing'. . . The text of De Grammatico clearly shows
why 'res' cannot be interpreted univocally. Such statements as
^"De Gram. 1&; AO 1:164. ^De Gram. 12,15.
^De Gram. 17; AO 1:162.
^Henry, The De Grammatlco of St. Anselm. p. 137. ^Ibid.
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"grammaticus est grammatica" and "grammaticus est qualitas/' *
and the manner in which Anselm interprets them, show why 'res'
cannot be interpreted univocally. The sense of 'res' must be
determined by the context in which it is used.
It is evident that in his attempt to achieve understanding,
which is among other things to see things as they are and to know
secundum rem. Anselm does not take his cue from the form itself
of ordinary discourse, nor from the de voce statements of the
grammarians. In his quest for understanding Anselm analyzes
language in terms of its proper signification, and always in
view of the 'res' themselves which are named or signified. The
fool thought only of the words and consequently uttered 'there
is no God'.^ Anselm asks why the fool said in his heart 'there
is no God': "Cur, nisi quia stultus et insipiens?"^
Through analysis of words, concepts, and notions, through
prayerful meditation on his beliefs, and through a searching out
of the coherent ratio of the Truth, Anselm sought understanding,
both to perceive and to speak de re or secundum rem. He was
prompted to do this by the challenges and objections of infidels,
the requests of brethren who wished both to understand what
they believed and to answer those who inquired as to their hope,
and Anselm's own desire to see into (intellegere) that which he
-*-De Gram. 12; AO 1:157; et al.
2Pe Gram. 9; AO 1:154; et al.
^Pros. 3,4. ^Pros. 3; AO 1:103.
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believed, to see it to be true. There was also the need to
refute heresies.-*- In the very process of answering infidels
and refuting heretics Anselm was compelled to examine more
closely and deeply his own beliefs, and to formulate the latter
ever more precisely and in depth.
3. Falsehood and error in relation to truth and knowledge
Anselmfs understanding of evil and falsehood must be ex¬
amined against the background of his doctrine of truth and
being. Moreover, his conception of ignorance and error must be
considered in connexion with his notion of cogitatio and his
2
notion of intellectus in particular. It should also be obvious
that an understanding of Anselm's notion of rectitudo is a pre¬
requisite to understanding his notion of falsehood and error.
'Malum*. 'iniustitia*. and 'falsitas' are terms that Anselm
uses of deviations and departures from truth or rectitudo. All
created things are finally measured and judged in the light of
their respective exemplars in the eternal Word.
(3.1) Anselm believes that all entities and acts that stand
in a right relation to their eternal forma also signify as they
should. Every right or true thing, deed as well as proposition,
also signifies rightly its transcendent debitum or exemplar.
-'-E.g., Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi.
2
Cf. especially Pros. 2-4; Quid ad haec respondeat editor
ipsium libelli (abbr., Kesponsio Editoris) 4.6-9; Cur Deus Homo,
Oommendatio: Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi 1.
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This is what Anselm has in mind when he states that "non solum
in iis quae signa solemus dicere, sed et in aliis omnibus quae
diximus est significatio vera vel falsa.Anselm believes that
there is either true or false signification in all actions and
"in rerum quoque existentia," which by virtue of their being
indicate that they ought to be. In other words, a just deed is
not merely right or true as a deed corresponding to its forma.
but it is also a true signification since it signifies a debitum
that man ought to fulfil.
Granted that some actions may be intended to exemplify or are
performed with a didactic purpose in mind, a purpose that may
have to be made explicit through propositional or verbal sig¬
nification, it can hardly be said that all acts are meant to be
or are to be understood to be acts signifying something. In his
extended application of the truth of signification to all actions
and entities Anselm has not given adequate consideration to the
factor of intention involved in significative acts. Anselm
asserts: "Quod si debet facere quod facit, verum dicit. Si autem
non debet, mentitur."^ If the verb 'mentirif is translated *to
lie* there appears to be a further difficulty, assuming that
* lying* involves the intent to deceive. For should a person
intend to signify the truth by performing an act which he believes
lj3eVer. 9; AO I:lS9; cf. Henry, The Logic of Saint Anselm.




to be right and just, even though the act is in fact wrong he
cannot be termed a liar. Strictly speaking, that person lies
who intends to signify through statement or action what he knows
is not the case. Even if one does the opposite of what he knows
he ought to do, he can be said to lie only if his intention is
to signify that he ought to do this deed. Anselm should have
offered further clarification on his use of 'mentiri1. It
should be added, however, that Anselm discusses signification
primarily in connexion with propositions.
(3.2) Just as 'malum non est aliud quam non-bonura, aut
absentia boni ubi debet aut expedit esse bonum," and just as
"iniustitiam non aliud esse asserimus quam privationem iusti-
tiae/' likewise falsehood is the absence of rectitudo. To
speak, however, of a false statement, a false thought, or a
false thing, is not to speak of no statement, thought, or thing,
but of the lack of truth where truth ought to be. It is clear
that only where there is created truth can there 'bef falsehood.
The ontological status of falsehood, if we may speak of its
ontological status, is evident in the following statement: "D.
Video ita ibi esse veritatem, ut nulla ibi possit esse falsitas;
o 4
quoniam quod falso est, non est."-5 Anselm answers "bene dicis."
However, Anselm clearly holds that the consequences or "multa
1 2
De Casu Diaboli 11; AO 1:251. Ibid. 9; AO 1:246.
3Pe Ver. 7; AO 1:1*5. 4Ibid.
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incommoda?" 3 which result from the absence of goodness and truth,
are certainly something. It must also be said that propositions,
thoughts, and things in general are clearly something even though
2
they may be marked by certain privations. A proposition which
lacks what may be called extrinsic or accidental rectltudo "sig-
nificat esse quod non est, . . . V Similarly, a thought (cog-
itatio) is said to be "veram, cum est quod aut ratione aut aliquo
modo putamus esse; et falsam, cum non est."4 'Falsitas* sig¬
nifies a certain discrepancy or the absence of a right relation
between the proposition or thought and the actual res or what
is actually the case.
(3.3) In view of Anselm's 'realism' discussed in the pre¬
vious section (2.2), and the negative status of that which is
termed evil or falsehood, the possibility and character of false¬
hood and error must be examined further. Moreover, these topics
can only be properly discussed in close relation to Anselm's
theory of rectitudo and his notion of correspondence. We have
already cited some of Anselm's statements pertaining to false¬
hood, error, and their causes. These causes include man's lack
of faith, his folly, his unjust will, the corrupted image of
God in man, reason's entanglement in corporeal images, an erring
inner sense, and misleading linguistic form.-5 In addition to
4De Casu Diaboli 26; AO 1:274. 2Cf. De Ver. 2,3,7.
3Pe Ver. 2; AO 1:178. 4Ibid. 3; AO lil$0.
3Cf. e.g. Pros. 1,3,4,7; Resoonsio Editoris 4,6; Mon. 36,64,
65; Cur Deus Homo II. 5.10.16.17: De Ver. 6.8-r>rior recensio;
Eristola de Incarnatione Verb! 1; De Casu Diaboli 1,9,11,26.
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his own liability and perversity man faces the ineffable and
incomprehensible supreme Truth.3- Anselm asks: how can man's
mind comprehend that divine knowledge "quae sic longe superior
et verior est creatis substantiis, si nostra scientia tam longe
superatur ab illls, quantum earurn similitudo distat ab earum
essentia?"^ Even created entities surpass man's knowledge.
(3.3.1) The above factors must be kept in mind if we are to
interpret Anselm correctly where he speaks of the mind viewing
and understanding res themselves,3 and the mind perceiving rec-
titudo.4 Anselm does not hold the naive view that the mind of
the knower simply surveys the field of knowable and perceptible
res externae. after which it simply fixes on and views infallibly
a thing just as it is. Such viewing would be something like an
infallible sensation or sense perception, or possibly B. Russell's
knowledge by acquaintance, where there is no error.3 Anselm
would grant, however, that the human mind may achieve a direct
acquaintance with intelligible truths. He states that man was
created to see (videre) even God. However, Anselm does not
teach that the mind's acies or intuitus? of things directly par-
allels the experience of the sensus exterior. The truth of the
1Cf. above (1.3). 2Mon. 36; AO 1:55.
3Cf. (2.2), esp. (2.2.4). 4Pe Ver. 11.
3B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford
University Press, 1959), esp. chapters 5,13.
6Pros• 1; AO 1:98.
^Pros.. prooeiriium; Mon. 10,62-63,66. ^De Ver. 6.
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exterior sense is natural and necessary. The exterior sense
belongs in a class with other natural actions which are true of
necessity.^" Mistakes in sense perception are not to be attributed
to sight or the other senses Msed iudicio animae imputandum est,
quod non bene discernit quid illi [exterior senses J possint aut
quid debeant." As is the case with all other created beings the
mind also always has a measure of truth by virtue of its own
being and functioning. However, the mind can hardly be said to
have necessarily true thoughts and true images of things.
The question remains as to how it is that man entertains
false thoughts and expresses false statements seeing that the
mind can view and know things themselves. How can the human
mind be in error if it knows res themselves and has direct access
to truths and res? Since Anselm does teach that the mind errs
and entertains false thoughts, we do well to examine more closely
those aspects of his epistemological theory related to the above
question. Anselm's whole method of seeking intellectus through
assiduous analysis would alone suggest that the mind's under¬
standing and viewing of truth is no facile accomplishment. This
is the case even though there are statements passim that may
seem to indicate the opposite. I have in mind those statements
which refer to the mind's acies. intuitus. and cogitatio of
things, as well as sola ratio, necessariae rationes, unum argu-
XCf. De Ver. 5.
2Pe Ver. 6; AO I:lfi4
225
menturn, rationalis mens, and immutabilis ratio."*" However, as
noted early in our discussion of Anselm's doctrine, these factors
must be interpreted in context and in direct connexion with
Anselm's own admission of the ineffable character of Truth,
human indigence, and his prayer for divine grace and guidance.
Prevenient grace, faith, and divine illumination are also required
in coming to know the Truth.2
(3.3.2) Much error results from the fact that the mind must
often utilize and depend on media. Anselm's method itself is
indicative of the fact that the mind must contend with such media
as words, propositions, analogies, and corporeal images. Only
as thorough understanding and a clear acies or intuitus are
achieved do we have real immediacy. The rational soul does
know and experience directly or immediately its own activity and
thoughts. Anselm states: "Nam nulla ratione negari potest, cum
mens rationalis seipsam cogitando intelligit, imaginem ipsius
nasci in sua cogitatione; . . .The mind also intuits certain
truths directly. Anselm would say that these truths are known
through that medium which is divine illumination: "Quanta namque
est lux ilia, de qua micat ornne verum quod rationali menti lucet!"^
This medium infallibly shows forth immutable truth. However, the
xCf. Pros.. rrooemium: Mon.. rrologus, 1,10,33,62,63,66;
Cur Deus Homo, praefatio. 11.21.
2
Pros.. prooemium. 1,4,14,16; Cur Deus Homo 1.1; De
Concordia III.4; cf. Hopkins & Richardson, or. cit. . pp. 42-44.
3Mon. 33; Ml 1-52. 4Pros. 14; AO 1:112.
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human mind is often in no condition to receive it.-*- Other media,
because of their false character and/or lack of clarity, often
conceal the truth. The human mind falls into error when it gives
its assent to a proposition or doctrine which is in fact false.
Such a proposition conceals instead of showing forth what is the
case.
(3.3.3) Anselm often seeks to ascertain whether a proposi¬
tion is true or false by subjecting it to analysis. Through an
analysis of a statement, which may have an improper logical
o
form, Anselm draws out the latent exact sense which may itself
suffice to show that the statement is true or false. It could
be said that this is in part what Anselm is doing when he utilizes
the reductio ad absurdum argument, and through restatement and
the explication of what is implied seeks to disprove the state¬
ment in question.3 Anselm would want to argue that the state¬
ment 'C-od is able to lie', which for one thing involves an im¬
proper use of 'is able', could be restated 'God is not God' or
'God is impotent', thereby disproving the initial statement.^-
Henry has drawn my attention to Anselm's use in De Grammatico 8
of an argument whose general form is that of the hypothetical
1Jl£os. 1,14,16. 2Cf. above (2.2.5).
^Cf. e.g., Pros. 2,3; De Ver. 1 - where Anselm argues that
if truth had a beginning there was truth before there was truth,
which is a most unsuitable conclusion; Mon. 1$.
4
Cf. Cur Deus Homo II.17.
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modus tollendo tollens. arid his use of an argument in De Gram-
matico 1 which involves an exclusive disjunction.^ By disproving
one of the alternatives one proves the other alternative, and
by proving one the other is disproved.
In seeking the verification or confirmation of proposi¬
tions Anselm often uses coherence as the test of truth and seeks
to display such coherence through the formulation of equipollent
propositions. By setting forth a series of intermediate equip¬
ollent propositions a coherence may be displayed and a certain
clarification achieved. What Anselm desires above all is to
gain a clearer and fuller view (acies. insrectio. intuitus)
of the res themselves and a greater degree of immediacy. As
one approaches through media a clearer vision of the res them¬
selves the need for media is diminished and the media them¬
selves are better understood. It should be pointed out that a
word like 'nihil* can be understood even though it has no
referent or counterpart in reality.2
(3.3.4) As we have already observed in connexion with
sense perception and divine illumination, the cause of error is
often not the media but the mind itself. Anselm would hold that
in sense perception things themselves are indeed perceived, but
the iudicio animae or sensus interior may misinterpret what is
^Henry, The Logic of Saint Anselm. pp. 242,243.
2
Cf. De Casu Diaboli 11; Ein neues unvollendetes Werk,
p. 42f; cited by Hopkins & Richardson, or. cit.. p. 165. n. 12.
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rightly reported by the senses.^" Anselm believes that the res
themselves are perceived even when they are not wholly or
rightly perceived. In divine illumination the divine light is
never indigent but the soul "videt se non plus posse videre
propter tenebras suas."^ Just before this Anselm had said that
there is no darkness in God. In addressing God Anselm says
3
"ubique es tota praesens, et non te video." The soul is at
fault. In the following question Anselm plainly indicates that
although he sees God only in part, yet it is God whom he sees
in part: "An et Veritas et lux est quod vidit, et nondum te vidit,
4
quia vidit te aliquatenus, sed non vidit te sicuti es?" Although
the mind has only a partial and imperfect view of God Anselm
believes that it is God who is partially understood and not
simply the per aliud expressions, aenigmata. and analogies which
must be used in speaking of God.^ We saw earlier that it is one
thing to conceive (cogitare) a thing by thinking only of the vox
signifying it, and quite another thing "cum id ipsum quod res
est intelligitur.The fool could think 'There is no Godf be-
cause he was only thinking the voces.' In the following state¬
ments we see the danger and the possibility of error involved in
speaking of God per aliud:
1Cf. De Ver. 6. 2Pros. 14; AO 1:111-112.
3Ibld. 16; AO 1:113. ^Ibid. 14; AO 1:111.
^Cf. Mon. 65 where per aliud expressions and aenigmata are
discussed.
^Pros. 4; AO 1:103; cf. also (2.2.4). ?Ibid.
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Nam quaecumque nomina de ilia natura dici posse videntur:
non tam mihi earn ostendunt per proprietatem, quam per ali-
quam innuunt similitudinem. Etenim cum earundem vocum
significationes cogito, familiarius concipio mente quod in
rebus factis conspicio, quam id quod omnem humanum intellec-
tum transcendere intelligo.1
However, man must speak in this fashion when dealing with
the ineffable. This particular difficulty is not encountered
when dealing with created entities. None the less, in the case
of the latter as well there is always the possibility of con¬
ceiving or expressing what is not the case. For the mind may be
dull, it may misconstrue what is presented to it, media may con¬
ceal or obscure, or the mind may confine its attention to words
spoken and written. Anselm states that where the mind does not
have either a view of the image of an object or a view of its
universal essence "nullum aliud [verbum] est utile ad rem osten-
2
dendam." On the other hand, no other word appears so similar
to the thing as "ilia simllitudo quae in acie mentis rem ipsam
cogitantis exprimitur."3 The latter word is "maxime proprium et
principale rei verbum."4 Anselm gives us no reason to believe,
however, that any such imago or similitudo in the mind is a type
of isomorphic picture of the thing. He simply says that such a
similitude "tanto magis vel minus est vera, quanto magis vel
minus imitatur rem cuius est similitudo."5
(3.4) In the following statement it is evident that while
1Mon. 65; AO 1:76. 2Mon. 10; AO 1:25. 3Ibid.
4Ibid. 5Mon. 31; AO 1:48.
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both true thoughts and false thoughts are possible, the means
whereby a certain correspondence is achieved cannot be fully
and categorically delineated: WM. Cogitationem quoque dicimus
veram, cum est quod aut ratione aut aliquo modo putamus esse;
et falsarn, cum non est."^ Although Anselm does indeed specify
certain means whereby correspondence is achieved, for him there
remains an impenetrable mystery which envelops the realization
of correspondence between our minds and things perceived.
Anselm's belief in the possibility and actuality of true thoughts
and statements is based on a prior belief, viz., that the mind
p
has access to res, not understood univocally, even though media
may be involved.^ Of course, the mind may fail to take full
advantage of the available access and means. This is the case,
for example, where media are treated as termini or where the
mind conceives falsely or contrary to what is the case. How¬
ever, even when the mind thinks or views the things or circum¬
stances themselves it may be in error or ignorance. It may
experience only partial vision, which is in certain instances
due in part to the ineffability of the object, or it may mis¬
interpret what it perceives. In any case, Anselm believes that
a right relation between mind and actual circumstances is attain¬
able because the mind does have access to things themselves and
it is possible for the mind to perceive truth.
-*-De Ver. 3; AO I:1&0. 2Cf. above (2.2.5).
^Cf. Mon. 62.
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(3.4.1) There are, of course, several questions that could
be raised in connexion with the mind's intuitus or acies of
things.^ They are questions somewhat similar to those which
could be asked of B. Russell's 'knowledge by acquaintance'.
For example, how can one know for certain that his mind really
intuits (intueri) some thing? For Anselm believes that the mind
can conceive what is not the case.* How can one know when he is
in fact viewing an actual extra-mental res or state of affairs
and when he is not? How does the mind determine which of its
conceptions or thoughts are altogether false and which are but
partial glimpses of extra-mental reality? Assuming that a
measure of faith is required, when does one believe that what
he thinks is the case is indeed the case? Once it is granted
that ignorance, falsehood, and error are possible, these kinds
of questions arise.
That Anselm is aware of these kinds of questions and the
problems with which they deal is evident in the aspects of his
method already discussed. We noted that his method of ascer=
taining truth includes the analysis of thoughts and statements
as well as the use of coherence and equipollent statements.
Much like the manner in which necessary truths are recognized to
be true, Anselm believes that as one achieves a deeper and more
penetrating intuitus of the truth the latter will more and more
Cf. Pros.. rrooemium: Mon. 10,33,62-64,66.
Cf. Responsio Editoris 4,6.
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be seen to be true. On the other hand, if the mind is in fact
entertaining a false conception the false character of this
conception is expected to become increasingly apparent. Of
course, at the rudimentary level of intuitus or immediate ex¬
perience one must finally believe or disbelieve that he is
actually dealing with extra-mental reality.
(3.4.2) Assuming that one is in fact in contact with extra-
mental entities, it may still be asked whether or not he can
know the actual character of his viewing of the object. Anselm
clearly declares that he has only a partial vision of God and
the truth.^ He also states that "creatas substantias multo
o
aliter esse in seipsis quam in nostra scientia." Can Anselm
make such statements without standing outside of himself or
without assuming an extra-worldly stance? It appears that the
above statements of Anselm are made possible in large measure
because of his beliefs concerning the nature of God, the nature
of created things in general, and the nature of the human mind.
The lack of coherence also tells us that our perception is
partial. Furthermore, although Anselm clearly recognises obvious
differences between mental perception or sight and corporeal
sight ? he does consider mental perception to be somewhat anal¬
ogous to sense perception.^ Anselm states that "saepe videmus
^Cf. Pros. 1,14; Mon. 65. ^Mon. 36; AO 1:54.




aliquid ncn proprie, quemadmodum res ipsa est, sed per aliquam
similitudinem aut imaginem; ut cum vultum alicuius consideramus
in speculo."^" He goes on to say that in this way we both see
and do not see one and the same thing. Anselm believes that
even while the mind perceives partially and confusedly it can
be aware of this fact. This awareness is achieved on the basis
of beliefs concerning that which is not yet perceived as well as
on the basis of what has been and is perceived. Anselm says
of the eye of the soul: "Sed certe et tenebratur in se, et re-
verberatur a te. Utique et obscuratur sua brevitate, et obrui-
tur tua immensitate." Even though his mental vision is blurred
and partial because of these and other factors, Anselm none the
less believes that he does perceive something of such a sublime
Mystery.-^
However, the question that persists is whether one can per¬
ceive or show in some way that one truly perceives the entity
itself, and in what manner, without assuming the impossible
stance of standing without oneself. Furthermore, it would seem
that certain beliefs and assumptions would be required even if
the latter stance were possible. Anselm does not express the
need for assuming this stance since he believes that he does in
fact intuit things themselves. He holds that the latter is the
case even when the object itself is not immediately present to
the intuitus of one's thought.^- The mind thinks and knows things
%on. 65; AO 1:76. ^Pros. 14; AO 1:112.
3Mon. 64-67. 4Mon. 62.
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even where this ran only be realized through their similitudes
and images.^" Anselm does not teach that the mind only knows the
likenesses and images of things. Of course, even to know that
one knows only media requires knowledge of more than media. Anselm
believes that he certainly knows more than media and consequently
finds that he can speak, as he does concerning media.
(3«4.3) Another significant question, related to the above
questions, concerns the sense of 'rectitudo1 when the latter is
used in connexion with a state of affairs or set of c ireumstances
in which one entity is rightly related to another entity. What
exactly does Anselm have in mind when he states that a created
res, for example, man, is rightly related to its eternal exemplar?
What is the exact character of that fcorrespondence1 between a
true proposition and that res or set of circumstances which it
signifies? We have already examined Anselm's terminology and the
different situations in which we find right delations'. Our
intention here is not to cover that ground again.
The word 'relation' does not name a referent to which direct
appeal can be made in seeking to ascertain the character of cor¬
respondence or the exact character of a state of affairs involving
a right relationship. Although Anselm spends a great deal of
time discussing 'rectitudo' he nowhere attempts to state precisely
or to picture for us the exact manner in which one entity is
rightly related to another. We saw that he uses the word 'similitude
1Ibid.
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but he does not attempt to articulate the exact character of
this similitude. I believe that he does not attempt this in
part because he himself realized that he could not do so. How¬
ever, Anselm doe3 clearly teach that one can intuit or see that
a thing does fit or is rightly related. He left indeterminate
the exact character of a right 'relation'. He prefers to say
simply that an entity is right or true when it exists as it
ought to exist or when it does what it ought to do. Although
one can recognize and perceive that an entity exists rightly he
cannot describe exactly or picture the character of the right
'relation' or 'relations' involved.
It is worth noting that Anselm does not use the term 'adae-
quatio' in his teaching regarding truth. 'Adaeouatio' is a
term which suggests correspondence in terms of physical propor¬
tions or spatial commensuration. 'Adaeauatio' appears to be
more definitive and more restrictive than the term 'rectitude'.
Consequently, the former term tends to have a more restricted
usage than the latter. 'Rectitude' appears to be more open-
ended. 'Adaequatio' is derived from the verb 'ad-aeouare' which
means 'to make equal to', 'to equalize', or 'to level with*.^"
The terms 'rectus' and 'rectitudo'. on the other hand, offer a
wider range of possible interpretations and consequently a wider
range of application. Unlike 'adaequatio'. 'rectus' and 'rectitudo'
"**Cf. Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon
Fress, 1S96), p. 29.
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are less apt to imply or suggest quantitative, spatial, or
physical commensuration. This is partly the reason why Anselm
was able to apply these terms to quite diverse entities and
actions."^ 'Rectitudo1 is therefore applied to actions, the
senses, thoughts, and even God himself. Although rectitudo is
finally ineffable it is "mente sola perceptibilis."2 If truth
can only be perceived and intuited in part, how could Anselm or
anyone else expect to describe or express it adequately and
properly?
^"Cf. Anselm's De Veritate.
2Pe Ver. 11; AO 1:191.
CHAPTER III
ROBERT GROSSETESTE'S UNDERSTANDING
OF THE NATURE OF TRUTH
With this chapter we come to the main body and primary por¬
tion of our inquiry, viz., Robert Grosseteste's doctrine of truth,
in which doctrine truth is set forth in its manifold character
in accordance with the supreme Truth and the various categories
of creaturely entities.
In the first chapter it was noted that there are a number
of basic questions that have to be asked regarding the locus of
truth, the application and usage of such words as 'truth* and
'true', and theories of truth which involve a number of impli¬
cations and consequences. The attendant problems pertaining to
certitude and validity were also considered. Special attention
was paid to Heidegger's examination of truth in view of the pro¬
found questions he raises regarding logical and intellectual
truth in relation to more primordial truth. Appeal was also
made to Heidegger's thought regarding truth because of his com¬
mentary on the traditional correspondence theory of truth as
formulated within the mediaeval setting. Heidegger was seen to
23 8
be concerned with the recovery of that which is foundational
for that truth which is understood as correspondence. The pur¬
pose of the first chapter was to provide a kind of critical
apparatus or framework in terms of which subsequent inquiry
could be more profitably pursued. The first chapter was also
intended to indicate that recent and contemporary debate and
theory concerning the nature and locus of 'truth' have a signi¬
ficant and relevant precedent in mediaeval discussion and doc¬
trines on the nature of truth. The underlying assumption, more¬
over, was that certain lacunae and impasses in the present dis¬
cussion derive in part from the failure to consider seriously
earlier doctrines of truth and mediaeval doctrines in particular.
One of such difficulties is the problem as to how the proposition
or assertion is to be connected or joined to the res or state of
affairs signified. Etienne Gilson states why this was not a
critical problem for St. Thomas in his understanding of truth:
"And that is why, being founded on a real relation, it ^knowledge
in terms of the judgement] has no need to ask how it shall rejoin
reality."^- Another basic presupposition underlying the first
chapter, and the entire thesis as well, is that to follow a purely
detached phenomenological and analytical examination of the doc¬
trines of truth under consideration is to fail to respond to the
mandate implicit in the subject of the thesis itself. Part of
the reason, then, for incorporating the first chapter was to set
"*"E. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosorhv. p. 23
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forth a declaration of intent and to indicate why the inquiry
was undertaken at all.
In the preceding chapter a cursory study of St. Augustine's
and St. Anselm's doctrines of truth was conducted in anticipation
of this present chapter which constitutes the focal point of the
dissertation. The investigation into Augustine's and Anselm's
notions concerning truth was essential not only by reason of their
own intrinsic significance but also because of their determina¬
tive influence on Grosseteste's own thought. At the same time
it is essential that one be aware of several factors that helped
to shape the thought of Grosseteste which had little or no impact
at all on the minds of Augustine and Anselm. These would include
such as the logica nova along with the major portion of the
Aristotelian corpus, the Pseudo-Dionysian treatises, the school
of Chartres, and the Greek and Arabic scientific treatises.
Some of these factors obviously could not have influenced Augus¬
tine or Anselm because they were either written or recovered
after they lived. Although such as the Pseudo-Dionysian writings
antedate Anselm by centuries and were available to him, they
appear to have had little impact on his thought. Josef Pieper
points out that Dionysius is mentioned just once in Anselm's
writings. Pieper goes so far as to assert that "if there was any
philosophical and theological thinker of importance during the
Middle Ages who remained untouched by the spirit of Dionysius the
Areopagite, he was Anselm of Canterbury."^-
lj. Pieper, Scholasticism, p. 55.
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Grosseteste, however, both translated and wrote commentaries on
the Angelical Hierarchy, the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, the
Divine Names, and the Mystical Theology. One may want to question
whether Anselm was altogether "untouched by the spirit of Dion-
ysius" but it is certainly true that the latter had a greater
impact on Grosseteste than on Anselm.
Grosseteste's metaphysics of light manifests the influence
of the Neoplatonic tradition but Grosseteste radically alters
what he does receive from that tradition and rejects what is in¬
compatible with his faith. Grosseteste's encounter with the
Aristotelian corpus in itself partly accounts for his wide range
of interests and intellectual pursuits in contrast with Augus¬
tine's and Anselm's more strictly theological writing. The
school of Ghartres also influenced Grosseteste in the direction
of focusing more attention on the created natural order although
he did not share their zeal for Platonism, humane letters, and
metaphysical speculation. It is clear that Grosseteste's interest
and investigations in the realm of physics constitute a point of
difference between him and Augustine or Anselm. However, the
great affinity among the three far outweighs the points of dif¬
ference that exist. That Anselm and Grosseteste are deeply rooted
in the Augustinian tradition is amply evident from their works.
At the same time it must be stated that they did not simply recapi¬
tulate or reiterate the teaching of Au ustine. Anselm, Grosseteste,
and many other Augustinians left their own unmistakeable imprint
on the body of doctrine which they inherited from Augustine and
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other sources. One must not overlook the considerable degree
of variation that exists in this Augustinian tradition. As
Leff says:
We are now in a position to identify that complex of thought
which goes by the name of Augustinianism. In doing so, it
must be emphasized, firstly, that this does not imply a com¬
pact body of doctrine or thinkers in any way approximating
to an organized party; and secondly, that the term must not
be taken to mean the rejection or disavowal of everything
connected with Aristotle.1
Grosseteste certainly does not reject "everything connected with
Aristotle," but at the same time it must be said that he is
quite critical and selective in his study and use of Aristotle.
This fact along with Grosseteste's stance within the Augustinian
tradition will become apparent throughout this chapter and
chapter four. It will be seen that Grosseteste occupies a stra¬
tegic position because he is one of the first in the Augustinian
tradition to encounter and deal with the new influx of Aristotle's
writings. In addition to these works there were a number of
other sources introduced in the twelfth century Renaissance with
which the figures of that century and succeeding centuries had
to cope.
Before examining the terminology used by Grosseteste in form¬
ulating his doctrine of truth we shall consider a number of intro¬
ductory matters including facets of the historical and intellec¬
tual situation at the time of Grosseteste, his position in rela¬
tion to certain significant developments, and cardinal motifs in
1G. Leff, Medieval Thought. p. 190.
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his own thought. This will enable us to understand better and
to appreciate more that which follows.
1. Introduction and background to Robert Grosseteste's doctrine
of truth
"The central figure in England in the intellectual movement
of the first half of the thirteenth century was undoubtedly
Robert Grosseteste."-*- Such is the judgement of Daniel Callus who
has devoted considerable attention to Grosseteste. Grosseteste
was born around 1170 in the county of Suffolk. He probably re¬
ceived his first schooling at Lincoln and then studied the arts
at Oxford. Prior to 119# he was in the household of William de
Vere, Bishop of Hereford, and at this time is declared to be well
versed in the liberal arts, to be proficient in the practice of
medicine and the determination of causes, which may be construed
as a knowledge of law. This is what is to be learned from a
letter of Giraldus Cambrensis. Callus believes that by 1199 at
the latest Grosseteste was a master in the arts. Thereafter he
probably taught the arts at Oxford and pursued his scientific
studies until 1209. It is presumed that after the susrendium
clericorum in 1209 Grosseteste left for Paris to study theology
and that in 1214 at the earliest he was chosen to be the chancellor
of Oxford. Grosseteste also served as archdeacon of Chester,
"4). A. Callus, "Robert Grosseteste as Scholar," Robert
Grossetoste-Scholar and Bishop, ed. D. A. Callus (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1955), p. 1. "This book edited by Callus is hereafter
abbreviated RG.
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Northampton, and Leicester during this period ending in 1232.
Russell believes that "the evidence of the manuscripts shows
that Grosseteste's interests were mainly scientific in the first
quarter of the thirteenth century.""'" Stevenson has this to say
of the period from 1200-1232: "The most salient feature, however,
of the thirty-two years is that they constitute the period of
Grossetestefs greatest intellectual activity, to which the major-
2
ity of his writing are probably to be assigned." In 1224 the
Franciscans arrived in Oxford and Grosseteste served th^m as
their first lecturer from 1229-1235. He was elected bishop of
Lincoln in 1235. From that time until his death in 1253 he was
active in administration, pastoral care of souls, promoting
preaching and better education of the clergy, and translating
or supervising translations of Greek sources into Latin.
These biographical notes indicate something of the range of
Grosseteste?s proficiency and interest. In an age when many
masters in theology were beginning to confine their attention
to the trivium and dialectic in particular, to the quaestio and
commentary on the Sentences. and to scholastic disputation,
Grosseteste directed his energy to the study of the Posterior
Analytics. Physics, and other works of Aristotle, the investiga-
lj. C. Russell, "Phases of Grossetestefs Intellectual Life,"
The Harvard Theological Review, XLIII, 1 (January, 1950), p. 100.
p
F. S. Stevenson, Robert Grosseteste-Bishop of Lincoln
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1899), p. 29.
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tion of causes of natural phenomena, the quadrivium and its place
in relation to other disciplines, glosses on the Holy Scriptures
and the Sentences. and the writing of theological and metaphysical
treatises. It is interesting to note that his investigations and
study in the different areas are concurrent. Grosseteste's writ¬
ing of theological treatises and treatises in natural philosophy
extends throughout his teaching career. Richard D. Dales has
sought to date Grosseteste's commentary on Aristotle's Physics.
Dales believes that what we have in the 'commentary' are notes
written over a period of years. Dales states: "The extreme limits,
then, of the period during which these notes were written would
be 1220 to ca. 1240. The evidence indicates, however, that the
bulk of them was written between 1223 and 1232."1 Callus states
that "the glosses on the Physics. as we have seen, and the major¬
ity of his ^Grosseteste'sj scientific treatises were all written
after 1230." Although specific areas of study received spe¬
cial attention at stated periods during his life, his interest
in a number of areas, physics included, persisted even when he
was teaching theology, engaged in pastoral and administrative
duties, and serving as the bishop of Lincoln. We shall inquire
"4*. C. Dales (ed.), "Introduction," Commentarius in VIII
Libros Phvsicorum Aristotelis (Boulder, Colorado: University of
Colorado Press, 1963), p. xviii. This texh of Grosseteste will
hereafter be designated Comm. Phys. plus number of book. Dales'
edition will be designated Dales plus page number in his edition.
^Callus, loc cit.. p. 23.
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later into the reasons for this continued breath of activity
and interest on the part of Grosseteste. He was not motivated
out of sheer intellectual curiosity or force of habit. There
is a rationale and clear purpose behind his rather diverse
activities.
Grosseteste appeared on the scene at a time when a number
of momentous changes and developments were taking place. Classi¬
cal sources and materials were being recovered and utilized in
distinct ways. Platonism and Aristotelianism were being intro¬
duced by way of Moslem philosophy and Jewish philosophy. In
the thought of these philosophers we find the intermixture of
I'JeoplatoniwSm, Aristotelianism, plus Islamic faith or Jewish
faith. Averroes (1126-117&), however, sought to separate the
Aristotelian doctrine from the Neoplatonlc elements that Avicenna
had mixed with it. In the twelfth century we also note the in¬
flux of a host of Arabic and Greek scientific treatises. Many
of these sources were available in Latin in the west by the end
of the twelfth century and in the early part of the thirteenth.
Our immediate concern, however, is to examine significant devel¬
opments which contributed to the shaping of twelfth century
thought and scientific method and which influenced Grosseteste.
We shall note how Grosseteste responded to these different
developments.
(1.1) The role and use of dialectic, reason, and authority in
relation to the scholastic method and the quest for truth
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(1.1.1) It is hardly possible at this juncture to conduct
a thorough examination of the place of reason or dialectic dur¬
ing the mediaeval period but the examination of certain trends
and issues should prove helpful. This preliminary study is
warranted in part by the increased preoccupation with dialectic
during the twelfth century as evidenced in the universals con¬
troversy, the thought of such as Abelard and Alan of Lille, Lom¬
bard's Sentences, and in the method of disrutatio. Logic or
dialectic soon dominated the arts curriculum and became increas¬
ingly normative. In the schools dialectic became principally
the form or mode of disputation. This resulted in the dialec¬
tical excesses against which John of Salisbury speaks in his
Metalogicon. Such dialectic severely restricted and limited the
operation and function of the reason. This dialectic is to be
distinguished from that rational method in which the mind or
reason applies itself to articles cf faith accepted on the basis
of authority. A. J. MacDonald^ states that reason, tradition,
and authority can be spoken of in terms of their broad and narrow
significance and sense. The ratio understood in the broad sense
is the human intelligence reflecting upon and pondering man, the
world, human opinion, revelation etc. Ratio as understood
in the narrower sense entails the exercise of the rational fac¬
ulties bound by the methods of the schools, in other words, the
-*-A. J. MacDonald, Authority and Reason in the Early Middle
Ages (London: Oxford University Press, l<-?33), p. 4ff.
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rules of dialectics. It is the latter which along with grammar
and rhetoric constitutes the trivium. MarDonald states the
following concerning the development of dialectics or logic:
Dialectics or logic became almost entirely syllogistic, and
rational attempts at the interpretation of doctrine or reve¬
lation sank into disrepute, until a few stronger minds
wrested the activity of reason from the normal exercise of
the schools, and attempted to secure for reason not only
greater freedom, but to apply it to the practical develop¬
ment and application of dogma.
The apparent threat to authority and faith posed by dialec¬
tic provoked varying degrees of reaction against dialectic. In
Peter Damian, Manegold of Lautenback, Otloh of St. Emmeran and
Walter of St. Victor we find a great deal of suspicion regarding
dialectic and profane or secular learning in general. Damian
was one of the most forceful in repudiating the study of such as
the arts. St. Bernard of Clairvaux held a more moderate position
and although he did not actually reject profane scholarship he
stressed its subordinate position in relation to simple faith
and piety in Christ. Lanfranc represents a moderate view deter¬
mined to a considerable extent by his controversy with Berengarius
on the Eucharist. Leff says of Lanfranc: "Lanfranc therefore
tried to establish the meeting-place of dialectic and theology,
/■
at a time when one was being upheld to the exclusion of the other.n<
The real issue revolved about the extent to which dialectics,
which was basically the logica veto?plus Boethius1 contribution
to logic, was to be utilized and how determinative a role it was
"^Ibid. p. 9. ^G. Leff, or. cit.. p. 97.
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to play. The still larger question pertained to the role and
function of the reason in relation to authority and faith. So
long as the character of this interrelationship was not estab¬
lished and thought through, the alternatives were pretty much
restricted to sheer acceptance of authority and tradition or
formal dialectical disputation concerning doctrine received and
accepted. Other possibilities included the setting up of a more
determinative and normative dialectics or an autonomous and
regulator}'- ratio,.
However, any student of mediaeval thought soon becomes
aware of other types of rational activity and uses of reason in
relation to authority and faith. Positions pertaining to the
place and function of the reason range from that of John the
Scot, St. Anselm, Gilbert de la Porree of the school of Chartres
to St. Thomas. Moreover, it should also be noted that it is mis¬
leading simply to speak of mediaeval 'rationalism* or of media¬
eval 'rational theology' without further explication and quali¬
fication. One reason for this is that the word 'reason' as
such does not express the sense of 'ratio' in its manifold usage
in mediaeval texts. One only has to consult a standard Latin
Dictionary to note the many difference senses which 'ratio* can
have. R. McKeon speaks"^ of the difficulty in finding substitutes
f°r 'ratio' in translation. He cites some of the possible senses
^"R. McKeon, (ed. and trans.), Selections from Medieval Phi¬
losophers . Vol. I (London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930)
p. xvii.
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that 'ratio' can have including such as a faculty of the human
mind, relations in things or related elements, a principle of
being, and a principle of knowing. One faces a similar problem
regarding the words 'auctoritas' and 'traditio'. A. J. MacDonald
states that John the Scot is often misinterpreted because 'auc¬
toritas ' as used by John is not understood correctly:
But it cannot be too sharply emphasized, since it is a point
which interpreters of John the Scot have missed, that reason
is here contrasted with written authority, with the writings
of Scripture or of the Fathers, not with the authority of
revelation or illumination, either in Scripture or in that
region of the soul which is superior to reason.
Nevertheless, it can be said that 'auctoritas' is generally used
to refer to the Sacred Scriptures in the first place and then the
testimony of the fathers.
We shall see that Grosseteste places great stress on auc¬
toritas and seeks to substantiate his theological and metaphy¬
sical formulations by frequently appealing to auctoritates. In
this respect it will become apparent that Grosseteste's method
is closer to Augustine's method than to Anselm's. Although all
three seek a deeper understanding of the content of the Faith
and a greater certitude and certainty, Anselm's method involves
a 'rational' explication and demonstration of the content of
the Faith without appealing to auctoritas. They all speak of
the mind seeking after intellectus and a clear vision of the
Truth. However, without citing and making an appeal to auctor¬
itates Anselm strives to see and to show the contents of the
^A. J. MacDonald, op. cit.. p. 47.
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Faith to be true. What should be pointed out at this juncture
is that Augustine, Anselm, and Grosseteste all utilize and pro¬
ceed on the basis of certain generally accepted notions and
metaphysical structures which are taken for granted. However,
whereas they use these notions and structures in a rather cri¬
tical fashion in the formulation of their doctrine, in certain
other mediaeval theological systems these notions are radically
determinative. As Leff states: "Just as St. Augustine gave
Neoplatonism a Christian foundation, so John [the Scot / endea¬
voured to set Christianity upon a Neoplatonic base."^ Other
examples of this degree of adaptation of the doctrines accepted
by faith are found in members of the school of Chartres, for
instance, Thierry of Chartres. The question as to how reason
and dialectic are to be employed and juxtaposed over against the
content of faith raises the whole issue of the scholastic method.
(1.1.2) There are a number of problems involved in seeking
to clarify and determine the basic character of 'the scholastic
method'. One of these difficulties arises from the different
interpretations offered regarding the nature of the method. A
considerable number of these have been brought together by Martin
Grabmann in his history of the scholastic method. Grabmann cites
such as Friedrich Paulsen, Wilhelm Dilthey, Reinhold Seeberg, and
August Sabatier as those who see in the scholastic a rationalistic
or at least semi-rationalistic propensity, whereas in such as
■^G. Leff, on. cit. . pp. 71-72.
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Karl Girgensohn "tritt in den Augen dieses Theologen bei den
Scholastikern die Vernunft ganzlich hinter Autoritat and Glauben
zuruck.""*" The definition given is determined by such factors as
the bias of the definer and the mediaeval figures selected as
most representative of what a scholastic should be. The expres¬
sion Scholastic method' is also quite inadequate as a generali¬
zation insofar as it is then expected to cover a number of methods
which have their own distinctive aspects. Etienne Gilson sets
forth one of the ways in which we can speak of 'scholasticism':
Scholasticism is the common denomination for the "scholas¬
tic philosophy" of the Faculty of Arts and for the "scholas¬
tic theology" of the Faculty of Theology. There is no harm
in attempting to define the "essence" of scholasticism,
supposing it has one, but to do so is beyond the proper capac¬
ity of a historian.2
Grabmann, however, in his historical study of the scholastic
method does set forth some definite ideas on the nature of the
method. He states the following regarding the method:
Es sei vor allem auf das 'fides quaerens intellectual' und
das 'credo, ut intelligam' des hi. Anselm von Canterbury
hingewiesen. Unsere geschichtliche Darstellung wird den
Nachweis erbringen, dass hier das grossartige wissenschaft-
liche Arbeitsprogramm des Vaters der Scholastik ausgespro-
chen ist, und dass dieses Arbeitsprogramm zugleich das Echo
der Patristik, besonders Augustins, und auch das wirksame
Vorbild fur die folgende Scholastik gewesen. Der Sinn und
die Tragweite dieses Arbeitsprogramms Anselms ist das Erstre-
ben eines Verstandnisses der Glaubenswahrheit, einer ration-
3-M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte Der Scholastischen Methode. Vol.
I (Basel/Stuttgart: Benno Schwabe & Co. Verlag, 1961), p. 16.
^E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle
Ap;es (New York: Random House, 1955) p. 249.
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ellen Einsicht in den Offernbarungsinhalt, und zwar auf der
festen und unerschutterlichen Grundlage des Glaubens. . . .1
This citation clearly indicates what Grabmann takes to be the
spirit and form of the scholastic method. He holds that the scho¬
lastics continued what the patristics had been doing, in other
words, discreetly using Greek philosophy with no transformation
of biblical Christianity. In like manner, "der Scholastizismus
bedeutet keine inhaltliche Umpragung und Entstellung des Urchris-
o
tentums." Grabmann's description of the method appears too neat
and precise. The question arises whether he has not oversimpli¬
fied the matter. One could ask whether he has reckoned suffic¬
iently with the determinative and normative role and influence
that reason and philosophy have often exercised when utilized
by the fathers and the mediaeval scholastics. Furthermore, it
should be pointed out that Grabmann's rather compact description
of the scholastic method and its central aims is quite general
in character and must be appropriately qualified and more pre¬
cisely delineated when setting forth the particular method of
this or that mediaeval theologian. Grabmann also offers this
general formal definition of the scholastic method:
Die scholastische Methode will durch Anwendung der Vernunft,
der Fhilosophie auf die Offenbarungswahrheiten moglichste
Einsicht in den Glaubensinhalt gewinnen, um so die ubernat-
urliche Wahrheit dem denkenden Menschengeiste inhaltlich
naher zu bringen, organisch zusammenfassende Gesamtdarstellung
der Heilswahrheit zu ermoglichen und die gegen den Offenba-
rungsinhalt vom Vernunftstandpunkte aus erhobenen Einwande.3
■kirabmann, op. cit., p. 33. 2Ibid., p. 75.
^Ibidw pp. 36-37.
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Such a definition has a certain utility if at the same time one
keeps in mind the differences in procedure, form, and method
present in 'scholasticism'. It could be said that commentary or
exposition, collation sheer compilation, disnutatio. monographic
studies, and the Summae are all attempts to gain insight into
the contents of what is believed. Differentiation arises from
and involves methods used, the character of the rational activity,
and the place given to dialectic and philosophy in relation to
authority and faith. The understanding of 'ratio' and its proper
function also appears to be very determinative. One must there¬
fore know for certain just what is intended speaking of mediaeval
'rationalism'. Leff has this to say concerning scholasticism:
Scholasticism has long been a subject for controversy. Ey
some it has been seen as an attitude or state of belief
which takes Christian revelation for its subject; to others
it is a method of disputation, and this has been its dis¬
tinguishing trait; while others have regarded it as the
rational aspect of belief, a philosophy in its own right.
While none of these is necessarily self-exclusive, in
my view scholasticism was essentially the application of
reason to revelation. It was an outlook in which rational
enquiry was governed by the assumptions of faith, and faith
was supported by the powers of reason.1
(1.1.3) The question remains as to how Grosseteste stands
in relation to the factors discussed above. It must be first
pointed out that Grosseteste does not oppose but rather advocates
profane learning such as the study of the liberal arts. Grosse¬
teste 's own study and teaching in the liberal arts, his treatise
1Leff, or, cit.. p. 92
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on the liberal arts, his numerous treatises in physics, and his
translations of and commentaries on a number of Aristotle's
works amply testify to the breadth of his scholarship. As Lud-
wig Baur says:
Grosseteste gehorte nicht zu jener allzukonservativen augus-
tinischen Richtung, welcher Philosophie und Profanwissen-
shaften ein Greuel waren; mit freiem Bliche tritt er der
neuen Gedankenwelt n'aher, gibt ober aller Wissenschaftsp-
flege eine Richtung auf die Theologie.1
In his treatise on the liberal arts Grosseteste speaks of a three¬
fold cause of error and imperfection. Such error arises from
the mind that is darkened by ignorance, from affections that
fall short or lack moderation, and on account of the motive
powers of the body that have been weakened by the corruption of
the flesh. Grosseteste speaks of the function of the seven arts
in overcoming such error and imperfection:
In humanis vero operibus erroris purgationes et ad perfee-
tionem deductiones sunt artes septenae, quae solae inter
partes philosophiae ideo censentur artis nomine, quia earum
est tantum effectus operationes humanas corrigendo ad per-
fectionem ducere.2
Concerning the trivium Grosseteste says that "mentis ergo
-*-L. Baur, "Das philosophische Lebenswerk des Robert Grosse¬
teste Bischofs von Lincoln" (Gorres-Ges., Vereineschr., f. 1910;
bound in 15 Diss. & C.on Scholastic Philosophy, 1901-1919) p. #2.
^De Art. Lib.; BW 1. BW is abbreviated form of the following:
L. Baur, "Die philosophischenWerke des Robert Grosseteste Bischofs
von Lincoln," Band IX of Beitra^e ssuur Geschichte der Philosophie
des Mittelalters. hg. C. Baeumker (M&'nster i. W.: Aschendorffsche
Verlagbuchhandlung, 1912). In the above volume L. Baur offers us
a critical edition of a number of Grosseteste's treatises. The
number following BW is the page number in Band IX cited above.
0
255
aspectum et affectum hae tres virtutes rectificant et ad perfec-
tionem perducunt."^- Grosseteste states that "hae septem natur-
alis et moralis sunt rrdnistrae: nam grammatica et logica sum
habeant sermonem rectum, habent probationem rectam: manifestum
est, quod probationem veram ministrant." It is interesting to
note that the arts are servants or attendants of natural and moral
philosophy. Grammar and logic provide true or right reasoning and
demonstration on behalf of other disciplines. Grosseteste is
interested in the services that the trivium can provide but not
in the trivium for its own sake. These attendants must always
remain subordinate to such disciplines as physics, ethics, and
theology which they may serve. Rhetoric has a service to per¬
form on behalf of "moralis scientia." He states that "moralis
scientia cum ornatu rhetorico vult doceri et sciri, ut proveniat
morum informatio." Other sciences "ornatum repudiant, in qui-
bus quaeritur sola veritatis ordinatio., Music and astronomy
receive a great deal of attention in De Artibus Liberalibus.
Grosseteste stresses the importance of the study of music in
seeking to understand movement, celestial and non-celestial har¬
mony, things composed of the four elements, and the elements
themselves. Music is also useful in medicine as it helps to
restore harmony among the elements of the body and concord of
body and soul. Natural philosophy needs the service of astronomy
more than that of the other arts. There is hardly an operation
within the realm of nature or human activity which can do without
1Ibid.: BW 2. 2Ibid.; BW 4. 3Ibid. 4Ibid.
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the service of astronomy. Such operations include the planting
of vegetables, transmutation of metals, and the curing of
diseases. Arithmetic and geometry receive little attention in
this treatise but have an important place in Grosseteste's
scientific method.
In this present context it is the place of logic or dia¬
lectic in Grosseteste's thought and methodology that is of
special interest. It has already been noted that logic helps in
providing true reasoning or demonstration. The function of
grammar is to understand rightly and then to communicate pro¬
perly what is understood. Logic then fulfils its function as
follows: "Recte informatum quale sit logica sine errore dijud-
icst."-*- Logic must pass judgement as to the truth of that
which is rightly understood. "Officium vero logicae est, quod
recte formatum est in intellectu, secundum tripartitam rationem
sui quale sit judicare et discutare."2 As we proceed it will
become apparent that Grosseteste does not repudiate the use of
logic, however, he is not preoccupied with logic or dialectic.
In De Libero Arbitrio. De Scientia Dei, and De Veritate Propo¬
sitions he deals in part with problems pertaining to the moda¬
lity of propositions in connection with factual necessity and
contingency. F. S. Stevenson^ believes that in his De Veritate
Propositionis Grosseteste manifests some acquaintance with Byzan-
^•Ibid.; BW 1. 2Ibid.
^Stevenson, op. cit.. p. 42, n. 1.
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tine logic. In his De Veritate treatise Grosseteste argues that
truth is indestructible. The argument used is akin to theorem
17 of Stoic logic. However, it must be said that he is much
more interested in understanding the nature of the supreme Truth
and the truth of things than logical or propositional truth.
The latter is recognized and examined but viewed as being strictly-
subordinate to the former. Aristotle's logic, the Posterior
Analytics in particular, is of interest to Grosseteste primarily
for what it has to offer in the formulation of a scientific
method in physics. A. C. Crombie cites two types of argument
used by Grosseteste: "The modes of argument used by Grosseteste
in his method of experimental verification and falsification are
called respectively, the modus oonendo r>onens and the modus tol-
lendo tollens."^ Crombie believes that both these modes of argu¬
ment are to be found in the treatise De Calore Soils. There is
also a gloss on the Sorhistici Elen^hi that is attributed to Gros¬
seteste. In his Quaestiones Theologicae he labels an argument
"paralogismus accidentis." "Theology, so he said in one of his
Dicta (no. 11&), turns the syllogism to spiritual uses and catches
^A. C. Crombie, "Grosseteste's Position in the History of
Science," RG, p. 116.
^Quaestiones Theologicae (_II/ ; ed. D.A. Callus, "The Suinma
Theologiae of Robert Grosseteste.'- Studies in Medieval History,
ed. R.W. Hunt, W.A. Pantin, and R.W. Southern (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 194#), p. 203. Callus' edition of Quaestiones Theologicae
will be used throughout the thesis and hereafter only his name
and the number of the page will be given in addition to Quaest♦
Theol. and section number.
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in its net spiritual fish who are readily caught. It is evi¬
dent that Grosseteste is hardly averse to all use of logic and
argumentation. At the same time he carefully limits his use of
logic and dialectical disputation and manifests a decided pre¬
ference for authority, experience, and observation in ascertain¬
ing the truth. Regarding Grosseteste's proposed solution of the
Jerome-Augustinian controversy on the incident between Peter and
Paul in Antioch, Beryl Smalley has this to say: "Nevertheless
his attempt to use history rather than dialectic by way of ex¬
planation throws light on his own mental processes. . . .The
interesting point is Grossetestefs preference for scholarship to
o
dialectic." Let us examine further Grosseteste's use of dialec¬
tic and ratio in particular types of treatises and forms of
writing.
Grosseteste's theological writing consists for the most part
of moralistic commentary on some of the books of Scripture, a
small number of biblical treatises, fragmentary comments on the
Sentences. monographs such as De Libero Arbitrio. De Unica Forma
Omnium and De Veritate, commentary on the Pseudo-Pionvsius. dicta.
and sermons. Those who have studied his biblical commentaries
and biblical treatises are impressed by the absence of dialectic
and scholastic disputation and the presence of spiritual inter¬
pretation and moral exhoration. Beryl Smalley, who has studied
^•Sir M. Powicke, "Introduction," RG, p. xviii.
2E. Smalley, "The Biblical Scholar," RG, pp. 93-94.
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tnese commentaries and treatises, comments on his Bible study:
Grosseteste was behind the times in his attitude to Bible
study. ... He believes, as his masters must have believed,
in associating theology and exegesis very closely. Doctrine
and theological speculation, on this view, ought to be kept
within a scriptural framework; they should be taught in
lectures on the Bible. . . . Grosseteste sponsored the older
view of an all-embracing study of Scripture. He rave high
priority in this study to the spiritual exposition. It was
part and parcel of his view of life.-*-
His spiritual exposition was directed towards preaching and edi¬
fication. Grosseteste was well versed in the Scriptures and
emphasized the need of using the Bible as the text in teaching
theology. In a letter to the regent-masters in theology at Ox¬
ford he urged that only the Bible be used as the text in teach¬
ing theology.^ With respect to Grosseteste's commentary on Gala-
tians and his Moralitates in Bvanrelia Callus states that "there
is hardly any trace of dialectic subtleties or scholastic dis¬
cussions; but an abundance of practical instruction, spiritual
advice, virtues to follow, vices and sins to avoid, all illus-
tratedbby appropriate and copious exemplar."^ Stevenson shares
the sentiment expressed above:
In spite of the extraordinary proficiency to which he CGros-
setestej attained both in theology and in dialectics, his
mental bias was in favour of keeping those studies as far
as possible distinct one from another, and not intermingling
1Ibid.. pp. B4-S5.
^Ep. 123; Epistolae, ed. H. R. Luard (R.S.), (London, 1&61),
pp. 34*5-347.
^D. A. Callus, "The Oxford Career of Robert Grosseteste,"
Oxoniensia, X (1945), p. 71.
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them in the manner which had become fashionable during the
twelfth century.1
Grosseteste's biblical and theological writing is marked by
constant appeal to auctoritas, that is, the Scriptures and the
fathers. Stevenson says of Grosseteste's Dicta Theologica:
"One of their most noteworthy characteristics is to be found in
their constant appeal to the authority of Scripture, and in the
writer's extraordinary familiarity with its contents.Callus
states that his exegesis involved exposition of the Biblical
text with the use of the patristic and mediaeval tradition.
"His chief biblical writings, the exposition on the Pauline
Epistles and on the Psalter, were written in the margin of his
copy of the Gloss, are based on the Gloss, and teem with patris-
tic and mediaeval citations." It can be said that much of the
commentary that we have from the hand of Grosseteste derives
from his interlinear and marginal jottings olaced in the texts
that he studied. His commentaries and treatises originated in
part also from his lectures given during his teaching period and
questions discussed in the schools. Grosseteste's dependence on
authority and tradition is very much in evidence in such works
as his De Libero Arbitrio and his Hexaeroeron. In the latter
especially, there is little that is original ~to Grosseteste.
The Hexaemeron. an extended commentary on the Genesis account of
"^Stevenson, ot>. cit. . p. IS. 2Ibid.. p. 33.
^Callus, "The Oxford Career of Robert Grosseteste," p. 70.
261
the six days of creation, abounds with citations from both the
Latin and Greek fathers. Throughout his writing Grosseteste
shows a high respect and reverence for his fathers in the faith.
Smalley indicates that this raised certain difficulties for
Grosseteste: "Difference of opinion in Greek and Latin tradition,
principally in St. Basil as opposed to St. Augustine, imposed
comparison and discussion. He had strong views of his own on
certain questions and had to reconcile them with his authorities.""*"
However, it can hardly be said that Grossetestefs theological
effort amounts to no more than the writing of commentary on the
Scriptures and other auctoritates along with the compilation
and correlation of the same. In fact, as we shall have occasion
to note, often in the course of writing commentary on a particular
text Grosseteste presents his own theological and metaphysical
views. However, it is not in his commentaries or in his devotional
and moralistic writings that we should expect to find his more
structured and systematically ordered and reasoned theological and
metaphysical formulations.
We find Grosseteste pursuing a more deliberate method and en¬
gaging in more systematic and reasoned theological formulation
in a number of his compact opuscula. his Quaestiones Theologicae.
his De Libero Arbitrio. certain of the Dicta. and in segments of
his Hexaemeron. Callus argues that a number of the opuscula along
with the Quaestiones Theologicae and De Libero Arbitrio are parts
of a Gumma Theologiae or Summa Sententiarum that Grosseteste
-*-Smalley, loc. cit.. p. 79
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planned to write after the pattern of Lombard's Sentences.1
The method that Grosseteste pursues in these treatises should
become rather apparent as we examine his doctrine of truth.
Grosseteste's method includes the frequent citing of auctoritates
and the use of such logical arguments as cited above. Grosse¬
teste is very much interested in seeing how the various doctrines
and beliefs which he adheres to on the basis of auctoritas co¬
here and are interrelated. Grosseteste pursues a method in the
above treatises which could be termed a 'scholastic method' as
the latter is broadly defined and described by Grabmann in his
text on the history of the method.
The opuscula of Grosseteste mentioned above include De
Unica Forma Omnium. De Grdine Emanandi Causatorum a Leo. De
Scientia Dei. De Veritate. De Veritate Prorositionis. and De
Intelligentiis. Callus says of surh treatises: "It is evident
from the treatment of their subject matter that they are theo¬
logical rather than philosophical. Even a cursory inspection
shows that these are not complete treatises, but rather mere
o
fragments, or sections of a larger work." Although they are
possibly part of a larger work, in the form in which they are
extant they could be considered monographs to the extent that
each opusculum deals with a specific topic or subject. Regard¬
ing these treatises of Grosseteste Callus offers the followings




The form in which they came down to us suggests a technique
rather of a treatise, or of questions attached to the lectio.
than of a quaestio disputata. Yet, the structure of the
arguments against and in favour of the thesis, and certain
phrases scattered here and there, which are easily traced,
may possibly hint as disputations. I am inclined to think
that these opuscules were questions raised or disputed orig¬
inally in the course of his theological teaching which
Grosseteste later arranged and set into a definite shape
According to Callus the above observation also applies to the De
Libero Arbitrio and the Quaestiones Theologicae. This observa¬
tion was made in 1945. It is in the essay entitled "The Summa
Theologiae of Robert Grosseteste", which introduces Callus' edition
of the Quaestiones and which was published in 194$, that Callus
argues that these treatises are parts of a Summa Sententiarum or
Summa Theologiae.
However, irrespective of the actual origin or initial form
of the above treatises, the subject matter or content is theologi¬
cal in character and the method is that of seeking to understand
what is held to be true. This method involves the frequent cit¬
ing of authorities, which includes the Scriptures, and the fathers,
plus reasoning based on the ratio or nature of the subject itself.
In De Libero Arbitrio Grosseteste argues that it is certain that
God knows singulars because "Deus est maius, quam quod possit ex-
cogitari."^ In the same work he also cites such authorities as
Seneca and Cicero in order to refute the heathen who put litt-le
stock in the Scriptures. We shall see that Grosseteste's method
■'•Callus, "The Oxford Career of Robert Grosseteste," p. 54.
^De Lib. Arb. 2; BW 157.
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involves not only an explication of the truth itself but also the
drawing of implications and deductions which rightly follow from
the nature of the truth. He repudiates those doctrines and posi¬
tions which are not in agreement with the nature of the truth.
In chapter four reference shall be made to Grosseteste's use of
reductio ad impossibile in the process of falsification. In
arguing that God knows singulars he also states that "si Deus
nesciret singularia, tu multa scires, quae Deus ignoraret. Hoc
autem absurdum est dicere."-'- Grosseteste uses this type of reason¬
ing both in his theology and in his physics. Such reasoning, how¬
ever, is accompanied by auctoritas and experimentum. As Ludwig
Baur states: "Wahrend die Methode der anderen Scholastiker durch
die auctoritas et ratio bestimmt ist, ist es bei Grosseteste
experimentum. ratio and auctoritas, worauf er sich beruft."2
Grosseteste is not at home in the realm of purely formal logical
categories. From time to time he will use a more formal argument
but it is not long and we see him again citing authority, making
an appeal to experience, and seeking a fuller explication and
vision of the truth. In De Libero Arbitrio the point is clearly
made that the divine Nature is not to be considered absolute nor
the divine action simply in terms of potentia. Grosseteste remarks
that such procedures lead to unacceptable predications regarding
1Ibid.: BW 156.
p
Baur, "Das philosophische Lebenswerk des Robert Grosseteste
Bischofs von Lincoln," p. 72.
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the divine Nature and activity. He does not want to expound upon
the latter from the viewpoint of sheer logical or formal necessity
but rather on the basis of what has been accomplished and ordered
by God and the attendant consequent necessity. These categories
will be explored more fully further on. Grosseteste's intention
throughout his intellectual activity is to arrive at a visio or
aspectus of the truth. In this quest the mystical side of his
character is clearly apparent. The latter is also evident from
Grosseteste's preoccupation with both spiritual and corporeal
light.
Grosseteste offers us no grand and comprehensive intellectual
system or synthesis. In the first place it could be said that
such a system does not seem to be altogether in keeping with
Grosseteste's temperament, method, and intellectual posture. The
writings of Grosseteste do not lead one to believe that he was
particularly interested in the development of a unified compre¬
hensive theological or metaphysical system. This is not to say
that he has not given us any systematic treatises. His monographs
in the fields of theology, metaphysics, and physics do deal with
specific motifs in an ordered and integrated fashion. Such trea¬
tises as De Artibus Liberalibus. De Veritate, De Luce, De Unica
Forma Omnium, and De Libero Arbitrio could be included in such
a category. It is also said of the Hexaemeron that "it is a
systematic and elaborate commentary on the Six Davs of Creation,
not a set of notes or marginal jottings.In the realm of
■^■Callus, "The Oxford Career of Robert Grosseteste," p. 57
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physics and astronomy such treatises as De Cometis, De Calore
Solis. De Colore, and De Generatione Sonorum are pretty much
restricted to an orderly discussion of the designated subjects.
Grosseteste's commentaries, however, are more diffuse, extensive,
and less compact. This includes his commentary on Aristotle's
Posterior Analytics. In this commentary there is not only the
setting forth of methodological principles such as the mode of
acquiring the experimental universal and demonstration, but also
discussion of general epistemological questions, the ordering of
the sciences, light metaphysics, and natural or physical phenomena-.
The multifarious and fragmentary character of Grosseteste's
literary output could possibly mislead one into assuming that he
consequently must have held a fragmentary and disjointed view of
reality and the cosmos. The closely knit treatise De Luce in
itself is clear evidence that such is not the case. Upon exam¬
ination of a number of Grosseteste's writings one can discern
behind them something in the nature of a Weltanschauung. The
commentary on the Posterior Analytics plainly shows that Gros¬
seteste does not consider one particular subject or facet of
reality in isolation from the rest. At the same time he stresses
the need for modes of cognition appropriate to different levels
and facets of reality. Such is particularly needful because of
man's present predicament which does not permit a clear and
unobstructed view of the totality of the truth. Hence the need
of sense experience as an important step in acquiring knowledge
of incorporeal truth. Multiple sources and modes of knowledge
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do not, however, preclude the possibility of a single unified
vision of the truth. One may therefore raise the question as to
why he does not delineate such a vision in the form of a com¬
plete rational system.
Although Grosseteste is certainly no metaphysical monist,
a position precluded at the outset by his strong belief in crea¬
tion, there is an adequate foundation in his conceptions of God,
truth, and the cosmos to provide for the formulation of a compre¬
hensive intellectual system. Such conceptions include his belief
in the radical oneness and utter simplicity of God, divine crea¬
tion, the manifold relations between the supreme Truth and created
truth, and the unity of the natural order founded upon light as
the first corporeal form. Baur speaks of the place of corporeal
light in Grosseteste's natural philosophy: "Es ist das Prinzip
der Einheit der Natur."!
There appears to be a number of factors which could be used
to account for the absence of such a system. It could be argued
that the press of manifold duties and varied scholarly pursuits
did not allow sufficient time for the formulation of such a
system. It can rightly be asserted that Grosseteste was more of
an encyclopaedic scholar than a systematic thinker. As Stevenson
says: "In the domain of intellectual activity Grosseteste must,
^"Baur, "Das Licht in der Naturphilosophie des Robert Grosse¬
teste," Abhandluneen Aus Pern Bebiete Der Philosophie und Ihrer
Gesch.ichte Eine Festgabe Zum 70. Geburtstag Georg Freiherrn von
Hertling (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshandlung. 1913),
p. 52.
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as will be shown, be regarded as the founder and inspirer of
what may be termed the encyclopaedic school of the thirteenth
century. . . .It may also be said that the vast amount of new
sources and material introduced in the twelfth century had to be
assimilated and digested before constructive synthesis and syste-
s
mati^ation could be effected. It is true that Grosseteste de¬
voted much of his energy and time to the translation and inter¬
pretation of such material. However, in view of Grossetestefs
doctrinal stance and teaching it seems unlikely that he would have
had to await the completion of such assimilation before initiating
the formulation of a comprehensive system. His thought indicates
that he was selective and quite critical in his reception of the
new material. This is clearly evident in his attitude to a great
bulk of the Aristotelian corpus. Grosseteste was clearly a con¬
servative Augustinian in this respect.
In addition to the possible reasons cited above, I believe
that Grosseteste did not feel greatly compelled towards develop¬
ing and articulating a system because of his doctrine of truth
which lessened or reduced both the need and the possibility of
a comprehensive intellectual system. Grosseteste, in the first
place, believed that the basic and primarj^ referent of ftruth'
was the being of God and the being of created entities. Intel¬
lectual and logical or prepositional truth also had their own
particular degree of being but were altogether subordinate ana
^"Stevenson, op. cit.. p. 23.
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inferior to the prior truth of God and res. Coherent and in¬
telligible structures of being were present and existent in God
and the created order, and between God and the created order by-
virtue of creation and exemplarism. Grosseteste believed that
there was a radical coherence and symmetry deeply imbedded within
the created order. This order was grounded in the eternal
rationes spoken by God.
It appears that Grosseteste would have felt a greater com¬
pulsion and need to formulate a comprehensive intellectual system
if he had understood truth to be primarily intellectual or logi¬
cal. St. Thomas, who also thought of truth as the being of God
and the created order and who also taught an exemplarism, believed
that truth was primarily that which resides in the intellect.
Gilson says that for St. Thomas "truth, in the full and proper
sense of the term, is found in thought alone; for truth lies in
the adequation of thing and intellect."1 Consequently, it would
seem reasonable to conclude that for St." Thomas it was highly
imperative that an intellectual synthesis and coherent intellec¬
tual system be constructed. Coherence had to be realized on the
level of human intellection and therefore on the level of propo-
sitional truth as well. There were, of course, other factors
which motivated St. Thomas, one of which was the challenge pre¬
sented by the 'purist' philosophers in the arts faculty at Paris.
^Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 235.
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Grosseteste, although he too would admit that human intellectual
truth should mirror the ratio and coherence of ontological truth,
did not share with St. Thomas this sense of urgency in construct¬
ing a coherent system. It seems therefore that Grosseteste was
more free to be diffuse and fragmentary in his approach to onto¬
logical truth and to be less concerned about tying the loose
ends together on the intellectual and propositional levels. Gros-
seteste's intellectual stance and doctrine of truth granted him
the freedom to engage in varied and penetrating probes into a
rather wide range of subjects.
Nevertheless, on the basis of Grosseteste's doctrine of
truth a symmetry and a coherence in the areas of thought and log¬
ical formulation could be expected to emerge. Although a coherent
vision or view of reality is discernible within the varied and
extensive literary production of Grosseteste, there is no pronounced
and deliberate effort to construct an elaborate system in the
form of something comparable to a magnum opus. Assuming that for
Grosseteste there is no pressing need for the formulation of such
a system, the question yet to be answered is whether such would
even be possible.
It is certainly clear from Grossetestefs thought that such
a task or project is beset by a number of difficulties. We can
only briefly cite some of the obstacles which block the path to
such a system. They pertain both to the very nature of the truth
and the condition of the human being as a knowing subject. The
ineffable grandeur of the supreme Truth does not permit an easy
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and ready formulation. The perfection, absolute simplicity, and
eternity of the supreme Truth will be viewed by the purified
human soul in heaven, but it can not be perceived by the unpuri-
fied human soul and much less expressed by such in terms of a
system. God is that supreme Light which lies beyond human com¬
prehension and expression. Man must therefore begin with faith
in or assent to the teachings of the Holy Scripture if there is
to follow the visio of the Creator and Redeemer which is eternal
life and true blessedness. In addition to the greatness of God
there is the impurity of the human soul and the feeble character
of human speech. With respect to human speech about God, Gros-
seteste states: "De re enim tanta nihil verum potest esse parvum,
licet parvitate dicentis possit esse non granditer dictum et pro
parvitate nostri dicentis non possit esse granditer elocutum."1
He also makes it clear that we cannot use language in a univocal
fashion when applying the same words to both God and his crea¬
tures. Even created truth, which is also intelligible, is often
beyond the grasp of the human intellect because the latter is so
bound up with corporeal phantasms and cannot proceed beyond the
sensible to the intelligible. Grosseteste also teaches that the
"mentis aspectus" is not able "superius ascendere quam ascendat
2
eius affectus vel appetitus." This is the affectus-aspectus
doctrine and it occupies an important place in his epistemology.
-*-De Unica Forma Omnium: BW 106.
^Comm. Phvs. VIII; Dales 147.
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The mind and the will cannot function independently of each other
but are closely interrelated. This has particular significance
in connection with knowledge of the supreme Truth. Reference was
made above to the three causes of error cited by Grosseteste in
his treatise on the liberal arts. One of these is the mentis
affectus that is not rightly ordered. In his commentary on the
Posterior Analytics Grosseteste asserts that errors can arise
from confusing different sciences and directing questions to a
science that are inappropriate. In the same commentary Grosse¬
teste states that when the senses are deficient, cognition of
the universal is also adversely affected. It is because of such
difficulties that a clear and complete vision of the truth is
not readily achieved. However, it should also be added that the
full and clear vision of the truth belongs only to the purified
soul in heaven. Supposing that such a vision of the totality
of truth were a present reality, it still is difficult to imagine
how it could be expressed or formulated in terms of a comprehen¬
sive rational system.
(1.2) The development of natural philosophy or physics in relation
to theology and metaphysics
In the twelfth century we observe a growing interest in phy¬
sics or natural philosophy, exemplified by the school of Chartres
and later by Oxford. One should really speak of the growth of
metaphysics at Chartres, partly because of the areas of special
interest, cosmogony and cosmology, and also because of the spec-
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ulative and rational methods employed. This school was strongly
influenced by Platonism and the Timaeus was utilized to a great
extent in their cosmological speculation. Rather than the juxta¬
position of a physical or natural science over against the Genesis
record of creation we find a Platonist influenced speculative or
metaphysical cosmogony and cosmology-. Leff says of the work of
Bernard of Silvestris entitled De mundi universitate sive mega-
cosmos et microoosmus: "This is so much the product of Plato's
Timaeus that it is hard to see its immediate bearing upon Chris¬
tianity."-*- What is of special interest at this juncture is not
this speculative metaphysics but the new posture assumed by merri-
at
bers of this school in relation to both the divine act*creation
and the created natural or physical order. Their purpose was to
set forth rational and physical explanations of the divine act
of creation and the nature and causes of created physical entities.
Members of the school were turning their attention to secondary
causes and principles that were immanent in the created natural
order. Prior to this time mediaeval religious thinkers followed
by and large the precedent set by St. Augustine in his desire to
know God and the soul, with little attention being given to the
created natural or physical order. However, it would certainly
be wrong to say that the material creation was without value in
the eyes of St. Augustine. The entire created order was valuable
just by virtue of the fact that it was created by God. This order
-'-Leff, op. cit., p. 120.
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also had revelatory significance as a symbol and reflection of
the eternal immutable Truth. As A. C. Crombie says:
The encouragement of a rational inquiry into the nature of
things had been implicit in St. Augustine's rational theology,
which had long predisposed Western Christendom to value the
natural world as sacramental and symbolic of spiritual
truths.1
The human soul occupied the pre-eminent place within this sacra¬
mental created order, for within the soul we have the reflection
of the Trinity. What was lacking was an investigation into the
material world for the purpose of better understanding that world
in its own right.
While it certainly would be wrong to assert categorically
that it was simply Greek philosophy, particularly Platonism,
which hindered the growth of natural philosophy in the early me¬
diaeval period, Platonism in the form of Neoplatonism contributed
greatly to the notion that the primary value of the material world
was that it symbolized eternal and spiritual truths and ideas.
There were, of course, also religious and historical factors which
inhibited the growth of natural science, such as the concern and
preoccupation with the salvation of souls and with the preserva¬
tion of the Christian faith and tradition. Kneale is therefore
partially right in asserting:
The chief obstacle to steady scientific progress was not the
influence of Aristotelian logic or anything else derived
1A. C. Crombie, Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Exper¬
imental Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 61. This
title will hereafter have the abbreviated form Robert Grosseteste.
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from Greece, but a lack of sustained curiosity about things
which were not mentioned by ancient authors and did not
appear to contribute in any way to salvation.!
This lack of curiosity, however, must be attributed in part to
the impact and influence of the Greek conception of the sensible
material world in which the material world was considered to be
most inferior to the spiritual or ideal world and to a certain
extent unreal. On the other hand, the degree of value that was
attributed to this world was in large part due to the Christian
doctrine of creation. Moreover, the conception of the created
order as symbolic of spiritual truth did have a positive affect
on the growth of natural science in that it directed men's minds
to seek to know God in and through created things. This can
rightly be considered one of the prime factors motivating those
within the Augustinian tradition, such as those at Chartres, to
investigate more fully both the nature of the act of creation
and created entities themselves. Concerning this, R. McKeon
states:
Significantly, too, the interest in mathematics and the
beginnings of science at Chartres and Oxford were connected
with augustinianism, for mathematics shows forth the eter¬
nal structure of things, and the knowledge of things con¬
ceived in their changeless natures must further the knowl¬
edge of God.^
The Platonist stress on mathematics in coming to know such
natures was a most significant methodological contribution to
!w. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, p. 241.
2
McKeon, op. cit. . p. xi.
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the growth of natural science. The pursuit of such science was
also motivated by practical, mechanical, and technical problems
faced in the twelfth century which up to this time had been dealt
with in a trial and error fashion. Crombie asserts that "in the
Middle Ages there is much evidence to show that by the time of
Robert Grosseteste, in the early thirteenth century, scholars
had long been interested in practical scientific problems.The
Greek and Arabic scientific treatises which were in process of
translation in the twelfth century also prompted further inquiry
in the realm of physics or natural philosophy. However, what
was required if there was to be further progress in this area
was a clarification of the different categories of causes and
the development of a method whereby efficient and material causes
could be ascertained. An experimental method had to be developed
so that proposed theories and hypotheses could be tested. We
shall take note of Grosseteste's contribution to the development
of such a method. There was also the need to utilize properly
both induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis. Further¬
more, there had to be a more critical delineation of the different
disciplines and sciences and the ways in which they are interre¬
lated.
At this juncture, we can do no more than cite some of the
developments that contributed to the growth of natural science
and a scientific method in particular. The introduction of the
^Crombie, Robert Grosseteste, p. 1$.
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new Aristotle, especially the Posterior Analytics and the Physics.
provided substantial impetus in the development of a scientific
methodology. These treatises stressed the need for knowing the
cause of the observed fact and the need for the clarification of
causes. It does seem, however, that too much was expected from
the formal cause and knowledge of the same. One of Grosseteste's
contributions in this area was to stress the importance of know¬
ing efficient and material causes. He gave minimal attention in
his physical science to final causes. He relied more on other
viae cognoscendi for knowledge of the final causes, particularly
with respect to the final causes of physical entities made by
the supreme Truth. Final causes of human artifacts were to be
found in the artisan and in the manifest function of the object
made. Grosseteste did not believe that the composite creaturely
res was the most productive source of knowledge of the second
plentitude of being or final cause.
Part of the deficiency of Greek physical science was due
to the inordinate stress on deductive demonstrations founded on
geometry as the determinative model science. Aristotle's over¬
riding preoccupation with the syllogistic form of reasoning and
the logic of terms can be said to have hindered somewhat the
development of a truly scientific methodology. The extensive
application of syllogistic reasoning in natural science tended
to blur the distinction between formal or logical necessity and
material or real necessity. It could be asserted that natural
regularity was therefore transformed into the category of logical
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necessity except that logical necessity was itself grounded upon
a real or material necessity and necessary definitions. The
demonstrative syllogism also tended to give the impression that
a greater certainty and actual proof had been achieved whereas
it was simply drawing out what was already implicit and intended
in the major premise. Some confusion also arises where Aristotle
speaks of the cause of a particular effect or attribute as a
middle term. He is really after the formal cause which would
account for the inherence of an attribute in a particular sub¬
stance. In spite of these restrictions and difficulties the
Posterior Analytics of Aristotle did provide needed impetus by
stressing the need for ascertaining causes and the propter quid
of that which is observed as fact. What was required was
greater emphasis on modal logic, the logic of propositions as
set forth in Stoic logic, and the fact of contingency. Grosse-
teste's use of the modus ponendo ponens and modus tollendo
tollens modes of argument is an example of the use of non-syllog¬
istic modes of reasoning. Kneale points out that these argu¬
ments were set forth by Aristotle in his Prior Analytics but
"he did not, so far as we know, succeed in giving a formal
analysis of any of them."-'- Neither does Aristotle use the nomen¬
clature by which they were later known. In speaking of the con¬
tribution of Greek science it is important to keep in mind both
the negative and positive effects, both its assets and liabilities.
-^"Kneale, op, cit. , p. 99.
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A. C. Crombie remarks that "Greek science, in fact, was and re¬
mained rather a science of demonstrative proof than a science of
inductive and experimental investigation.
In addition to those already mentioned, there were other
factors which contributed to the growth of physical science dur¬
ing the time of Grosseteste. There was increased emphasis on
the quadrivium and the role of mathematics in ascertaining phy¬
sical causes. In connection with this point R. McKeon makes this
significant observation:
And whereas philosophers in the earlier ©ugustinian tradition
found philosophy almost entire in the discovery of God at the
center of all things. Grosseteste seeking to develop the
consequences of that philosophy hit upon mathematics as the
perfect dialectical instrument for its development; the
effect of the application of mathematics was so to turn the
search for God in things to the elucidation of things, that
the inquiry for God was to inspire the first systematic
experimental investigation of things.^
This brings to mind another significant development in this
period which contributed to the growth of physical science,
namely, the increased interest in the classification of know¬
ledge and the ordering of the various disciplines or sciences.
What is of special significance is that this classification was
conducted not only on the basis of subject matter and aims but
more and more on the basis of the different methods of study
and investigation used. There was also increased interest in the
■^■Crombie, Robert Grosseteste. pp. 6-7.
^McKeon, op. cit., p. 262.
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manner in which the various sciences and disciplines are inter¬
related. In the twelfth century, the emphasis was initially
upon the liberal arts, how they are to be studied and their pur¬
pose. Two representative works devoted to this were Thierry of
Chartres' Heptateuchon and Hugh of St. Victor's Didascalion.
Later the emphasis shifted to the mapping out of the different
areas of philosophy and the relating of these areas to such dis¬
ciplines as mathematica and theology. The De Divlsione Philos-
ophiae of Dominic Gundisalvi is a representative work on such a
classification. The real problem was in finding the rubric or
guiding principle in terms of which the ordering of the sciences
could be achieved. The traditional Aristotelian classification
into theoretical, practical, and productive sciences is based
on their respective aims or purposes. The theoretical sciences
are subdivided in a somewhat confused fashion on the basis of
change or movement, modes of existence, and whether they deal
with the sensible or insensible, matter or form. The demarca¬
tion is not always clear. As David Ross says: "It cannot be said
that in practice the distinction between physics and metaphysics
is well maintained by Aristotle, and it may be noted that the
bulk of the Physics is what we should call metaphysics."-'- What
was lacking was the development and delineation of different
methods or approaches derived from and based on a critical divi¬
sion of the entities and phenomena to be examined and investi¬
gated. What was needed was a less formal and abstract clsLSsifi-
-k). Ross, Aristotle, p. 157.
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cation with greater attention being directed to the nature of
that which is studied and the method whereby it should be inves¬
tigated. Crombie speaks of the Greek lack of sensitivity re¬
specting method:
Perhaps because for the Greeks this distinction between
science and metaphysics was one between two worlds or two
kinds of subject matter, they did not adequately consider
some fundamental methodological problems involved in the
method of experimental verification on which the distinction
was by implication based.1
It cannot be said, however, that the Greeks had no concern for
method and approached each and every subject in the very same
way. For example, the sensible and intelligible could not be
perceived in one and the same manner. Nevertheless, a lack of
methodological sensitivity is apparent in the widespread and
almost indiscriminate application of a priori arguments and
geometrical proof in scientific demonstration. This is evident
where Aristotle states that geometry can provide the causes and
reasons for facts observed in the field of optics.2
Although Grosseteste did not undertake a systematic ordering
of the sciences and the parts of philosophy, he is concerned
throughout his varied activity with the manner in which one is
to proceed in particular disciplines and how the latter are
interrelated. Let us consider briefly how Grosseteste views
these interrelationships.
■^Crombie, Robert Grosseteste. p. 6.
^Posterior Analytics I.13.
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(1.3) Grosseteste's teaching on the manner in which the various
sciences and disciplines are interrelated
On the basis of his theology and doctrine of truth one would
have every reason to suspect that Grosseteste would be concerned
about the connexions between the different areas of knowledge.
At the same time, it should be pointed out that he was very much
cognizant of the profound differences present in the structure
of truth. There was the immense gulf between Creator and crea¬
tion and a hierarchy of being and truth within the created order.
Because of such differences and the condition of the human soul
one had to pursue different courses in the acquisition of dif¬
ferent kinds of knowledge. This did not mean, however, that a
particular science could be explored in isolation from the rest.
To the contrary, theology could be of service to natural science
and vice versa. On the basis of his doctrine of light Grosse¬
teste stressed the fundamental role of optics in the realm of
natural science. Concerning astronomy Grosseteste states that
"astronomiae ministerio plus ceteris eget philosophia naturalis.
We noted above that the seven liberal arts are attendants or
servants of natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and theology.
Grosseteste says of geometry in particular: "His igitur regulis
et radicibus et fundamentis datis ex potestate geometriae, dili-
gens inspector in rebus naturalibus potest dare causas omnium
effectuum naturalium per hanc viam." Grosseteste, however,
-^De Art. Lib.; BW 5. ^De Natura Locorum; BW 65-66.
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takes care to point out that geometry cannot provide the actual
physical cause of the reflection of light and the equality of
the angle of incidence and reflection.! Geometry helps us in
the formal description of such phenomena. In discussing subal-
ternating and subaltern sciences, which is the relationship that
prevails between metaphysics and physics, geometry in relation
to optics, and astronomy in relation to mathematical astronomy,
Grosseteste points out that in the subaltern sciences are to be
found conditions or circumstances which are not accounted for
by the subalternating science. It is for this reason that the
subalternating science cannot of itself demonstrate and provide
the actual natural causes of phenomena belonging to the subal¬
tern science. He says of metaphysics in relation to physics:
"Similiter a natura entis quod est subiectum metaphysicae non
exit totaliter quod dico corpus mobile quod est subiectum
physicae. . . ." Sciences may share in common principles from
which demonstration proceeds but this does not mean that they
share in common subject and attributes to be demonstrated. It
^Comm. Post. 1.3 (Venetiis, 1552), f. 9. Reference is here
made to book and chapter of Grosseteste's commentary on Aristotle's
Posterior Analytics. As indicated, the 1552 Venice edition, an
early printed edition, is being used. The above and subsequent
folio numbers refer to this edition. At the beginning of Liber
Primus of Grosseteste's commentary we find the following: Divi
Roberti Linconiensis Archieoiscopi Parisiensis, in Aristotelis
Posteriorum Analiticoru Libros, Elegantissima commentaria Felic-
iter incipiunt. The text that I have read and examined is in the
Bodleian Library, Oxford.
2Ibid. 1.13; f. 24.
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is stated that "non enim est subiectum musicae numerus cui ac-
cidit relatio, sed compositum ex numero et relatione, et de hoc
composito quia non praedicatur numerus par non praedicatur de
suo toto."-'- This is an important methodological distinction.
This is a qualification that must be kept in mind when speaking
of Grosseteste's use of arithmetic and geometry in natural
philosophy.
Three areas of special interest to Grosseteste were the
study of the Sacred Scriptures, natural sciences, and languages.
Russell states that "by the end of his career Grosseteste had
become famous for emphasizing the importance of the study of
three subjects as a part of theological training: the Bible, the
language in which the Bible was written (Greek, Hebrew), and the
sciences.The emphasis on language study follows from Grosse-
teste's concern to get back to the sources. While bishop of
Lincoln he was engaged in the translation of a number of Greek
sources into Latin. .The study of the natural sciences was an
important prerequisite to theology and the study of the Scrip¬
tures in that it enabled the student of the Scriptures to under¬
stand the many allusions made in Scripture to natural phenomena.
In a scientific homily on Ecclesiaticus XLIII: 1-5 entitles De
Operacionibus Solis Grosseteste utilizes metaphysical and physi¬
cal theory in explicating the text. Grosseteste attempts to
give a type of scientific explanation to a rather poetic descrip¬
tion of the sun. He takes that part which states that "a man
^Ibid.. 1.12; f. 15. ^Russell, loc. cit.. p. 94.
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blowing a furnace is in works of heat, but the sun burneth the
mountains three times more. . . V1 He then goes on to say that
the earth is like a furnace because of the eruptions from within..
He seeks to give a quasi scientific explanation of why it is
that the sun burns the mountains three times more than the rest
of the terrain. He takes literally and at face value what is
intended to be figurative expression. The text is also being
used as a basis for physical theory. He also explains how
mountains are formed by the sun heating vapors within the earth.
Grosseteste teaches that in understanding and observing the sun
we see how great is the Creator of the sun. D. A. Callus cites
Grosseteste's reason for including two chapters pertaining to
the seas and the winds in his recension of John of Dasmascus'
De Fide Qrthodoxa:
They were omitted [he says] because some might, perhaps,
have thought that such questions on seas and winds were not
matters of great relevance for theology. Nevertheless,
truly wise men know for certain that every glimpse of truth
is useful for the interpretation and understanding of
theology.^
These chapters were interpolated into the text at a later date
but Grosseteste's reason for including them clearly indicates
the importance that he attached to the knowledge of physical
phenomena in connection with theology. It appears that Grosse-
^Ecclesiasticus 43:4.
^Mss. Pembroke College, fol. 3rlD; Ashmole, fol. 135va; Royal
5 C. iv, fol. 93VD; cited by Callus, "Robert Grosseteste as
Scholar," p. 50.
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teste stresses the study of physical science not for the purpose
of constructing a natural theology but more for the purpose of
extolling the greatness of God through an understanding of the
works of creation. Richard C. Dales says:
Robert always insisted that before one could understand
adequately the meaning of scripture, he must first have a
correct knowledge of the things of which scripture speaks.
The study of nature is the study of God's creation and is
therefore worthwhile. While physics and theology are two
distinct sciences, nevertheless theological points are often
illuminated by a correct knowledge of the natural world, and
our ability to attain a correct knowledge of the natural
world is dependent on cur theological views.1
It must also be kept in mind, however, that behind Grosse-
teste's interest in physical science lies his doctrine of exem-
plarism and the notion that the created order reflects or mirrors
divine Truth. Grosseteste believed that an understanding of
natural phenomena could only serve our understanding of the nature
of God. Grosseteste®s preoccupation with light as the first cor¬
poreal form, as a connecting link between the human and body, as
a principle of knowledge, and as a ground of the being and the
beauty of corporeal entities, must be seen in relation to his
emphasis on spiritual light, illumination, and the first light
which is God. It is not difficult to understand why Grosseteste
was so interested in optics and considered it to be a fundamental
physical science. Baur states that "das licht ist ihm gleichsam
der Schlussel, mit dem er alle Ratsel der Natur zu enthullen
hofft, das durchgreifende Seins- und Erklarungsprinzip fur alle
^Dales, "Introduction," op. cit.. p. xx.
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Erscheinungen der Natur."-*- In his light metaphysic Grosseteste
clearly manifests his mystical bent. It must be pointed out,
however, that only through divine illumination and grace can man
view that Truth which is above and in which the eternal rationes
of created things exist.
On the basis of those facets of Grossetestefs thought cited
above, a number of which will be explored more fully in this
chapter and chapter four, it is evident that he was not only
interested in a considerable number of disciplines and sciences
but also in the different ways in which they are interrelated.
Near the beginning of this chapter we noted that Grosseteste was
simultaneously interested in a number of subjects and branches
of study. We cited Grosseteste's treatise on the seven arts in
which he states that they are servants of such major disciplines
as moral and natural philosophy. Furthermore, there is also the
distinction between the subalternating sciences and the subaltern
sciences. Grosseteste generally considered and pursued a par¬
ticular discipline in view of and in relation to other disci¬
plines. He believed that different sciences and disciplines,
for example, physics and theology, could reciprocate and be of
mutual.service. Grosseteste's doctrine of truth is to a consid¬
erable extent mirrored in his ordering of the various disciplines
and sciences. We shall therefore be in a better position to
Baur, "Das Licht in der Naturphilosophie des Robert
Grosseteste," p0 42.
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understand this ordering after having examined his doctrine of
truth. Throughout all of his intellectual activity Grosseteste's
ultimate goal is to achieve a visio of his Creator and Redeemer.
Another factor merely intimated in this introduction, one
that will be examined further later on, is that Grosseteste did
not utilize one and the same method throughout all of his intel¬
lectual pursuits. In the formulation of his theological notions
he relied heavily on aurtoritas and used rational or logical
arguments where he considered them to be appropriate. When
dealing with historical issues and questions he investigated the
pertinent sources and texts. Although Grosseteste did cite and
utilize auctoritates in pursuing physics and natural philosophy,
he places considerable stress on logical arguments, both induc¬
tive and deductive, on deliberate observation, and on experi¬
mentum. Whereas in his theological treatises and formulations
Grosseteste is generally content and willing to buttress his
position and rest his case on certain auctoritates cited, plus
an argument here and there, in his formulation of physical
theory and a scientific methodology he takes a more independent
course and stresses observation and exrerimentum. Although
Grosseteste derives a great deal from Aristotle's Posterior
Analytics in seeking to develop his own method, at certain points
in his physical theory and method Grosseteste strongly disagrees
with Aristotle's views. In such instances Grosseteste will be
seen to base his case on one or more, usually more than one, of
2S9
the following: auctoritates. logical arguments, his own obser¬
vations, and experimentum.
2. Analysis of terminology used by Grosseteste in his doctrine
of truth
In the first section of this chapter we have considered some
of the historical, biographical, intellectual, and methodological
factors that contributed to the shaping of Grosseteste's thought
and his doctrine of truth in particular. The intention was not
to trace out all of the numerous sources upon which Grosseteste
draws in formulating his own thought. Our purpose was less
ambitious than that. The intention was to cite some of the
major trends, motifs, and developments transpiring before and
during Grosseteste's time, and especially to note where Grosse¬
teste stood in relation to the former. As we proceed, Grosse¬
teste ?s intellectual and spiritual stance or posture should
become more apparent. It should become evident which factors
had the most determinative and formative impact on Grosseteste.
However, it should be pointed out that our primary concern is
not to trace out and detect GrossetesteTs sources but to examine
Grosseteste*s own formulations, notions, and emphases. Although
Grosseteste stands squarely within the Augustinian tradition his
thought has its own uniqueness and special qualities. Some of
these qualities should become apparent.
In this chapter we shall be examining the various component
parts of Grossetestefs doctrine of truth. This means that we
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shall be dealing with his doctrine of God, his conception of
being, his view of created res, and his ideas concerning logical
truth. This means that we must also explore his beliefs regard¬
ing necessity, contingency, mutability, causality, etc. It
must also be kept in mind that for Grosseteste all of these
topics or themes are interrelated. Moreover, oftentimes one
particular topic or issue is discussed in a number of different
places. Therefore, we have had to examine a number of treatises
besides his De Veritate treatise. Before we consider Grosse¬
teste 's doctrine of God, the supreme Truth, we shall conduct a
kind of formal analysis of the terminology that he uses. Such
as analysis, although hardly adequate in itself, will tell us a
great deal about the fundamental character of Grosseteste's
understanding of truth.
(2.1) "Veritas*: equivalents, cognate terms, and signification
Formal equivalents used by Grosseteste in place of "Veritas"
gather around a few key terms or phrases. These words used by
Grosseteste are certainly not new with him but he does bring them
together into a structured and coherent treatment. Borrowing from
Augustine, we find Grosseteste speaking of "Veritas" as "id quod
estj' This is the equivalent that Augustine employs in Soliloquia
II.5.& and in other places as noted in the chapter above. 'Id
quod est' raises immediately the whole question of
1De Ver.: BW 130.
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being and the relation of being to truth. This shall be dis¬
cussed later but it can be said at this point that in Grcsse-
teste this is no univocal phrase and no ontologism is implied.
On the other hand, 'id quod est' has reference to something be¬
yond a Wittgensteinian "states of affairs" (Tractatus. 2.11),
or what Heidegger would call Vorhandenheit. We shall see that
there is an extended range of application of 'id quod est* which
can at no point be considered apart from the other equivalents
of 'veritas.1. In his commentary on the Posterior Analytics
Grosseteste uses the same equivalent: "Cum autem Veritas sit
illud quod est, & [sic^/eomprehensio veritatis sit comprehensio
eius quod est, . . . ." Here we notice then a very close alli¬
ance between 'being' and 'truth'. Grosseteste will emphasize
that 'ens' and 'Veritas' cannot be applied to particulars with¬
out diversity in 'intentio'. He is also concerned to guard
against equivocation and sheer ambiquity. Not only is 'veritas'
understood as 'illud quod est' but Grosseteste draws from
Augustine the sense that truth is that "quae ostendit id quod
est."^ Here 'veritas' signifies a being or entity in terms of
its disclosing or showing forth its being and possibly also the
being of other entities. This means that 'id quod est' shows
itself as such and can be seen to be such. Such truth, as a
•^-Cornm. Post. 1.2; f. 3.
^De Vera Relic. 36.66; CCSL 32:230.
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kind of bringing into view, varies of course, depending on the
particular application.
In this area of usage Grosseteste also speaks of 'veritas'
as "rei entitas."3 Here Grosseteste has in mind the entity it¬
self, the very being of the thing itself. The 'rei entitas' in¬
volves within itself the notions of 'esse ' * 'essentia', 'verum',
'ratio', and the like. In Pe libera Arbitrio Grcsseteste says
2
that "idem Veritas et entitas," Although they are used inter¬
changeably, 'Veritas', when applied to a being, stresses rela¬
tions and emphases not so explicit in 'entitas'. It must be
said at this point that neither Augustine nor Grosseteste is
interested in 'being' per se and therefore is not to be considered
as an ontologist in that sense. Because we are employing a for¬
mal analysis of the words themselves used by Grosseteste, it must
not be thought that he used such a method. Other equivalents
allied to the above are such as "rationes aeternas rerum"3 and
"rationes rerum increatas."^ "Ratio rei aeterna"-' is also used
closely in conjunction with 'veritas' and 'verum' and serves to
show how these terms are bound up with 'rei entitas'. Here
'ratio' signifies the ultimate ground of created res. viz., the
eternal exemplars spoken by God. The sense of 'ratio' here is
similar to what Anselm intended when he said in the Commendatio
1De Ver.: BW 130. 2Be Lib. Arb. 6; BW I8d.
3Ibid.: BW 191. 4Comm. Post. 1.7; f.S.
5Pe Ver.; BW 137.
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of the Cur Feus Homo that "veritatis ratio tarn ampla tamque pro¬
funda est, ut a mortalibus nequeat exhauriri; . . . . As
Earth has indicated in his study of Anselm, this is the key
'ratio' for Anselm, although Anselm does use 'ratio1 in other
ways. So also in Grosseteste, the primary sense of 'ratio' is
that mentioned above and it transcends the human intellectus.
In Grosseteste's thought, then, it is the 'rationes aeternae'
which are pre-eminent although it must be said at the same time
that he speaks of knowing such as the essence of color "non
solum ratione, verum etiam experimento manifestum est his. . . .
However, this latter 'ratio' is very dependent on the former.
'Veritas', in reference to created res, has also "plenum esse
primum" and "essendi plenitudo"^ as equivalents. Here again we
note the proximity of 'Veritas' to 'esse'. These above words
and phrases are not to be considered apart from those to be
given below inasmuch as they are all closely interrelated.
The above terms, however, give us an idea of some of the major
senses of 'veritas' in Grosseteste's thought.
Another word that appears repeatedly in the De Veritate
treatise as an equivalent for 'veritas' is the term "adaequa-
tio."^ This term of course is found in the traditional defini¬
tion of truth as 'adaequatio rei et intellectus'. which St.
Thomas wrongly attributed to the Definitionibus of Isaac Israeli
^•Cur Deus Homo. Commendatio: AO 11:40. ^Ee Colore; BW 79
3Pe Ver.: BW 135. 4Ibid.: BW 130,134.
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J. Karitain cites the work of P. Muckle which indirates that
the definition does not come from Isaac Israeli. "Transmitted
by some compiler or other, it must be regarded as being much
older and was in any case prepared for by Aristotle. It will
become apparent, however, that Grosseteste doesn't simply use
this most significant word 'adaequatio' in the customary fashion.
It will be adapted to fit into his theological framework.
Richard McKeon gives the following definition of adaequatio:
Adaequatio, adequation, commensuration. the identity of two
quantities or the motion and approach to identity of quan¬
tity, as the commensuration of space and the thing in space;
thence any approach to equality, as opposed to assimilation
or approach to likeness; thus truth is the adequation of
thing and understanding.2
Grosseteste's usage of 'adaequatio' will be seen not to be in
terms of such "identity of quantity" but ae conformity between
sermo and res. The words we are now citing signify 'relation¬
ships' and related Qualities' rather than just esse and entitas.
Another word very much like 'adaeouatio' that is used by Grosse¬
teste is " coequatio," ^ which is more expressive yet than ' adae¬
ouatio '. "Nunc autem supponamus quod Veritas est coequatio re-
rum et intellectuum."^
Other words that also stress the idea of relationship and
"®"J. Maritain, The Decrees of Knowledge (London: Geoffrey
Bles, The Centenary tress, 1937), p. 106, n.l.
2
R. McKeon, Selections From Medieval Philosophers. Vol. II
(London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 193D, p. 427.
•^Quaest. Theol. [ilj; Callus 203. ^Ibid.
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corresptftdence are "confcrmitas" and the adjective "conforms."^
Similar in terms of sense are the words "similitudo" and "simi-
lis," which again stress the element of relation.2 These notions
of likeness and similitude not only characterize the sense of
Veritas in the thought of Grosseteste, but they are also indica¬
tive of the nature of his mundus and man's place within it and
the whole in relation to the supreme Truth. The title of a brief
opusculum clearly gives evidence of this, Quod homo sit minor
mundus. Here is an attempt to think of similitude spatially and
in terms of the elements.
Another equivalent of 'veritas' that is of considerable in¬
terest is one that Grosseteste derives from Anselm, viz. 'rec-
titudo'. Although Grosseteste does not at all use and apply the
term to the extent that Anselm does, we can readily see the marked
influence of this central theme of Anselm in his understanding
of truth. In De Libero Arbitrio Grosseteste speaks of the "rec-
titudinem voluntatis,"3 He speaks also of "rectitudo rectificans"
and "rectitudines rectificatae.As was evident in Anselm's
use of 'rectitudo'. this understanding of truth incorporates in¬
to one word both the relation between the rectificans and the
rectificatus. the quality belonging to "res rectae."5 and that
rectitudo in terms of which things can be right. 'Rectitudo' is
a term that stresses not only the factor of relationship but the
1De Ver.: BW 134,137. 2Ibid.; BW 136,142.
3Pe Lib. Arb. 17; BW 221. 4Pe Ver.; BW 135.
^De Lib. Arb. 17; M 224-
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oughtness and the debitum ivhich created beings should fulfil.
We have seen in the second chapter how Anselm's understanding of
Veritas as rectitudo functions as a principle or central motif
that is used to structure or integrate his whole theological
system. Anselm saw right thinking in terms of the Tightness of
thought and statement in relation to the ratio and rectitude of
the summa Veritas and created entities. Although C-rcsseteste
uses 'rectitudo1 only on a few occasions, the sense of it none
the less is apparent throughout his discussion of truth.
The lexical equivalents that Grosseteste uses for 'veritas'
show in themselves that cognitive and prepositional truth will
not receive primary consideration but will assume a place sub¬
ordinate to the supreme Truth and the truth of created entities.
Epistemological issues and the ordo cognoscendi are completely
bound up with the ordo essendi. Grosseteste considers human
knowledge and propositional truth in terms of their ontological
status and in relation to the supreme Truth and the whole created
structure. The ontological status of human knowledge has not
always received adequate consideration. Erich Frank draws our
attention to this point:
In spite of their general sceptical tendency, modern philos¬
ophers often consider human knowledge as something completely
different from its object, from existence, as something that
has, so to speak, no existence of its own. Thus, however,
they make knowledge (consciousness) absolute. But knowledge
is itself existent just as, on the other hand, its object is
knowablc. Hence the opposition between Knowledge and Being
is not absolute but dialectical.1
1E. Frank, Philosophical Understanding and religious Truth,
p. 115, n. 47.
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Grosseteste*s very terminology which we have cited above shows
that truth involves him in the question of the being of truth,
the knowledge that is determinative of that which is, the know¬
ledge of being, and the being of knowledge. Having considered
the terminology in a somewhat formal manner let us now look at
the actual application of the terms.
(2.2) The application of the above terms
Deus, of course, is the summa Veritas. Therefore each term
applied to him receives its most proper application and sense
when used of him. Although, as we shall see, the intentio of
the terms used of God may in some cases be analogous to the
intentio of the same when applied to created res, the sense of
words as they are used of the summa Veritas is not determined
by or derived from the sense of the words as they are found in
ordinary usage when predicated of created res. To the contrary,
if a word used of the summa Veritas is also applied to a created
res. the sense in the latter case is said to bear only a simili¬
tude to the former. For it is the created res that is 1 con¬
form!S* and 'similis1. However, if one cannot proceed analog¬
ically from a knowledge of the created res to the supreme Truth
then there must be some other way, if one is to have knowledge
of God. Grosseteste attributed such knowledge to illumination
from the Truth above. The meaning of terms therefore that are
applied to the summa Veritas must be intuited and perceived in the
summa Veritas himself. Grosseteste says: "Cum audis, *Deus est
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forma vel formositas, sicut et Veritas', noli quaerere, quid
sit forniositas, sicut nec quid sit Veritas.""*" Here we are told
not to engage in a rational interrogation thereby hoping to
discover the meaning of 'formositas' and 'veritas' when predi¬
cated of God. This means then that we can intuit directly the
sense of the sign in the signified when the term is applied.
Grosseteste's admonition is to refrain from inquiring after a
general notion of truth after having heard that God is truth.
For this would be to presume that one could arrive at a univer¬
sal, a general or generic term which could then be predicated of
>
God. Grosseteste is not speaking out against a nominal defini¬
tion. Neither is he opposed to the question of the inquirer
after the nature of God. His real concern is that one does not
construe a^ general notion of the nature of truth which notion
is then applied to the summa Veritas. His basic point is that
a "dictum vero de Deo sub nullo genere praedicamentali contine-
tur."2 Later on we shall deal more fully with the matter of
univocity.
Having noted that 'veritas' and its equivalents are not used
univccally, we look further at the actual application of the
words. Because of his belief in the utter simplicity, immutabil¬
ity, and eternity of God, and because of his belief in the exis-
*"Pe Unica Forma Omnium: BW 103. (Hereafter cited simply
as De Unica.)
2Pe Lib. Arb. 16; BW 217.
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tence of universals and substantial forms on different levels,
Grosseteste is led to maintain that God does not simply have
his attributes but that he is his attributes. In a discussion
on the four causes enumerated by Aristotle Grosseteste says:
"Sed in causa prima, cum ipsa sit substantia simplicissima, idem
est in ea quod efficit et quo efficit."3- If God were not in his
very own essentia those attributes which are predicated of him
the way would be open for God to be subsumed under a "genere
praedicamentali" and the "substantia simplicissima" would be in
jeopardy. Grosseteste says: "Item: si univocaretur Beus cum
aliquo dicto non secundum relationem, oportet Deum esse eompos-
itum et non simplicem, vel irsum esse partem alterius substan-
tiae vel qualitatem vel quantit.atem alterius." If Grcsseteste
had not been dealing with predicates against a background of
universals, forms, and exemplars, it would not have been necessary
to affirm so emphatically that God is. what is attributed to him.
Grosseteste, however, feels compelled to assert the following:
Ergo ipse et species est^ cum nihil sit in ipso, quod ipse
non sit, sicut cum sit iustus ipse, est iustitia ipsa, qua
iustus est. Sic, cum sit formosus et speciosus ipse, est
forma et species, qua formosus et qua speciosus est, immo
insa formositas et speciositas.3
Irrespective of the question as to whether this kind of
formulation is in fact necessary and whether the presuppositions
•*~De Statu Causarum: BW 122.
2Pe Lib. Arb. 16; BW 217. 3Pe Unica: BW 103.
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that require such are valid, it does have the merit of emphati¬
cally affirming that God is not to be judged and assessed in
accordance with that which is extrinsic to himself. This of
course has significant implications for the understanding of
truth and will require that everything else, i.e., all created
res. be considered in relation to the summa Veritas. For God
is Veritas. esse. rectitudo. iustitia. etc. This means
that when the adjectival forms of these words, viz., 'verus',
'rectus', are applied to created res, the latter will be so
qualified not because they particioate in the summa Veritas but
because they stand in a right relation to the same, and more
particularly, to their ratio aeterna in mente divina. The above
use of words also forces the words away from univocity toward
analogous senses. For instance, a created entity that is judged
to be verus or rectus is so called not because it shares in the
divine Nature, which is an impossibility, but by reason of its
agreement with its exemplar, which means that it has the ful¬
ness of second being. The latter will be discussed below.
Grosseteste makes it very clear that the creature cannot share
in the essentia of the Creator: "Item: in nullo communicant cre¬
ator et creatura. Univoca autem in aliquo communicant. Ergo
creator et creatura in nullo univocantur.1,1
'Veritas' will be applied by Grosseteste to the divine Ver-
bum. Sarientia« and Sermo. The meaning of 'Veritas' will be the
1De Lib. Arb. 16; BW 217.
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same in each case. We shall see that it is in this Verbum that
we have the eternal speaking and reasons of created res. These
are considered to be the exemplars and existing ante rem. There
are no eternal essences existing alongside the "substantia sim-
plicissima." This would be an impossibility. Grosseteste clear¬
ly affirms that no substance or essence other than the divine
Essence dwells in the simplicity of eternity. Grosseteste stresses
that although we speak of the "notiones aeternae" and the "ratio-
nes innumerabiles," there is only the one undivided simple eternal
Essence:
Et ideo non ponetur ex vi talis sermonis aliqua pluralitas
entium, aut est pluritas relationum vel rationum aeter-
narum in Deo, ubi non est nisi unica et indivisa essentia.1
It is to this one eternal Essence that 'veritas1 is first
and most properly applied. We therefore see that the first and
primary signification of 'veritas * is the "unica et indivisa
essentia," the one eternal God. Within the divine Essence we
2
do have an interior "similitudo secundum paritatem," but no
correspondence extra is here implied. God exists by and through
himself, not by virtue of a right relation to something existing
without himself. When 'rectitudo* is applied to the supreme
1Ibid. $; BW 195.
^Hexameron VII.1; ed. J.T. Muckle, "The Hexameron of Robert
Grosseteste, The First Twelve Chapters of Part Seven," Mediaeval
Studies, VI (1944), p. 15$. Hexameron is hereafter abbreviated
Hex, and Muckle's edition is simply designated Muckle plus
page number.
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Being it signifies that "quae secundum se recta est-On the
other hand, when we begin to use 'verus' and 'Veritas' of created
res these words cannot have simply the sense of 'esse' and
'essentia'. but we must also include the notions of similitudo
and conformitas extra whereby the created res is held in being.
On the basis of the above discussion it is already apparent that
Grosseteste does not use 'Veritas' and related terms in a uni-
vocal fashion.
When words like 'rectus' and ♦verus' are applied to created
entities they signify not only the esse of these entities, but
also the fact that the latter exist rightly and conform to
their respective regulae and rationes, at least to some degree.
In contrast to our speaking of God as the Veritas. whenever we
speak of the Veritas of creaturely entities we are involved in
speaking of right relations ad extra. The supreme Being, on the
other hand, is not dependent on any right relations ad extra in
order to be. Both Anselm and Grosseteste hold that a thing is
or exists only to the extent that it is true or right, i.e.,
rightly related to its ground of being in the eternal Word. We
shall see that Grosseteste speaks of the truth of all creaturely
entities in terms of the fulness of first being and the fulness
of second being. This latter distinction is not to be confused
with Aristotle's distinction between primary substances and sec¬
ondary substances. The differences between the two distinctions
1De Ver.; BW 137
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should become apparent when we examine more closely Grosse¬
teste 's first being and second being.
Grosseteste believes that all true res within the created
order are such by reason of their conformity or right relation
to their eternal exemplars. This also holds for 'necessary
truths'. The latter are also considered to be 'true' in terms
of their right relation or correspondence to a sermo interior in
the divine Word. This kind of true statement, viz., the neces¬
sary statement, is viewed by Grosseteste as an effect of an
eternal truth in the divine Word and it therefore is made to
function as a basis for an 'inductive' argument for the exis¬
tence of that eternal Truth which is the supreme Truth. In order
to understand properly how these statements appeared to Grcsse-
teste one must avoid looking at them as the analytical statements
of modern logic. This significant point is stressed by the
Kneales (The Development of Logic) regarding Aristotle's nec¬
essary truth. For Grosseteste and Augustine they were certainly
not immutable and eternal by virtue of sheer linguistic conven¬
tion. For Grosseteste the notion of conformity of one kind or
another is operative in all our true statements. Only in the
summa Veritas is there no need to conform or to accomodate it¬
self to something else. Grosseteste states:
Deus autem nullo est falsum aliquid, eo quod similitudo omnis
est paris ad parern, aut inferioris ad superiorem, Deus autem




On the basis of the above examination of Grossetestefs
terminology it should already be evident that if one is to deal
adequately with his doctrine of truth he must be prepared to
explore Grosseteste's thought in a number of areas. However,
before attempting to do the latter we should consider a special
problem with which Grosseteste wrestles.
(2.3) Truth: single or multiplex
Grosseteste raises and directs his attention to the question
whether truth is unica or whether it is multiplex. He deals
with the question in a number of places. He deals with it at
the very beginning of the treatise on truth, quite extensively,
then in the middle of the treatise, and finally at the end of
the treatise. The question seems to be tied up with the whole
matter of the"pluralitatem et distributionem"! of the name of
truth. It would be helpful first of all to determine what is
not part of the problem. It is not a question as to whether
there is something outside the essence of the Creator that par¬
ticipates in the divine Mature and consequently in both true
and divine. Grosseteste faces up to this already in the second
paragraph of the treatise where he states: "Si non est alia
Veritas, quam Deus, esse verum est esse divinum, et hoc est
vera arbor, quod divina arbor, et vera propositio, quod divina
propositio, et ita de ceteris. Grosseteste, of course, will
1Ibid.: BW 13S. 2Ibid-J M 130.
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not permit the attribution of divinity to the creature and con¬
sequently this is not the issue. Neither is there any question
as to whether 'Veritas1 is most properly and fittingly applied
to God, nor is there any doubt regarding the unity and simplicity
of God. It is most certain that the divine Nature is not com¬
posite and that it will not permit any kind of distribution of
itself. Neither is Grosseteste calling into question man's role
as image-bearer and the likeness that man has to God through
creation, nor the likeness of the created res to its exemplar in
the mind of God. Grosseteste firmly professes both throughout
his writing. He is not in doubt concerning the single Rightness
that is right according to itself and according to which every¬
thing created is to be measured and judged. There is finally
only one ultimate criterion for all created things. What then
is the problem?
On the basis of a contemporary linguistic perspective one
could all too easily dismiss the problem as one rooted in seman¬
tical and linquistic misunderstanding and confusion and in a
failure to distinguish adequately tokens, signs, and terms. Or
one may say that the problem lies in lack of insight into a
theory of distribution and the differences between univocal and
analogical expression. The problem of universals may also be
cited. All of this, however, is only partly true and it would
be wholly misleading if we were to think that it directed us to
the central point with which Anselm and Grosseteste were pre¬
occupied. In addition, it would be false to say that they had
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achieved little or no degree of critical acumen regarding lan¬
guage and meaning. The De Veritate treatises under consideration
and Anselm's De Grammatico alone would indicate a fair degree
of critical sense. Anselmfs and Grosseteste's discussion of free
will or liberty of the will also show an awareness of problems
of language and meaning. However, we find in both Anselm and
Grosseteste that their preoccupation and foremost concern is not
with words but with the things that are signified by words.
A cardinal point that the De Veritate treatise of Anselm,
particularly chapter thirteen entitled "Quod una sit Veritas in
omnibus veris," forced upon Grosseteste is that the summa Veritas
is not the truth of a particular thing but when something is in
accordance with the summa Veritas then Tightness or truth can be
predicated of that thing: "ita summa Veritas per se subsistens
nullius rei est; sed cum aliquid secundum illam est, tunc eius
dicitur Veritas vel rectitudo.As noted in chapter two, Anselm
wishes to emphasize that there is a supreme Truth which is in no
way derived from nor contingent upon any other entity. This
Truth is the supreme Measure and does not change or perish even
though that which is measured may perish. Anselm wants this
clearly understood before we proceed to speak of the truth of
this or that creaturely entity. Anselm has the summa Veritas
in mind when he stresses that truth is one and unchangeable.
1De Ver. 13; AO 1:399.
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These beliefs are shared by Grosseteste who also emphasizes
that every true thing is only seen to be true in the light cf
the summa Veritas,
At the beginning cf the De Veritate Grosseteste seeks to
establish the legitimacy of applying 'truth* to a number of things
rather than only to the summa Veritas. It is only after appeal
to authoritative texts, viz., the Scriptures and Augustine, and
by a consideration of things called 'true', that he considers
manifold application in order. However, after this accumulation
of evidence substantiating such usage, he then draws together a
number of statements from Anselm, Augustine, and one Scripture
text which appear to say that there is no truth other than the
summa Veritas. It is because of "hae nebulae caliginosae con-
trariarum opinionum" that he says: "Unde parumper intendendum
est ut, quid sit Veritas, agnoscatur.He then seeks to deter¬
mine just what is meant when we sreak of the truth of proposi¬
tion and the truth of created things. However, after having con¬
sidered these truths and having said: "Putamus etiam, sicut in-
nuit Augustinus in libro de mendacio, multiplicem esse rerum
veritatem,he still feels that in some way every usage of 'Ver¬
itas* signifies the summa Veritas:
Sed forte nusquam ponit.ur ncrcen veritatis, quin significet
ut formam nominis aliquo modo saltern adiacenter vel oblique
veritatem summam. Sicut enim Veritas rei nec intelligi
potest nisi in luce veritatis summae, sic forte nec supponitur
1De Ver.: BW 134. 2Ibid.: BW 133.
3 OS
per nomen veritatis nisi cum significations veritatis
summae.
Grosseteste here suggests that perhaps the truth of a thing ought
not "to be hypostasized through the name of truth except when it
bears the signification of the supreme truth."2 He is wrestling
with the question as to how truth is both single and multiplex.
His discussion of the question reflects somewhat and is reminis¬
cent of AnselmTs treatment of the same issue as set forth in the
thirteenth chapter of his De Veritate. However, as noted above,
Anselmfs discussion centers in the fact that there is a
single Rectitudo which is in no way dependent on other beings
but rather is the basis of all creaturely rectitudines . Grcsse-
teste's discussion, on the other hand, is centered especially
ih the distribution of 'veritas' taken as a universal sign.
Grosseteste senses that a difficulty ensues in asserting both
that truth is single and that the name, viz., 'Veritas'. sig¬
nifying it is distributed. Just what is intended then when
speaking of the truth of this or that creaturely thing? At this
juncture Grosseteste offers the following rather unsatisfactory
conclusion:
Unica est ergo Veritas ubique significata et praedieata per
hoc homen Veritas, sicut vult Anselmus, scilicet Veritas
summa. Sed in multis veritatibus rerum dicitur ilia una
Veritas multae veritates.3
1Ibid.: EW 139.
2Ibid.; trans. R. McKeon, Selections From Mediaeval Philos¬
ophers Vol. I, p. 275.
3Ibid.; BW 139.
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However, one would be ill-advised and remiss if one were to
hold and to view these statements in isolation from the rest of
Grosseteste's teaching concerning truth. Certain problems arise
in the passage under consideration largely because Grosseteste
is stressing the singularity of truth and is utilizing the notion
of the distributed universal sign. His general usage of 'Veritas'
is less restricted than the above statements and discussion would
seem to suggest. In surveying Grosseteste's doctrine concerning
truth and being it becomes clearly evident that words like 'Ver¬
itas' and 'ens' do not and can not have a univocal sense. At
one point Grosseteste asserts the following concerning 'ens':
"Nec tamen ista propter talem comparationem ad invicem sub hoc
nomine 'ens' univocantur, nec etiam penitus aequivocantur.
At the end of the treatise on truth Grosseteste speaks of
the manifold application to single things of the definitions of
truth offered throughout the treatise. There is a common ele¬
ment and an element of diversification:
Supradictae autem definitiones veritatis communes sunt omni¬
bus veris. Sed si descendatur ad singula, invenietur uniu-
scuiusque veri ratio diversifioata.
In contrast to the Aristotelian 'particular', we shall observe
in Grosseteste a greater appreciation of the 'singular' which can be
directly traced to the divine knowledge of singularia. On the
other hand, in his striving for scientia and intellectus we shall
see that Grosseteste is intent on fixing on the 'universal'.
1De Lib. Arb. 16; BW 216. 2Pe Ver.: BW 142.
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However, with respect to the definitions mentioned above we
note both the common factor and the element of diversity which
arises because of a different ratio for each single thing.
There seems to be a kind of admixture both of univocity and
equivocity which enables us to s^eak of one true thing being
like another true thing by reason of the formal definitions,
while at the same time diverse by reason of different rationes.
In view of the latter the definition of the truth of each true
thing is different from the other:
Quapropter intentio veritatis, sicut intentio entis ambigua
est: ex parte aliqua est una in omnibus veris et tamen per
appropriationem diversificata in singulis.^
Grosseteste does not want the general definitions of 'Ver¬
itas' to be held and considered in abstraction from the actual
appropriation of the same. Although these general definitions
and senses are operative and are retained throughout the range
of specific and actual usage, the former must be qualified and
amplified in accordance with actual usage. To illustrate his
point Grosseteste cites a specific class of truths, viz., pro-
positiones both in terms of their first being or truth and their
second being or truth. The second truth of the propositio must
be distinguished from the second truth of other kinds of entities.
Diversity in the meaning of 'veritas' arises both from the dif¬
ferent general definitions and the application of 'veritas'.
1Ibid.; BW 143.
311
having been defined in a number of ways, to different kinds of
entities.
3. The supreme Truth: his nature and relation to created truth
(3.1) Introduction to Grosseteste's doctrine of the supreme Truth
(3.1.1) As we have already noted, Grosseteste follows Augustine
in affirming that Veritas is id quod est. This represents a
primary usage and sense of 'veritas' but is very formal as it
stands. If further qualifications and distinctions were not
added to this definition it could be taken to be the beginning
of a general ontological inquiry. However, even for these words
to prompt such an investigation they would have to possess at
least a modicum of sense. This is the point that Heidegger made
regarding 'truth' in the introduction of his essay on the essence
of truth:
We want the real 'truth'. Well, truth then! But in calling
for real 'truth' we must already know what in fact is meant
by truth. Or do we only know by 'feeling' and in a general
sort of way?l
As was evident in our exploration of certain ontological
problems in the second chapter in connection with Augustine's
understanding of truth, the 'id quod est' phrase did not function
as a type of ouaestio disrutata inviting speculation and conjec¬
ture. The 'id quod est' did not have reference to being in
*M. Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," pp. 320-321.
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general cr bare esse. The esse-essentia and the ens-res dicho¬
tomies, to which such as Avicenna, St. Thomas, and others gave
their attention, are more likely to foster talk about sheer esse.
Augustine in his De Trinitate (V.2.3), in speaking of God as
the unchangeable Essence, recognizes the derivation of 'essentia*
from 'esse', but throughout his thought there is no mental or
extra-mental cleavage. We have noted the gradation of beings
extending from God to formless matter, but no question is put
concerning being as being. Grosseteste, like Augustine, does not
pursue or engage in a general ontological inquiry. Grosseteste
is interested in particular beings or essentiae. He does not
attempt to formulate a general theory or doctrine of being. We
shall see, however, that a number of ontological questions and
issues arise during the course of Grosseteste's investigations
and formulations. Rather than simply speak of Grosseteste's
theory or doctrine of being it would be better and closer to the
truth to speak of his doctx^ine of God, creation, this or that
creature, etc. Likewise, in dealing with his teaching con¬
cerning truth one must examine his doctrine of God, his formula¬
tions pertaining to God's relation to his creation, and doctrine
regarding created beings.
Grcsseteste agrees with Anselm that truth or rlghtness is
perceptible to the mind alone. Grosseteste, as will become
apparent, does not teach that the mind perceives a kind of uni¬
versal being or truth. He does teach that particular entities
are perceived to be right or true in relation to the supreme
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Truth and in the light of this Truth. Grosseteste believes that
in knowing the truth of some thing we know the very entitas and
ratio of the thing. He states:
Cum autem Veritas sit illud quod est, & comprehensio veri-
tatis sit comprehensio eius quod est, esse autem eius quod
dependet ab aliquo non cognoscitur nisi per illud esse a
quo dependet.^
In this statement Grosseteste declares that if one is to know the
truth and being of a contingent entity he must know its source
and that on which it depends. This matter will be discussed
more fully as we proceed.
(3.1.2) In formulating his doctrine of God Grosseteste is
primarily indebted to Augustine although he borrows also from a
number of other sources including the Greek fathers. Further¬
more, the influence of Aristotle is evident in such treatises as
De Unica Forma Omnium and De Statu Causarum. among others. How¬
ever, Grosseteste*s understanding of the summa Veritas is essen¬
tially derived from Augustine. The impact of Aristotle is more
pronounced in Grossetestefs epistemology and scientific method.
The nature of the supreme Truth is now to be considered, as well
as its knowledge, will, wisdom, and speaking. The latter of
course is the eternal Word of the Father. This is the basis for
there being any created truth. The intention is not to discuss
in great detail the facets in Grosseteste's understanding of the
summa Veritas which have been taken over from Augustine. We are
primarily interested in elements involved in the creator-creation
relationship. Consideration of the latter is a prerequisite to
^Comm. Post. 1.2; f. 3•
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our later discussion of Grosseteste's epist-emology and problems
concerning necessity, contingency, causality, and the like.
(3.1.3) Before dealing directly with Grossetestefs doctrine
of God we should touch on the relation between the ordo essendi
and the ordo cognoscendi. We shall also consider briefly some
of the difficulties involved in making affirmations and predi¬
cations concerning God. Grosseteste believes that it is not
merely possible for the ordo cognosrendi to follow the ordo essen¬
di . but necessary, if we are to perceive created truth and make
true judgements. As Grosseteste himself says: "Nemo est igitur,
qui verum aliquid novit, qui non aut scienter aut ignoranter
etiam ipsam summam veritatem aliquo mcdo novit." Grosseteste
here seems to make explicit what is more implicit in Augustine's
own formulations and doctrine of illumination. Grosseteste
affirms that any knowledge of created truth presupposes knowledge
after some manner of the supreme Truth itself. This is so whether
one is aware of it or not. We see here how this ordo cognoscendi
is necessarily grounded in the ordo essendi. This does not imply
an ontologism which teaches that in knowing these eternal and
necessary truths one therefore sees the divine Mind, the simple
supreme Truth. Grosseteste is not affirming this in the above
statement. He is saying that anyone who knows some truth knows
something about the supreme Truth, whether knowingly or unknow¬
ingly.
1De Ver.: BW 13d.
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Although Grossetestefs theory of knowledge will be examined
later, I have touched upon this epistemological factor in order
to contrast it with the ordo cop-noscendi which is to be followed
if one is to achieve understanding of the supreme Truth. If
knowing and recognizing the truth of the created thing a.re only
possible through illumination from the Truth that is transcen¬
dent, then the nature of the transcendent supreme Truth itself
is to be judged and known only in and through its own Being.
Grosseteste does teach that we must begin with fides and the
articles of faith as the beginning of the way to "visio Crea-
toris & Reparatoris, but there is always the imperative to
direct our minds to the supreme Truth and away from this or that
mutable thing. He says: "Tolle hoc et illud, et vide ipsum
formosum, si potes. Ita Deum videbis non alia forma formosum,
sed ipsam formositatem omnis formosi." This same kind of
directive is present in the asr>ectus-affectus motif in Grosse¬
teste fs epistemology, In his Comm. Post. (1.14) Grcsseteste
states that human intelligence would have complete knowledge from
the superior light without the help of the senses if it were not
weighed down by the mass of the body. We shall see that under
the impact of Aristotle Grosseteste introduces sense knowledge
•^Dictum 129; ed. E. Brown, Appendix ad Fasciculum Rerum
Expetendarum et Fugiendarum Sive Tomus Secundus (London: Iroren-
sis Richard! Chiswell ad insigne Rosae Coronatae in Coemeterio
S" T-auli, 1690) p. 231. This source is hereafter simply desig-
nated Brown plus page number.
2Pe Unica: BW 103.
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as an important part of his theory of knowledge but he explains
that such is required "in omnibus habentibus mentis oculum mole
corporis corrupti occupatum . . . . Scientia, and especially
intellectus, is of the universal, the essence or substance, and
sense knowledge is required in order to achieve this. The fac¬
tor to be emphasized, however, is that knowledge and understand¬
ing is of the non-sensible universal or essence. The help of
the senses is required because the intelligentia cannot function
as it should due to the corrupt body. The sensible-intelligible
dichotomy plays a determinative role in Grossetestefs doctrine.
However, as will become apparent, Grosseteste manifests a greater
appreciation of the sensible and corporeal world than does
Augustine. This fact is borne out in part by the considerable
number of treatises formulated by Grosseteste in which he deals
with physical topics and problems.
Throughout his intellectual activity, but especially in
his attempts to speak of God, Grosseteste avows his own indi¬
gence and need of illumination from above. The ordo essendi is
ever before his mind as he seeks a greater understanding of that
which he believes and in some measure has come to know and see.
In the fourth chapter we shall cite a number of the major pre¬
requisites whereby knowledge of the truth is made possible.
(3.1.4) Grosseteste states that there are some major diffi¬
culties involved in attempting to formulate predications concern-
^"Comm, Post. 1.14; f. 1$.
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ing the supreme Truth. Grcsseteste attributes these difficul¬
ties to a number of factors. In sneaking of God as the first
Form and the Form of all things Grosseteste states:
De re enim tanta nihil verum potest esse parvum, lice- pro
parvitate dicentis possit esse non granditer dictum et pro
parvitate nostri dicentis non possit esse granditer elocu-
tum.l
That we should experience difficulty in speaking of God is not
surprising in view of the great and incomprehensible nature of
God. In an allusion to Anselm's Proslogion Grosseteste states:
"Deus est maius, quam quod possit excogitari.He who trans»-
cends human comprehension and thought can also be expected to
transcend man's powers of expression and formulation, especially
in view of man's parvitas dicentis. In the following statement
of Grosseteste we can see further why theological formulation
is beset by difficulties:
. . . quod sicut non communicant in mensura una intelli-
gentia et res temporales, multo magis non communicant in
mensura una creator et creatura aliqua.3
Grosseteste emphasizes that terms as understood and defined
in ordinary usage and discourse cannot as such be simply applied
to God. A special difficulty arises, however, in that he does
not develop a clear or adequate doctrine of analogy. The situ¬
ation is further complicated by the presence of the eternity-
time, necessity-contingency, and incorporeal-corporeal dichotomies
1De Unica: BW 106. 2Pe Lib. Arb. 2; BW 157.
-^De Ordine Emanandi Causatorum a Deo; BW 14&. This treatise
is hereafter cited as De Ordine.
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in his thought. At the same time he wishes to make affirma¬
tions and predications concerning the Creator, He was acquainted
with the works of Pseudo-Dicnvsius, on which he wrote commen-
is apparent in his method. We shall see that although Grosse-
teste does not pursue consistently and radically a via negativa,
he does operate with a terminology which to a considerable ex¬
tent simply states that God is not this or that. On a number
of occasions he offers what could be termed formal positive
attributes, which may involve the qualification of a word or ex¬
pression through the use of superlatives. We have in mind ex¬
pressions like 'most perfect', 'most simple', 'simple eternity',
and 'simple abstract form'. However, the latter expressions
also seem to represent a kind of via nemativa in which through
qualification and abstraction we are directed away from the
conceivable and towards the inconceivable. In discussing facets
of Grosseteste's psychology and epistemology, D. E. Sharp states:
"Strictly speaking, because of the plenitude of His being, God
transcends all affirmation; for He is above substance, above ens,
above eternity, above wisdom, and so on ——- cf. Comm. De. Myst.
Theol. f. 270r."-^ Sharp refers here to Grosseteste's commentary
on the Mystical Theolopv. In spite of the difficulties involved
in speaking of God, Grosseteste does not abandon the attempt to
"*"D„ E. Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thir¬
teenth Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 3$.
taries, and something of the Pseudo-Dionysian
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do so. Grosseteste does anticipate and long for a clear and
full intuition and vision of the supreme Truth which will obviate
formulations now required.
(3.2) The necessary, immutable, and eternal supreme Truth con¬
sidered in relation.to the categories of time and space
(3.2.1) As with Anselm, the aseity of God is very crucial for
Grosseteste. This is deeply implied in the words 'substantia
simplicissima'. God is not dependent on nor does he partici¬
pate in another being. He exists in his own right, ner se. In
discussing Aristotle's per se connection between a subject and
its attribute Grosseteste applies the notion to God as the first
Cause: "Dicitur autem per se esse quod per efficientem causam
non est, & sic sola causam prima est per se . . . .Although
Grosseteste speaks of God as causa prima we must not read into
it Aristotelian content. Regarding Grosseteste's idea of matter
and form, potentiality and actuality, D. A. Callus says: "It is
obvious that all this is entirely un-Aristotelian; under cover
of Aristotelian terminology a doctrine comes to be formulated
2
which is completely foreign to Aristotle." Grosseteste's causa
prima must be seen in the context of all the other predicates
applied to God. No other being is per se, for every being other
than God has an efficient cause. God simply is.
^Comm. Post. 1.4; f. 4.
^Callus, "Robert Grosseteste as Scholar," RG, p. 25.
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Grosseteste also teaches that God is the first Form. On
the authority of the great Augustine Grosseteste says that God
is "prima forma et forma omnium." Since God is form "necessario
est forma prima, quia ante ipsum nihil. Ipse enim est primus et
novissimus.Grosseteste argues that reason also shows that
God is the first Form and the Form of all. For forma is that by
reason of which a thing is what it is and "Deus autem a seipso
est id quod est. Seipso enim Deus est, quia deitate deus est et
2
deltas deus est." There is no formal cause or form outside
God whereby he is. Again we note that God is absolute and a se.
There is nothing on which he depends for his nature and esse
but he is the absolute and all things are relative to him.
Although Grosseteste makes mention of the argument for the
sternal and necessary Truth on the basis of eternally true state¬
ments, which argument is used by Augustine, he is more interested
in elaborating upon the nature of the supreme Truth and created
truths. He emphatically states that these eternal and unchange¬
able truths constitute no plurality of eternally existing essences.
He denies such a plurality and at the same time affirms the one,
simple and undivided Essence which of course is the supreme Truth:
In qua tamen pluralitate non ponitur nisi simplex et indivisa
essentia, et tamen nulla persona est alia, nulla notio est
alia nulla forte similiter ratio est alia, et tamen haec
omnia non sunt nisi una essentia.3
he Unica: BW 107. 2Ibid.; BW 103.
3pe Lib. Arb. 3; BW 196.
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Here are asserted the simplicity, the indivisibility, and the
unity of the Essence which is the supreme Truth. Grosseteste
shares the same attitude towards these eternal and unchangeable
truths that Augustine manifests in his Soliloquia and De Libertb
Arbitrio but not the same urgency in utilizing them as an argu¬
ment for establishing the existence of God. The thrust of the
argument is concisely stated by Grosseteste: "Item: quod verum
est, veritate verum est et veritate, quae est, et quae aliud
*1
est." Grosseteste makes reference to Augustine's discussion
of mathematical truth in his De Libero Arbitrio (II.£.21) where
the latter speaks of the incorruptible truth of number. Grosse¬
teste concludes that "Aeterna est igitur talium Veritas ac per
hoc summa Veritas." Even the truth of number, such as seven
and three are ten, is considered to be eternally and unchange¬
ably true not because of linguistic convention or coherence but
by reason of its "conformitas ad dictionem suam in aeterno Verbo."3
This indicates the character of the eternal Word which is the
divine speaking. The idea here is not that linguistic or logi¬
cal form functions as a kind of antecedent necessity forcing the
being of the incorruptible truth of number or the being of the
eternal supreme Truth. The mathematical formula is certainly
not a cause of the supreme Truth but an enuntiatio which is true
in conformity to the eternal Word, the summa Veritas. This is
1Ibid. : BW 190. 2Pe Ver.; BW 132.
3Ibid.: BW 140.
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how Grosseteste understood the necessary nature of eternal and
unchanging truth. He says: "Est igitur Veritas, quod per se
necesse est esse vel saltern necessario consequens ad per se
necesse esse."^ The supreme Truth therefore is. necessarily
through itself. "Item: cum idem sit Deo esse et essentia, et
esse suum ei sit in sua libertate, et ita totum quod est in
libertate consistit."2 The existence of the supreme Truth is
therefore not problematical for Grosseteste. The supreme Truth
is necessary in that it exists rer se. in accordance with its
own nature which is esse and essentia. Closely bound up with
this are the factors of immutability and eternity, Involved
here are also questions pertaining to rosse and perfectic.
(3.2.2) Grosseteste also derives from Augustine the doc¬
trines of the immutability and eternitjr of God. As E. Gilscn
puts it: "Eternity and immutability will always remain the two
main attributes of God in the doctrine of Saint Augustine."
The sense pervading both attributes is that of freedom from
change, freedom from any defect or deficiency such as posse or
^otentia not yet realized, and freedom from duration and tem¬
poral sequence or succession. Grosseteste does not teach the
immutability of God simply for its own sake. There can be no
change in God for this would imply lack of plenitude of being
1Ibid.: BW 139. 2Pe Lib. Arb. 17; BW 229.
-^Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Kiddle Ares
(New York: Random House, 1955) p. 71.
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and lank of utmost perfection. "Deus autern est completio inrom-
pletibilis, perfectio imperfectibilis, et ideo forma non forma-
bilis, perfectio imperfectibilis, et ideo forma non formabilis,
quia penitus sine defectu et incommutabilis.Grosseteste, then,
sees perfection in static form after the fashion of intelligible
form. That which is most perfect must be free from movement and
change, and time as well, for the latter entails change and the
possibility of corruption and imperfection. God, of course, is
incorruptible and not liable to any imperfection.
Grosseteste's doctrines »of God and creation, among others,
were shaped and determined to a considerable degree by his notions
of form, matter, potency, act, eternity, and time. The latter,
along with his conceptions of necessity, contingency, and causal¬
ity, influence and structure to a considerable extent the material
content of his thought. This at times introduces a kind of inner
tension between the above more formal categories and the subject
material. Certain problems arise then on account of the pre¬
supposed theses applied, rather than out of the particular sub¬
ject matter itself. Grosseteste is not altogether unaware of the
problem. In answer to Aristotle^ saying that the first princi¬
ples of science can be applied similiter to metaphysics, physics,
mathematics, and logic, Grosseteste says:
Et non dico similiter, quia in omnibus est aeque certitude,
comprehensio enim certitudinis non est solum a natura demon¬
stration's, sed per naturam rerum super quas erigitur demon-
stratio.
xDe Unica: BW 10$. ^Comm. Post. II.6; f. 43.
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This is a significant methodological observation and taken for¬
mally pertains also to the application of metaphysical categories
over a broad and diverse range of entities. Grosseteste realizes,
although not as critically and as much as he should have, that
general metaphysical notions and theories, as well as general
axioms such as logical ana geometrical axioms, are not equally
applicable to all entities or subjects. These theories and
axioms must therefore not be utilized indiscriminately and with¬
out due qualification. There are, of course, particular theories
and principles that are applicable to and fit only a particular
category or class of entities. These and related issues will be
considered more fully as we proceed.
With respect to the created order Grosseteste operates with
doctrines of potency and act, form and matter, a doctrine of the
four causes, and a cosmogony of light, in his attempt to account
for actualization and the process of becoming. He allows for
ronsidex-able change, process, and movement within the created
and contingent order. However, perfection is understood as stages
or the completed state of actualization and therefore tends to be
a static category. D. E. Sharp says of Grosseteste's theory of
becoming:
Potency, for him, is the mark of every contingent nature,
being manifested in participation in existence, in mutabil¬
ity, and in power to seek the good. Only God is. in the
sense that He alone can be said to be absolutely; hence all
such terms of analysis as potency and act, matter and form,
cause and effect, must be regarded as indicating relative
being.1
^Sharp, or. cit.. p. 14.
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The supreme Truth is therefore riot involved in becoming but
is the most perfect forma and sheer actuality. Perfection as we
understand it of God is consequently without any change, process,
or movement. This will have profound repercussions in the under¬
standing of the Creator-creature relationship and the whole under
standing of truth. Although there is the process of becoming
within the created order, the process is looked upon as corrup¬
tible truth. "Item: in futuris et contingentibus videtur esse
Veritas corruptibilis." We shall see, however, that Grosseteste
is none the less intent on showing and maintaining that there is
contingency within the created order. But because of categories
already mentioned, viz., necessity, immutability, and eternity,
in terms of which the supreme Being must be understood, it will
be difficult to give adequate place to the elements of contin¬
gency, possibility, becoming, and time. Truth is bound up with
being, but being becomes the static amid the dynamic becoming.
Divine willing, creation with its contingency, and human willing
will, however, by their own weight bring pressure to bear upon
the aforementioned categories. It should be pointed out that
although in both Anselm and in Grosseteste the divine will is of
vital significance, it is not divorced from the ratio of the
supreme Truth.
Grosseteste understands God then as perfect actus and forma.
He says: "Ergo si in Deo est posse sine actu, est ipso actu
1De Ver.; FW 130.
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perfectibilis. At hoc est impossibile, cum sit perfectissimus.
Consequently, there is no change or mutability in God. "Sub¬
stantia Dei, supra quam cadit ista relatio, est simpliciter invar
O
iabilis." God therefore is understood to be most simple, most
perfect, and simple eternity.
(3.2.3) Out of the above discussion arises the question concern¬
ing the relation of the supreme Truth to time. It is immediately
apparent that even if the supreme Truth is spoken of in relation
to the category of time, time, however it may be understood,
cannot qualify or structure this utterly unchangeable supreme
Truth. Grosseteste states that God is in time or absent from
no time:
Et nota, quod aliter dicitur solem 'moveri in cmni tempore
et Deum esse in omni tempore. Deus enim, dicitur esse in
tempore quia nulli tempore deest, vel quia est in simpli-
citate aeternitatis, a qua fluit omne temrus secundum illud:
"Qui tempus ab aevo ire iubes .",3
The problem that arises here is how it is that he who dwells
in the simplicity of eternity, which for Grosseteste involves no
temporal connotation such as one would have in sempiternity, can
be in every part of time which implies being in a particular
part of time even while being in every part. Grosseteste made
it most clear in the final part of his commentary on the final
book of Aristotle's Physics, which circulated as the separate
1De Lib Arb. 7; BW 175. 2Ibid. S; BW 177.
3Pe Scientia Dei: BW 147.
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crusculum De Finitate Motus et Tenporis, that there is no eter¬
nal (unending) movement and time. Grosseteste directs his
polemic against the perpetuitas motus et temporis in either
direction. He speaks out against future rernetuitas: "Stabit
ergo caelum et finietur motus et tempus, cum cessabit hominum
generatio.This includes even circular motion, which in com¬
parison to linear motion is of a perfect and simple nature and
by terminating in itself copies the nature of form: "quod rcaxime
accedit ad naturam formae et maxime recedit a natura materiae."^
Such motion however is a corporeal perfection and is not appli¬
cable to the incorporeal. There are many perfections for Grosse¬
teste which is made evident by his talking of God as "perfectio
perfectissima." For it must not be thought that the incorrup¬
tibility of the heavenly spheres resides in their circular diur¬
nal motion. It is derived from the fifth essence, viz., aether
or corpus coeli. This essence is the basis of incorruptibility.
Grosseteste states "quod in corpore coelesti non est possibili-
tas ut corrumpatur, quia non habet contrarium.nJ It is on account
of this that Grosseteste can say of the celestial spheres: "novem
scilicet caelestes, inalterabiles, inaugmentabiles, ingenerabiles
et incorruptibiles, utpote completae " Grosseteste
lPe Finitate Motus et Temooris; BW 106. This treatise is
hereafter cited as De Finitate.
2
De Kotu Supervaelestium: BW 92. Hereafter cited as De Motu.
^De Motu: BW 9#.
4De_ Luce Seu De Inchoatione Formarum: BW 56. Hereafter
cited as De Luce.
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posits the perfection of incorruptibility in the face of the
corruptibility present in time and movement. This perfection
is found in the spheres because of their composition of the fifth
essence which is "impermutabilis secundum se, (sed) permutabilis
per humiliationem sui ad inferiors."^ Apart from such an excep¬
tion and perfection as has been cited, Grosseteste feels that
time entails the possibility of corruption. That which is situ¬
ated without time is immutable and consequently incorruptible.
Forma is perfect in that it is immutable and is situated in the
simple eternity of the divine Nature. This is so even when forma
is present in a creature and therefore in time.
Because motion and time are bound up together, and that
which is temporal is caught up in a process of becoming that
entails the possibility of corruption, it is obvious that the
most perfect supreme Truth must be absolutely removed from any
such motion and time. Grosseteste therefore sees God in the
absolute simple eternity, or rather, identifies eternity with
the immutable essence of God.
Eternitas enim est essencie incommutabilitas sive essencia
incommutabilis. Dei autem maxime proprium nomen est essencia.
Quicquid enim alio nomine significatum de Deo dixeris, in hoc
homine quod est essencia instauratur; propterea in partici-
pacione incommutabilitatis essencie est homo maxime pro-
pinque Dei imago.2
This notion, falsely attributed to Jerome, removes or abstracts
from 'eternitas' any sense of sempiternity or perpetuity and
1De Cometis: BW 36. 2Hex. VII.7; Muckle 168.
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consequently any change or movement. This is further indicated
by Grosseteste in De Libero Arbitrio (c. 7) where he argues that
in the same instant Socrates can not be both black and white
(cf. consequent necessity), and in relation to every indivisible
instant eternity is more simple and indivisible. Eternity then
is the immutability of God and is understood in terms of an
instant more simple and indivisible than we can conceive. "Ergp
si Deus in aeternitate scit aliquid, non potest ad eius opposi-
tum."^ This certainly safeguards immutability whereas sempi-
ternity could pose a threat to immutability. In the light of
this indivisible instant it can be said:
Item: In aeternis nihil praecedit aliud natura tempore vel
spatio. Sed posse oppositorum naturaliter praecedit utrum-
que illorum. Ergo in aeternis non est posse respectu
oppositorum.
The only kind of priority which Grosseteste will allow
within the divine Being is a causal priority between the Father
and the Son. In De Finitate Kotus et Temroris Grosseteste says
that Aristotle's arguments are based on the thinking of "aeter-
nitatem simplicem" under "phantasmati extensionis temporalis"
so that there must always be a time before the first time and a
time after the last time. Eternity, not time without beginning,
measures the "non-essef? of the universe: "Non-esse namque mundi
et eorum, quae cum mundo coeperunt, non mensurat tempus sine
initio, neque omnino, tempus sed aeternitas."3 Grosseteste
1Be Lib. Arb. 7; BW 174. 2Ibid.; BW 175.
3pe Finitate; BW 103.
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believes that Aristotle and other philosophers have not begun
to understand the simplicity of eternity:
Nec moveat aliquem, quod Aristoteles et alii philosophi
probant Deum esse incommutabilem et intemporalem et certera
talia, ut putet eum vel alios philosophos simplicitatem
aeternitatis perspicue intellexisse.1
Grosseteste therefore does not feel that anyone should
wonder why the universe is not older "quam dicit scriptura, et
cur non prius incepit quam dicit scriptura, quid non potest
intelligi incepisse prius, quam incepit, ab intellectu compre-
p
hendente totum tempus praeteritum terminatum". The interesting
point made here is that the universe had an instans primum and
consequently there was no endless time before creation and the
question cannot arise as to why the universe was not created
before it was created. In contrast to Aristotelian causality
we notice Grosseteste*s stress on the creation of the universe
and likewise the creation of movement and time. This focuses
the attention on the radical dependence or contingency of the
creation on the Creator but at the same time presents no small
difficulties when one attempts to relate the simple eternity of
God to change, motion, and potency. There is also the problem
of relating the immutable and necessary knowledge, willing, and
speaking of the supreme Truth to contingent creatures and crea*
turely events. The area of most concern, however, is not that
of natural and physical events but the problem of relating and
"'•Ibid.; BW 105. ^Be Ordine: BW 150.
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juxtaposing human willing and knowing with divine willing and
knowing. Grosseteste is preoccupied with this issue in De
Libero Arbitrio. In De Veritate Propositionis and De Scientia
Dei he is concerned with the traditional problem of the truth
of statements regarding future contingent events.•
We shall take note of Grosseteste's considerable effort in
attempting to explain and show how contingent truths and events
can be maintained and preserved in the face of the immutable
and necessary divine knowledge and speaking of these truths and
events. While the immutable and necessary nature of God's
willing and knowledge raises problems concerning creaturely
contingency, Grosseteste's rejection of the perpetuitas motus et
temporis as the correct understanding of the simplicitas aeter-
nitatis does spare him from some of the added difficulty that
would have ensued in connexion with contingent truths and events
had he understood the eternity of God as sempiternity or duration
without beginning or end. Grosseteste holds that for God all
creaturely entities and events are present in an indivisible
instant.
(3.2.4) Another aspect of Grosseteste's understanding of the
nature of God closely related to the above pertains to the pre¬
sence of God in relation to space. At this point we are not
primarily concerned with Grosseteste's physical theory and expla¬
nation regarding space and place which he develops in his com¬
mentary on Aristotle's Physics. He says: "ht hec racio vere
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convincit infinitum esse sed non infinitum magnitudine.Grosse-
teste also speaks of the finite dimensions of magnitude in his
treatise on light metaphysics: "Lux igitur, quae est in se sim¬
plex, infinities multiplicata materiam similiter simplicem in
dimensiones finitae magnitudinis necesse est extendere." Like¬
wise, one is not able to think the universe to be elsewhere
than it is unless he posits space outside the universe:
. . . sicut non potest intelligi mundura alibi esse, quam
sit, ab intellectu, qui comprehendit extra mundum non esse
spatium, cum tamen necessarium sit, ipsum posse esse alibi,
quam sit, apud imaginationem ponentem spatium extra mundum.3
How then is God related to this finite magnitude or uni¬
verse, in terms of his presence in it? Grosseteste reflects the
more mature thought of Augustine on the presence of God as fill¬
ing the universe with his power and conserving it in being.
Augustine, under Manichean influence, could not free himself
from thinking of God's presence in terms of material being ex¬
tended infinitely throughout infinite spaces. Under the influ¬
ence of Neoplatonism Augustine came to see God as a spiritual
Being and the notion of spatial extension subsided. The question
that remains, however, pertains to the manner in which God is
present in or with the universe that is spatially extended. In
his commentary on Aristotle's Physics Grosseteste emphasizes
that there could be no place without space. Grosseteste also
-*~Comm. Phvs. Ill; Dales 5$.
^De Luce: BW 52. ^De Ordine: BW 150.
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states that space is the threefold dimension of corporeal exten¬
sion. He says:
Nichil enim habet trinam dimensionem nisi corpus. Locus
tamen semper repletur spacio .... Spacium enim hoc
nichil est nisi trina corporis dimensio. Si autem tale
spacium esset aliquid et locus et omnis pars rei esset
in tali spacio et ita in loco sicud totum cuius est in
loco.l
This understanding of space and place affected considerably
Grosseteste's understanding of the divine presence in the world.
It should be noted that he also concurs with Aristotle that void
does not exist. While mathematicians could think of space as
infinite and empty, real space must be considered plenum accord¬
ing to Grosseteste.
In seeking to explain how God is present in this space
which he created Grosseteste uses the classic Latin expression,
viz., 'ubiaue totus'. The equivalents are 'everywhere whole'
and 'repletive presence'. Grosseteste says: "Ad quod in primis
p
respondeo, quod solus Deus totus ubique simul est." In saying
that the whole of the divine Being is wholly present in every
place simultaneously it is evident that he is not thinking of a
corporeal being, extended and diffused throughout space. Grosse¬
teste cites Augustine's classic epistle (1&7 to Lardanus) deal¬
ing with the presence of God. In this epistle Augustine empha^
sizes that we must not think of God after the fashion of a material
mass, in which a part is less than the whole. We should add that
1 2
Comm. Phvs. IV; Bales 7$. Be Intelligentiis: BW 112.
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if this were the case, then less of God would be present in a
particular place or part of space than in a larger part or in
the whole of space. In seeking to illustrate the presence of
God Augustine refers to the immortality of the immortal body
and the health of the healthy body. He points out that the
smaller members of the body are not less immortal and healthy
than the larger members. This is an attempt to illustrate how
God is totally present everywhere. Augustine wants to steer
clear of conceiving of the presence of God in terms of quantity.
After making this reference to Augustine, Grosseteste states:
Ex his verbis Augustini, ut supra dixi, aliquatenus iuva-
tur noster intellectus ad comprehendendum, licet velut de
longe in nubilo, quomodo Deus ubique est, quia plene com-
prehendere, quomodo ipse ubique est, supra viventis hominis
capacitatem est.l
Much of the difficulty arises simply from the fact that
Grosseteste is dealing on the one hand with the supreme Being,
who is incorporeal, simple, eternal, and nonspatial, and on the
other hand with a corporeal, spatial, temporal, and composite
created order. Grosseteste's understanding of these latter
categories and qualities, along with his understanding of the
perfection, simplicity, and transcendence of God, tended to
heighten the difficulty of determining and ascertaining how God
can be and is related to and present in the created order. If
•space' and 'place* are made to signify and are used consistently
in connexion with corporeality with its three dimensions, the
1Ibid.: BW 114.
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question arises as to how an incorporeal Being and spiritual
entities can be said to be in 'space' or in this or that 'place'.
We shall note momentarily that Grosseteste does extend somewhat
his usage and conception of 'space' and 'place'.
In speaking of the ubique totus presence of God in a created
finite order a certain difficulty seems to arise in connexion
with the immutability and simple eternity of God. Since the
created order is not eternal but had a beginning, it appears
that the ubi^ue totus presence also had to have a beginning in¬
asmuch as this presence presupposes the created order. The change
involved is that of God becoming ubique totus. To my knowledge
Grosseteste does not deal with this particular issue. In any
case, his response would probably be that this difficulty arises
when one posits time before the time created by God. However,
Grosseteste does not allow for a time prior to created time.
Grosseteste would also possibly respond to this difficulty by
saying that we are thinking of God in terms of a mensura inferi¬
or whereas we should be thinking of him in terms of the ruensura
superior that is proper to him. As already intimated, Grosse¬
teste believes that God dwells in his simple eternity and that
all entities and events are present to God in his indivisible
eternity.
In speaking of God's omnipresence Grosseteste stresses that
we must not think of God as we think of places. In other words,
it is one thing to say that God is present in a place and quite
another thing to say that a given creature is in a place. We
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saw earlier that a locus is always filled by space, that is,
"trina corporis dimensio." Grosseteste wants it clearly under¬
stood that although God is present in all places, viz., every¬
where, he is not contained by these places nor is he supported
by them. God exists or endures (consistere) in and through him¬
self. The corporeal entities, however, which occupy and fill
up places, are contingent and contained in their places. Grosse¬
teste makes clear that certain qualifications must be kept in
mind when speaking of God in relation to place:
Sed notandum quod comparatur Deus ad hoc nullo modo compara-
tur locatum ad locum, dicente Augustino: fDeus est in mundo
non inclusus, extra mundum nec exclusus, supra mundum non
elevatus, infra mundum non depressus.f Si est ibi aliqua
proprietas et cornparatio loci ad locatum, eo enim indigent
omnia sicut proprio locante, ipse autem nullo indiget.J-
Grosseteste goes on to say that God is everywhere "potentialiter,"
"presentialiter," and "essentialiter.The second of the three
adverbs is included lest God be identified with his power. "Es-
sentialiter" is added lest it be thought that God is only the
efficient cause whereas he is "etiam ut causa formalis et vera
forma uniuscuiusque."3 Although Grosseteste here recognizes that
certain qualifications are in order when speaking of God being
in places, and although he speaks some of the presence of God in
terms of its dynamic and functional character, he continues to
operate with a rather narrow and restrictive notion of place.
^-Quaest. Theol. |j[vJ ; Callus 206.
2Ibid. ; Callus 206. 3Ibid: Callus 207.
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His understanding of place and space is bound up with the notion
of three dimensional corporeal extension. The qualifications
that he offers above are indicative of the fact that he sticks
with this notion of space, viz., corporeal extension. We have
in mind notions of place and space which are not so much tied to
the factors of spatial magnitude and corporeal extension. De¬
pending on what factors are involved, we could possibly speak
of functional place or space, historical place, ontological
place, i.e., place in the hierarchy of being, logical place,
moral place, etc.
Along with this judgement concerning Grosseteste's con¬
ception of space and place we could probably make a similar
judgement with respect to his conception of time. If he would
have had a less restricted and restrictive conception of time,
or better, different conceptions of time or different types of
time, he might have been less intent on removing God from time
and relegating him to the category and realm of simple eternity.
He could then possibly have had room for a certain process and
movement that would not have entailed corruptibility and possible
loss of being.
There is one point in particular where Grosseteste breaks
away from his usual understanding of place. He speaks of the
place of angels and equates their place with their ministerium.
He asserts that the angel is not ubique totus in the universe
for this is God's prerogative alone. Angels perform their ser¬
vice in "corporibus assumptis" but they are not said to have
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their place in these bodies. "Sic, ut reor, angelos esse in
corporibus assumptis est, ipsos movere et regere ea in usus ali-
cuius ministerii.The angels and other created incorporeal
spirits are said to have places by virtue of their functions and
operations:
Et non est hoc ipsum esse alicubi, quod superficie locali
circumscribi aut in situ punctuali figi, ut possit inter
ipsum et alia situm habentia certis linearum mensuris
distantia seu propinquitas metiri.2
Grosseteste states that the angel is not to be assigned a place
in the universe anymore than the soul can be assigned a particu¬
lar place in the body. An angel may be said to be somewhere by
reason of a certain operation, service, or ministry. Its place
cannot be measured geometrically or in terms of spatial extention.
Here we have what could be called functional or operational place.
Grosseteste acknowledges the difficulty of conceiving of this
kind of place: "De hoc mallem sapientiam humiliter audits, quam
temerarie aliquid definire."^ None the less, it must be said
that Grosseteste generally and primarily thinks of space as
"trina corporis dimensio." Parallel to this is his conceiving
of time in terms of change, movement, becoming, and corruptibil¬
ity.
Grossetestefs understanding of space, time, perfection,
potency, act, and related categories or factors, shaped and
determined in large part his doctrine of truth. His understanding
1De Intellieentiis: BW 116. 2Ibid.: BW 113. 3Ibid.
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of the supreme Truth, corruptible contingent truth, history,
the Incarnation, and so on, was radically affected and influ¬
enced by his understanding of the factors cited above. Truth
is primarily eternal, immutable, and incorruptible being, the
supreme Being in particular. Therefore, even though it is said
that God is present in the world, he is present as the immutable,
eternal (nontemporal), and most perfect and simple Truth in the
midst of a temporal, changing, finite, and corruptible created
order. However, as we shall see, such a dichotomy or division
has to be and is qualified or modified to some degree because of
such factors as God's presence in the world, the innumerable
relations between Creator and creatures, and the fact of the
Incarnation itself. We shall now consider the eternal Word of
the supreme Truth, who is the perfect similitudo of God the
Father and the foundation of created truth.
(3.3) The Word of the supreme Truth
Having considered the necessary, immutable, and eternal
nature of the supreme Truth in connexion with the categories of
time and space, it is now essential to note the strategic place
that the Verbum Dei has as the eternal speaking of the Father,
the "Sermo Patris.""^ 'Verbum'. in Augustine and likewise in
Grosseteste, receives its most fitting and most meaningful appli¬
cation when used of the Filius Dei. The applications of 'verbum'
1De Ver.; BW 134.
340
of least significance are those instances where it refers to the
written or spoken word. We saw how Anselm in the Monologion
(c.10) constructed a scale of different senses of 'verbum' rang¬
ing from the sensible written or spoken word, to the thinking of
the word within the mind, to the thinking of the corporeal image
or the thing itself, and finally the universalis essentia. The
highest form of speaking is the rerum locutio. the very speaking
of things whereby they come to exist. Grosseteste focuses his
attention on this highest form of speaking, although instead of
speaking of "summae essentiae locutio" he talks of the "Sermo
Patris" and the "verbum omnipotentis Dei." The words differ but
the meaning is the same. This speaking of the Father, which
speaking is the Filius Dei, is the very source of the being of
things which in turn makes possible our speaking. Our speaking
must finally be adequated to the res not only, but also to the
divine speaking itself, if it is to be true. ,Verbumt, there¬
fore, is most fittingly used of the divine Being himself, for
the Word of God is the very being of God and through this Ver¬
bum each res is created.
It must be remembered, of course, that although we speak
of the divine Nature, the divine willing, the divine knowing,
the divine mind in which are the innumerable ideae. and now of
"the Verbum Dei, these are all to be considered within the one
substantia simolicissima. In De Statu Causarum-1- Grosseteste
•*~De Statu Causorum: BW 122. Hereafter cited as De Statu.
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states clearly that the divine substantia or essentia keeps its
simplicity intact even though a multiplicity of actuality issues
forth from it. This means that for the causa prima, the final
cause or the "intentio boni" is not something that is added over
and above the contemplation of the essence of the thing. So too,
in the Verbum Dei the divine speaking, willing, knowing, creat¬
ing, and conserving in being are one in the one Verbum Dei. The
illumination of created things whereby they can be seen to be,
and to be true, is also one with the above in the Verbum Dei.
Grosseteste speaks of the unity of causes of created things in
the divine substantia: "Et propterea idem est in ea secundum
substantiam efficiens, forma et finis.The Verbum spoken
eternally in the one simple supreme Truth is the very source and
foundation of all created truth and being, including the nature
of all created beings and the knowledge of the same. If one
would understand the various facets of Grossetestefs conception
of truth, his epistemology, and methodology, then one must first
know the place that the Verbum Dei has in his thought. This
Verbum is to be considered first in relation to the Pater and
subsequently in relation to the creation. This is to consider
first the nature and being of the eternal Verbum and then its
speaking in relation to the creation.
1IMd.
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(3.3.1) The nature and the being of the Word of God in relation
to God the Father
Within the divine substantia itself there is similitude
according to Grosseteste. It has already been noted that this
is a central motif running throughout Grosseteste's thought.
It doesn't, however, have just one sense or application. He
distinguishes between the similitudo that prevails between man
and God wherein man is said to be made in the image of God and
the lesser similitudo between other creatures and God. We
noted earlier that in the "participacione incommutabilitatis
essencie est homo maxime propinque Dei imago." In commenting
on the words of St. Gregory of Nyssa, Grosseteste contrasts the
similitudo found in the image of God in man with the similitudo
present between other creatures and God:
Unde etsi in aliis creaturis eluceat aliqua Dei similitudo
nec tamen elucet in illis Dei imago quia imago est summa
et propinquissima similitudo. Naturalis enim capacitas
omnium que sunt in Deo per maxime propinquam i;iaitacionem
est in homine Dei imago. Cum autem capit ea secundum
possibilem sibi imitacionem, tunc est reformata imago.
In those created entities without reason there is then "simili¬
tudo Dei aliqua" but only in man is the image of God. By reason
of the one divine essentia one can also speak of immanent like¬
nesses within the created structure. For instance, as the mem¬
bers of a genus achieve greater similitudo to their common ratio
aeterna or exemplar they are more similar to each other. Grosse-
^Hex. VII.7; Muckle 16£
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teste even compares man as microcosm to the mundus. We inti¬
mated earlier that the individuality of the singular is grounded
in GodTs knowledge of singularia, else such singularity could be
lost in the one exemplar, or in the universal immanent in the
genus composed of particulars.
In speaking of the similitudo of the Filius to the Pater
Grosseteste makes certain that we do not interpret this simili¬
tudo in the same sense as the other similitudines of which we
have just spoken. There is a passage relating to this which is
worth quoting in its entirety:
Similitudo autem est duplex: out equalitatis vel paritatis,
aut imparitatis et imitacionis. Quapropter et imago duplex
est: aut summa videlicet similitudo secundum paritatern, aut
summa similitudo secundum imitacionem. Secundem primam
accepcionem imaginis, solus Filius est imago Dei Patris.
Omnia enini que habet Pater, habet equaliter et Filius et
quecumque facit Pater hec eadem et similiter facit Filius
et sicut habet Pater vitam in semetinso sic dedit et Filio
vitam habere in semetioso. vitam, inquam, hoc est, Divinitatis
plenam et totam substanciam, non multiplicatam, neque divi-
sam, neque imminutam. Ideoque Patris est similitudo secun¬
dum equalitatem. Homo vero similitudo est Dei Trinitatis
per imitacionem. Non enim potest creatura factori suo com-
parari nec cum eo in aliquo univocari; potest tamen per
modum aliquem imitari.
It is most essential that this above distinction be kept in mind,
particularly in view of the similitudo motif and the light meta-
physic and cosmogony which figure so prominently in the thought
of Grosseteste. Grosseteste repeatedly asserts his Creator-
creature dualism in which he makes clear that man in no way shares
in the divine essentia or substantia. After stating that Anselm
1Hex. VII.1; Muckle 158.
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assigns a single ratio to liberum arbitrium, Grosseteste says:
Concedimus reversa, quod nihil univoce dicitur de creatura
et creatore; sed tamen creatura rationalis ita propinquum
est vestigium et similitudo et imago sui creatoris, quod
in his, secundum quod est propinquum et assimilatum verti-
gium, meretur etiam communicare et nomen, non quidem uni¬
voce sed propinqua, imitatoria similitudine.
However, it is altogether different with the Son or Word of
God in his similitudo to God the Father. The Son is most fully
like the Father because he is that which the Father is:
Filius autem, qui similis est Patri plenissime, est id quod
Pater. Unde ibi nulla ex parte aliqua falsitas est, sed
plena versfas et lux, "et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae".
This statement is crucial for all that follows. The Son is the
full truth and light because there is no falsehood in him in
any part. This absence of falsity is most readily explained by
the prior statement in which Grosseteste asserts that the Son
is that which the Father is. Here there is the "similitudo
secundum paritatem" within the divine Being, that is, that re¬
lation between the Father and the Son grounded in parity. Here
we have an interior likeness within the substantia sirnrlicissima
itself. All created things shall be true by reason of their
conformity to this Verbum which is most fully like the Father.
The created entity is said to have a likeness to God, but only
through the Verbum Dei.
Most appropriately does Grosseteste open his treatise on
truth by citing a crucial text from the Gosnel of John (John 14:6):
-LPe Lib. Arb. 16; BW 217. 2Pe Ver.: BW 136.
345
"Ego sum via Veritas et vita". Hie ipsa Veritas dicit se
esse veritatem. Unde dubitari non immerito potest, an sit ^
aliqua alia Veritas, an nulla sit alia ab ipsa summa veritate?
This is the heart of the matter for Grosseteste in his notion of
truth. Back of this text and these opening statements lies the
Verbum Dei. The Truth that says that he himself is the Truth
is enabled so to speak because of an eternal uncreated simili¬
tude and that perfect unity in the substantia sirrrolirlssima. It
is essential therefore to see what Grosseteste has to say con¬
cerning the nature and being of the Son in relation to the Father
whereby the Son can say: "Ego sum via Veritas et vita."
Grosseteste makes reference to Chrysostom (In Joh. Homil.
IV [al. IIlJ) where the latter speaks of a priority of the
Father in relation to the Son according to cause, not according
to time or nature:
Unde Chrysostomus super illus *In princirio erat Verbum1:
♦Praecedit Pater Verbum non natura, sed causa; praecedit
Filius naturaliter omnia alia.' Ergo cum individua essen¬
tia, quae onmi simplici est simplicior, omni indivisibili
indivisibilior, sit prius et post, praediximus, quod in
aeternis est prius et post.2
Grosseteste mentions that we have difficulty in grasping this
notion of causality within the Trinity for we only think of
causality in relation to creatures: "Hoc verbum iterum videtur
habere obscuritatem, quia nulla est, ut videtur, in Trinitate
processio, nulla causalitas nisi ad creaturas.Grosseteste
1Ibid.; BW 130. 2Pe Lib. Arb. S; BW 179.
3Ibid.. BW 186.
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also rites St. Athanasius in support of the coeternity and the
coequality of the three persons among whom there is no grada¬
tion of being or nature and no distinction of time."'- Grosse-
teste warns us against imputing our meanings, faults, and errors
into the words of Athanasius:
Quapropter si intelligimus in suis verbis aut eis imponimus
aliquid falsum et veritati contrarium, haec nostra praesump-
tio et nostrum vitium, et non est, quod ipse in suis verbis
aliquid intellexerit impium.
Grosseteste denounces strongly the reading into the words
of the fathers alien meanings which they did not intend. This
happens through failing to see through the language to the
Trinity itself, that is, failing to see the words as they are
applied. Grosseteste explains further that Chrysostom intends
by the words "causalitas" and "processio" nothing other than that
what the Father has he gives to the Son so that the same life
which the Father has he gives to the Son. In this way the Father
causally precedes the Son. Grosseteste proceeds by making ref¬
erence also to Hilary:
Quod ipsa Veritas dicit: 'sicut Pater habet vitam in seme-
tinso. sic dedit et Filio habere vitam in semetinso* hoc
est, quod Hilarius dicit, Patrem esse maiorem Filio non
solum secundum quod Filius est homo, sed secundum quod est
Verbum, et tamen Filium Verbum non esse minorem Patre, sed
aequalem.3
•^.Symbol. Athanasianum; cf. Denzinger, Enchiridion XVIII 136
(ed. 9 Wirceb. 1900) pg. 36s. This source is cited in De Lib.
Arb. By BW 136.
2Pe Lib. Arb. 3; BW 136.
^Ibid.; BW 137; Hilarius: De Trin. IX.54,55; Tract. in
Ps. 13?Tn7 17.
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Grosseteste then cites the De Trinitate (V.13,14) of Augustine
where he says that the Father is the originator or begetter of
the Son because he has begotten him. Grosseteste says that Augus¬
tine's principiatio. Hilary's maioritas. and Chrysostom's causal-
itas et processio share the same intention. There is no idea
here of the Son having been created or made by the Father.
Grosseteste believes that Chrysostom destroyed the impiety of
the deformed intelligence, which wrongly interpreted the words
"maiorem Filio," when he added: "Filium non Patre esse minoreml'I
It is clear then that the Son is not less than the Father in
essentia. On such a basis Grosseteste can affirm that there is
no falsity in the Son, for this is impossible and would be con¬
trary to his very nature.
In De Ordine Emanandi Causatcrum a Deo, which has as its
other title-De Eternltate Filii in Divinis. Grosseteste emphasizes
strongly that the Son did not have esse after non-esse. He cites
reasons for the failure to understand that the Son is without
beginning when at the same time it is said that the Son proceeds
from the Father.
Multum coangustat mentes indissertas et corporalium phan-
tasmatum mutabilitate plenas, quod audiunt Filium coaeter-
num Patri et sine initio, cum Pater Filii sit causa et
Filius a Patre procedit.2
The point that Grosseteste repeatedly makes is that the Father
and the Son share in the same measure while the Creator and the
1De Lib. Arb. 8; BW 188. 2Pe Ordine: BW 147.
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creature do not:
Sic Filius coaeternus est Patri, cum Pater sit plenum prin-
cipium Filii, nec possit esse sine Filio, et Filii mensura
a mensura Patris non sit diversa.1
The Father is the full origin or principle of the Son but the
Father is not able to be such without the Son and they share in
the same measure, power, and capacity. There is no such common
measure between God and the creature. The Son must necessarily
have a beginning for those who cannot dispel certain ideas from
their imaginations and who think only in terms of a measure
inferior to the first measure. The being or existence of the
Son, however, is in the "mensura prima simplicissima":
Filius vero, cuius esse est in mensura prima simplicissima,
licet ab alio sit, non potest habuisse non-esse, quia in
mensura simplicissima non potest esse eidem esse et non-
esse.2
This statement makes clear that in the first measure, which is
most simple, a thing either is or it is not. This, of course,
would also hold within the created order. However, in the
simplicity of eternity that which has esse cannot have had a
prior non-esse and vice versa. For the simplicity of eternity
is more indivisible than any indivisible instant that we could
ever imagine. Such is the nature of the similitudo of the Son
to the Father in the simplicity of eternity. There is no in¬
equality between the Father and the Son either in essentia,
natura, or tempus.
1Ibid.: BW 143. 2Ibid.: BW 149.
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In the Hexameron Grosseteste cites a short passage from St.
Gregory of Nyssa (De Hominis Orificio) wherein Gregory speaks of
the three Persons of the Trinity as mens. verbum. and caritas.
Grosseteste says: "mens etenirn et verbum est summa Divinitas. . . .
Non ergo procul hec a natura humana conspicias; in te namque et
verbum et intelligenria, que imitantur verbum mentemque divinam."^
Insofar as man imitates the divine mens. verbum. and caritas he
images each of the three divine Persons. Man is created truth be¬
cause of his likeness to the triune God. By reason of this simi-
litudo man is said to be in the image of God. The factor to be
stressed at this point, however, is that the mens. verbum. and
caritas are single in the one most simple essentia This is the
sumrna Veritas. and the Verbum Dei or the Filius has no falsehood
in himself because he is most fully like the Father and is in
essentia that which the Father is. It is now important to see
how the Verburn Dei is related to the created order.
(3.3.2) The Word of God as norm and ground of created truth
As in the case of the divine knowing, so too in the Verbum
Dei. the innumerable relations between the one most simple essen¬
tia and the multitude of created entities in no ways destroys
that simplicity. The consideration of the role of the Verbum
Dei given below will make apparent how God is related to the
natures of created things through his eternal speaking of their
exemplary forms. In connex ion with this speaking, the relation¬
s-Hex. VII.7; Muckle 166.
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ship between the summa Veritas and created entities must be
looked at in terms of the divine knowing, willing, and effect¬
ing of created things. Grosseteste would not consider such
vantage points to be of his own choosing for they are grounded
in the nature of the divine Being, both in himself and in re¬
lation to created truth. For example, the divine knowing and
willing are closely bound up with the Sermo Patris.
The divine willing stresses more the determinative and
the causal character of God's relation to the creation. Here¬
in God is seen more as effecting what he has in his mens.
These effects are both his own deeds and the resultant creaturely
entities. In willing, the divine Nature is considered primarily
as efficient cause. Such willing must be seen, however, as
being directed in terms of the true bonum as final cause dwell¬
ing in the first intellectus or mens.
The divine knowing does not stress as much the determina¬
tive and causal character of the relation of the divine Nature
to the created order even though much knowing is also effica¬
cious. Such efficacy, for instance, does not apply to God's
knowledge of the malum through the bonum. Divine prescientia is
utilized in seeking to cope with the problematical aspects of
predestinatio. The qualities of divine knowing stressed by
Grosseteste are its immutability and necessity grounded in its
eternity,. We shall note the crucial distinctions in the divine
knowing involving different types of necessity and varying
degrees of effecting. Such diversity results from such differences
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as Godfs knowledge of his willing and his knowledge of human
willing. The divine knowing which is determinative of the natures
of things pertains to the ideae of things in the mind of God.
It is in the Verbum Dei or Sermo Patris that Grosseteste sees
the divine Being and the divine effecting in their oneness in the
one essentia. In the Verbum Dei there is similitudo in two direc¬
tions, both between the Son and the Father and between the Son
and the created entity. It is in the divine Verbum as the forma
one with the Father and the forma of created things that we find
also the effecting and the preserving of things. In contrast to
the divine willing in accordance with which a created entity is
not always or necessarily adequated, depending of course on the
sense in which the voluntas aut beneplacitum Dei is understood,
each created entity is most fully as this Verbum Dei says with
respect to the first perfection of being and possibly with re¬
spect to the second also. Thus it may be said: "Ipse igitur
Sermo Patris secundum hanc definitionem veritatis maxime Veri¬
tas est.""*"
A number of operations of the divine Nature toward the
creature are bound up in this single Verbum Dei. In accordance
with Grosseteste's presupposed framework, we see that the Verbum
is also looked upon as formal, final, and efficient cause. As
already noted, Grosseteste first of all regards the divine essen¬
tia as formal, final^and efficient cause of the creation, but in
1De_Ver.; Btf 134
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the Verbum these operations come most expressly to the fore¬
ground and it is in and through this Verbum that the effecting
takes place. It is also in conformity with this eternal speak¬
ing that a thing is said to be true. It shall become apparent
that everything that is, in whatever degree, has to have some
such conformity.
Following Augustine, Grosseteste clearly states that man
has not been created in the image of the Father or Son alone:
"non quasi Pater ad imaginem Filii fecerit hominem aut Filius
ad imaginem Patris, sed unus Deus Trinitas ad imaginem sui unius
et trini.""^ The negative point to be made here is that man is
not made simply in the image of the Son or the Father alone,
but in the image of the whole Trinity. It is important to keep
this in mind when referring to the eternal speaking of man in
the divine Verbum. Another significant qualification to be
made is that although the eternal speaking of the created thing
is situated within the Verbum Dei or Filius Dei, neither the
Son himself alone nor the whole Trinity is to be taken as the
eternal exemplar or universal of humanitas and certainly not as
the exemplar of any other created species. The exemplar of
humanitas is not the Trinity itself inasmuch as the exemplar-
humanitas is itself in the image of the Trinity. Other exemplars
of created things do not even image the Trinity. We shall see
that Grosseteste runs into difficulty in the De Veritate treatise
-'•Hex. VII. 10; Muckle 171.
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where these distinctions are not kept clearly in mind. Keeping
in mind these negative observations, we now consider in a posi¬
tive fashion the operations of the Verbum Dei in relation to
created truth.
(3.3.3) The Word of God and the eternal exemplary forms or
reasons
It was observed above that God is his own forma: "Deus
autem a seipso est id quod est."-*- Because forma is that in vir¬
tue of which a thing is what it is, God is forma and forma of
his divinity. The sense, however, is not at all similar when
we say that God is forma omnium. Grosseteste argues from the
ratio formae itself that God is form: "quia forma est, qua res
est id quod est, velut humanitas, qua homo est homo, forma hom-
inis est." It is this latter forma that is our present concern.
In the Hexameron Grosseteste makes reference to that passage in
St. Augustine's De Vera Religione (43.$l) where Augustine under
Neoplatonic inspiration discusses the "unum principale" which
is the Father of Truth and of Wisdom:
(Sapiencia Patris), que nulla ex parte dissimilis simili¬
tude eius est, dicta est et imago quia de ipso est. Ita»
eciam Filius recte dicitur ex ipso, cetera per ipsum. Pre-
cessit enim forma omnium, summe implens unum de quo est,
ut cetera que sunt in quantum sunt uni similia per earn
formam fierent.3
The consequence is not that each created thing is in some
J-De Unica: BW 10S. 2Ibid.
3Hex. VII.9; Muckle 170.
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degree divine, although Neoplatonism may direct one to such a
conclusion. All created things are what they are and have being
only through the Filius. according to the forma. The created
thing is not said to be similar to the Father of Wisdom and
Truth because it is in some manner divine. The similarity arises
because a particular creature is what he is according as the
Father has eternally spoken it. Grosseteste has in mind that
exemplar which eternally endures and in terms of which the par¬
ticular members of a species have their nature:
Itaque homines quidem pereunt, ipsa autem humanitas, ad
quam homo effingitur, permanet et hominibus laborantibus
et intereuntibus ilia nihil patitur.l
Grosseteste states that the forma that he has in mind in speak¬
ing of God as forma creaturarum is not the forma that is joined
to matter to make up the completed substance. He illustrates
what he has in mind:
Dicitur itaque forma exemplar, ad quod respicit artifex,
ut ad eius imitationem et similitudinem formet suum
artificium; sic pes ligneus, ad quem respicit autor. ut
secundum ipsum formet soleam, dicitur forma soleae.2
Grosseteste asks us to imagine the form or the similitude
of a house to be constructed as the exemplar held in the mind
of the architect or builder. He then asks us to imagine the im¬
possible, viz., that by the power of his will the architect
applies matter to the form in his mind so that the house iS
formed. Furthermore, we are to imagine that the matter is fluid,
^e Lib. Arb. 5; BW 168. 2Pe Unica: BW 109.
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so that if it should be separated from the form in the mind of
the builder it would lose its shape and cease to be a house.
Imagine also that the house remains in esse only as long as the
will of the architect applies the matter of the house to the
form. Grosseteste then applies this illustration to the forma
omnium creaturarum:
Eo itaque modo, quo forma huius in mente huiusmodi archi-
tectoris esset forma domus, est ars, sive sapientia, sive
verbum omnipotentis Dei forma omnium creaturarum. Ipsa
enim simul et exemplar est et efficiens et formans est et
in forma data conservans est, dum ad ipsam applicantur et
revocantur creaturae.l
Here it is said that the Wisdom or the Word of God is the form
of all creatures. It is not to be understood as though the Ver¬
bum Dei itself is applied to a particular entity as the form of
that thing. The Verbum Dei. however, is to be likened to the
mind of the architect or faber in which is held the form of the
thing that is to be effected as the completed substance.
In the statements just quoted we note the manifold opera¬
tion of the forma. It is the Verbum Dei as exemplar which
interests us at present. The Verbum Dei as forma efficiens.
formans, and conservans. will be examined later. It is this
transcendant forma in the Verbum Dei which is determinative of
the very nature of the created entity, thereby both making it to
be what it is and consequently holding it in existence, in being.
In contrast to the more immanent Aristotelian forma that effects
-'"Ibid.; BW 110.
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a greater degree of autonomy for a species and its members,
Grossetestefs forma is in the first place bound up with the
divine Verbum which results consequently in a radically contin¬
gent created order of things. 'Contingent' here signifies con¬
ditional or dependent existence or being. The Verbum Dei or
sapientia Dei is seen by Grosseteste then as forma. model ex¬
emplar or archetype and the effected entity is made in confor¬
mity to and in agreement with the same. Grosseteste further
elucidates the meaning of verbum and forma with another ref¬
erence to Augustine:
Partim vero elucet haec intentio formae per reliquam auc-
toritatem, quam de libro tertio decimo Confessionum posui,
ubi dicitur angelus converti ad verbum Patris ad id, a
quo factus est, ut lux fieret et conformis formae aequali
Patri id est sapientiae, in qua Pater fecit omnia.1
This particular facet of the function of the Verbum or
Sapientia of the Father brings to the fore the notion of con¬
formity, similarity, and likeness between the exemplar in the
divine Verbum and the created entity which is patterned after
it. Veritas is not now spoken of as id quod est or as that
similitudo that inheres within the divine essentia itself, but
specifically as that adaeauatio. similitudo or correspondence
that prevails and necessarily persists between the divine Ver¬
bum and the res. Veritas. thus understood, involves a relation¬
ship that necessarily obtains but is subordinate to that simili¬
tudo secundum paritatem which is found within God himself. With
1Ibid.
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respect to man Grosseteste asserted: "Homo vero similitude est
Dei Trinitatis per imitacionem.Man stands above all other
creatures on the earth by virtue of his creation in the imago
Dei. These other creatures, nevertheless, bear some similitude
to God and this is so because of a certain conformity and simi¬
litude to the Verbum Dei as forma. Creatures inferior to man
can be said to image their forma which is found in the 'Verbum
Dei.
Before proceeding to a consideration of the Verbum Dei or
the Sermo Fatris as the actual speaking of things whereby truth
as adaequatio is realized, it would be profitable to examine
further Grosseteste's thought regarding the eternal divine Word
which ante rem constitutes the very ground of created truth
both in terms of 'esse' and 'adaequatio'. Grosseteste's position
is that there can be no effecting of created truth, whether
things, thought or statements, without that ontologically prior
Word which is verurn per se. The summa Veritas in its willing,
knowing, and speaking is the very foundation of all other esse
and Veritas. The primary sense of 'Veritas' in this instance
is therefore id quod est or esse and not commensuration or
correspondence.
We have seen above how the eternal Verbum Dei is understood
by Grosseteste as forma and exemplar of the thing to be created.
Problems arise, however, concerning the actual character of such
^Hex. VII.1; Muckle 15#
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a Verbum and the implications for the whole theory of truth
when thought of in terms of relations. Part of the difficulty
arises from the somewhat strange admixture of terras and figures
such as 'sapientia1. 'sermo', 'regula', 'ratio ', 'exemplar*.
'verbum'. and 'forma'. Some of the terms seem to call more
for a visual frame of reference while others demand an audi¬
tory frame of reference. Grosseteste stresses the fact that
neither ordinary observation nor usual hearing is intended.
For in each of the two frameworks and with all the terms used,
he realizes that he is dealing with the intelligible and more,
viz., the ineffable itself. Insofar as 'verbum' is used to
signify the Filius Dei himself, it is apparent that its sense
in such a usage is far removed from the common usage when
reference is made to the printed word or the customary spoken
word. Grosseteste also asserts of the Creator and his speaking:
"Suum enim creare est suum dicere et suum scire."-*- When the
Verbum Dei is examined in its function of speaking and effecting
created entities it will be clearly seen that such a Verbum has
a creative and dynamic function.
Grosseteste also speaks of a type of speech or language
which differs from the ordinary spoken or written word:
Sed cum verior sit sermo, qui intus silet, quam qui foris
sonat, intellectus videlicet conceptus per sermonem voc-
alem, magis erit Veritas adaequatio sermonis interioris
et rei, quam exterioris; quod si ipse sermo interior esset
J-De Lib. Arb. 2; BW 155
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adaequatio sui ad rem, non solum esset sermo verus, sed
ipsa Veritas.1
This statement reflects the thinking of Anselm in his Monologion
where he discusses different types of words and speaking. The
movement here is from the expressed and written word towards the
thing spoken of and the ratio and essentia of the thing itself.
The trend is away from the notion of hearing and the auditory
altogether, and in the direction of sensible and corporeal sight,
and beyond that to the intelligible and its corresponding mental
or intellectual sight.
The nature of this "Verbum and Sermo is further indicated
where Grosseteste says: "Sapientia autem et verbum,sive 'Sermo
Patris' maxime adiquatur hoc modo adaequationis rei, quam dicit
2
et loquitur." We note here at least three factors which
clearly distinguish the speech or language of the Father from
written and spoken language as commonly understood. In the
first place, fverbum' and 'sermo' are used conjointly with 'sap¬
ientia' and other such words as 'forma' and 'exemplar'. which
have been cited above. This manifests the exceptional sense of
'verbum' as it coalesces with terms derived from a visual frame
of reference. Also, the fact that this Verbum corresponds so
completely to res shows that no typical sense can be intended.
It is also said that the Verbum speaks or expresses the thing
itself. This last mentioned function conveys the creative and
sustaining activity of the Verbum.
1De Ver. : BW 134. 2Ibid.
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It is most apparent that Grosseteste here uses 'verburn'.
'sermo', 'exemplar'. etc., figuratively and not in a strictly
literal fashion or manner. That this is the case is also made
apparent in his commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.
In speaking of predicates that are predicated simpliciter of a
subject he goes on to say: "... quia licet sint ideae et
rationes rerum increate ab aeterno in mente divina ipse ideae
nihil pertinent ad ratiocinationem in qua praedicatur aliquid
de aliquo."^- The ideae and rationes in the divine mens really
have no connection with those subjects and their predicates
which are required for ratiocination. For Grosseteste the un¬
created rationes and ideae are spoken and expressed from eter¬
nity in a manner beyond our comprehension. What holds true for
the auditory and verbal mode of expression is also true for the
notions of ratio. idea, forma, and exemplar. Insofar as he is
operating in the sphere of the intelligible, the incorporeal,
and the corresponding oculus mentis. Grosseteste is very much
aware of the inadequacy of our empirical categories and of lan¬
guage taken from ordinary sense experience. Therefore, although
he will speak of the light of the supreme Truth, man beholding
immutable truth, the vision of the essences of contingent things
in the divine mens. and the aspectus motif, Grosseteste would
not want this kind of viewing or seeing confused or identified
with observation of corporeal entities. In the treatise wherein
^Comm. Post. I. 15; f. 20
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he repudiates the notion of the eternity of motion, sempiternity,
and the eternity of the world, he asserts:
Quare scire debemus, quod multa per discursum rationis con-
vincimus esse vera, quorum essentiam non intelligimus, sicut
multi homines sciunt ostendere firma ratione, quod intelli-
gentiae sunt et quod Deus est, non tamen intelligunt essen¬
tiam divinam vel incorporeitatem intelligentiarum, sed ea
sub phantasmatibus corporalibus quasi solam sub nube vident,
et si sequantur phantasmata multas proprietates corporales
de non corporalibus false affirmant. . .
Nevertheless, the use of this kind of terminology does provide
far reaching consequences for Grosseteste's thought and method.
He does not pretend to be able to explain that which he calls
the model, form, and exemplar:
Forma vero, quae simul est exemplar et quo res est, non est
coniuncta rei, sed abstracts, simplex et separata. Haec
est forma prima, quae qualiter sit forma prima, difficule
est explanare.2
We saw how he uses certain analogies and figures in an
attempt to provide some understanding of how things are created
in agreement with their eternal rationes and regulae in the
divine Word. He used the instance of the shoemaker and the
wooden foot which serves as the model in fashioning the shoe,
the silver image or statue which serves as the form of the wax
image, the clay which was the form of the statue, and the forma
or similitudo of the house in the mind of the builder. He also
says: "Sic etiam vita feonorum, ad quam respicimus, ut ad eius
similitudinem mores vitae nostrae formemus, dicitur nobis forma
Vivendi."'* Such terminology, of course, draws from the sphere
•*"De Finitate; BW 105. 2Pe Statu: BW 125. -^Pe Unica; BW 109.
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of the visual and the pictorial and Grosseteste is aware of the
inadequacy of such analogies. This disparity is due in part to
the great distance that is fixed between the sensible and the
intelligible realms and the great gulf fixed between the summa
Veritas as Creator and the creaturely artist and builder. The
latter point is made clear in the following:
Non tamen hanc similitudinem de modo, quo Deus est forma
omnium, sicut nec supradicta attuli sicut usquequaque
congruam divinae excellentiae, quia sicut creatura eius
similitudinem etiam non potest perfecte exprimere, sic
nec mens creata.potest aliquid perfecte et ei ex omni parte
simile fingere.
These models and ideae, which have been eternally held and
expressed in the divine Word, function as the ontological ground
and the source of created being and truth. Prior to creation
itself there is the eternal Truth and the interior relations
within the divine essentia in its utter simplicity. Here there
can be no dissimilitude whatsoever but only perfect correspon¬
dence which is most clearly manifest in the Sonfs relation to
the Father and in the relation between the divine essentia and
his eternal speaking of the forms and the reasons of things to
be created. Although problematical, herein is perfect likeness
and correspondence of models to res not yet created and perfect
conformity of divine knowledge to future contingent events. It
has also been noted that the eternal ratio of mankind is in the
image of the triune God while essentially different from the
1Ibid.: BW 111.
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Son's relation to the Father. As asserted above, this simili¬
tude between the forma or ratio of man and the triune God is a
similitudo secundum imitacionem. Humanitas is found in the true
and genuine image of the Trinity. There is no dissimilitude or
falsity in this instance because God the Father did not will or
intend that man should share in his essentia. There would be a
lack of correspondence or conformity and consequent falsehood
only if the eternal forma of man was contrary to what God willed
or spoke and this is impossible. The rationes and regulae of
things to be created are as they ought to be not because they
correspond to anything outside the divine essentia, but simply
because they are the divine speaking and willing. It will be
noted that created res are true only by reason of their con¬
formity to the divine speaking and their eternal rationes in
the divine mind. As Grosseteste often asserts: "Quae regula non
aliud est, quam ratio rei aeterna in mente divina."-*- Such a
regula will also be considered truth in the highest degree after
the act of creation by virtue of its relation to the created
thing, which relation is one of complete adequation or commen-
suration. However, such a regula is truth in the first place
simply by reason of what it is and its ontological position.
Before the effecting of created entities there is, of course, no
thing outside of the most simple divine Being itself. Grosse¬
teste deals with this matter in connection with statements,
1De Ver.; BW 137
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whether necessary or contingent, that have been true from eter¬
nity. He says:
Nec exigit Veritas talis sermonis alicuius extra Deum exis-
tentiam aut coaeternitatem. Similiter igitur cum dicitur
'hoc verum aeternum est aut enuntiabile aeternum est', sus-
cipitur praedictio haec propter formam correlativam dic-
tioni in aeterno Verbo; propter quam tamen relationem nihil
exigitur extra Deum esse.l
These eternal truths do not exist outside or apart from the
esse of God. The truth of the regula. the enuntiabile or relatio.
is in the first instance its very esse as divine speech or know¬
ledge. This is in accordance with the Augustinian notion that
Veritas est id quod est and that its primary signification is
the summa Veritas. There obviously cannot be any external prin¬
ciple or norm under which and in relation to which God is found
to be the summa Veritas. His esse precedes ontologically any
adaeauatio and serves as the ultimate ground of the latter. The
rationes and regulae of created things have no truth or being
in and of themselves for they are not independent of God. It
is as God's own thought and speaking that they exist and conse¬
quently they do not depend on creaturely entities for their
truth and being. These eternal reasons of things in the divine
mind and speaking are themselves the ontological ground for
creaturely being and knowing. Grosseteste strongly insists,
however, that such rationes and eternally true enuntiabilia are
not essences existing eternally outside the supreme Truth himself.
"''Ibid.: BW 141.
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The eternal and immutable rationes and regulae expressed
by the divine Word constitute the ultimate ground of all created
essentiae. The former determine the latter. Moreover, all
creaturely beings and events are measured by these rationes and
regulae. Although true propositions concerning created essen¬
tiae do, of course, correspond to these essentiae, the ultimate
and primary correspondence is that which exists between these
propositions and the eternal rationes and formae. While Grosse-
teste does teach that these necessary truths or definitions,
composed of subjects and per se predicates, are grounded in and
do refer to primary substances (subiectum) he does not con¬
sider the latter to be the ultimate ground of these necessary
truths. He also emphasizes that although we have both subject
and predicate in the necessary truth expressed by man, neither
in the primary substance nor in the eternal ratio or forma are
there subjects and predicates. There is no subject-predicate
distinction in the subiectum and exemplary forma. Necessary
truths immutably and necessarily signify rightly by virtue of
the fact that both subject and predicate have as their ultimate
referent the immutable forma in the Word of God. The intrinsic
coherence of the necessary truth arises out of an adaequatio ad
extra, viz., the correspondence of both subject and predicate
to one and the simple ratio or forma. This latter connexion is
especially explicit in the case of mathematical truths in which
•^Comm. Post. 1.15; f. 20
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instance a direct and immediate relation or connexion between
the necessary predication and the immutable forma is most appar¬
ent.
In the divine Word then, we have the simple and perfect
ratio or forma which is truth just by virtue of the fact that
it is the speaking of the divine Word. The exemplary forma is
truth just because of what it is, not primarily because of corres¬
pondence to something outside of the supreme Truth himself.
However, it should be pointed out that the Sermo Patris. in view
of its perfect adequation to the entities it expresses, is also
the supreme adaequatio. Therefore, the Word of God is the
supreme Truth, both as esse and adaequatio. Nevertheless, with¬
out reference to anything outside the triune God these exemplary
forms are held in being in the divine Word, the iilius. "Filius
enim qui est Sapientia gehita, que sapientia est rationes omnium
creaturarum . . . . 1,1 The exemplary formae and regulae of things
are right and true as they are because of what they are. Grosse-
p
teste says of the regula that "secundum se recta est."
Although Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics (I.11) re¬
jects the being of forms or one existing beside the many, he
realizes the necessity of predicating one of the many in order
to save the universal. The universal is required, of course,
if we are to attain scientific or demonstrative knowledge. In
•^•Quaest. Theol. [ilfj; Callus 205.
2Pe Ver.: BW 137.
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his Metaphysics and also in his Posterior Analytics Aristotle
inveighs against the Platonic Forms and the substantiality of
univerbals. He says: "The Forms we can dispense with, for they
are mere sound without sense; and even if there are such things,
they are not relevant to our discussion, since demonstrations
are concerned with predicates such as we have defined."-'' In his
commentary on this very point, Grosseteste says:
Unde omne quod praedicatur simpliciter repertum est de sub-
iecto, vel in subiecto, quia formae separate a subiectis
quas posuit Plato genera et species et praedicabilia sicut
sunt prodigia in natura quae format error intellectus sicut
sunt prodigia in natura quae format natura errans, quia
licet sint ideae et rationes rerum increate ab aeterno in
mente divina ipse ideae nihil pertinent ad ratiocinationem
in qua praedicatur aliquid de aliquo. Ipse itaque ideae
in se prodigia non sunt, sed cum intellectus vult facere
eas praedicabiles de rebus a quibus sunt divise et sepa¬
rate, in hac ordinatione prodigia sunt,,. . .
Herein it is made clear that Grosseteste is aware of the thrust
of Aristotle's polemic, but at the same time Grosseteste posits
that the universal required for demonstration is grounded finally
in the simple ideae or rationes found in the divine mind. These
ideae will figure prominently in Grosseteste's epistemological
theory. Even demonstrated knowledge and syllogistic reasoning
will finally rely for their validity on the ideae increatae.
Much else can be known about these eternal formae and ideae
by virtue of the fact that such formae also constitute the ground
Analvtica Posteriori 1.22; trans. G.R.G. Mure in Introduc¬
tion to Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1947),
pp. 49-50.
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of such necessary truth as two plus three equals five. With
respect to the latter it is apparent that there need be no cor¬
respondence or reference to anything outside the supreme Truth.
There is, of course, a great deal of divine speaking and knowing
that is related to contingent reality. However, there is no
need of such an ad extra relationship in the case of the eternal
forma spoken by God that is the ground of such a necessary truth
as the equation that seven plus three equal ten. Grosseteste is
very much interested in the latter necessary truth which is true
and has esse without beginning and without end. How does he
view the 'necessary' character of such a truth? In knowing this
we shall gain a better understanding of how he views these eter¬
nal formae. Their necessary character involves more than the
fact that they are eternally true for truths concerning contin¬
gent events have also been expressed eternally by the divine
Word. Such an enuntiabile as two plus three equals five is not
for Grosseteste a truth that is necessarily true because it
happens to be a tautology or an analytical statement, nor because
it is true irrespective of every and any state of affairs. Such
an enuntiabile most certainly has a referent in terms of which
it is immutably true. It is not true simply by reason of its
logical form, neither does the nexus in terms of which it is
true fall on that level. It may appear to us that for Grosse¬
teste it is finally no more than a tautology, whereas it is such
only insofar as the nexus whereby the terms on each side of the
equation are joined is one simple immutable ratio or forma spoken
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by God. In the supreme Truth there is the simple identity of
both terms. That two plus three equals five is necessarium sim-
pliciter is due finally to the immutable divine Word alone.
Having said that these exemplars and forms have been spoken
eternally and immutably in the divine Word, the question remains
as to whether they could possibly have been spoken differently
from all eternity or whether altogether different rationes could
have been uttered. This is a most significant question concern¬
ing these necessary true statements because they have not been
declared to be true simply by virtue of logical form irrespec¬
tive of every conceivable state of affairs. Grosseteste wants
to assert that such statements refer to what could possibly be
termed an 'eternal state of affairs', and the question yet
outstanding is whether such a state could have been different.
As did Anselm, Grosseteste used rather extensively the
notions of antecedent and consequent necessity.He uses these
notions in particular in trying to cope with the difficulties
relating to true statements concerning future contingent events.
Problems pertaining to divine knowledge and speaking of contin-
gent res and events will be dealt with later. Grosseteste clearly
adopts Anselm's understanding of antecedent and consequent ne¬
cessity. Grosseteste states:
Sed necessitas est duplex: una, quae cogit rem ad esse et
^These notions have already been discussed in connexion with
Anselm; cf. Chapter II, Part B. (2.2.2). These notions are also
discussed later on, e.g., (3.4).
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est necessitas antecedens: alia, quae sequitur esse rei et
non cogit rem ad esse et est neeessitas consequens. —
Necessitas enim motus Solaris et lunaris cogit eclipsim
ad esse. Sed necessitas huiusmodi: me vidisse heri Socra-
tem currere, non cogit Socratem ad currendum, sed consecuta
est cursum Socratis.l
There can be no doubt that consequent necessity applies both to
the nature of supreme Truth and its willing. This necessity
also characterizes contingent events after their occurrence.
That the creation has its antecedent cause in the Creator is
not disputed. The question is whether the supreme Truth could
have spoken or willed rationes and formae different from those
he has willed. God is not forced to will or act as he has be¬
cause of some cause antecedent to himself. It could be said
parenthetically that Grosseteste does not wish to speculate
about naked posse with respect to God but is more concerned about
the divine actuality. He is particularly interested in what
God has spoken and willed and which cannot be otherwise than it
is in view of consequent necessity. Once God has spoken some
thing or has known some thing it is impossible for him there¬
after not to know or not to speak that same thing. God*s know¬
ledge is immutable. He does not cease to know what he knows
nor does he acquire new knowledge.
In his De Libero Arbitrio and its recensio Grosseteste is
preoccupied with the eternal divine speaking and knowing which
are immutable. The stakes are very great in this case insofar
-*-De Scientia Dei; BW 146.
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as Grosseteste is concerned to preserve intact the human free
will in relation to the immutable divine speaking, willing, and
knowing. What he has to say in this context pertaining to the
free will of man is most relevant to the question relating to
the necessary character of the forma exemnlaris. Grosseteste
speaks against those who would say that God only knows univer-
sals and not singulars and that he is able not to know what he
now does know. He states: "Sed ex hoc sequitur ipsius |Beus^]
scientiam esse alterabilem, quod manifeste falsum est et contra
omnes sanctos."-'- This applies equally to God's eternal knowing
and speaking of the eternal reasons and forms of things to be
created. More is involved here than consequent necessity alone
for this necessity applies to human knowing and speaking in
which something known may be forgotten and something not yet
known may be known at a later time. Consequent necessity simply
means that what has been can no longer not have been, which is
quite different from asserting that a certain thing or event
was forced to be by an antecedent necessity. According to Gros¬
seteste God is not subject to any exterior force or antecedent
necessity. God has not been forced by any exterior necessity
to express immutably the eternal rationes and formae. However,
although God is not subject to any exterior necessity, his im¬
mutable and eternal expression of these formae is subject to and
governed by his own nature. God's knowledge, willing, and speak¬
ing are immutable because of his own immutable nature.
ipe Lib. Arb. 2; BW 153-159
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Another question, already cited, is still to be considered.
Grosseteste discusses the attempt to preserve the free will and
creaturely contingency by asserting that the divine speaking and
knowing could have been different. Granted that his knowledge
is immutable, the issue is whether his knowledge could not have
been eternally and immutably different. This is an attempt to
safeguard the free will of man and creaturely contingency through
imputing a certain degree of contingency to the divine activity.
With respect to the forma of such a truth as "septem et tria
esse decern" it would appear that God could not possibly have
spoken differently.
As noted above, Grosseteste holds that temporal sequence
or priority are not to be found in the simple eternity of God:
Item: Omne posse, quod est sine actu suo, est respectu
actus sui ad hoc futuri. Sed in Deo nihil futurum. Ergo
nec aliqua possibilitas respectu actus futuri.1
He says further: "Item: In aeternis nihil praecedit aliud natura
tempore vel spatio."^ Grosseteste questions therefore whether
there can be such as a "posse oppositorum" in eternity because
such a posse precedes the actuality of one or other of the op-
posites. There could not have been a period of time then in
which God contemplated a number of possibilities after which
time he willed or spoke one or several of them. Grosseteste
does allow for a causal priority in eternity as in the case of
the Father preceding the Son causaliter. It is stated that
1Ibid. 7; BW 174. 2Ibid.: BW 175.
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"rationales potestates" are capable of opposites: "Ergo cum eius
[jJeus^] potestas sit summe rationalis, nulla potestas magis erit
oppositorum.This causal priority is further explained:
Haec prioritas causalis insinuatur ex significatione prae-
teriti per hoc verbum fpotuit1, cum dico: 'Deus potuit non
scivisse Af, et cum dicitur 'Peus posset non scivisse A*
• • •
The question that persists is whether God, in whom there
is only causal priority, might have spoken or willed differently
than he has spoken and willed. Grosseteste makes a key distinc¬
tion at this point between considering the nature of God absolutely
in terms of infinite power, or considering the same in terms of
works performed and Godfs relationship to the creation. God is
able to will what he has not willed so far as sheer potentia is
concerned. Grosseteste, however, goes on to say:
Si autem consideretur non absolute, sed in ratione, qua
vult vel scit unum aliquod, non potest eius oppositum
scire et velle.3
According to the infinite power of God we could say that
God could have created an infinite number of worlds. "Si vero
ipsa eadem respiciatur in agendis ordinatissima, impossibile
est . . . .^ Again, in consideration of the most perfectly or¬
dered divine activity we cannot say that God could have created
more worlds or no world. With respect to divine potentia Grosse-
^De Lib. Arb.. recensio. 9; BW 176.
2Ibid.: BW 178. 3Pe Lib. Arb. 8; BW 181.
^•De Lib, Arb.. recensio, 9; BW 180.
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teste would concur with Augustine that God would have been able
to save or liberate mankind in another way. "Sed se considere-
tur jdeusj omnia agens convenientissime, non potuit aliter lib-
erasse hominem."^ In the latter sentiment Grosseteste agrees
with Anselm (De Concord. Praesc. Grat. et Lib, Arb.. 3). So too
with respect to the timing of creation Grosseteste states that
it would not have been suitable for the world to have been
created before it was created, if in every single part being is
considered to be divided most suitably. Grosseteste in addition
does not allow for what he calls a vain or useless possibility:
"Si vero haec possibilitas est impossibilis ad actum suum deduci,
cassa est. Sed Deus nullam possibilitatem cassam facit. Prae-
terea nullo modo dicitur possibilitas, si impossibilis est ad
2
actum deduci." When we talk about abstract and absolute divine
potentia we are speaking of empty and futile possibility because
we are not taking into consideration a concrete actuality which
renders other possibilities cassus. Against the background
given above we acquire some understanding of the necessary char¬
acter of these eternal reasons of things found in the divine mind.
Ergo cum rationes sint sempiternae, stabiles, immutabiles,
vivantque non vita mortali, sed immortali, ipsae rationes
sunt necessariae; ex quibus necessario sequunter res tem-
porales, mutabiles, corruptibiles, contingentes.-*
It is the triune God that is causally prior to these exemplary
•^Ibid. ^Ibid.. recensio. 8; BW 173.
3Pe Lib. Arb. 5; BW 167.
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forms which function in a normative capacity in relation to
subsequent created entities, statements relating to the same,
and such necessary truths as considered above. It is important
to realize the different senses that Grosseteste attributes to
Tnecessitas1 and tnecessarium*. The eternal reasons or forms
must be further examined in their normative function as the
ground of the being of created truth.
It may seem that the exemplary and archetypal forms and
reasons of created things spoken in the divine Word preclude
any dynamism and process of becoming within the created structure.
On the contrary, by detaching the final and formal exemplars
and causes of things from the created themselves in relation to
which the created entities possess varying degrees of being,
Grossetestefs doctrine makes possible a greater degree of be¬
coming within creation. There is also the substantial form
that is joined to the thing itself by which the thing is what
it is. It will be seen that the actuality of a creature is its
agreement with its form and its potency is its dissimilitude to
the same. It is not that form which is joined to the thing it¬
self which is the final ground of the being of the thing itself.
The exemplary cause and form which is altogether outside the
thing is the final ground of its being. The latter is of much
more significance than the form that is immanent within creation.
The supreme Truth is the "rectitudo rectificans" which makes
possible "rectitudines rectificatae.The created entity has
1De Ver.; BW 135.
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its truth and being by virtue of its relation to the measure by
which it is measured, viz., the supreme Truth.
How then do these reasons in the divine Word function as
the ground of creaturely being and also allow for movement and
becoming in the creaturely realm? These rationes have a twofold
character both as final and formal causes and consequently, as
such, they serve as the basis for the first and second plenitude
of created being. Final and formal cause are not to be looked
upon as two distinct exemplars but only as a distinction within
the one exemplar spoken with reference to a particular creature
to be created. The created being moves within the confines
designated by these polarities of the exemplar. A thing must
be conformed to the exemplar as formal cause if the thing is to
have any being whatsoever. How is the exemplary form a final
cause?
In his discussion of Aristotle's four causes Grosseteste
speaks as follows concerning the final cause o#- finis; "Dicitur
enim primum bonum intentum in mente agentis et secundo modo
dicitur finis quod est ultimum in re operata."^- The finis or
bonum of the thing to be created is in the mind of God the agent.
The true good or end exists in the first Intellect. That species
of the good existing in the human anima is only a similitude of
the true end or purpose existing outside the anima. Grosseteste
would also speak of the finis of the thing to be created as the
^-De Statu; BW 125.
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ultimate form of the thing which causes its motion: "...
et hoc est idem cum ultima forma rei et proprie appellatur
terminus sive finis intentus."3, The exemplary form is certainly
no less than the full and perfect form and this includes the
finis to be realized and fulfilled by the created thing informed.
Grosseteste puts the following rhetorical question: "Item: quid
est forma, nisi completio rei sive perfectio?"^ In commenting
on AristotleTs contention that we have scientific knowledge of
things in knowing their causes Grosseteste says:
Manifestum est itaque quod in his quae sunt a natura aut
arte semper est causa finalis id quod est secunda perfectio
et bonitas eius, sed in rebus fortuitis nihil fit propter
aliquid.3
The exemplary form as the ultimate form and the finis of the
entity to be created brings forward the second perfection and
the goodness of the thing. This is the norm, and for the crea¬
ture to have fulness of esse he must be conformed to the ultimate
form. Grosseteste states further: "Finis vero est causa formae
et forma est causa materiae, et materia non est nisi occasio
formae ut sit, et finis etiam est causa efficientis inquantum
efficiens.
Grosseteste speaks of how the efficient, formal and final
causes are combined into one:
Efficiens autem, quod hafoet in se potentiam et actum, non a
potentia, sed ab actu dicitur efficiens, quia actus effici-
1Ibid.; BW 126. 2Pe Unica: BW 108.
3Comm. Post. II.3; f. 36. 4Ibid.: II.2; f. 34.
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entis per aliquam multiplicationem fit causa formalis
effecti, et non in quantum intelligitur, sed inguantum
diligitur hoc est inquantum est bonum et finis.1
Although this is not strictly applicable to the supreme Truth
and the exemplary forms, it does shed some light on the relation
between final cause and the formal cause. The supreme Truth, in
speaking the exemplary reasons of things, perfectly understands
and loves that which he speaks. He also effects the creature in
accordance with the exemplary form understood and loved. The
supreme Truth creates things with a view to their full realiza¬
tion of the bonum or finis intended. In contrasting the supreme
Truth as efficient cause with created efficient causes as secon¬
dary causes, Grosseteste says that in the latter the "intentio
boni" is added over and above the "speculationem essentiae."
It is considerably different with the substantia simplicissima
in which the intentio boni is not added over and above the con¬
templation of the essence of the thing.
Although the eternal reasons of things are certainly nothing
less than the perfect and ultimate forms of things, and can be
nothing less, they may function also as determinative and norma¬
tive forms which in a more static fashion distinguish one species
from another species. This means that an entity can belong to
a particular species and have plenum esse primurn without having
attained perfect conformity to the ultima forma. Grosseteste
^"De Statu: BW 121.
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has entities corresponding in varying degrees to the finis or
ultima forma which is transcendent and primary. The substantial
form that is joined to the thing itself is much inferior to the
exemplary form in the mind of God. In fact, Grosseteste has a
number of levels on which the forms are to be found. The fourth
and lowest is the level of the created res. He states: "Quarto
modo cognoscitur res in sua causa formali quae est in ipsa a
qua ipsa est hoc est . . . . He speaks further regarding these
most disparate forms:
. . . et nihil est creature nisi species duplex, scilicet
species aliquo modo genita ex e^, per quam est cognitio
incompleta; et species antecedens, scilicet forma eius
exemplaris, que est tota causa et verissima individui, et
eadem una omnium.
In this statement we have a clear reference to the form that
is to be found in the singular creature itself, setting it apart
from other singulars both of its own and other species. Refer¬
ence is also made to the antecedent form or exemplary form which
is the most true and complete cause of the particular. Each
individual entity has no less than plenum esse primurn whereby
it has membership in a particular species, and for this degree
esse it is radically dependent on the forma exemplaris which
is its ground of being. Grosseteste says of the exemplary form:
"Igitur per earn est verissima cognitio uniuscuiusque individui,
^Comm. Post. 1.7# f.
2Guaest. Theol. (i); Callus 195.
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sed non est divisa per singula, sed una est omnium et etiam
unius tantum."^ The exemplary form is also the ground of the
truest knowledge of any single individual. The exemplary form
does not suffer division or multiplicity in relation to singu¬
lars which of course possess varying degrees of being. The ex¬
emplary form is one and yet it has a particularized relationship
to every member of the species of which it is the exemplar.
Grosseteste does not spell out precisely the exact character of
the immanent forma joined to the created entity and how it com¬
pares to the universalia incorruptibilia and the forma exemplaris
in the divine mind. This is partially apparent in the following
words: "... quia forma est, qua res est id quod est, velut
humanitas, qua homo est homo, forma hominis est."2 The ambi¬
guity revolves around the intended sense of such a word as
'humanitas' in the different contexts in which such a word is
used. The meaning is> sufficiently clear where the referent is
plainly the forma in the divine V/ord. Such is not the case
where Grosseteste is using such a word as 'humanitas' with re¬
gard to the immanent form that is situated in the composite
particular. It appears that in the latter case he has in mind
that which is similar to Aristotle's universal or which is sit¬
uated in the members of the infima species. This is apparent
where Grosseteste speaks of "verus homo" as the man having first
fulness of being: "... verus homo est animal, quod componitur
1Ibid.: Callus 195-196. 2Pe Unica: BW 108.
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ex corpore et anima rationali.Grosseteste uses the above
definition to illustrate the plenum esse primum. It is clear,
however, that Grosseteste's understanding of the nature of
humanitas extends far beyond this definition. Grosseteste's
commentary on formal definition offers some light:
Diffinitio autem formalis dicitur ostendere quod quid erat
esse, quod forma est vere essentia ipsius rei, et dat esse
proprie. Materia autem dat proprie potentiam essendi, sicut
supra plenius expraessum est.2
Regardless of how the immanent forma in the composite is
understood and defined, the created entity's ground of being lies
ultimately within the divine Being itself.
Cognitiones enim rerum causandarum quae fuerunt in causa
prima aeternaliter sunt rationes rerum causandarum, et
causae formales exemplares et ipse sunt creatrices, et hae
sunt quas vocavit Plato ideas et mundum archetypum, et hae
sunt secundum ipsum genera et species et principia tarn
essendi quam cognoscendi, ... .3
There is also a penultimate ground of being which are the "cog¬
nitiones" in the "ipsa mente intelligentiae." An antepenulti¬
mate ground of being of terrestrial species is in the powers and
lights of celestial bodies which serve as their causal powers.
These latter two grounds are created and intermediate grounds of
being for terrestrial species. They in turn are dependent on
the supreme Truth for their being.
The ground then, of the rationes sempiternae is in the
divine Word itself. The ideae creatae and the universalia incor-
-*-Be Ver.: BW 135.
3Ibid. 1.7; f. 8.
^ Comm. Post. II.3; f. 35.
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tuptibilia. which in their own way serve as grounds of the
being of singular terrestrial entities, derive their actus from
the supreme Truth. They find their potential existence in the
supreme Truth as the efficient cause. Such is also true of the
created composite. Grosseteste realizes that potentia is used
in a number of different senses. There is the potentia of pre¬
serving a completed thing in being. He speaks of other senses
as well:
Dicitur enim ens potencia quod presencialiter est, sed in-
completum et imperfectum est, ut materia. Dicitur e.ciam
ens potencia quod non presencialiter est, sed possibile
est esse, ut dies crastina.-*-
In speaking of the thing to be created as having potential
existence or existence in potentia Grosseteste does not have in
mind the entity that is "presencialiter" but "incompletum et
imperfectum." He has in mind that which is not "presencialiter"
but which is possible and has esse in potentia. The example
"dies crastina" given above is more illustrative of what Grosse¬
teste has in mind when he says that every creature has been in
potency from all eternity inasmuch as its causes have been pre¬
sent from eternity in the efficient cause. All immanent and
created causes exist in potentia in the one eternal efficient
cause. For some created thing to be possible and potential
there must be something that is in actus. which may be the su¬
preme Truth alone or the same along with created causes. The
^Comrri. Phvs. I; Dales 27.
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thing that is to be created most certainly exists qua creature
only after it has been effected. The eternal rationes of
creatures, however, have had complete actuality from all eter¬
nity. As D. A. Callus remarks in his essay entitled "Robert
Grosseteste as Scholar," 'potentiality' and 'possibility' are
often used in a confused fashion by Grosseteste. A degree of
confusion arises because the meaning of 'possibilis' is not
always made clear and explicit. Grosseteste states: "Omne
itaque possible esse, cum adhuc non sit, dico esse in potentia;
et omne, quod est in potentia, possibile est esse. — "1 He
does clearly state that what lacks a required cause is impossible
and consequently cannot be considered to be in potentia. It
seems that 'possibilis' in this context does not refer so much
to that which is contingent as to the power or capability of
effecting and the possibility implied in potentiality. If this
is so, then that which is possibilis can be at the same time be
necessarius in terms of antecedent necessity. Such is certainly
the case with respect to the determination of the natures of
created entities by the eternal exemplary forms. Grosseteste's
more common and explicit usage of 'potentia' occurs where it
is used almost interchangeably with 'materia' in which case it
refers to a composite entity that is not yet completely actus.
'Potentia' in this usage refers to that capability or potenti¬
ality whereby an incomplete entity may proceed to completion.
•k)e Potentia et Actu: BW 126.
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Such potentia signifies incompleteness and also the potentiality
or possibility of achieving complete actuality. This is illus¬
trated where he says that the "Embryo intenditur propter homi-
neiri et est via in hominem."^ Actuality is dictated by forma.
However, what has been of interest to us at this point is the
potential existence of created forms grounded in the supreme
Truth and its "Verbo, quo aeternaliter dicuntur."2 It is clear
that this potentia of future created things involves a consider*-
able degree of antecedent necessity.
(3.3.4) The supreme Truth and exemplary forms as principium
ccgnoscendi.
The supreme Truth and the exemplary forms therein also serve
as the principium cognoscendi. This is not the place for a de¬
tailed consideration of Grossetestefs epistemological theory but
we do well to note briefly how the divine Word and its exemplary
reasons serve as the final ontological ground of all knowledge.
This will help to show how Grosseteste's doctrines of being and
knowledge are integrated and interrelated.
At the very outset it ought to be observed that cognitio is
finally possible only because of the esse of the supreme truth
which is intelligible and knowable a se. In the manner in which
the supreme Truth is the principium essendi of all contingent
esse, it reriders possible knowledge qua knowledge in terms of
1Ibid.: BW 128. 2Pe Ver.; BW 135.
3#5
its very existence. Grosseteste acknowledges the contingent
character of the very esse of human knowledge regardless of what
the particular content happen to be. He recognizes the dialec¬
tical character of cognitio wherein it is seen both in terms of
its own being and as cognition of entities outside itself.
Such teaching does not permit human knowledge to become so
easily absolutized as is the case where knowledge qua knowledge
is not seen in terms of its own contingent being. Knowledge
qua knowledge, just as enuntiatio qua enuntiatio. without con¬
sideration of its content, has a degree of esse just by reason
of a degree of conformity to the eternal exemplar which is deter¬
minative of its peculiar nature as knowledge.
The supreme Truth and its exemplary rationes are responsible
for the intelligibility of created things. The supreme Truth
and the eternal exemplars are intelligible by reason of their
own nature and can be contemplated by the intellectus purus.
Ad hoc dicendum quod universalis sunt principia cognoscendi,
et apud intellectum purum et separatum a phantasmatibus
possible est contemplari lucem primam quae est causa prima,
et sunt principia cognoscendi rationes rerum increatas
existentes ab aeterno in causa prima.1
The uncreated rationes serve the intellectus that is pure and
free from corporeal images as the ground of knowledge in a very
direct and immediate fashion. The knowledge of the nature of a
particular species can be acquired in this manner. Created
things are knowable because they have been made in conformity to
•*-Comm. Post. 1.7* f-
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these rationes. Levels of created intelligibility correspond
to the hierarchy of levels of created being. This ranges from
the lux creata which is intelligentia down to the forma or causa
formalis which is part of the concrete composite entity itself.
As already noted,^ knowledge derived from the forma present in
the thing itself is not altogether complete. Grosseteste speaks
of the "intelligibiles" and the "scibiles"^ which can be appre¬
hended by "visus interior," which is mental vision. The intelr-
ligibiles are not visible to the eye of the mind simply by
reason of their own essential nature plus the faculty of mental
sight. The supreme Truth or first Light plays a continuing and
immediate role in all of human knowing. Reference is here made
to the great doctrine of illumination which has such a signifi¬
cant place in Augustine's thought.
Attention is here focused upon the doctrine of illumination
for the purpose of showing how the supreme Truth or Light and
the exemplary rationes serve as principium cognoscendi in terms
of illumination. Grosseteste speaks of a lux spirltualis which
is contrasted with the lux which is the "prima forma corporalis."
Grosseteste says of the lux which is the first corporeal form:
Lux vero omnibus rebus corporalibus dignioris et nobilioris
et excellentioris essentiae est, et magis omnibus corporibus
assimilatur formis stantibus separatis, quae sunt intelli-
gentiae.3
^Cf. p. 379, n. 2. 2Comm. Post. I. 19; f. 27.
^De Luce; BW 52.
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This light is responsible for corporeal extension and approaches
the immaterial forms but it is not to be equated with the lux
soiritualis which makes possible the vision of the intelligi-
biles. Concerning the lux spiritualis Grosseteste says:
Dico ergo quod est lux spiritualis quae superfunditur rebus
intelligibiles, et oculus mentis quae se habet ad oculum
interiorem ad res intelligibilis, sicut se habet sol cor-
poralis ad oculum corporalem et ad res corporales visi-
biles.l
This spiritual light is shed abroad upon res intelligibiles and
the oculus interior so as to illumine their true and essential
natures. This light is provided by the lux prima for the mind
of every knower, not just for the intellectus rurus. Some
intelligible things are more visible than others: "Res igitur
intelligibilies magis receptibiles huius lucis spiritualis magis
visibiles sunt oculo interiori, et magis sunt lucis receptibiles
p
quae naturae huius lucis magis assimilantur." Grosseteste goes
further than this in his theory of illumination and speaks of
knowing the truth of things only in the light of the supreme
Truth.
Veritas igitur etiam creata ostendit id, quod est, sed non
in suo lumine, sed in luce veritatis summae, sicut color
ostendit corpus, sed non nisi in luce superfusa ....
Similiter potentia est lucis summae veritatis, quae sic
illustrat veritatem creatam, quod ipsa etiam illustrata
ostendit rem veram .... Sola igitur lux summae veritatis
primo et per se ostendit id, quod est, sicut sola lux
ostendit corpora.3
^Comm. Post. I. 17; f. 21. 2Ibid
3Pe Ver.: BW 137.
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This more immediate and direct illumination is the more signi¬
ficant ground of knowing from Grosseteste's point of view.
Whereas the illumination provided by the created spiritual light
makes possible knowledge of intelligible natures, the lux veri-
tatis summae shows forth the very truth and being of the res.
"Whereas the former is instrumental in acquiring knowledge of
immanent essentiae and universalia. the latter illumination
enables the knower to achieve knowledge of the very truth of the
singular entity which is to know it as it is in actus. Whereas
the doctrine of the spiritual light gives to the intellectus a
more active role in knowledge, the latter divine illumination
is the more immediate activity of the supreme Truth whereby he
shows forth or discloses the degree of esse or Veritas possessed
by a finite singular. Concerning divine illumination in Augus-
tinianism, Gordon Leff says:
More than anything else, it expresses the essentially super¬
natural, ideal nature of truth and reality, which can only
come through God's aid. This illumination differed from
Neoplatonism and Arabian determinism in being the direct
gift of God; ultimately, therefore, it depended less on
intellectual clarity than on the inclination of the soul.
Intuition of the truth was, as with St. Augustine, part of
a way of life.l
This function of the supreme truth as the ground of the knowledge
of created truth clearly shows how dependent the human mens or
intellectus is on exterior illumination both of the mind and of
the created entity itself. The truth of the thing is seen in
"^Leff, Medieval Thought, p. 192.
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the thing itself, but not in its own light. The lux of the supreme
Truth shows forth, exposes to view (ostendo). its own being and
also the nature and truth of the created res. The principium coe-
noscendi lies outside the mind and consequently the mind must be
directed outside itself both towards the supreme Truth and towards
created truth. Grossetestefs epistemology is to be discussed
more fully below.
(3.4) The supreme Truthfs knowledge of created truth
Grosseteste also speaks of the supreme Truth and his knowl¬
edge of created things and contingent events before creation and
ante rem. This cognitive truth is perfect and immutable even
though it is held in relation to contingent and mutable beings.
Herein we have truth as knowledge in which there is perfect adae-
quatio with that which is known. This knowledge, in part, is
normative or determinative and descriptive at the same time. How¬
ever, it is also, in part, simply descriptive but perfectly true
nevertheless. Divine knowledge of singulars has special relevance
to the matter of the individuation of the singulars of an infima
species.
God obviously can and does know contingent created entities
without recourse to sense. In De Libero Arbitrio Grosseteste
asserts that the knowledge of God is unchanging and that from a
all eternity he knows all things in one view. Does God know
created things only in the eternal ratio that he has spoken, in
universalia? Grosseteste answers those who would attempt to save
creaturely contingency by holding that God does not know this
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particular A but only universalia. Grosseteste bases his reply
on citations from the Scriptures, Seneca, Boethius, Augustine,
and on ratiocinatio. The arguments are such as the following:
Item: cum sit singularium creator, de necessitate cognoscit
ipsa.
Item: si Deus nesciret singularia, tu multa scires, quae
Deus ignoraret. Hoc autem absurdum est dicere.2
Item non amatur, nisi quod cognoscitur. Et Deus, cum non
sit ingratus, diligentes se diligit. Ergo et ipsos cog¬
noscit.-'
Granted that God knows singular res in addition to the
rationes and universalia. the manner in which God knows these
things must yet be declared. Partly as an attempt to defend
the immutability of the divine knowledge of changing things,
past and future, and partly in an effort to set forth the most
excellent character of this knowledge, Grosseteste states that
God knows according to the immaterial form which is the total
and most sufficient cause of the particular substance "et ideo
per earn ^species immaterialis]] vere cognoscitur individuum; et
hec species est una omnium substantiarum, non sicut forma uni¬
versalis, sed verissime una."^ This or that singular created
res is thus said to be known by God in a most perfect fashion,
that is, "in puritate essentiae suae, non concernendo earn cum
1De Lib. Arb. 2; BW 155. 2Ibid.; BW 156.
3Ibid.; BW 157.
^•Quaest. Theol. [~lj (i); Callus 195.
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accidentibus.God knows this singular as this singular in
the antecedent exemplary cause of the thing itself. God knows
what he has spoken, and in his Word which is responsible for
the being of the singular he knows that same singular. God
knows such things apart from all the tenses and mutations of
time: "Eius enim scientia cadit super ipsas essentias rerum non
relatas ad temporum mutationes.Such an essentia is not seen
either as that which is past or as that which is future but as
that which is eternally present. For each created singular
thing there is a corresponding singular act of divine knowing
in which the forma exemplar!s is applied to each member of a
species. As noted above,^ the exemplary form is simple and not
divided according to singulars, but at the same time it is the
form of the one single thing alone. The singular has the forma
as its own particular forma through the divine speaking and
knowing which demands particular application.
The divine speaking and knowing of the singular in its
essential nature play a determinative role with respect to the
individuation and individuality of the various members of a
species. In this connexion I wish to cite an observation made
by D. E. Sharp.
This [form as.the essence of a thing] might lead to the
identification of the form and the existent being, and
^Comm. Post. I. 14; f. 1&. 2Be Lib. Arb. 2; BW 160.
^Cf. p. 379, n. 2; p. 3&0, n. 1.
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certainly Pamphilus Montius Bononiensis, the author of the
marginal notes in Grosseteste's Comm. on the Post. An,,
does say (cf. f. £r) that form is that which expresses the
individuality of a being and concludes that Grosseteste
regards form as the principle of individuation; but, in
point of fact, the problem of what distinguishes the form
as involved in this composite from a like form as involved
in any other composite did not occur to Grosseteste, unless
he discussed it in the lost Commentary on the Metaphysics.1
Grosseteste may not be as explicit as he could be on the matter
of individuation but he does provide a basis for distinguishing
the immanent forma in one composite from the forma in another com¬
posite. For Grosseteste, materia is clearly not the basis for
the individuation of forma. In Grosseteste's hylomorphic theory
each substance within the species receives its individuality
from its own forma whereby it is what it is. The forma of one
member of a species can be distinguished from the forma of
another member of the same species on the basis of singularity
alone. Varying degrees of actuality or being also distinguish
one singular from another. The ultimate ground of individuality,
however, is not to be found in the created res itself but rather
in the divine Word where each singular entity is expressed.
Singularity and individuation arise out of the divine speaking
in which the exemplary forms are expressed individually for each
singular entity.
There are, of course, other distinguishing characteristics
which are responsible for the differences between one member of
a species and another. The primary distinguishing factor is the
''"Sharp, op. ext., p. 16, rj« 3•
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degree of being possessed by one singular in contrast to another
of the same species. There are also the accidental features
which do not differentiate forma from forma but which are obser¬
vable to the senses. These other differentiating features are
also known by God. It was noted above that God knows created
res in their antecedent exemplars and in the purity of their
essences separated from all accidents.
God, however, is also perfectly cognizant of all beings as
contingent entities. This knowledge differs from the normative
knowing but is no less eternal and immutable. God knows every
contingent particular and every singular just as it is: "Igitur
Deus, qui solus per hanc novit tantum se, novit et tamen omnia
et etiam singula verissime sicut sunt."-*- This immutable and
eternally true divine knowledge proved to be problematical for
Grosseteste when discussing the free will. Can the contingent
be preserved when the divine knowledge pertaining to it is eter¬
nally true? Grosseteste sees a similar problem with respect to
the divine speaking that has been eternally and immutably true
concerning future contingent events. Grosseteste poses the
problem in De Scientia Dei:
Si Deus scit antichristum esse vel fuisse vel fore, anti-
christus est vel fuit vel erit. Sed antecedens est necess-
arium. Ergo et consequens est necessarium. Si autem
antecedens est contingens, accidit permutationem aut decep-
tionem posse cadere in Deum. Et etiam si consequens fuerit
contingens, cum sit convertible cum antecedente, alia
^"Quaest. Theol. jjlf] (i); Callus 196
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inconvenientia videntur accidere: si enim antichristum erit,
Deus scit illud, aut aliquid latet eum, quod est incon-
veniens.1
Grosseteste is operating with the axiom that the necessary-
follows necessarily from the necessary. He feels that he must
assert what is contrary to the rules of logic and the syllogism:
"... non videtur modus evadendi, nisi dicendo ex necessariis
2
sequi contingens." Grosseteste's intention is not merely to
save contingency in general but he is concerned in particular to
protect such as the liberum arbitrium and what it may will, and
the contingency of antichristus. He wants to maintain both the
necessary and immutable divine knowledge and the contingency
within the created order.
In using the syllogistic rule which states that from the
necessary antecedens follows the necessary conseauens Grosse¬
teste is assuming that the 'necessary* divine knowledge and its
relation to the contingent is sufficiently akin to the necessary
premise and its causal relation to its conclusion to make the
application feasible. This assumption compels him to assert
that which is contrary to the logical rule. However, he con¬
tinues to utilize the causal inference facet of the logical rule
while at the same time substituting a contingent consequent.
How then can creaturely contingency be maintained?
•1-De Scientia Dei; BW 145.
2Pe Lib. Arb. 4; BW 166.
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In De Scientia Dei Grosseteste utilizes the notions of
antecedent and consequent necessity in seeking to resolve the
above difficulty. He also questions the applicability of the above
logical rules when dealing with the simple eternity of God and
his necessary knowledge of contingent events. He says that in
logic we deal with the contingent, the necessary, and the im¬
possible "quorum una est mensura, verbi gratia, ut necessarii
mensura sit tempus secundum suam universalitatem, sicut et con-
tingentis secundum suam partem."1 This explains why in logic
the contingent cannot follow from or after the necessary and
the impossible from the contingent. He warns against the attempt
to measure the simple eternity of God according to a measure
taken from time:
Cum autem per mensurationem aeternitatis infinitae imag-
inatur mensuratum a temporis totalitate, accidit nobis
ab hac imaginations deceptio, a qua non possumus absolvi,
donee mentis oculus purgatus a temporis compositions
ascendat ad contemplationem simplicis aeternitatis.2
Grosseteste asserts that God knows all things in one view
and what is a future event for man is a present reality for God.
God knows every entity and event in the indivisable simplicity
of eternity. This divine knowledge does not destroy the contin¬
gency of that which is known, for necessity in this instance is
consequential and not antecedent. God's knowledge of future
things is to be compared to my present knowledge of my present
sitting. The necessity of such divine knowledge is comparable
1De Scientia Dei: BW 146. ^Ibid.
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to the necessity of my knowledge that I sat after I sat. That
is Grosseteste*s method of showing how creaturely contingency
remains intact in the face of the eternal and immutable divine
knowledge of the same contingency. He has this to say regarding
necessitas seauens and conseauens:
Hac sequente et nihil efficiente necessitate necessarium est,
Deum scire meam sessionem eras futuram et similia. . . .
Ergo omni simili modo, quo necesse est, Deum scire res, cum
sint vel praeterita sint, necesse est, eum scire easdem
antequam sint . . . . sic ex necessitate scientiae Dei
sequitur futurum contingens.l
In this case it is clearly manifest that the necessary knowledge
of God is not to be understood as antecedent necessity or effi¬
cient cause which forces that which is known into existence.
If there is a causal relationship, it is the contingent res
which is responsible for the eternal and immutable knowledge of
God concerning this res. This is to be distinguished from that
divine knowledge which is causal and determinative.
Grosseteste's proposed solution rests, therefore, on two
basic notions in particular. One of these is the doctrine of
simple aeternitas wherein God has foreknowledge of future con¬
tingent things which knowledge is similar to human knowledge of
things that presently exist or that have existed. Another basic
doctrine sets forth the necessary character of that contingent
which is or which has existed. Grosseteste says: "Item secun¬
dum Anselmum praeterita non possunt non esse praeterita.
iDe Lib. Arb.. recensio, 3; BW 15$.
2Ibid.. recensio. 5; BW 165.
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Grosseteste goes on to say that if someone has spoken a verum,
it is necessary in that it will always be true and cannot be
not true. He says concerning Isaiah's foreknowledge of the
captivity: "Isaias scivit hanc captivitatem. . . . Ergo necess-
arium est scivisse."^ Grosseteste speaks of the twofold manner
in which truth is not susceptible of falsity and how contin¬
gency is nevertheless preserved:
Duplex enim dicitur permutabile a veritate in falsitatem:
aut quia non est susceptibile falsitatis, aut quia secun¬
dum hunc ordinem post veritatem non est susceptibile
falsitatis. Primo modo est necessarium, sed secundo modo
non est necessarium.2
Whatever has had truth or esse. whether it be necessary or con¬
tingent, temporal or eternal, will always have had the same.
Truth as divine knowledge of the contingent includes know¬
ledge of malum as well. God knows evil things of which he is
in no manner the cause.
Per formam enim exemplarem boni scit Deus malum, quod non
est aliud quam boni privatio. Cum enim non possit cog-
nosci res nisi per speciem, malum autem non habet speciem
nisi bonum cuius est privatio, ipsum non cognoscetur nisi
per bonum.3
The divine knowledge corresponds perfectly to the contingent
entity which is lacking in truth and being for God knows the
thing according to its eternal exemplary form and he can observe
1Ibid.: BW 166.
^De Veritate Propositionis: BW 145. Hereafter cited as
De Ver. Prop.
•^Quaest. Theol. [Vj (ii); Callus 196.
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the lack of conformity to the exemplary form and the degree of
privation. God can have such knowledge for he knows "per com-
prehensionem causae imrautabilis in essendo et in causando."^"
Before created things come into being and contingent events
occur God knows the truth concerning them. This is possible
because he swells in simple eternity. God has assumed therefore
innumerable relationes to creatures not yet in existence. These
relationes are not eternal beings and they have no essences of
their own. Only the things to be created will be essentiae.
"Et propter hoc nulla sequitur ex talium relationum multitudine
essentiarum multitudo."^ The crucial point to be noted here is
that in the relatio there is the extremitas which is not yet
created and which has no esse until it is created. It is not
altogether clear how there can be the relatio when the one ex¬
tremity does not yet have esse. In the recensio of De Libero
Arbitrio Grosseteste states that for God there have been eternal
relations to creatures, and if no creatures then relations to
their absences. He asserts unequivocally that in his simple
eternity God does have perfect knov.'ledge of all things.
(3.5) The libertas voluntatis of the supreme Truth
This is not the place for a detailed and careful examina¬
tion of Grosseteste's doctrine of voluntas Dei and liberum
3-Comm. Post. 1.2; f. 2.
2Pe Lib. Arb. 3; BW 194.
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arbitrium. These notions have been carefully examined by such
1 ?
as Ludwig Baur and Friedrich Vogelsang. What is of special
interest in this context is the manner in which the divine will¬
ing can also be called 'truth1. With respect to the liberum
arbitrium Grosseteste proceeds in a rather unusual way. Having
established that such exists, he then inquires as to quid sit.
He wrestles with the problem as to whether such words as 'liberum
arbitrium'. 'libertas '. 'voluntas' can be used univocally when
applied to God, angels, and mankind. He says that because we
are dealing with a diversity of essences and different sub¬
stances we cannot settle for univocity. There are, however,
lik e nesses between these essences and this makes it possible
to use such a word as 'libertas' in an analogical fashion. It
can be so used because of comparatio and similitudo.
Grosseteste makes inquiry as to the essence of free will.
A working or nominal definition and a specific application are
presupposed from the start. Such definitions are required if
there is to be an investigation into what constitutes true and
right willing and choosing. Grosseteste inquires into that sim¬
ilitudo between God's willing and man's willing in terms of which
such expressions as 'liberum arbitrium' and 'libertas voluntatis'
"*"L. Baur, Die Philosophic des Robert Grosseteste. Beitrage
zur Geschichte '3er Philosophie des Mittelalters. Bd. l£, 4-6
(Munster i. W: Aschendorffsche, 1917).
2F. Vogelsang, Per Begriff der Freiheit bei Grosseteste
(Gutersloh, 1915).
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may be applied to each. By insisting upon a single essentia or
univocal core Grosseteste finds himself in considerable diffi¬
culty because of the posse peccare situated in the human will.
Grosseteste has been using 'liberum arbitrium1 to signify the
"vertibilitas voluntatis."3- However, posse peccare and such
vertibilitas are not to be found in God and consequently such
notions cannot belong to the essentia of the liberum arbitrium.
How does one treat the posse peccare? Grosseteste suggests the
following:
Auctores itaque, qui dicunt potestatem peccandi et non
peccandi esse quiditatem et essentiam liberi arbitrii per
accidens loquuntur. Qui vero hoc abnegant per se loquun-
ter.2
Having cited auctoritates that argue for posse peccare as
belonging to the essence of the liberum arbitrium. Grosseteste
says that such vertibilitas is the very least of the "quiditas
voluntatis rationalis." He points out that there can be ver¬
tibilitas without potestas peccandi. He mentions the "potestas
volendi utrumque duorum oppositorum"3 which is found in God.
There are more than the two opposites or alternatives of good
and evil. There may be several good things that may be chosen
and there may be many things neither goodnor bad that man can
will laudably. Grosseteste also remarks that the "flexibilitas
ad bonum et malum in homine non erit de liberi arbitrii eius
J-De Lib. Arb. 17; BW 226. 2Ibid.
3Ibid.; BW 223.
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quiditate, quia quandoque erit sine hac vertibilitate*A
considerable amount of difficulty might have been avoided had
Grosseteste not been so intent upon ascertaining the single
common meaning of 'liberum arbitrium'. 'Free will' then could
have been defined simply as vertibilitas or as the will not
bound by an external antecedent necessity. Qualification could
follow with respect to specific usage. A procedure similar to
this must eventually be pursued in any case.
'Libertas' is the word that Grosseteste uses to describe
the voluntas Dei. At this point Grosseteste borrows to a con¬
siderable extent from Anselm. He refers to Anselm's De Liber-
tate Arbitrii where the latter attributes a common meaning to
'libertas arbitrii' as used with respect to God, angels, and
man. He takes the following definition from Anselm: "Ergo
'liberum arbitrium est potestas servandi rectitudinem volun¬
tatis propter ipsam rectitudinem'."2 The divine will has per-
fect libertas for it is the will that always wills rightly.
Item: 'generaliter' dixi propter libertatem voluntatis Dei,
quae libera est et ad volendum quod debet, et ad consequendum
quod vult. . . . Esse autem unumquodque sicut debet est recte
esse. . . . Ergo si est liberum et potens ad velle quod de¬
bet, est liberum et potens ad recte velle et ad rectitu¬
dinem voluntatis.3
God has the perfect libertas because he is perfectly free to will
what he ought to will and free to accomplish what he wills. The
debere in this instance is the divine essentia itself and the
1Ibid.; BW 222. 2Ibid. 3Ibid.: BW 221.
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divine willing is in perfect agreement with it. The voluntas
Dei possesses that complete rectitudo which is Veritas. There
must be the rectitudo voluntatis if there is to be recte velle
and ex contrario. "Et haec ratio communis liberi arbitrii,
quam dat Anselmus."3 Grosseteste contrasts the Tightness of
the divine willing with the creature's willing:
In Deo autem idem est velle aliquid et velle consonum suae
voluntati et ita rectitudini et aequitati. . . . creaturae
voluntas non sit ipsa rectitudo, nec sit illi essentiale
conformem esse voluntati divinae.^
The rectitudo of the divine will is the ground of the rec¬
titudo of the human will. Although there is a ratio communis
in the formal definition of 'rectitudo' and 'libertas arbitrii'.
there are crucial qualifications to be made as the terms are
used of the Creator's will and the creature's will. Grosseteste
states that the same nomen may be used but this does not mean
that it has to be used univocally.
Sic dicitur libertas arbitrii in Deo liberior quam in angelo,
et in angelo quam in homine, non quia sunt univoca, sed
quia cum hie sit libertas et in angelo libertas, ilia ali-
cui uni propinquicr et haec remotior. Sic igitur patet,
quomodo una potest ei assignari ratio et quomodo non.^
Such is the case because we are dealing with a diversity
of essences and substances. Grosseteste speaks about the "com-
mensuratio" between esse and velle as we find it in God, angels,
and men. Of man it is said: "In patria autem erit totum esse
nostrum bene esse et totum commensuratum nostrae voluntati
BW 222. 2Ibid.: BW 225. 3Ibid.; BW 219.
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ordinatae et totum esse bene, quod ibi habebimus, habemus in
nostra potestate.vl Grosseteste qualifies this by saying that
it is not entirely within our power, moreover, esse and velle
will not be for us as it is for God. Bsse and essentia are not
the same for man as they are for God who perfectly wills "suum
bene esse." Although Grosseteste cannot be called a radical or
thoroughgoing voluntarist, he does place considerable emphasis
upon the divine will where he says: "Igitur suum bene esse, cum
hoc sit suum velle, omnino habet in sua potestate propria et
voluntate ordinata."2 Libertas belongs to the very essentia or
esse of God and consequently he is "summe liberum." Grosseteste
also states that "esse suum ei sit in sua libertate."3 This
implies no random or arbitrary willing because he who wills is
entirely good and he wills only "res rectae." This he does in
a most orderly fashion. The summa libertas is described as
follows:
Sciendum ergo, quod vera et summa libertas est esse bene
secundum quod vult, et habere totum esse suum bene commen-
suratum ordinate voluntati suae in sua propria potestate
omni alio circumscripto.4
In the supreme Truth there is this perfect congruity or
commensuration of esse. essentia, and velle. which is a rectitudo
within the supreme Truth itself. The supreme Truth also wills
rightly all created things in perfect agreement with his own
nature. In the divine will is found the ground for the rectitudo
1Ibid.: BW 230. 2Ibid.; BW 229. 3Ibid. 4Ibid.
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of human willing. The dynamism present in the cosmos is rooted
ultimately in the dynamic divine willing wherein is true blessed¬
ness. Veils has the primacy over apprehendere and aspicere:
"Primum igitur esse est velle et maximum esse. In velle enim
primo et per se proprie consistit beatitudo, in 'aspicere' autem
non.""1" It must not be inferred from this that Grosseteste looks
disparagingly upon aspectus. Aspectus figures prominently in
his epistemological theory. However, true and right affectus
is a prerequisite to true and right aspectus. The importance of
the will and its function is clearly displayed in the creation
and conditus of created and contingent truth. Created truth is
radically dependent upon the supreme Truth who wills and effects
it.
(3.6) The supreme Truth's effecting of created truth
Our concern at this point is not to examine Grosseteste's
entire cosmogony, which would also call for an explication of
his light metaphysics and his doctrine of corporeal light.
Questions pertaining to unformed matter and the first corporeal
form, which produces space and corporeity, are posterior and
subordinate to the questions which now interest us. The questions
now asked have to do with the ontological status that is to be
attributed to the created order as a whole, with only limited
attention given to specific res qua res. This means that the
^•Ibid.; BW 231
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divine efficiens and supportans must be examined in relation to
the question of 'contingency1.
It is clearly manifest that what has been inherited or de¬
rived from the Neoplatonic tradition by such as Augustine, and
those of the Augustinian tradition, has been radically revised
and altered. Even where Neoplatonic terms are utilized, their
senses are radically different from what they are in Neoplaton-
ism. The reason for this can readily be observed by taking
note of just a few cardinal Christian doctrines. We have al¬
ready noted the doctrine of a personal God who wills according
to his perfect libertas and who has his own vertibilitas and
even wills his own esse. It was seen that he exists a se and
is compelled by no antecedent necessity to act. The doctrine
of creation now under consideration also stands in stark con¬
trast to Plotinian necessary generation or emanation with its
hierarchy of deities. In speaking of the Christian world of
Augustine, E. Gilson writes:
On the one side, God, one in the Trinity of a single, self-
existing substance; on the other side, all that which,
because it has but a received existence, is not God. Un¬
like the Plotinian dividing line which we have seen running
between the One and all that is begotten by the One, the
Christian dividing line runs between God, including his own
begotten Word, and all that is created by God. As one among
God's creatures, man finds himself therein excluded from the
order of the divine. Between "Him who is" and ourselves,
there is the infinite metaphysical chasm which separates the
complete self-sufficiency of his own existence from the in¬
trinsic lack of necessity of our own existence. Nothing can
bridge such a chasm, save a free act of the divine will only.l
■'■Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1959) pp. 53-54.
406
I have included this rather lengthy citation from Gilson be¬
cause it sets forth rather precisely and explicitly the issue
now under consideration in Grossetestefs thought, viz., the
contingent and conditional character of all created esse and
Veritas as contrasted with the transcendant summa Veritas. The
fact of creation and the resultant created truth also have a
far-reaching impact on Grossetestefs theory of knowledge and
his methodology in general.
(3.6.1) A great deal of Grosseteste's polemic is directed
against Aristotle's doctrine of the eternity of the World. In
De Finitate Motus et Temnoris. which is also part of his com¬
mentary on the eighth chapter of Aristotle's Physics. he replies
to four arguments of Aristotle intended to prove the infinity of
time and of the world. Over against those philosophers who
find in Aristotle the doctrine that the world had a temporal
beginning, Grosseteste contends that Aristotle did teach the
eternity of the world. In his Hexameron he produces quotations
from Boethius, Augustine, and Ambrose indicating that Aristotle
did teach the eternity of the World. He then says:
Ex hiis itaque et multis aliis, quae afferri possent nisi
prohiberet prolixitas, patet evidenter quod plurimi philosc-
phorum simul cum Aristotele asserverant mundum carere tem-
poris principio, quos unius verbi ictu percutit et elidit
Moyses, dicens "in principio".I
Slex. f. 142ra (MS. Brit. Mus. Reg. 6.E.V.), cited by D. E.
Sharp, op, cit., pp. 43-44.
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Grosseteste continues by saying that expositors who deny that
Aristotle teaches such an eternity make the heretical Aristotle
a catholic and themselves heretics. On the basis of the teach¬
ing of the Scriptures, the traditions of the fathers, the very
being of God himself, and the nature of creaturely being, Grosse¬
teste asserts vigorously the temporis principium along with the
beginning of the created world.
In his commentary on Aristotle's Physics. Book One, Grosse¬
teste cites Aristotle's critique of Melissus whose arguments
Aristotle considers to be merely contentious and whose premises
are false. In fact, the argument of Melissus is gross and
palpable and offers no difficulty at all, says Aristotle. The
question is whether the principium naturalium is one or many,
and if one, is it mobile or immobile. Melissus has said that
it is unum and immobile. His assumption is that what has not
been made has no principium. That which is without a principium
is simplex and unum. It is at this point that Grosseteste follows
through the argument as he sees it. If the mundus has been made,
then it has received esse and so has tempus. for they are co¬
equal. Time, however, is "motus simplex qui non est generacio
subiecto facta.""'' However, it is impossible to have successively
"principium primum iniciacionis," therefore, the mundus has no
principium and it is a unum simplex. Grosseteste believes that
such philosophers as Melissus and Aristotle have not been able
^•Comm. Phvs. I; Dales 10.
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"attingere simplicitatem eternitatis." Consequently, before
every motion and time there must be posited another motion and
time. Grosseteste states that according to Melissus' opinio
"bene sequitur mundum non fuisse factum sub tempore, sed sine
inicio temporis extitisse."^- He does not think that the reason¬
ing of Aristotle and the Platonists is altogether sound:
condicio J^contradicioJ vera. Si non est factum, non habet
principium efficiens; ponunt enim causarn mundi Deum. Si
eternum et causatum, eternum coequevum sue cause, sicut si
pes fuisset ab eterno in pulvere, vestigium ab eterno fuis-
set. Secundum igitur Aristotelem non sequitur: Si non est
factum non habet princirium. quia secundum ipsum possibile
est ut sit eternum et habeat principium efficiens.2
Both Melissus and Aristotle are deceived and speak falsely, says
Grosseteste: "Unde Melissus mentitur in eo quod ponit mundum
non esse facturo^et Aristoteles in eo quod putat non factum posse
habere efficiens principium.Grosseteste would of course
agree that God is the cause of the mundus although he would pre¬
fer to speak of the creator rather than causa. He does speak
of God as the efficient cause but for him there is no mundus
non factus and no eternal efficiens.
Let us consider further how Grosseteste comes to his posi¬
tion on the basis of the very ratio or essentia of the supreme
Truth himself in addition to the appeal to the Scriptures and
auctoritates. Although Grosseteste repeatedly cites the Scrip®
tures and the fathers in explicating and validating his theolog-
Sed secundum non est hec
^Ibid.; Dales 11. ^Ibid.; Dales 11-12. ^Ibid
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ical doctrine, he also pursues Anselm's method whereby he
validates his reflection even as he probes more deeply into
the nature of the subject under investigation. He draws out
implications and equipollent statements congruous with doctrines
already stated and accepted. Such is the case with respect to
the doctrine of creation as it is developed both in accordance
with the Scriptures and other authoritative sources, and with
serious attention paid to the nature of God, the nature of
grace, and the nature of created beings. For what other reasons,
then, can there be no eternal efficiens?
Grosseteste has stated repeatedly that there can be no
common measure (mensura) which is shared by God and man and for
this reason alone we can never use words univocally in speaking
of God and man. It is God's prerogative to dwell in simple
eternity and his alone. The question is posed as to whether
the creature may not be coeternal with God himself, since every
cause which lacks nothing towards effecting that which is to be
effected does not precede its effect. Grosseteste again alludes
to the classic example of the foot in the dust which causes the
footprint and which foot in the dust does not precede the caused
footprint. Concerning those who think thus Grosseteste says:
"In hanc caliginem deciderunt philosophantes et de humana sapien-
tia tumentes, licit ipsi in parte viderint illud, quod huius
caliginis tenebras pro magna parte possit purgare."-*- He says
1De Ordine: BW 147.
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that such philosophers, and the author of the Liber De Causls
in particular, write that the rrima causa is before aeternitas.
the intelligentia is with aeternitas. and the anima is after
aeternitas and surra temrus. There is another measure for the
being of res which are in time and with time. Although different
mensurae are recognized, Grosseteste is quick to respond that
aeternitas in the above context is a res creata. There is a con¬
tinuity of esse here that is out of order when we are speaking
of the creator in relation to the creatura. Grosseteste calls
for an ontological break or gap between creator and creatura
which is not to be found in the monistic hierarchy of being ad¬
vanced by Plotinus, Proclus, and others of the same school.
The eternally begotton Son of the Father does share in the
same mensura ivith the Father and is coeternal with the Father,
but the creature does not.
Non tamen creatura, cuius Deus est principium et causa
plena, est coaeterna Deo, quia nec etiam est aeterna, cum
non communicat in mensura cum causa sua. Quapropter etiam
ei non potest in mensura parificari. Quodcunque ergo causa-
tum non communicat in mensura una cum causa sua, non poterit
causae suae dici coaequaevum, sive parificatum in mensura.1
Consequently, the example of the foot in the dust as the cause
of the footprint, which cause does not precede its effect, is
not applicable inasmuch as they share the same measure. Grosse¬
teste states most emphatically that there was no eternal creation
but that the Creator existed when there was no creature. "Prae-
3-Ibid.: BW 14S
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cedit igitur creator omtuem creaturam et fuit creator quando
non fuit creatura, sive ut. potius dicatur: est creator quando
non est vel fuit creatura."^ The 'quando' here signifies
aeternitas. In the mensura prima simrlicissima it is not
possible to have had non-esse before esse. The creature, how¬
ever, has had non-esse before esse. "Et cum cuiuslibet crea-
turae non-esse fuerit absque initio, et ita fuerit in mensura
prima simplici, non potest esse in ea mensura alicuius crea-
turae esse."2
The notion of an eternal mundus is also objectionable in
that God would have materia existing from eternity along with
himself. Grosseteste does not at this point clearly distin¬
guish between semriternitas and aeternitas. for materia could
exist in an endless duration without sharing in the simrlicitas
aeternitatis. However, it is clear that he is also against
attributing endless duration to the mundus. God would then be
similar to the human artifex who produces entities through an
already existing materia. It must be noted that in his cos¬
mogony Grosseteste does have God creating first the unformed
matter and then informing such with corporeal light and sub¬
sequent forms. In the act of creating the prime matter ex nihilo
the divine sovereignty is more clearly revealed than if there
had been an eternal efficiens of materia or mundus. We have al¬
ready noted how often Grosseteste remarks that there can be no
1Ibid 2Ibid.; BW 149-150.
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substantia or essentia before creation with the obvious excep¬
tion of the divine essentia himself. He speaks of that which can
be in potentia and yet be nothing or no thing.
Materia vero prima et omnis res immaterialis penitus, ante-
quam crearetur, fuit in potentia; et tamen nihil unquam
potuit esse materia, nec es aliquo potuit esse materia. Et
haec quidem manifesta sunt.-^
The human builder or maker must have the materia. as material
cause, available to him if the thing to be made is to be con¬
sidered in potentia. It is absolutely different with the divine
Maker in whom all the things that are to be created and made are
in potentia. For the divine Being as causa or creator the quod
efficit and the quo efficit are the same. The final, formal,
and efficient causes of all creatures are ultimately and eter¬
nally bound up in the unica forma omnium who also provides the
material cause through creation of materia ex nihilo.
As manifest in the quotation given above, the nihilum is
not an aliquid. The very first matter is created from no thing
whatever. Grosseteste does have his own doctrine of rationes
seminales and also the notion of a more direct or immediate con¬
tinuous creative activity. This does not jeopardize in any way
the ex nihilo notion. He remarks that what can be said about
natural things not made ex nihilo is not applicable to that created
ex nihilo: "De creacione namque materie et animarum ex nichilo,
nichil ad intencionem presentem.He says of what is foreknown
J-De Potentia et Actu; BW 127 > of. also Hex. fl43vb.
^Comm. Phvs. I; Dales 27.
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by God that "nec attribuitur ei esse ante rerum creationem prop¬
ter aliquid, quod est aliud, . . . "-1- The complete omnipotence,
freedom, and simplicity of God must be recognized and affirmed.
Against the eternity of the world Grosseteste also argues that
if time is infinite, either the number of separated souls is
infinite, or else all souls are one, or the one soul returns to
other bodies, or souls would have to be mortal; however, each
o
of these proposals is impossible.
The mundus. then, has its principium. and the latter is
grounded in the will of the divine efficiens causa. As noted
above, if one considers the divine power simrliciter. it follows
that the divine voluntas could have willed differently than it
has willed. Irrespective of whether he would or could have
willed otherwise, God did will and create the existing mundus
and it is this mundus which is the object of Grosseteste's
inquiry. This world is radically contingent or dependent on an
origin or ground outside of itself and is held in esse by this
source and is scibilis by reason of the same. God, in his speak¬
ing and willing, is the one on whom the creation is radically
dependent or contingent both in the realms of being and knowing.
The created intellectus in its being and operation is likewise
radically contingent. In commenting on being and necessity in
mediaeval thought, Gilson says:
-*De Lib. Arb. BW 194.
^Hex. f. 142rb; cf. D. E. Sharp, op. cit.. p. 43.
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As soon as the sensible world is regarded as the result of
a creative act, which not only gives it existence but con¬
serves it in existence through all successive moments of
its duration, it becomes so utterly dependent as to be
struck through with contingency down to the very roots of
its being.1
Grosseteste agrees with Aristotle that we know a fact scien¬
tifically when we know it in its cause and when we know that the
fact cannot be other than it is. However, for Grosseteste the
cause is finally the perfectly free will of God, and the fact
cannot be other than it is because it has been thus freely
willed and subsequently has to be what it is by reason of con¬
sequent necessity.
(3.6.2) Another facet of creation relevant to our immediate
purpose is the immediacy of the Verbum Dei in creating in the
beginning and in subsequent immediate creation. The Verbum Dei
is, of course, foundational for the esse of everything that is,
whether it follows from the will of man, a seminal reason,
through the active potency in matter, or by casus. Even "ista
casualia," which happen not according to the foreordaining
knowledge of God, are not or are not made "nisi eo efficiente,
ipsa tamen sciente non necesse est hoc fieri."2 The activity
of the creative Verbum is most clearly seen in the eternal be¬
getting of the Son, in the creating of the intellipentiae. in
the effecting of animae, the first matter, corporeal light, and
■^Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 71.
2Quaest. Theol. [i] (ii); Callus 196.
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the like. The creation of the human soul is accomplished by
the eternal divine Word which is immediately involved in the
effecting of the immanent form of man and inferior forms. "Item:
ut dictum est, immediatissima causa omnis conditae essentiae est
Verbum Dei aeternum."^ He goes on to say that nothing is more
proximate or more closely related to the essence of any produced
thing than the eternal wisdom. He speaks of the free will of
man as the "bonum indifferens" which is created by God and which
reflects to a great degree the divine effecting of things
through the divine Word. He says concerning the created essentia:
"Item: si est aliquid, Deus aeternaliter illus dixit; et suum
dicere est suum agere. Ergo cum a Deo dictum, a Deo actum est."
The created essences and forms constitute part of the •necessary'
sector within the created order, necessary in terms of the ante¬
cedent determinative Verbum which causes them to be.
Grosseteste says that the Verbum Dei expresses itself and
speaks things. God has freely spoken all natures from eternity
and speaks them into their contingent existence. His Verbum is
normative and they are made as he speaks. Herein is perfect
adaeauatio. The essence of a created substance is altogether
determined by the divine Verbum.
Ita enim est res quaeque plenissime, ut hie sermo dicit;
nec in aliquo aliter est, ac dicitur hoc sermone; nec solum
adaequatur, sed est ipsa adaequatio [sermoj sui ad res,
quas loquitur. . . . Nec potest hie Sermo non loqui, nec
J-De Lib. Arb. 10; BW 201. 2Ibid. 21; BW 237.
41(5
non adaeauari ei, quod dicit. Unde non potest non esse
Veritas.*
As the Verbum Dei speaks there is further Veritas founded, not
only in terms of the esse of the things spoken but also in terms
of the perfect correspondence or commensuration that is estab¬
lished. The divine Verbum is also active in the conservans and
the surrortans of created entities. This will be considered
below in dealing with created entities themselves.
(3.6.3) Let us also consider briefly the character of the
efficiens of created truth in terms of divine motive and purpose.
In a treatise of only thirteen lines, Grosseteste says: "Magnus
Deus in semetipso ad semetipsum hominem fecit."2 Grosseteste
believes further that all other created beings, even the most
perfect celestial bodies, are created for man and his needs.
"Stabit ergo caelum et finietur motus et tempus, cum cessabit
hominum generatio."^
It was God's love or desire for the true good or finis of
the ratio or exemplar eternally spoken that moved him to create
the same. The bonum or finis of the thing is that which is
willed or spoken by God in the first place. He says of the
"bonum per se":
Quod autem appetitur, est bonum per se. Species autem
effecti, in quantum movet efficientem, est in ratione boni.
Bonum autem per se finis est; est ergo proprie in ratione
finis. . . .et non in quantum intelligitur, sed inquantum
diligitur hoc est inquantum est bonum et finish
*I)e Ver.: BW 134. 2quo(} Homo sit Minor Mundus; BW 102.
-^De Finitate: BW 106. ^De Statu: BW 121.
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In touching upon the misericordia and iustitia of God,
Grosseteste cites Cassiodorus who said that all the works of
God are of mercy and justice. "Et huiusmodi est quod dicit
Psalmus: 'Omnia opera eius misericordia et Veritas.'"•* Justice
is the will restoring to a certain one his due whereas mercy
is the will relieving from misery and distress. Grosseteste
then goes on to say that the works of the first creation were
not of justice because there was no demand or claim. They were
not works of justice according to nature because creation was
"de nichilo." Neither were they works of mercy insofar as there
was no "miseria." He therefore concludes:
Ad hoc dicendum quod opus prime creationis fuit opus ius-
titie, scilicet promissionis. Promissio nichil aliud est
quam expressio voluntatis plene creandi res. Ergo ab
eterno promisit, licet non esset creatura cui promittere-
tur.2
Grosseteste could have said that the first creation was an
act of God's grace or compassion if the latter was not thought
of strictly in connection with miseria. Grosseteste proceeds
by saying that God would have been just to "solvere promissum,
licet non esset iustum alicui creature solvi. . . ."3 He finds
three facets in the work of fulfilling the promise which corre¬
spond to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, viz., "exigens, et pro¬
missio et solvens, quia opus talis iustitie non est nisi solvere
-*-Quest Theol. [ill] > Callus 204; (Cassiodorus —— In
Psalmum C, 1).
^Ibid.; Callus 205. ^Ibid.
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exigenti prorrdssum. This is followed by an elaboration upon
the operations of the three persons of the Trinity:
Filius enim qui est Sapientia genita, que sapientia est
rationes omnium creaturarum, exigit se rationes omnium
exprimi in natura, sicut ars desiderat exprimi. Unde
dicitur: 'Delicie mee est esse cum filiis hominum', prop¬
ter quo$- est celi et terre creatio, et omnium que in eis
sunt. Promissio vero, id est, expressio voluntatis plene,
quid aliud quam processio Spiritus Sancti? Ex sua enim
ineffabili bonitate, que applicatur Spiritui Sancto, hoc
voluit. Solvens autem Pater est a quo omnia. Et sic
iustitia prime creationis in Trinitate completur.2
According to Grosseteste, this is the motivating power that lies
behind the first creation. Again we see that God was not coerced
into creating the world for there was no creature who had a
claim upon God or who could make demands of him. God created
out of the libertas of his own will for his delight is to be
with the sons of men whom he made finally for himself. Having
briefly considered Grossetestefs doctrine of creation we now
go on to consider created truth in itself and in relation to
the supreme Truth.
4. The truth of created res
In dealing with created Veritas and esse Grosseteste is not
concerned in the first place with a particular species or genus
nor with particular individual substances. When he does single
out a particular species it is humanitas which receives primary
consideration. D. E. Sharp comments on Grosseteste's attitude
to the forms of life inferior to man, viz., the vegetative and
1Ibid. 2Ibid.
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sensitive: "But with them Grosseteste is not particularly con¬
cerned, for, as Augustine has pointed out, even the superior
animal kingdom is incapable of knowledge (scientia). and there¬
fore of merit or demerit."!
In his De Veritate treatise Grosseteste considers different
truths and kinds of truth. The basic bifurcation is of course
between the supreme Truth and created truth. Within the realm
of created truth man and the statement or proposition are of
special interest to Grosseteste. Cur procedure is patterned
after the character of the treatise itself. It should be rather
apparent by this time that for Grosseteste fVeritas' can not be
discussed and considered in abstraction from existing entities,
viz., the supreme Being and created res. Res creatae cannot
exist nor can they be known as created things except in relation
to and in the light of the supreme Truth. Grosseteste, however,
does allow for knowledge of such as mathematical truth, creaturely
causes, and immanent forms without the knowledge that their foun¬
dation and source is the supreme Truth, and without knowledge of
the supreme Truth per se. Nevertheless, Grosseteste would want
to say that anyone who knows any truth whatever, has some know¬
ledge of the supreme Truth although he may be unaware of his
having such knowledge. He says: "Nemo est igitur, qui verum
aliquid novit, qui non aut scienter aut ignoranter etiam ipsam
summam veritatem aliquo modo novit.This clearly indicates how
■^•Sharp, op. cit., p. 27. ^De Ver.: BW 13$.
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radically dependent is all created Veritas and esse upon the
supreme Truth.
(4.1) The contingent character of all created truth and being
It must be noted at the outset that 1 continuere' has more
than one meaning or sense as it is used and understood by Grosse-
teste. 'Contingens' may refer to that thing or phenomenon which
may be or may not be and which may occur either through an ante¬
cedent necessity or without such a necessity. In other words,
that thing or act which is willed is brought into being through
an antecedent necessity, but the willing itself could have been
otherwise and therefore it was not impossible for the thing not
to be. Grosseteste finds this kind of contingency rooted in
the divine willing and in human willing.
*Contingency1 is also applied to the enuntiatio. This can
mean that a statement may or may not exist. Grosseteste would
declare that all statements that are true are contingent upon
some Veritas or esse outside of the statement itself. Even the
statement that is necessarium simpliciter is dependent upon a
ratio or essentia external to itself. 'Contingent* also refers
to that statement or statements that may be true or may be false
and which do not express a per se or essential connexion between
a subject and what is predicated of it. In terms of consequent
necessity a statement that is true is subsequently necessarily
true.
Every creaturely entity, including every proposition, is
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finally contingent by reason of the fact that it is dependent
on the supreme Truth for its Veritas and esse. This is the sense
that is of primary importance in the present context. We have
already touched upon the question of causal priority and potentia
in the divine willing and whether God might or could have willed
other than he has. The matter is complicated by the fact that
what God has willed he has willed in the most orderly and most
suitable manner. Grosseteste, however, is not especially interes¬
ted in naked potestas or potentia and bare possibility. He is
more interested in the actual willing of God and the actuality
of created truth and being. It is all of the actual created
esse that is so dependent on the supreme Truth for its esse.
It has already been observed that the created order along
with time have been brought into being ex nihilo. The created
structure does not possess any kind of autonomous or independent
existence even after it has been created. There is a perpetual
divine speaking and willing which keeps existing entities from
falling into non-esse. Grosseteste, in his commentary on Aris¬
totle's Physics. Book One, stresses this point. Aristotle
answers those who would affirm that all things are one principle.
Aristotle's reply is that such is impossible because such cate¬
gories as substance, quality, and quantity are distinct and
cannot be reduced to any single category. Neither can several
substances be reduced to one substance. Aristotle wants to show
that 'is' has different senses, even when used as a copula. He
then asserts that 'is' also has different senses when used to
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indicate existence. Here he refers to the individual substance
which alone can exist independently whereas such as quality and
quantity cannot exist independently of the primary substance.
This distinction between a dependent and an independent existence
provides Grosseteste with an opportunity to set forth a more
profound division in the realm of existence which also clearly
shows that 'ens' or 'esse' cannot be used univocally. His argu¬
ment runs as follows:
Si ens dicatur univoce de omnibus cum substancialiter dica-
tur de primo ente, dicetur de omnibus substancialiter.
Sed de quocumque dicitur substancialiter ens, ipsum necesse
est esse per se. Necesse autem esse per se non potest nisi
unum solum simpliciter eternum. Igitur si ens dicitur
univoce omnia unum. . . . Sed qui dicunt omnia esse unum
decipiuntur per hoc quod credunt ens et unum univoce dici
cum utrumque dicatur equivoce.^
Grosseteste emphatically asserts that if ens is uttered
univocally with the sense expressed above, then all things are
"unum simplicissimum." Grosseteste is able to make the unum
simplicissinum the inevitable conclusion, if 'ens' is used in
a univocal fashion, because of the sense that is called for by
the one eternal supreme Being which has esse oer se. Conse¬
quently, each usage of 'ens' could only refer to the unum sim-
rlicissimum. Such is not the case because 'ens' is used eaui-
voce. Grosseteste argues further that if 'ens' is used uni-
vocally then "non distrahitur in multitudinem nisi per diversas
differencias quarum nulla est ens, sicut humanitas non distra¬
hitur in multas humanitates, nisi per multas differencias quarum
•^Comm. Phvs. I; Dales 6-7.
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nulla est humanitas; ac est impossibile ens distrahi in multi-
tudinem per id quod non est."l Grosseteste also argues that
"Si enim nichil esset de quo non diceretur ens univoce, cum in
intencione entis non differrant encia, non esset reperire in
quod diversificarentur encia."2 We saw earlier how individua¬
tion and the singularity of the individual entity is rooted ul¬
timately in the supreme Truth himself and his speaking and
willing. Now it looks as though entia are differentiated as
entia. However, for Grosseteste differentiation of entia in¬
volves more than the fact that the existence or existing of one
created res is distinct and separate from the existence of
another res. He sees every singular created res as possessing
a degree of esse peculiar to itself, which is quite different
from simply seeing this existent over against that existent. If
'ens' is to express the actual degree of conformity of the
particular res to its ratio in the divine Word, then 'ens' must
be used and understood accordingly.
The contingent nature of created truth is clearly manifest
in the following contrast between esse per se and that esse which
depends on the same:
Item cum unum solum eternum necesse sit substancialiter esse,
omne autem quod incipit esse non substancialiter est. Quic-
quid incipit esse in tantum est in quantum ab eterno esse
substanciali dependet, et res que incipit esse nichil aliud
Q) est quam ab esse eterno general! dependere vel
fy 2pJ a verbo ipsius portari; magisque est quod ei propinquius
•^-Ibid.: Dales 7. ^Ibid.
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adheret, minusque quod minus propinque. Cum ergo esse de
uno tantum dieatur substancialiter, et de aliis secundum
dependenciam ab illo uno, sed prius et posterius, mani-
festum est quod dicitur equivoce.I
Herein is expressed the great distance that separates the supreme
Being, who has esse substantialiter, from those beings which have
come to be and which depend on the one eternal Being for their
existence. Grosseteste states that these contingent beings are
supported and borne by the Word of the one eternal Being.
Another significant factor in the above quotation is that the
contingent ens which has a greater propinquity to the one supreme
Being is greater, exists to a greater degree, and ranks higher
in being than that ens which has less propinquity to the one
eternal Being. Grosseteste therefore feels himself compelled
to say that 'esse1 can only be used eauivoce.
In De Veritate Grosseteste further explains how the created
thing is held in being by the divine Word. He uses the example
of the square container which gives this same form to the water
it contains. If the water is left to itself it loses its form.
The form of the liquid is also known through knowledge of the
container that shapes it. "Similiter omnis creatura ex se, si
sibi relinqueretur, sicut est ex nihilo, sic relaberetur in nihi-
lum" Every creature must be kept from falling into non-esse♦
That which holds the ens in being is described as follows: "Hoc
est igitur, ut videtur, alicui creaturae esse, quod ab aeterno
1Ibid. 2Pe Ver.: BW 141.
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Verbo supportari. De quo Verbo dicit Paulus: 'portansque omnia
verbo virtutis suae.'"3- We have already observed how C-rosseteste
attributes a number of functions to forma. It serves as an
exemplar and is active in efficiens and formans. Furthermore,
"in forma data conservans est, dum ad ipsam applicantur et
revocantur creaturae."2 Grosseteste alludes to Augustine's notion
that all things are governed by divine providence and that "ip-
sarnque eorum providentiam esse forroan incommutabilem, per quam
mutabilia omnia subsistunt, ut formarum suarum numeris impleantur
et agantur."3
The creature, which is grounded in an antecedent necessity,
does not exist by virtue of its own quidditas and has no esse
substantialiter. The creature, both in its essence and in its
particular existence, is radically dependent upon a source or
ground that lies entirely extra se. Such a mundus is decisively
different from a sempiternal necessary universe not founded in
a free creative willing. Within the context of such a necessary
universe it is more difficult than ever to maintain clear and
proper distinctions between categories of logical or formal ne¬
cessity and categories of existential or real necessity. The
'necessity' that may be expressed by a predicative or copulative
'is' and that 'necessity' which is intended by an existential
'is' are more readily confused in the absence of a clearly de¬
fined contingent order. Gilson has this to say about Aristotle's
xIbid. 2De Unica: BW 110. 3Ibid.
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world: "It is perfectly true that Aristotle's <p v cri £ is a
Necessity, shut down on itself, a closed system, and that any
attempt to open it up to the divine influence would be altogether
unjustifiable."*
The doctrines of creation ex nihilo and the radical depen¬
dence of the created realm upon the eternal supreme Being have
far-reaching effects on Grosseteste's theory of knowledge and
method of inquiry ranging from theology to physics. In pointing
up the stupendous gulf separating the supreme Being and creatures
Grcsseteste sets the stage for his doctrine of the knowledge of
God which is very much grounded in immediate divine activity,
the Scriptures, and the auctoritates of the fathers. In addi¬
tion to these Grosseteste also speaks of some other means of
attaining knowledge. Experience, observation, experiment, and
mathematics play crucial roles in gaining knowledge of immanent
efficient and material causes. Nevertheless, the nature of the
supreme Truth, the pronounced contingent character of created
truth, and the condition of finite fallen man necessitate con¬
tinual divine assistance in all areas of human knowledge. The
ordo cognoscendi is very much dependent upon the ordo essendi.
Facets of Grosseteste's doctrine of knowledge will be dealt with
in the next chapter. We now go on to consider created truth
in terms of conformity and correspondence.
1
Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, p. 3#0.
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(4.2) Created truth and its correspondence or conformity to the
eternal rationes in the divine Word
In the above section on the supreme Truth it was observed
that 'Veritas' signifies in the first place the being of the
divine essentia apart from any notion of relationship. The one
true God is Veritas per se and not so by reason of his relation
to a being outside himself. This is so even though the divine
speaking is also truth because of its conformity to that which
it speaks. The divine knowledge is truth also by reason of its
correspondence to that which is known. One can therefore speak
of the divine Veritas and esse both apart from the notion of
relationship and in terms of relationship. Such is not the case
when referring to created Veritas insofar as there is no created
Veritas without such Veritas being at the same time truth as
adaeauatio, rectitudo, conformitas. and similitudo. Created
Veritas is esse but it can never be considered as esse alone.
It is clear that there is little chance of created entities
achieving an absolute or independent existence. They can serve
as measures but they are always at the same time measured. Being
and correspondence are both implied whenever one speaks of created
Veritas. Creation has its own ontological status which is rela¬
tive through and through and never autonomous. There is a hori¬
zontal and immanent relativity which is altogether dependent on
a vertical relativity or relation of the world to the transcen¬
dent supreme Truth. The created order is composed of a hierarchy
of relations in which all truths are 'relative' or 'relational'.
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It hardily needs to be said that the 'relativity1 which
Grosseteste advocates so strongly is not that 'relativity' which
characterizes an individual's knowledge as relative to his own
social, historical, and psychological environment. Grosseteste
does deal with such 'relativity' when he discusses the spiritual
and moral condition of the finite knowing subject. His basic
concern, however, is with the truth of things in relation to the
truth of God and the truth of knowledge or statement in relation
to both. He is particularly interested in that matrix of onto-
logical relations in the midst of whi^h the knowing subject can
acquire knowledge of the truth as that which is. Especially
important is the ordering of relations and the priority of one
relation over against another. Veritas is not 'relative' or
'relational' with the implication that there are no norms or
criteria to which the knowing subject has access whereby he can
validate or verify what he knows.
Grosseteste clearly recognizes the involvement and role of
the knower in acquiring knowledge and realizes that the knower
is essential to the acquiring of such knowledge. Although the
knower is in part responsible for knowledge and the true state¬
ment, that which is known is the measure or ground of such con¬
formity or correspondence. He says that Veritas as "eoequatio




The prior cntologieal relation between the scibilis and the
sciens makes possible Veritas as knowledge or statement. A
still more fundamental relation is that which holds between the
scibilis and its ratio and the sciens and its forma. These
relations constitute the basis for the relation between the
scibilis and the sciens.
What then is the character of this foundational relation?
Grosseteste speaks of it by using AnselmTs notion of rectitudo:
In rebus autem, quae dicuntur hoc aeterno Sermone, est con-
formitas ipsi sermoni, quo dicunter. Ipsa quoque conformi-
tas rerum ad hanc aeternum dictionem est earum rectitudo
et debitum essendi, quod sunt. Recta enim est res et est
ut debet, inquantum est huic Verbo conformis. Sed inquan-
tum est res ut debet, intantum vera est. Igitur Veritas
rerum est earum esse prout debent esse, et earum rectitudo
et conformitas Verbo, quo aeternaliter dicuntur.1
Every creature must have a relation to the eternal sermo and
some degree of rectitudo if it is to exist at all. Creaturely
rectitudo presupposes that according to which a thing is true or
right and consequently can never be seen in isolation from the
rectitudo which does the measuring: "Et complectitur haec
definitio etiam summam veritatem, quae est rectitudo rectificans
simul cum veritatibus reruro, quae sunt rectitudines rectificatae.
o
Rectitudo autem est in nullo a se exitus aut declinatio."
Grosseteste agrees with Anselm that this is an intelligible
Tightness and not a visible Tightness and therefore it can be
perceived by the mind alone. If a creature falls short of its
1De Ver.: BW 134-135. 2Ibid.: BW 135.
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debitum essendi. to the degree that it fails it is false:
"Item: Omnis res, inquantum deficit ab eo, quod tendit esse,
intantum est falsum illu.d, quod tendit aut fingit esse.""*" We
have already considered the rectitudo voluntatis set forth in
De Libero Arbitrio. That voluntas that wills rightly for the
sake of rectitudo itself possesses libertas. Consequently, the
quidditas of the free will involves the "potestas standi in
veritate sive rectitudine, et non decidendi vel deserendi earn,
si habita est."^
Creaturely being, truth, and goodness are bound up together
and to mention one is to mention the others: "Omne namque, quod
est, bonum est; et omne quod est, verum est. Unde aut falsum
et malum omnino non sunt, aut falsum et malum non sunt nisi in
vero et bono."-^ Grosseteste distinguishes between that which
appears to be true but in fact is not conformed to its ratio:
"Item: quodlibet est verum id, cuius esse conformatur rationi suae
in Verbo aeterno; et falsum id, quod fingit esse eiusque rationi
in Verbo aeterno non conformatur.Herein lies the primary re¬
lation whereby a creature exists and has its own particular
degree of esse.
It should also be noted that each entity is found to have
a multiplicity of relations to beings outside itself. It is
related in the first place to the ratio above, then to the uni-
1Ibid. 2Pe Lib. Arb. 17; BW 222.
3Pe Ver.: BW 136. ^Ibid.
431
versals in the created light and in the mind of the intelligentia.
Terrestrial species are also related to their causal powers in
the powers and lights of the celestial bodies. There is also the
relation to the universal in the species and the relations to
the other particulars of the species. The entity is also related
to the knowledge and statements that conform to it. In varying
degrees and spanning diverse levels of being there is Veritas as
conformity or correspondence. There is an order of priority as
well. Having noted the relations that are determinative of
created Veritas and esse, the precise character of this created
esse must be examined in the light of its two orders of being.
(4.3) The twofold plenitude of being and the related logical
usage of 'true' and 'false'
The twofold plentitude of being is parallel to the formal
and final causes of the thing, which causes are one in its
ratio in the divine Word. If a thing is to exist at all it
must have the first jhlenitude of being. On this level Grosse-
teste is able to utilize Aristotle's universal affirmative and
his notion of the universal form within the species. This first
plentitude is intended where Grosseteste speaks of verus homo
as that animal which is composed of body and rational soul. How¬
ever, as noted above, this formulation hardly constitutes the
whole of Grosseteste's doctrine of man. This is a definition
that Grosseteste will allow in order to delimit a species for
purposes of syllogistic demonstration and like procedures. He
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uses the above definition to illustrate the first plenitude
of being. He states: "Rerum autem duplex est esse: primum et
secundum; potestque res habere plenum esse primum et carere
plenitudine esse secundi. Et propter hoc potest eadem res esse
vera et falsa . . . I!"^ Grosseteste, however, generally uses
'verus' in reference to the creature possessing the second
plenitude of being. It seems rather redundant to apply 'verus'
simply to man as man.
In connexion with the first level or plenitude of being
the question also arises as to what is intended when speaking
of a 'false man'. Does this mean 'not man', 'nonexistent man',
or 'apparent or illusory man'? Although Grosseteste does not
offer us a detailed or complete treatment of this question he
does speak of the statue of a man as being a 'false man'. In
other words, that which appears to be a man but is not really
a man is termed a 'false man'. This judgement is based on
appearance. 'False man' on this level implies 'not man'. How¬
ever, these expressions are not strictly equivalent. For not
all entities other than man simulate man. The expression 'not
man' does not necessarily imply 'false man'. The question
raised here will be discussed further below.
Grosseteste's real concern is to apply 'true' to man on
the first level of being in order to contrast it with 'true'
and 'false' on the second level of being. The 'true' that is
"





used basically for emphasis with respect to the first pleni¬
tude drops out when 'true' and 'false* are employed in connexion
with the second plenitude. Grosseteste's real interest lies
with the singular man in relation to the ratio in the divine
Word and the degree to which such an individual approximates
this ratio. This is evident where he cites Augustine: "Idem
quoque Augustinus: 'si mendax est et vitiosus, falsus homo
est.'"^ Here again is the notion that the false is only found
in the true and the privation of being in that which has being.
Here complete actuality has not been realized. The 'false'
man has privatio and lacks fullness of being. Even a tree can
be spoken of as a 'true' tree:
Quapropter Veritas est defectus privatio, sive essendi
plenitude; tunc enim est vera arbor, cum habet plenitudi-
nem esse arboris caretque defectione esse arboris, et
haec plenitudo essendi quid est nisi conformitas rationi
arboris in Verbo aeterno?2
The imperfect or incomplete thing has within it a certain
dynamic or dialectical tension which finally is resolved when
the entity achieves fullness of being. We observed earlier that
for Grosseteste an ens can be in potentia in either of two
different ways. The entity in potentia may presently exist and
yet be in potentia because it is incompletum or imrerfectum.
Within the present context such is the man who is not yet per¬
fect and who lacks the second plenitude of being. In the same
man the second plenitude, which does not presently exist but
1Ibid. 2Ibid.
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which is none the less possible, is also said to be in potentia.
As long as a man is in potentia and in the process of becoming
he is said to be both a 'true' man and a 'false' man. Potentia
lies between nihilum and complete actus. "Et dico potentiam
non quod nihil habet actu, sed quod non omnino habet actum.""''
Actus can also be spoken of in two ways: "Item dupliciter dici-
tur ens actu vel quod completurn est, ut perfectum per formam,
vel quod presencialiter est."^ The becoming of which we are now
speaking must not be confused with the natural becoming in which
the seed grows into a plant. This second plenitude of being in
man is not a necessary natural addendum that is found joined to
the first order. In this instance the "principium transmuta-
tionis" involves the divine willing and human willing. It is a
matter of choosing to bring to completion or to desist from the
same: "Et in cuius electione est utrumque, dicitur potentia
rationalis, quia haec in solis rationabilibus, in quantum huius-
modi sunt, invenitur."^ Such willing is not found in subhuman
species. Grosseteste also speaks of this second plenitude of
being as fulfilment of the operation or function for which pur¬
pose an entity has been brought into being: "Dico ergo quod boni-
tas in unoquoque est completio secundae perfectionis eius et
haec est completio operationis ad quam unaqueque res per se apta
natus [sicj est, et propter quam nata est."^ This is nothing
-^-De Statu: BW 123. 2Cornm. Phvs. I; Dales 2S.
^De Potentia et Actu: BW 129. 4comm. Post. I. 17; f. 22.
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less than the final cause situated in the ratio. which ratio
is determinative of the debitum essendi. A thing truly exists
when it fulfils that finis or terminus for which it has been
created.
A thing's departure from rectitudo or debitum essendi
involves both a turning from its ratio in the eternal Word and
a turning towards a ratio or an entity that is alien to its
own nature. Falsity includes both the lack of a conformity
that ought to be as well as the presence of a conformity that
ought not to be. Grosseteste quotes from Augustine's Solilo¬
quies :"Item idem in eodem: 'Falsum est, quod ad similitudinem
alicuius accommodatum est, neque id tamen est, cuius simile
apparet. Quapropter quodlibefc est verum, quod privatur defec-
o
tione.'" It is important to note that Grosseteste as a rule
does not begin with the appearance of some thing and then judge
it to be true or false in accordance with the appearance of the
thing. In other words, 'true' and 'false' qualify an entity
in terms of its own essence. Aristotle,-* however, speaks of
the 'false' thing as that which produces the appearance of some¬
thing but is not that which it appears to be. Such is a scene-
painting or a dream.^ One then judges the painting of a man to
1Solil. 11.15.29. 2Pe Ver.: BW 135.
^Metaphysics /\ . 1024^17-26.
^D. Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1964)
p. 165.
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be a 'false man*. The problem with such usage is that it is
misleading because the qualification is made on the basis of
appearance. Grosseteste faces such a problem where he deals
with the presence of the false similitudo. He says:
Cum enim falsum sit, quod ad similitudinem alicuius accom-
modatum est, nec tamen est id, cuius est simile, omnis
autem creatura alicuius habet similitudinem, quod tamen
ipsa non est, videtur, quod omnis creatura sit falsum
aliquid.1
Judgement is subsequently made in accordance with appear¬
ance rather than in terms of the essence of that entity which
has departed from its true nature or plenitude of being. The
question is then asked: "Quod si \viz., the above statement]
verum est, numquid homo, qui est similitudo et imago Dei, nec
tamen Deus est, est falsus Deus, sicut statua hominis est
falsus homo?Grosseteste is now speaking as did Aristotle
above. Has Grosseteste not failed to take sufficiently into
consideration the essence of man? He does assert here that man
has been made in the imago Dei. 'False god' ought to be applied
to that creature that strives to be God or to be as God and
presumes to be more than a creature. However, even in this
latter instance it would probably be more correct and precise
to call such a creature this or that false creature. In any
case, man's true nature involves bearing the likeness of God.
Grosseteste ought to have said that man is a false man who strives
to be as God or who fails to reflect faithfully the imago Dei.
1De_Ver.; BW 136. 2Ibid.
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One of the reasons why a certain misunderstanding arises is
evident where he speaks of the statue of man as a false man.
The judgement is again based on appearance. Grosseteste, of
course, refuses to call man per se a false god: "Absurdum vide-
tur hoc dicere. Et quia ad praesens non occurrit auctoritas,
quae istud determinet, interim differatur a nobis huius solutio.
GrossetesteTs basic and usual procedure is to qualify created
things according to their degree of conformity to their own
specific nature and eternal ratio. Shortly after the above
discussion he repeats what he has said before: "Cum autem, ut
praedictum est, Veritas cuiuscunque est eius conformitas rationi
suae in aeterno Verbo, patet, quod omnis creata Veritas non
nisi in lumine veritatis summae conspicitur."2
The esse of an entity is shown forth by its truth. "Esse
igitur cuiuslibet rei sua monstrat Veritas."3 A particular ens
not only shows forth its own existence but the manner in which
it exists or its rectitudo. Its degree of being is proportionate
to its degree of conformity and rightness. The singular entity
discloses its own esse in the light of the supreme Truth. The
singular cannot disguise its measure of being through feigning
to be that which it is not, whether it pretends to be what it
ought to be and is not, or tends or pretends to be that which is
contrary to its own nature. The truth and being of the individual
shines forth and is directly intuited apart from any process of
1Ibid. 2Ibid.; BW 137. 3Ibid.: BW 132-133.
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abstraction. There must be some Tightness in everything that
exists, for total dissimilitude allows for no being whatsoever.
That creature that has a more complete similitude to its exem¬
plary form possesses a quality of existence not found in that
creature which is quite dissimilar to the same exemplar. This
brings us to a consideration of the precise character of the
diversity found within the realm of created entities.
(4.4) The nature of created beings and their diversity
It should be said at the outset that Grosseteste does not
provide us with a fully developed ontology, unless he might have
approximated such in a commentary that he might have written on
Aristotle's Metaphysics. It is questionable whether he ever
wrote such a commentary. Such has not been discovered. Grosse¬
teste was not particularly interested in metaphysics as meta¬
physics. One should not expect to find in his thought the subtle
and detailed distinctions and formulations relating to essences
and existence v/hich were spelled out by such as St. Thomas. This
is not to say that Grosseteste entertained no ontological beliefs.
This could hardly be affirmed in view of his thought already
examined. Although he does not closely scrutinize esse qua esse,
he has assumed an ontological stance which underlies his dis¬
cussion of truth and related topics.
In his ontological beliefs Grosseteste is in basic agree¬
ment with Augustine. Grosseteste's beliefs, however, are in
certain respects more developed and critical than Augustine's
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ontological beliefs. In both Augustine's and Grosseteste's
beliefs the influence and impact of Neoplatonic ontological
doctrine is evident. However, as already noted, on the most
fundamental levels their doctrine and thought differ sharply
from basic Neoplatonic tenets. Grosseteste, for example, does
not hold to a theory of emanation involving necessary ideas
existing per se which by reason of their very nature must issue
forth into other particular beings. Over against Greek monism
Grosseteste posits a radical dualism in which the divine Being
is radically set over against created res and entia. One can
be certain that when Grosseteste is speaking about esse he is
not thinking about a single all pervasive nature or being. We
have already noted that he is very much against using 'esse'
or 'ens' univocally. Each singular entity must finally be con¬
sidered and intuited in terms of its own being.
Esse is not bare existence, for then it would be rather
nonsensical for Grosseteste to say that one thing is more than
another is. It then would only make sense to say that a thing
exists or does not exist. It was noted that Aristotle himself
injects a qualitative distinction into the realm of being or
existence when he states in his Physics and elsewhere that pri¬
mary substances alone exist independently while things in other
categories exist dependently. Grosseteste introduces the same
formal qualitative distinction on a much more sublime level,
viz., between Creator and creature. We have already taken note
of the necessary esse of God and the radically contingent esse
of the creature.
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The critic who would say that it is nonsensical to assert
that one res has more esse or is more of an ens than another res
has confined himself to thinking of esse in terms of sheer exis¬
tence as opposed to nonexistence. Such a critic may also be
thinking for the most part in terms of quantitative differentia¬
tion. When Grosseteste states that one singular thing has more
esse or is more an ens than another singular entity he is in
part saying that the former has a type or a mode of existing or
existence that the latter does not have. Depending on the en¬
tities under consideration, this difference results from one or
more other differences. The latter consist of different rationes
or forraae. different attributes and qualities, different types
of willing and acting, and the two fullnesses of being. Sheer
quantitative difference per se is not determinative. Grosse¬
teste says that the ten commandments are not to be compared as
such with respect to being "quia substantia magis est ens, quam
quantitas."! Not only are sheer numerical and spatial quantity
not determinative of the degree or character of esse. but the
language of quantity that requires univocal speech also appears
to be inapplicable to the ens or esse which concerns Grosseteste.
The exact senses of 'ensT and 'esse * are finally determined by
actual usage and application. The mind can intuit the being of
the singular entity.
1pe Lib. Arb. 16; BW 218.
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There are, therefore, different levels or grades of being
within the created order. The creature that has attained the
second plenitude of being has a grade or level of esse that is
not found in another creature of the same species which lacks
this second fullness. The supreme Truth does not simply impart
bare existence but always the being of this or that res or ens.
Grosseteste is really distinguishing between essence and exis¬
tence and res and ens both when he asserts that esse does not
belong to creatures substantialiter and when he says that "non
est idem nobis esse et essentia . . . ."^ A particular sub¬
stantia or essentia exists by virtue of a divine act of bringing
into existence in accordance with the ratio that God has eternally
spoken and willed. The ratio exists as ratio only as a divine
activity. It has no essentia or esse of its own for there is
only the one eternal divine essentia. Neither do the great
number of relationes that are eternally true constitute a great
number of essences existing alongside of the one divine Being.
Such a relatio may be looked upon as nothing more than a ratio
spoken by God: "Hoc itaque modo respondebitur ad supradictas
oppositiones, aut cogemur fateri enuntiabilia nihil aliud esse,
p
quam rationes aeternas rerum in mente clivina." He says further
of the relatio: "Quae relatio nullam habet ante creationem cssen-
tiam subsistentem praeter essentiam divinam. The creatures
1 2 . 3
Ibid. 17; BW 230. Ibid. 8; BW 191. Ibid.: BW 194.
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spoken of in such eternally true statements have no essentia
or esse before creation and the propositions themselves only
exist as divine utterance, not as particular essences or beings.
Although Grosseteste may be said to conceive of being pri¬
marily in terms of essentia and res rather than esse and ens.
we do not find in his thought any simple reduction of existence
into essence or of ens into res. The latter is precluded by his
beliefs concerning the creation and contingency of created beings,
the nature of divine existence, and the different levels of
creaturely existence. From Grossetestefs viewpoint, one cannot
answer the question of what it means for a thing to exist by
merely answering that it is to have this nature or essence con¬
trasted with that nature or essence. The moment one begins to
explicate the quiddity of the res one is involved in describing
its manner of existence. To speak of a particular essentia is
to speak of a particular mode of existence. Furthermore, when
dealing with singular created entities one must do more than
simply take into consideration their respective natures. In
such instances one must take note of the actual being of each
singular.
When speaking of a man who only has first fullness of esse
it could be said that the second fullness of esse is accidental.
Although he may come to have the latter, without it he is still
man and still exists. However, the second fullness of esse can
not be considered accidental to man as 'true' man, that is, man
having both plenitudes of being. In the eternal rationes there
is invariable and perfect fullness of esse.
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(4.5) Factors determinative of the types of created beings
There are a number of factors, therefore, that are respons¬
ible for determining how an entity comes to be and the manner
or mode in which it exists. Creation implies that all res less
than the divine Being exist contingently. At this point there
is no differentiation in respect of particular essences. On the
contrary, their nature as creatures has been determined by the
manner in which they have come into being without reference as
yet to their diverse essences. The divine efficiens is the
ground of all created esse. No creaturely essentia has esse
substantialiter.
Levels of being within the created realm are further deter¬
mined by a hierarchy of essences and natures patterned in accor¬
dance with the hierarchy of rationes uttered by the divine Word.
At the lowest we have that matter called the elements and their
combination into mixtures. These are called material forms and
they are situale . There follows an ascending series of forms
such as the plurality of forms in man which includes his bodily
form, and the forms of the sensitive and intellectual souls.
There is the first corporeal form lux which is responsible for
spatial extension and corporeity. Of this light Grosseteste
says: "Amplius: formam primam corporalem formis omnibus sequen-
tibus digniorem et excellentioris et nobilioris essentiae et
magis assimilatam formis stantibus separatis arbitrantur sapien-
tes.
1De Luce: BW 52.
444
A superior class of forms is that of the intelligence or
angelic beings who have union with incorporeal bodies and can
understand without corporeal faculties. They are called the
separated forms. We note here a movement from the material realm
to the sphere of the spiritual joined to the material and on to
the spiritual separated from the material. There is also a move¬
ment from the particular or singular with its material accidents
to the universal which is higher. The latter ascending order
only holds within the context of a specific class of entities.
The order ascends from the variable to the immutable. Grosse-
teste speaks of the universal that is more incorruptible than
the particular:
Et quia incorruptibilius est particulari cum sit magis
remotum ab accidentibus materiae variabilis, et magis
appropinquans enti primo erit magis ens, non tamen quod-
libet universale est magis ens quoli*et particulari, quia
universalia rerum naturalium sunt minus entia quam singu-
laria intelligentiarum.l
It is evident that corporeality and mutability are charac¬
teristics of those things which are more corruptible and whose
esse is less stable. The elements, for example, are incompletely
actualized and undergo the vertical motion of rarefaction and
condensation, while the superior celestial spheres are completely
actualized and pursue the perfect circular motion. Those beings
which exist on the superior levels of existence are less sub¬
ject to corruption and further removed from non-esse. The
•^•Comm. Post. I. 17; f. 22. 2Pe Luce; BW 57-5$.
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essences of things and their propinquity to the supreme Being
are determinative of their state of being. It is the divine
Word which has determined the natures of things and their conse¬
quent status in the created hierarchy of being. Those things
that suffer the greatest mutation are most susceptible to de¬
struction and have the most fragile esse. There are various
levels of contingency and dependency within the created order
while at the same time all things depend radically on the su¬
preme Truth for their existence. In the mind of the intelli-
gentia are also the formae exemplares and rationes causales of
things to be made. There are penultimate grounds of being within
creation itself.
The above ordering is of course altogether fixed by the
divine will and modes of esse are granted through the divine act
of effecting beings. Human willing also has its own role to
perform both with respect to what it makes and human esse as
well. Angelic willing has been determinative in their sphere
of operation but this is beyond our present interest. Every man
exists as man but not every man exists in strict conformity to
the debitum essendi. for man does not always will as he ought to
will. The individual who wills rightly and whose being is com¬
mensurate to his willing is truly free and truly exists. This
bene esse is accidental to man qua man existing as such in the
first order of being. The bene esse is obviously not accidental
to the true or authentic existence of man. The norm or standard
for this true being is the final cause or purpose found in that
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perfect ratio in the divine Being. Unlike God, esse and velle
are not for man necessarily one with his essentia "unde licet
totum esse nostrum futurum sit ut volemus, non tamen totum quod
sumus, sic erit nobis liberum et voluntarium ut Deo. Velle enim
propinquissime cadit super esse.""*" Human velle consequently
falls ahead of human esse. The bene esse follows then upon
willing recte. We find in man a kind of existential fall from
his essentia as determined by the second fullness of being. This
appears to be somewhat akin to what has been asserted in our
time by Paul Tillich and others. The second order of esse is
that existence in which there is true liberty: "Commensuratio
itaque eius, quod est bene esse ad potestatem et voluntatem
propriam ordinatam vera libertas est."2
God is entirely free and is completely as he wills "cum sit
ei idem esse et velle et bene esse et ordinate velle."3 Per¬
petual beatitude follows from true libertas wherein there is no
posse peccare. "Ex his iam patet, quod quanto aliquid beatius
et melius, tanto liberius, quia esse suum habet suae voluntati
commensuratius . . . ."^ Blessedness and felicity consist finally
in willing rather than in thought. A man's will cannot be
altered through force but only by his own volition. Man's "bene
esse" is not realized, however, through a bare autonomous human
will. Grosseteste wonders whether the human will images the will
1£e_Libi_Arb. 17; BW 230. 2Ibid.; BW 229.
3Ibid. ^Ibid.; BW 230.
447
of God who creates all things by his word without the help of
others. No definitive answer is given. It is certain that God
has no part in the willing of evil although the voluntas itself
is from God. It is clearly stated that the liberum arbitrium
in and of itself is not able to will the bonum meritorium.
Our faith compels us to speak thus. Arguments are also presented
to substantiate and explicate what faith teaches. That which
brings about goodness must be better or greater than that which
is caused to be good. If the evil person is able to make him¬
self good, then the evil one is better than the good itself and
this is impossible. Another argument is that making good being
is greater than simply making being. If a creature could create
good being and God could create only being, it follows that man
would be greater than God and this is impossible. Such argu=
ments are derived from St. Augustine and St. Bernard.
Grosseteste then inquires into the manner in which help
from above is granted:
Hoc viso quaeri posset, cum ita sit, quod velle bonum
gratuitum non potest quis nisi a gratia, et gratia nihil
aliud est, quam Dei velle, ut scilicet velis rectum, cum
prius noluisti: aut ergo hoc vult simpliciter, aut cum
conditione.
If simpliciter. then man does not will in a voluntary and free
fashion for it necessarily comes to be if willed by God uncon¬
ditionally. "Si simpliciter, tunc ut prius non esset illud
meritorium; si sub conditione, ut prius erit processus in
1Ibid. 21; BW 239.
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infinitum.Grosseteste does not fully resolve the difficulty.
He pursues another line of thought in which he would have us
imagine a line extended to infinity. Imagine also a point on
the line which can only remain fixed or can only descend. If,
however, a digitum is added to the point, it will then be able
to ascend if it so wills.
Sic dici potest de libero arbitrio, quod de se descendere
potest, ascendere autem ad bonum gratuitum non nisi per
appositionem gratiae, quae appositio ei necessitatem ascen-
dendi non imponit; sicut nec digitus puncto moto in linea.
Si tamen ad primam gratiae appositionem ascendere velit,
potest hoc. Ergo forte est conditio, qua vult aliquem
velle bonum gratuitum, scilicet si ipsa libertas arbitrii
eius primam gratiae appositionem non refutet. Utrum tamen
ita sit vel non, non dico.2
Grace is absolutely essential to willing recte and to exist¬
ing in the second plenitude of being. Grace, however, does not
force man to so will: "Et dicit Augustinus quod homo non habet
gratiam, non ideo quia Deus non dat, sad quia homo non vult
accipere; et tamen non habet gratiam quia vult, sed ipsa gratia
est earn volendi recte."3 Grace makes man free for willing in
accordance with the debitum essendi wherein lies his rectitudo.
Esse bene follows upon such willing. The finis for which man
has been created is thereby fulfilled. These are some of the
factors that are determinative of the esse of all creatures
generally and of man in particular. We observe a certain primacy
of essentia but it is not held or considered in abstraction from
•''Ibid.; BW 240. 2Ibid.
30uaest. Theol. [i] (ii); Callus 193
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existentia or ens. Because a particular res or essentia has
its own mode of esse that is peculiar to itself, to speak of a
certain res is to speak of a specific ens. When one is dealing
with a particular ens one also is dealing with a res or an
essentia. The essentia and the peculiar esse of the singular
can only be immediately perceived or known and only the singular
itself can demonstrate the same.
A formal definition can hardly express the particular esse
of the individual entity. Neither the copulative or predicative
fisf nor even the existential 'is1 can begin to communicate the
character of the esse of the individual. Even the universal,
which species can be perceived in and through the singular, is
never considered simply as a logical abstraction held in the
mind but always as that which has its own kind of esse either
as the forma of the individual, a created causal ratio. or as
the exemplary ratio spoken by God. The general definition and
predicables pertaining to the essence of the subject are not
permitted to obstruct his view of the res itself or the ratio of
the thing. The singular composite entity is so significant be¬
cause of its own unique degree of conformity to its ratio spoken
by the supreme Truth. Herein lies the truth of the created res.
Rightness and conformity constitute the truth and the singularity
of the created entity and give it its own peculiar significance
as a member of a particular species. Each species has its own
rank in the order of being as well. However, differentiation
according to the first and second plenitudes of being and truth
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lies within the realm of singulars. The singular entity would
not receive such consideration if the emphasis fell simply on
the form shared by the particulars of the class. It is the
latter which is required in syllogistic reasoning wherein the
singular with its uniqueness gives way to the universal and its
corresponding particulars.
5. Cognitive and propositional truth
We now come to the usage of 'Veritas1 which is of lesser
import for Grosseteste. Intellectual or propositional truth is
dependent both on the truth of created entities and the supreme
Truth. The truth of knowledge and statement could be included
in the above category of created res inasmuch as they are certain¬
ly part of the created order. There are reasons, however, which
justify this separate treatment. Grosseteste himself singles
out such truth for particular consideration. This is not to say
that he subjects such truth to intensive examination. Cognition
is basically a matter of intellectual viewing rather than a labor¬
ious process of mental sifting and conceptualization. The relation
of the proposition to the reality signified is somewhat simplified
in terms of an adaeauatio or conformitas of the former to the
latter. Another ground for the separate treatment of logical
truth lies in its unique place in the order of truth and being.
Although it has its own ontological status and its own existence,
which, moreover, keeps it from becoming absolute, as only an
effect it is last in the order of truth. It is not determinative
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of the other spheres of truth but is itself altogether deter¬
mined. What Frederick Copleston has to say about Anselm's
doctrine of truth can also be applied to Grossetestefs theory:
"The eternal truth is only cause and the truth of the judgement
is only effect, while the ontological truth of things is at once
effect (of eternal Truth) and cause (of truth in the judgement
Logical truth is found at the end of the series and reflects
prior truth. Such truth, particularly that which is necessarium
simpliciter. is taken to be indicative of other truth and finally
the supreme Truth itself. Cognitive and logical truth have a
twofold reference. They are true both in relation to the divine
Truth and its speaking and in relation to that res which is
spoken. There may be reference to the supreme Truth alone,
depending of course on the content of the knowledge or statement.
There can be no reference to the truth of created things without
either explicit or implicit reference to the supreme Truth.
Cognitive and logical truth are also contingent on a con¬
siderable number of factors. The human mind has its own role
to play in the formulation of such truth. We observed above how
human willing is operative and instrumental in the development
of created truth both through the begetting and making of entities
and in the willing that is partially responsible for true human
existence. Flan's intellectus and velle are also active in the
If. Copleston, S. J., A History of Philosophy. Vol. II
(London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1959), p. 164.
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formulation of logical truth insofar as they offer propositions
conformable to that which is. The human will determines to
make a statement and subsequently formulates the same, but the
measure of its truth is not located in the intellect or in the
will. The knowing subject is responsible for making the true
judgement but the ultimate ground of such conformable judgements
resides in that which is signified. Although the human subject
is active in the efficiens of propositional truth and in this
manner is a ground of conformability, the prior ground is that
truth which makes such conformity a possibility.
(5.1) Cognitive or intellectual truth
Grosseteste's epistemological theory will be examined more
fully in the next chapter. It is the ontological status of
human cognition and the notions resulting therefrom, and their
character as tbuth that interest us at present. Grosseteste
asserts that the intellectus is not determinative of the prin¬
ciples of being:
Non est enim intellectus effectivus principiorum, nisi
forte dicatur quod efficit ea quae sunt principia esse
principia cognoscendi conclusiones cum ordinat ea ad con¬
clusions. In se autem sine nostra ordinatione sunt
principia essendi.i
Here it is stated that the human intellect can only arrange
premises, axioms, and principles, which themselves are founded
upon beings, so that demonstrated conclusions may be effected.
^Comrn. Post. II. 6; f. 43.
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The universals and the rationes which serve as principles of
being can in no way be brought about by the intellect of man.
The latter can only order the notions and knowledge which it
has acquired. The possession of such knowledge manifests that
the human intellect is able to achieve a certain rapport with
things outside itself. As already indicated, this rapport is
viewed as a certain adaeauatio or conformitas. Propositional
or logical truth presupposes this adaeouatio of the mind and
things existing independent of and without the mind.
Cognitive or intellectual truth is achieved through mental
vision. The created entity shows forth its own truth and
being, and the mind is capable of viewing this truth. This
shining of the truth of things into the eye of the mind sets
up a type of correspondence between these things and the mind.
Such knowing is hardly an autonomous achievement on manfs part.
Man has been granted an intellectus with the capability of
such viewing. Created things have also been made intelligible
and knowable. The light of the supreme Truth makes the truth
and being of entities visible to intellectual sight. On this
basis there is possible that truth which is "eoequatio rerum et
intellectuum.Grosseteste speaks in the same breath of the
adaeauatio of discourse and thing and of understanding and thing:
"Et hoc est, quod aliqui dicunt veritatem esse ^daequationem
sermonis et rei* et fadaequationem rei ad intellectum*.The
•^Quaest. Theol. J~lfj ; Callus 203. ^De Ver.; BW 134
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difficulty centers about the exact nature of this adaequatio.
We shall not examine again the meaning of the term itself except
to state that it signifies a type of commensuration and not an
identity or an assimilation. This adaequatio rei et intellectus
involves the intelligible thing and an interior or mental speak¬
ing. The intellectus is not adequated through the reflection
in itself of corporeal images of things known. The essentia
and rectitudo of a thing is perceptible to the mind alone. There
is no picturing here after the manner in which the corporeal eye
may be said to image or reflect a sensible object. Cognitive
truth involves a picturing or commensuration between the intelli¬
gible object and the intellectus. Intellectual truth is taken
to be that interior speech which corresponds to the res: "Sed
cum verior sit sermo qui intus silet, quam qui foris sonat,
intellectus videlicet conceptus per sermcnem vocalem, magis erit
Veritas adaequatio sermonis interioris et rei, quam exterioris.
. . ."I Such speech is an intelligible picturing which corres¬
ponds to the intelligible rectitudo and esse of the thing that
is known. The written or spoken word or statement is not thought
to have the same degree of conformity or truth as the speaking
in the intellectus.
It must also be noted that cognitive truth is understood
to be truth not simply in terms of its correspondence or con¬
formity to the truth and being of things but also in terms of
1Ibid.
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its own being. On the basis of its conformity to its ratio in
the supreme Truth intellectual truth has its own status in being.
However, it is far from having an absolute or independent exis¬
tence. It is radically contingent and arises out of a multiple
conformity. Intellectual truth does not possess its truth or
being by virtue of its own intrinsic or internal coherence or
validity. Cognitive truth has its own debitum essendi to which
it must be conformed. It is quite clear what this debitum essendi
consists of in this instance. The intellect lacking in cognitive
truth fails to be a true intellect. The nature of intellectual
truth will become more apparent when Grosseteste's epistemology
is more carefully examined.
(5.2) Logical or propositional truth
Several references have already been made to propositional
truth, but our present intention is to examine more systematically
Grosseteste*s view of such truth. Grosseteste does not attempt
to spell out the precise manner in which the true proposition
and what it signifies to be the case are related. It is clear,
however, that he holds to no theory calling for a strict isomor¬
phic imaging or correspondence. Such imay be approximated in
other spheres of truth but certainly not in the sphere of pro-
positional truth. The proposition (propositio, enuntiatio) has
its own type of relation to things signified and this relation
is based upon the prior relation which the intellectus has
assumed with respect to such things.
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(5.2.1) The nature of propositional truth
Grosseteste is very much aware of the Aristotelian stress
on intellectual and logical truth. He says: "Consuevimus autem
usitatius dicere veritatem orationis enuntiativae. Et haec
Veritas, sicut dicit philosophus, non est aliud, quam ita esse
in re signata, sicut dicit sermo.Here is a concise explica¬
tion of the nature of this truth. There is a certain conformity
between the sermo and the res inasmuch as the sermo fits or is
agreeable to a given situation or real state of affairs. Else¬
where he says:
Item: Veritas propositionis est adaequatio sermonis et rei
Deus autem non est haec adaequatio, quia non erat haec
adaequatio, antequam esset sermo et res; cum Deus et Veri¬
tas summa et sermonem et res creatas sermone significatas
praecesserit. Est ergo aliqua Veritas, quae non est suinma
Veritas.2
Propositional truth is situated in that sermo which signi¬
fies what is actually the case. It is worthwhile to note that
the sermo signifies or points out created res. Sermo is made to
refer to the thing itself in its essentia and its ens. It may
be questioned whether this sermo exterior does indeed refer
directly to the res or possibly to such as a natural sign or
copy of the res in the soul or the sermo interior mentioned above.
In either case there is no doubt that the sermo exterior has a
clear signification and that its truth or validity can be ascer¬
tained. Logical or propositional truth is really another form
1Ibid. 2Ibid.: BW 130.
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of the sermo that is silent within the mind even though the
latter "raagis erit Veritas." Although the written or uttered
true statement does not attain to the same degree of adaeouatio
as does the interior speech, nevertheless, it does signify the
res itself in accordance with which the proposition is termed
true.
In seeking to show that there is other truth in addition
to the supreme Truth, Grosseteste quotes from AugustineTs De
Mendacio where the latter asserts that truth is twofold, one
being the supreme Truth which is contemplated and which is to be
preferred above the mind itself. The other truth is propositional
truth: "Postea veritatem, quae est in enuntiando, non audet
[_AugustineJ praeferre animo, sed innuit earn temporalibus omni¬
bus praeferendam sic inquiens. . . ."4 The truth of proposi¬
tion must be preferred above all things temporal but Augustine
dares not prefer it above the mind Itself. Grosseteste accepts
this as rightly indicating the locus of logical truth. Along
with the truth of sermo he speaks also of the truth of opinio:
Veritas enim sermonis vel opinionis est adaequatio sermonis
vel opinionis et rei. Haec autem adaequatio nihil aliud
est, quam ita esse in re, sicut sermo vel opinio dicit, et
hoc est in futuris rem esse in futuro, sicut sermo vel
opinio asserit earn futuram.2
Even opinio can be true by virtue of its relation to its object.
Opinio is considered to be inferior to scientia and intellectus.
1 2
Ibid.; BW 131. De Ver. Prop.; BW 144.
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(5.2.2) Necessary and contingent logical truth
Grosseteste also speaks of that kind of true statement which
involves an essential or per se predication and whose truth is
known accordingly: "Cognoscitur autem Veritas propositionis, cum
videtur identitas in substantia praedicati et subiecti."! Here
it is plainly evident that such a true proposition is necessarily
true because it refers to an identitas in the thing itself. It
is not seen to be true simply because of its logical or verbal
form but because both subject and predicate signify a single
ratio or essentia. Such truths are required for demonstration:
"
. . . demonstrationes enim et rati^inationes fiunt de simpli-
citer praedicabilibus in quibus subiectum et praedicatum sunt
p
idem numero in subiecto, et non sunt res divise." Such truths
are considered to be necessary truths because they signify an
unchanging universal or essence. In such essential or per se
predications the question regarding existential import arises.
Although an affirmation of existence is not clear or explicit
in these predications, Grosseteste certainly considers them to
have existential import. He believes that the terms involved
in these propositions do have referents and that they name these
referents. Even the terms of a mathematical equation direct us
to an eternal referent, viz., an eternal ratio. Such truth is
necessary because of the referent which is an immutable per¬
petual nexus to which both terms refer. On this basis the pro-
J-Comm. Post. I. 9; f. 10. 2Ibid. I. 15; f. 20.
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position or equation that is termed necessarium simpliciter
demonstrates such a nexus. Consequently, even the proposition
that is necessarium simrliciter is said to be 'true' by reason
of an extrinsic correspondence. 'True1 is not applied to such
a statement simply to indicate an internal or intrinsic consis¬
tency or coherence. This of course does not preclude or exclude
intrinsic coherence within the statement, on the contrary, the
external adrequatio causes such coherence. In the referent is
found the real or factual coherence which is the identitas
spoken of above. The eternal immutable connexion is finally
fixed within the eternal ratio spoken by the divine Word. Con¬
sequently, a necessary connexion is also present in the creature
itself because of its conformity to this ratio.
That necessary true propositions depend on a certain corre¬
spondence is clearly manifest in the following statements:
Non enim est eadem Veritas huius dicti 'aliquid fuisse
futurum* et huiusmodi •septem et tria esse decern*.
Altera est enim conformitas huius ad suam dictionem in
aeterno Verbo et altera illius. Sunt igitur plura imrao
innumerabilia sine initio et erunt sine fine.-*-
It is not to be supposed that these enuntiationes themselves
have existed eternally alongside God. Nothing but the divine
Being and his activity have existed eternally. Grosseteste there¬
fore feels compelled to confess that these "enuntiabilia nihil
aliud esse, quam rationes aeternas rerum in mente divina."^ The
necessary truth is not only always true but it is always true
1Be Ver.: BW 140. 2Ibid.; BW 141.
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necessarily. Wherever the one term or the subject is to be
found, there the other term or predicate is also to be found,
and such is the case essentialiter or simpliciter.
Grosseteste clearly does not consider necessary propositions
as being sheer formal or analytic truths. More is involved than
linguistic or logical form. The impossibility of falsification
of necessary truth is not finally grounded in linguistic or
logical form but in a real identity which in turn owes its per¬
petuity to divine immutability. There is always a conformitas
and a referent. The latter is always determinative of the mood
and character of the proposition relating to it. We shall not
treat here questions pertaining to the verification of such pro-
positional truth except to cite the following statement concern¬
ing definition: "... unde intellectus diffinitionis non est
nisi sicut apprehensio simplex quemadmodum visus et auditus.""*"
Grosseteste also speaks of the truth of logical form which is to
be distinguished both from the truth spoken of above and strictly
formal truth.
There is also another class of propositions that have been
eternally true. Such propositions pertain to the divine speak¬
ing and knowing of contingent facts. Grosseteste sets forth a
number of such statements that refer to contingent realities.
They run as follows: 'Deus scit A-'. 'Caesar laudatur', 'Socrates
scitus a Deo'. 'aliquid fuisse futurum'. 'Petrum fuisse futurum'.
-*-Comm. Post. 1.9; f. 10.
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etc. Such have been true sine initio not because all the
entities signified have existed from eternity, for only God has
eternally existed. These statements are, of course, necessarily
true insofar as they represent the divine speech itself. They
are not necessary in the sense that the subject and predicate
refer to a single identitas by reason of which the predicate
necessarily inheres in the subject. Grosseteste held, however,
that the above truths, as well as all other contingent true state¬
ments, are necessary in terms of consequent necessity.
In his discussion of propositional truth Grosseteste does
not seem to differentiate between proposition and sentence. This
is especially evident in the grammatical form of the statements,
like those cited in the preceding paragraph, which relate to the
divine speaking and knowing of contingent events. The absence
of such a differentiation is also manifest where Grosseteste
states that the "veritates negationum omnium de creaturarum
existentia videntur habuisse veritatem sine initio ante rerum
creationem, utpote 'mundum non esse' verum fuit et sine initio
verum ante mundi creationem . . . . When proposition and type
or token sentence are not distinguished we are forced to charac¬
terize contingent •propositions' as being true at certain times
or at a certain time. This means that a contingent •proposition'
may be true at one time and then cease to be true. However, by
reason of consequent necessity it must be said that if a 'pro-
1De Ver.: BW 139.
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position' is or has been true, it at least will always have
been true even though it may not continue to be true. Such is
not the case with respect to necessary propositions. Grosse-
teste states that the latter truths are without beginning and
without end.
The special difficulty that Grosseteste faces in dealing
with the eternal divine speaking and knowing of contingent events
is to find appropriate statements (sentences) that are indeed
contingent and at the same time express the perpetually true
divine dictio. In our statements we only approximate the divine
dictio. Grosseteste states that such a praedicatio as "hoc
verum aeternum est aut enuntiabile aeternum est" is a "formam
correlativam dictioni in aeterno Verbo; propter quam tamen
relationem nihil exigitur extra Deum esse."-1- The verum here
intended is such as 'Socrates scitus a Deo' or 'Plato scitus
a Deo'. Considerable difficulty arises from the fact that man's
knowledge and predications concerning contingent events are
marked by time and tense while for God all things are present
to him in his indivisable eternity. Foi" God, who dwells in his
simple eternity, all res are simply present.
Contingent logical truth refers to the whole body of state¬
ments or propositions that signify events or states of affairs
ranging from those which are frequenter to those which are casu-
ale . Such logical truth refers both to that which is brought
1Ibid.: BW 141
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directly into being by divine antecedent necessity and that which
also lies within the sphere of human willing. Herein the pro¬
position may be true or may be false inasmuch as the referent is
no single ratio and involves no necessary essential connexion.
Grosseteste says the following concerning the contingent propo¬
sition: "Quaelibet igitur talium propositionum 'antichristum
erit', 'antichristus est futurus' est vera non necessaria, sed
contingens, quia possibile est, quamlibet talem esse falsam."1
Grosseteste does not say that propositional truth is to be termed
contingent only when a proposition refers to the referent that
is free from antecedent necessity. Contingent' does not refer
exclusively to that which is free from antecedent necessity,
for such a restricted usage would exclude a vast amount of crea-
turely phenomena. Insofar as the antecedent necessity or cause
might have been different than it was, to that extent the caused
might have been different than it was. What truly differentiates
necessary propositional truth from contingent propositional
truth is that the former signifies an actual essential or per
se connexion. The former is therefore perpetually true and is
so even as a token or type sentence. Because such necessary
truth has existential or material import it is evident that a
perpetual ratio or essentia is assumed.
Grosseteste then, does not consider all contingent true pro¬
positions to be of the exact same character. In discussing the
^•De Ver. Prop. ; BW 144.
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contingency of A in such a statement as 'Deus scit A', Grosse-
teste states:
Nec tamen sunt sic pure contingentia, ut est hoc contingens:
Socratem esse album, quia potest in futuro desinere esse
albus. Hie enim est omnino contingentia. Sed in hoc 'duo
et tria esse quinque' est omnino necessitas.l
Grosseteste wants to say that pure contingent true propositions
(sentences) may cease to be true. Necessary propositions under¬
go no fluctuation in their truth value. Such is evident in
definitions and in predicating a property of a subject. The
causal definition of a lunar eclipse is also placed in this
category even though the eclipse itself is not perpetual and is
found in the realm of natural necessity. Grosseteste says of
such a definition: "Quaelibet istarum propositionum vera est in
p
omni hora. Et hoc est quod Aristot. intendit dicere."
Grosseteste and Aristotle find the category of intermittent
natural phenomena particularly troublesome. The difficulty
arises not from the intermittent natural phenomenon itself and
the sphere of natural necessity as such. For example, the lunar
eclipse is not perpetual and the reason for this is clear. The
phenomenon of eclipse is not something that belongs to the essence
of the moon. This is clearly understood. The "propter quid"
of the eclipse of the moon is also plainly set forth. The dif¬
ficulty arises out of the juxtaposing of the intermittent lunar
eclipse with the logical truth relating to it. The "syllogismus
^De Lib. Arb. 6; BW 170. 2Comm. Post. 1.8; f. 8.
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propter quid" is valid in each moment and so is the causal def¬
inition of the eclipse. The referent, however, is not perpetual.
Aristotle, in his Posterior Analytics (Bk. I, Ch. £), concludes
that demonstration and knowledge of intermittent events are, as
such, eternal in terms of their reference to events of a speci¬
fic kind. They are not commensurate and universal with respect
to the particular phenomenon. This leads Grosseteste to assert:
"Eclipsis enim simpliciter semper est in rationibus suis causal-
ibus, nulla tamen eclipsis particularis semper est in ratione
sua causali."-*- Grosseteste goes on to explain what Aristotle
means and that Aristotle did not say that an eclipse always is:
"
. . .sed intendebat dicere quod conclusio in qua demonstratur
eclipsis, est proximo habens veritatem in omni hora, sive eclip¬
sis sit, sive non sit."2 The source of the difficulty seems to
be the logical form of the demonstrative syllogism coupled with
the failure to distinguish lj between the sentence and
the proposition. A clearer understanding of and a greater usage
of conditionals might have removed some of the difficulty.
Another complicating factor is that the logical functioning of
categorical and hypothetical propositions is not always suffi¬
ciently delineated. Grosseteste says further that the eclipse
can not always be because it is not "natura aliqua" but a
"privatio naturae." It should also be noted that Aristotle and
Grosseteste do of course recognize that the lunar eclipse itself
1Ibid. 2Ibid
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is conditional even though this conditionality is not adequately-
expressed in the language of the logical inference. In dis¬
cussing whether the summa Veritas is the only truth and the truth
of all true things Grosseteste makes a passing reference to the
truth of the conditional:
Sua igitur Veritas aeterna est et summa; similiter omnium
cnnditionalium Veritas ut: 'si est homo, est animal*. Per
hypothesim igitur omnis enuntiabilis Veritas est summa
Veritas.1
Grosseteste concurs with Aristotle that demonstration is
possible with respect to natural phenomena which occur with some
frequency: "Sed demonstratio communiter dicta extenditur etiam
ad contingentia nata quae frequenter sunt."2 There is a cate¬
gory of events which cannot be demonstrated: "Cum igitur ita
sit quod causalia [sic]} , nec semper sint, nec frequenter, demon¬
stratio autem omnis est eorum quae semper sunt, aut frequenter,
patet quod causalium [sic] nulla demonstratio est aut scientia."-^
This does not mean that true statements cannot be made concern¬
ing "contingens erraticum." What is asserted is that such cannot
become the matter or subject of demonstrated knowledge. Grosse¬
teste contrasts the casualis with the necessary: "Sed res casualis
est extra necessitatem simpliciter et extra necessitatem natura-
lem quae non est necessitas simpliciter, sed cum circumscriptione
impedimenti.
^De Ver.: BW 132. 2Comm. Post. I.IS; f. 25.
3Ibid. 4ibid.
467
It is apparent that the singular event and the fortuituous
event create special problems* Consequently, significant singu¬
lar historical events do not receive their due. This is to be
expected in view of the doctrine of immutability, the stress on
necessary and essential connexions between subjects and their
predicates, the required demonstration of such connexions through
a syllogistic middle term, and the accepted method of proceeding
from universal premises and prior principles to particular in¬
stances or cases. In addition, statements signifying such singu¬
lar events are considered to have only temporal validity and
therefore are thought to lack permanence and to have truth only
at a certain time. The timeless truth is the model proposition
because it is never invalid or lacking in truth even as a token
sentence. It is so because its referent does not change and
is always a present reality.
(5.2.3) The twofold being of propositional truth
We have already discussed the two orders of being of created
things in general. Grosseteste also speaks of the twofold being
of logical truth. He describes the twofold esse as follows:
Singulorum namque veritates sunt definitiones esse eorum
primi vel secundi, utpote Veritas propositionis, a qua est
propositio vera, nihil aliud est, quarn enuntiatio alicuius
de aliquo vel alicuius ab aliquo; et haec est definitio
eius esse primi. —- Veritas autem propositionis, a qua
est propositio vera, nihil aliud est, quam significatio
esse de eo, quod est, vel non esse de eo. quod non est.
Et haec est definitio eius esse secundi.1
1De Ver.: BW 142-143.
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The first being is simply the assertion or the proposition it¬
self irrespective of whether or not what it states to be the
case is actually the case. The predication can be true in this
first order of being even though it may not be true in the
second order of being. Grosseteste makes this point when he
presents an example of an enuntiatio that is true according to
the first order of being: "——Similiter vera propositio est
hominem esse asinum, quia habet plenum esse primum enuntiationis;
sed falsa est, quia caret plenitudine esse secundi."-*- Here
Grosseteste purposefully sets forth a statement that is necessar¬
ily false according to the second plenitude of being. He does
so in order to emphasize the distinction that he is making.
Aside from contradictory statements it is possible for the pro¬
positio having the first plenitude of being to have the second
plenitude as well. An enuntiatio clearly cannot possess the
second fullness of being unless it has the first.
The first fullness of being is simply the predication it¬
self. As stated in the above quotation, it is the positing of
something regarding something else or the negation of something
concerning something else. To have this first plenitude of
being we must have a meaningful assertion or statement. The
'false* statement in this context would not be a propositio.
'True' and 'false' in this order of being indicate the conformity
1Ibid.: BW 135
469
or lack of conformity to the exemplary ratio of the proposition.
This, of course, is not the usual sense in which 'true' and
'false' are predicated of a statement or proposition. Confusion
may result since 'true' and 'false' are also used to indicate
that the assertion as such corresponds or fails to correspond
with a particular state of affairs. As Kneale has said: "Clearly
it is to propositions that the predicated 'true' and 'false'
apply fundamentally.""*■ This is not the 'true' and 'false' that
Grosseteste now has in mind, for the present 'true' and 'false'
are used to qualify the enuntiatio qua enuntiatio. The conform¬
ity in question is not with that which is signified but with the
exemplar of signification itself. Grosseteste appears to use
'propositio' and ♦enuntiatio' as equivalents. There is no indi¬
cation that each has its own peculiar sense or is used to signify
something distinct from the other. Neither does it appear within
this context that Grosseteste is speaking at any time of the
'enuntiatio' merely as a grammatical unit or a meaningful arrange¬
ment of words. The 'propositio' that has the first fullness of
being is always subject to evaluation in relation to the second
fullness. If Grosseteste were dealing only with the declarative
sentence there would be no need to introduce the notion of the
second fullness of being. When he speaks of the propositio as
the "enuntiatio alicuius de aliquo vel alicuius ab aliquo" he
has in mind the act of signifying a particular situation or state
*W. and M. Kneale, op. cit.. p. 50.
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of affairs. He is very much of a realist in holding that the
proposition must be considered in immediate connection with the
actual entities designated. This is manifest from his continual
stress on correspondence and his refusal to consider the first
perfection of disccurse wihtout at the same time examining the
second perfection.
Grosseteste describes the second perfection as follows:
"Haec enim est secunda perfectio enuntiationis: significare id
esse, quod est, et non esse, quod non est."^- The 'true' pro¬
position signifies, shows, and points out things as they actually
are, while the 'false' proposition declares things to be different
from what they are in fact. This notion of propositional truth
may be .judged to be rather naive and over simple. However,
the second perfection as delineated above would direct us away
from a notion of crude correspondence to a more dynamic theory
of signifying. The verb 'significare' has a considerable pro¬
fundity and depth of meaning as indicated by Lewis and Short:
"In gen., to show bv signs: to show, point out. express. publish.
make known, indicate: to intimate. notify, signify, etc."
'Significare' brings to mind some of the terms used by Heidegger,
for example, 'Erschlossenheit', 'Entdeckung', 'Sehenlassen',
'Vorstellung'. and the like. One must be careful not to draw too
he Ver.: BW 135-136.
2C. T. Lewis and G. Short, A Latin Dictionary (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1$96), p. l69o."*~~
471
strict an analogy between these German words as used by Heideg¬
ger and the Latin 'significare'. This latter term does help
in modifying the notions implicit in 'adaequatio' and 'conform-
itas'. These words, 'adaequatio' and 'conformitas', are more
apt to make us think of the relationship between proposition
and thing as a strict picturing, isomorphic representation, or
radical commensuration. Although the notions of representation
and relationship certainly are not absent in 'significare'. i«-
the use of tho lattor our attention is directed away from think¬
ing of the relationship certainly aro not absent, in 'oignifi--
earo f, in the use of the latter our attention is directed away
from thinking of the relationship in terms of a problematical
identity of quantity or approach to equality. In what way can
the propositio and the intellectus be said to be equal to the
res? In thinking of quantity one thinks of such as number, size
or spatial extension, mass, and weight. However, quantitative
approximation of the sermo. the intellectus. or the propositio
to the res has been seen to be a kind of intellectual or intel¬
ligible picturing or imaging within the sphere of what could be
called intellectual or ideal space. Signifiratio also involves
representation, but it is of a different character than that
pictorial representation mentioned above. In significatio the
relationship between the sermo or propositic and the res is
grounded more in the functioning of the propositio as the sign
which shows forth a particular res or state of affairs. In sig¬
nificatio the emphasis falls on the showing forth, the pointing
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out, the presenting of that quod est or quod non est. Herein
the notion of re-presentation is less prominent than when pro-
positional truth is seen in terms cf adaeouatio and conformitas.
It must also be added that representation is not as prominent or
crucial in the adaeauatio rei et intellectus. It becomes such
in the realm of external sermo and the rropositio. According
to the second perfection cf the enuntiatio the proposition is
true when it declares or discloses that which is. To assert that
the proposition is true is not simply to say that it is conform¬
able to the thing or fact, it is to state also that the proposi¬
tion is engaged in the act or function of bringing forth into
view the thing or state of affairs. The true proposition also
shows forth its own twofold plenitude of being and its own truth
even as it shows forth the truth of the thing. The following
statements of Grosseteste are pertinent at this juncture: "Item
dicit Augustinus in libro de vera religione, quod Veritas est,
quae ostendit id quod est. Esse igitur cuiuslibet rei sua mon-
strat Veritas. Cum enim sit haec veritatis definitio, omni
veritati convenit monstrare id quod est."-*- Both adaeauati and
significatio must be kept in view when one is speaking of the
truth of the proposition.
Grosseteste responds to a possible logical objection to
predicating both truth and falsity of a proposition:
Cumque hoc modo dicitur res una simul vera et falsa, non
1De Ver.: EW 132-133.
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est assertio de eodera contraria, quia non eiusdem esse
asseritur plenitudo et defectio. Sed cum dicitur falsi-
tas, est vera falsitas et falsum est verum falsum.1
The law of excluded middle is not violated and there is no con¬
tradiction or inconsistency here. Falsity is true falsity and
for a thing to be false it must first be true in order for it
to be false. The idea is that there must be some thing if we
are going to be able to speak of something that is false.
Grosseteste then asks: "Numquid inest contrarium suo contrario,
et fallit in his terminis regula logicorum, sicut secundum
Augustinum in bono et malo?" He then asks whether there are
more contrarieties over and above these two in which the regula
logicorum fails or is inapplicable. The contrarieties that he
has in mind are those of the true and the false and the good
and the evil. The question is then raised concerning the dif¬
ference of those opposites or contraries in which the rule of
logic fails from those in which it does not. Grosseteste then
partially resolves the problem as he asks another question:
"Numquid in his solis contrarietatibus fallit regula logicorum
quarum alterum contrariorum sequitur esse?"3 To the degree that
this can be called an answer Grosseteste seems to be responding
that the laws of contradiction and of excluded middle do not hold
where one of the opposites or contraries follows after or suc¬
ceeds esse. The logical axiom is not really declared invalid.
It is declared not to be altogether regulatory in the realm of
1Ibid.: BW 136. 2Ibid. 3Ibid.
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esse where the false exists only in the true and the evil in
the good. Herein the contrary is situated in its contrary.
However, Grosseteste's doctrine of the twofold being of created
entities is sufficient evidence that he does not violate the
logical law of excluded middle even in the sphere of esse. As
he himself stated, fullness of being and lack of being are not
predicated of the same identical thing in the same manner.
Grosseteste fully recognizes the integrity and self-identity
of the res or ens. in his view this serves as the ontological
ground of the logical axioms mentioned above.
(5.2.4) Problems of propositional truth in relation to the
supreme Truth
Although logical or propositional truth may appear to be
rather far removed from the supreme Truth, in actuality this is
not so. The enuntiatio is radically contingent on the supreme
Truth whereby it has its truth and being. Grosseteste states:
Item: verisimile est, quod si unius alicuius enuntiationis
Veritas, qua enuntiatio vera est de creaturis, sit summa
Veritas, et omnium enuntiationum et enuntiabilium Veritas
sit eadem Veritas nihil iam caret initio et fine, nisi
suprema Veritas.1
The multiple ways in which the true proposition is dependent on
the supreme Truth will not be traced out at this point. From
what has already been considered and discussed one can arrive at
a rather clear understanding of this multiplex contingency.
1Ibid.: BW 132
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Grosseteste made the above statement in view of what Anselm
concluded in his treatise on truth, viz., that there is no other
truth than the supreme Truth and that this same Truth is the one
Truth of all truths. Grosseteste argues that there are other
truths, otherwise one would have to conclude that whenever truth
is predicated of a thing, divinity is also predicated. In the
above quotation Grosseteste states that only the supreme Truth
is eternal, without beginning and without end. He then goes on
to say: "Atqui Veritas huius: 'septem et tria sunt decern' caret
initio et fine. Ergo haec Veritas est summa Veritas."^- We saw
how Grosseteste faced this difficulty by saying that such state¬
ments are forms correlative to the speaking in the eternal word
and that the "enuntiabilia nihil aliud esse, quam rationes
aeternas rerum in mente divina.''^ All true propositions, just
as all other created things, have their exemplary forms in the
divine Word, which does not mean that the former share in the
divine Nature. The ultimate ground of propositional truth is
alone divine.
In the Quaestiones Theolodcae Grosseteste sees a problem
arising in view of the fact that everything true derives from
truth. God, of course, is Truth. He says: "Sed videtur quod








ment runs as follows: malum fieri is true; everything true is a
Deo: it must be concluded "ergo malum fieri est a Deo."^
Unnecessary difficulty is generated at the outset through
failure to distinguish clearly and adequately between the true
statement concerning malum and the malum itself. Furthermore,
Grosseteste does not offer adequate clarification regarding the
different ways in which 'malum fieri* may be said to be true,
viz., that it rightly signifies what is or is not the case and
that it is rightly related to the twofold ratio or criterion
of propositional truth. This ratio or criterion is situated
in the supreme Truth.
Grosseteste refers to a line of reasoning followed by some
in response to the difficulty cit d above:
Ad hoc dicunt quidam quod Veritas negationis negatio est,
et Veritas propositionis significantis privationem esse
privatio est, et neutra istarum veritatum aliquid est,
licet ea aliquid sit verum; unde nec est a Deo. Sed Veri¬
tas rerum naturalium aliquid est, et hec sola est a Deo.
Sed hii non noverunt quid sit Veritas.2
Grosseteste goes on to say that those who pursue this line of
reasoning believe that truth is the res irsa. This belief, he
says, is clearly false. He then adds: "Deficiente enim re non
deficit Veritas." I should also like to add that if 'Veritas'
is taken to signify esse. it must also be said that the above
line of reasoning is impossible. For one would then have to
state the impossible, viz., that esse is a nepatio or a rrivatio.
1 2 3
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In offering his own brief response to the above argument
which concludes that 'malum fieri est a Deo*. Grosseteste begins
by saying: "Quid autem sit Veritas posterius perscrutabitur per
Dei gratiam.This would seem to indicate that this is some of
Grosseteste's earlier reflection on the nature of truth. He
goes on to say that "nunc autem supponamus quod Veritas est
o
coequatio rerum et intellectuum." Rather than assert that
truth is the res ipsa Grosseteste wants to say that truth is a
coeauatio of the thing and the understanding. He states further
that "coequatio non est a re coequata, sed a coequante, quic-
quid sit illud."3 There is a lack of clarity at this point
because the res coequata and the roeauans are not designated.
From what Grosseteste says in his De Veritate it would seem that
the eoequan3 is finally the supreme Truth himself.
On the basis of this brief explication of the nature of
truth Grosseteste describes the logical fallacy that he finds
in the argument which concludes that 'malum fieri est a Deo':
Ergo in illo secundo argumento est paralogismus ac (f.
307rb) cidentis. Album est ex ineoruscatione lucis et
claro et multitudine in perspicuo puro; sed hoc corpus
est album. Ergo hoc corpus est ex incoruscatione lucis
etc .4
However, even if one were to grant that this fallacy is present
in the argument, a certain confusion and difficulty persists so
long as it is said that 'malum fieri* is true and it is not
made altogether clear just what is intended when making this
statement.
1Ibid. 2Ibid. 3Ibid. ^Ibid.
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6. The indestructibility of truth
Grosseteste firmly believes in the indestructible existence
of truth. He does not actually utilize a strict formal argument
of the type in which one may attempt to demonstrate the existence
of truth by using formal definitions or analytical statements as
premises. However, propositional truth is clearly assumed in
the argument of Grosseteste examined below. For Grosseteste him¬
self there is no question as to the indestructible nature of
truth. For in holding to the existence of the surnrna Veritas one
is at the same time affirming the immutable perpetuity of truth.
The summa Veritas does not even change in his mode of being,
much less from being to ceasing to be.
Grosseteste at this juncture is seeking to refute those
sceptics who doubt the existence of truth altogether. He uses
an argument that is very much like theorem 17 found in Stoic
logic, which is described as follows: "If the first then the
first; if not the first then the first; therefore the first.""'"
It could also be stated as follows: if P, then Q; if not P,
then Q; therefore Q in either case. Grosseteste's reasoning
proceeds as follows:
Cum autem Veritas sequatur ad omnia, etiam ad contrarium
suum, quia falsum necessario est verum falsum, et contra
regulam logicorum etiam ad omnem negationem sequatur veri-
tatis affirmatio et insuper etiam ad sui ipsius destruc-
tionem, quia sequitur: si nulla Veritas est, patet quod
Veritas est, quia Veritas est id, quod per se necesse est
%. and M. Kneale, op. cit., p. 172.
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esse. Unde enim, nisi quia per se necesse est esse,
sequitur ad omnia etiam ad sui ipsius destructionem?!
There are definite beliefs or assumptions underlying this
argument. One of these is the belief in Veritas as esse and
esse as Veritas. Another is the doctrine of the twofold order
of being which serves as a basis for the assertion that a con¬
trary can exist in its contrary. Another belief is that truth
by reason of its own nature necessarily exists. The argument
states that if there is something that is false, it is only so
because there is first something that is true. Veritas is
said to follow every negation including the negation of truth
itself. It is impossible to negate truth and thereby destroy
it. We observe here an argument that is somewhat akin to Augus¬
tine's argument in his Soliloquies: If not T, then t; if t, then
T; therefore, if not T, then T. In other words, if there is
to be anything that is true there must be Truth. This is one
of the underlying assumptions. Augustine's argument also pre¬
supposes the proposition which denies the existence of truth.
Grosseteste does not explain just what he means when he speaks
of the destructio of truth. The negation or denial of truth
could hardly destroy truth. Even such an attempt is considered
to be in itself testimony to the existence of truth. Against
the argument, however, one can say that if there were no truth,
then neither could there be any true statement. The following
1De Ver.: BW 339
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criticism which is directed against such as Augustine and
Descartes is also relevant in this context:
But it is interesting to notice that all these opponents
of scepticism overstate their case by claiming that the
proposition in which they are interested follows from
its own contradictory; in fact the proposition is veri¬
fied only by the occurrence of an attempt to establish its
contradictory.1
It is clear, however, that Grosseteste has made his case
for the being of truth on the basis of the nature of truth itself
and not simply on the basis of the attempt to negate truth. He
states: "Est igitur Veritas, quod per se necesse est esse saltern
necessario consequens ad per se necesse esse. Aliter enim non
sequeretur ad omnem afflrmationem et negaticnem." Truth is
declared to be consequent to every affirmation and negation.
Grosseteste grounds his argument finally in truth itself as esse.
Inasmuch as truth is understood in the first instance as the
very esse of the supreme Truth it is not difficult to see why it
should be indestructible. It is impossible for the supreme
Truth to cease to be because it is of the very nature of the
immutable divine essentia to exist.
Grosseteste again asks whether the rule of logic fails:
"
— Sed numquid hie vere fallit regula logiccrum? an super omnis
negationis divisionem cadit esse, ex quo esse affirmato de divis-
ione sequitur veritatis affirmatio?He is asking if the law
^"Kneale, op. cit.. p. 174. ^De Ver.: BW 139.
3Ibid.
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of contradiction has to be declared invalid at this point. How
can the contradictory follow its contradictory? He is not ready
to reject the logical axiom. He would rather propose that esse
falls without or that it is situated over and above the divisio
of all negation. Two comments are in order here. It must first
be stated that Grosseteste considers logical truth to be radically
contingent upon higher orders of truth and being. The esse of
God and the esse of the created thing are neither supported in
esse nor reduced to non-esse by the affirmative and negative
statements that we make pertaining to their esse. Grosseteste
also is asserting that through the method of division the affir¬
mation of truth follows upon the affirmation of being. The latter,
moreover, follows upon esse itself.
Grosseteste really spends little time explicitly arguing for
the existence of truth, although in a way his whole explication
of the nature of truth could be considered something of an argu¬
ment for truth. Grosseteste does not share Augustine's concern
to demonstrate the existence of the truth through an appeal to
necessary truths. In Grosseteste we do not find the anxious
quest for certainty and certitude that we find in Augustine. He
does not appear to take scepticism as seriously as did Augustine.
Grosseteste feels that the presence and existence of truth is
everywhere manifest and beyond dispute. He is especially con¬
cerned to explicate the nature of truth and to describe the
various kinds of truth and their interrelationships. His confi¬
dent attitude is manifest in the following sentence with which
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he concludes his brief discussion on the indestructible nature
of truth: "Quomodocunque sit, manifeste inextinguibilis est lu*
veritatis, quae etiam sui illustrat extinctionem, nec aliquo
modo ccrrumpi potest.""*" It is certain that truth cannot be ex¬
tinguished, annihilated, or destroyed, even though it may not
be altogether clear just how it is to be related to the affir¬
mative and negative statements made concerning it. Grosseteste
does not believe for a moment that the being of truth is jeo¬
pardized by statements that deny its being. It has been observed
that as long as there are statements there is truth. It should
be reiterated, however, that Grosseteste is particularly inter*
ested in the fact of truth itself. There are true things and
above all the supreme Truth himself. Contingent truth endures
because that upon which it depends is immutable and not liable
to corruption. Grosseteste has arrived at the certainty of this
fact through his knowledge of the supreme Truth himself. Grosse¬
teste does not arrive at his position through an elaborate dia¬
lectic or argument. It is through an intellectual or mental
viewing of the truth itself, effected by illumination from above,
that Grosseteste achieves such assurance concerning the imper¬
ishable character of truth.
This leads us to consider Grossetestefs doctrine regarding
knowledge of the truth. We have already noted in what way know¬
ledge is spoken of as truth. We would now examine the prerequi-
1Ibid.
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sites and process of cognition itself in view of that which
has been discussed above. The order of knowing finds its
place within the matrix of relationships already spelled out.
Grossetestefs epistemological doctrine is founded upon what is
known and the reality of knowledge itself. Grosseteste's pro¬
cedure is to trace out the way to the knowledge of truth and
to reflect upon the process of knowing as he has experienced
it. The doctrine of truth exrounded above clearly shows that
for Grosseteste knowledge is not merely possible but actual.
The actuality of knowledge is not in doubt. With this under¬
stood, the character and media of knowledge can be examined
and set forth.
